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Abstract 
Football clubs have multiple stakeholders sometimes with different and conflicting 
objectives. If a club concentrates solely on achieving sporting success at the 
expense of its financial objectives, it risks jeopardizing its long-term stability, which 
may affect the sporting integrity of the league as a whole. The behaviour of one club 
potentially has externality implications for other stakeholders which cannot always be 
internalised. There is therefore the need for regulation of the pre-emptive type to 
avert such negative consequences for clubs.  
FIFA has requested all member associations to implement club licensing to improve 
upon professionalism in management and to ensure long-term stability of club 
football. This thesis picks up on this theme to review the financial regulatory system 
in Ghana, obtain lessons from other jurisdictions and develop an incentive-based 
context-specific Football Financial Clearinghouse framework that is applicable in 
Ghana.  
The thesis employs a mixed-method research approach to evaluate the financial 
disclosure, position and performance of professional football clubs in Ghana, utilising 
critical reviews, interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires to answer 
specific research questions. The empirical analysis in this thesis shows that financial 
licensing and monitoring needs to be complemented by the provision of incentives 
and support services to clubs to achieve optimal regulatory compliance. The key 
incentive in the specific case of Ghana is to ensure regulated access to credit. 
This thesis makes four significant contributions to knowledge by showing that: 
Ghanaian football clubs are in a difficult financial situation; there is an appetite for 
change amongst Ghanaian football’s stakeholders for a new financial regulatory 
framework; the existing financial regulatory frameworks, especially in Europe, are not 
applicable in the Ghanaian context as they were made for a different jurisdiction; and 
that the FFC framework would be an appropriate context-specific framework to deal 
with the financial regulation of Ghanaian football clubs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In many ways, football clubs are quite different from conventional firms in many 
other areas of economic activity. As such they cannot be understood simply 
using ordinary models of firm organization (Morrow, 1999). Football clubs 
operate in a complex industry, with multiple stakeholders, each with different 
objectives and interests which sometimes run counter to each other (Walters, 
2007). These objectives could include sporting success, match attendance, 
league health and profits. To the extent that most of these objectives rely on 
clubs achieving on-field success for their attainment, there is a tendency for 
club administrators to focus on on-field success, sometimes to the exclusion of 
very important commercial objectives. 
Where football clubs give insufficient attention to the financial constraints they 
face, there is increased risk that they will behave in a more financially 
irresponsible way. This can include instances of over-investment in player 
talent and excessive financial risk-taking. This can lead to clubs failing during 
the course of a football season and as a result distorting the competition, 
generating negative publicity and putting pressure on the league to bail-out 
insolvent clubs (Budzinski, 2012).  Irresponsible behaviour by one club can 
result in negative contagion effects for other clubs too, and for the sporting 
integrity of the league as a whole. In such a distinct area of activity as football, 
financial regulation might be seen as an appropriate way of pre-empting the 
occurrence of such behaviour, behaviour which otherwise might result in 
negative externalities for other stakeholders (Drut and Raballand, 2012).  
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Considerable social benefits, arising out of the financial investments by football 
clubs, may exist that without external support would be produced at less than 
socially optimal levels. This might be particularly significant in a developing 
economy context and may include employment creation, national cohesion and 
promotion of positive skills in the youth (Sanford et al., 2008). Thus, financial 
regulation might also be required to provide the framework for internalising the 
consequences of the production decisions of individual football clubs. In this 
regard, the introduction of regulation of the pre-emptive form does not require 
the existence of financial crises as a necessary condition. Thus professional 
football in Ghana does not have to be in financial crises before an appropriate 
financial regulatory framework is developed for the long-term financial stability 
of the industry.  
The context within which research is conducted is also important in determining 
the methodology adopted and how the research findings are interpreted. The 
next section discusses the country Ghana, Ghanaian football and football 
business environment. 
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1.1  THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
1.1.1  The Country, the Economy and its Politics 
Ghana is located on the west coast of sub-Saharan African with a total land 
area of 238,537 square kilometres. Figure 1.1 shows a map of Ghana and its 
10 administrative regions.  
 
Figure 1.1: An Administrative Map of Ghana 
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It has an estimated total population of 25.37 million in 2012 according to the 
World Bank, with an annual change of 2.2%. Gross Domestic product is 
estimated at US$40.71 billion in 2012, with GDP growing by 8% and 14.4% in 
2010 and 2011 respectively (World Bank, 2012). Table 1.1 shows Gross 
Domestic Product at market prices for the period 2007-2011, as issued by the 
Ghana Statistical Service. 
 
  
22 
 
The Services sector accounted for 48.5% of GDP in 2011, with Industry and 
Agriculture sectors contributing 25.9% and 25.6% respectively. The Services 
sector is also the fastest growing sector of the economy. Ghana is considered a 
lower middle income country in 2012. However, almost 30% of its population 
still lived below the poverty line in 2006 (World Bank, 2013).  
Females account for 51% of the population whilst 71.2% are considered as 
Christians, with a Muslim minority of 17.6%.  The largest out of the 75 different 
ethnic groups is the Akan who have a 47.5% share in the population. The 
official language is English, and 78.3% of males and 65.3% of females are 
considered literate.  
The country returned to constitutional democracy in 1992 after 11 years of 
military rule under Jerry Rawlings. Since then three other presidents have been 
elected in six different Presidential elections. The two main political parties are 
the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) which between them have shared the presidency since 1992. The 
country runs an executive presidency political system with one legislative 
chamber made up of 230 Members of Parliament.  
1.1.2  Politics and Football in Ghana 
The direct intervention of the state in the running of the national soccer teams 
has been a legacy of the perceived role of football in the social life of the 
Ghanaian that continues to the present day. Football was seen as a political 
instrument and as a tool for nation-building during the immediate post-
independence era (Bediako, 2012; Broere and van der Drift, 1997). The first 
President of the Republic provided financial support for the national team to win 
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international laurels as part of an effort to enhance his political image on the 
continent. For instance, in pursuit of the President’s socialist ideals, the 
National Director of Sports in 1960 ordered that the top two players from each 
of the league clubs join a model club called Real Republikans, referred to as 
the ‘Presidents Own Club’, to compete in the league, initially on a non-scoring 
basis. They were also to represent the country in the first CAF Inter clubs 
competition so as to guarantee a greater chance of success. The club was 
disbanded immediately after the President was overthrown in a military coup in 
February, 1966 (Bediako, 1995, 2012; Fridy and Brobbey, 2009).  
The industrialization efforts of subsequent governments between 1966 and 
1978 also led to the formation of ‘factory clubs’, owned and financed by state-
owned industrial firms that took part in the league, which also provided 
employment for the players of the clubs.  These well-resourced clubs, which 
were most often led by military officers, provided sporting challenges to the 
traditional clubs (Bediako, 2012). Examples include Akotex FC (Akosombo 
Textiles Ltd), Ghanacan (Nsawam Cannery Ltd), Juantex (Juapong Textiles 
Ltd), GIHOC (Ghana Industrial Holding Company Ltd), and Complex Stars 
(Ghana Food Complex Ltd). All of these clubs collapsed as financing ceased as 
a result of the privatization of state –enterprises which begun in the early 1980s 
as part of the country’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) initiated under 
the auspices of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Subsequent political leaders have also utilised their association with football 
clubs to pursue their political ambitions (Fridy and Brobbey, 2009). President 
Kuffour, who ruled the country from 2001 until 2009 was the former Board 
Chairman of the country’s biggest football club, Asante Kotoko. His successor 
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as President, Prof Atta-Mills was also a former Board Chairman of Hearts of 
Oak, Kotoko’s main rivals.  President Kuffour’s Vice-President was a former 
Board Chairman of Real Tamale United, the biggest club in the northern part of 
the country, whilst the current President, John Mahama is also closely 
associated with the same club.   
At the level of club football, despite the fact that supporters of the two most 
successful clubs in terms of sporting achievements, Hearts and Kotoko cut 
across the two big political parties, NDC and NPP, Fridy and Brobbey (2009) 
argue that the NDC’s successes in general elections are negatively related to 
the successes of Kotoko which is based in Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti 
Region, the stronghold of the opposition NPP. Between 1993 and 2001 when 
the NDC dominated Ghanaian politics, Kotoko failed to win a single league title, 
with Hearts of Oak winning six titles. This series of events resulted in 
speculation that the ruling NDC party, which was responsible for appointing the 
management of the FA, was in some way influencing the outcome of the league 
for political reasons (Bediako, 2012).    
Until 2006 when the current statutes of the Ghana Football Association were 
promulgated, the ruling political party had the power to influence football politics 
as Government nominated two people to serve on the 5-member Management 
Board of the FA, one of whom was to be the Chairman. The new structure, 
which was introduced on the directives of FIFA, was in part to ensure that 
Government interference in the operations of the FA was kept to the minimum 
(GFA, 2006), as FIFA felt that changes in the FA administration resulting 
directly from changes in Government,  created instability in the administration of 
the game in the country.  
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However, in recognition of the social role played by football and the importance 
of Government’s continued financial support for the activities of the FA, 
especially in the financing of the National Football Teams, the FA introduced 
into its Statutes, a Public Interest Committee, with representation from both the 
Government and the FA (GFA, 2010b, Art. 70). 
 The active role of the clubs in campaigning for the autonomy of the FA from 
government has meant that the relationship between Government and the 
clubs is strained to the extent that whilst Government finances the activities of 
the National Teams through the FA, there is no evident financial support from 
Government to clubs. This would imply that any suggestion of a role for 
Government in the financial regulation of clubs would have to be justified to 
both clubs and Government, on the back of the history between Government 
and clubs.  
1.1.3  Governance Structures in Ghanaian football 
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the composition of the FA Congress and the 
league structures in Ghanaian football. The GFA Congress is the supreme and 
legislative organ of the FA (GFA, 2010b, Art. 23). It is the highest decision-
making body of the FA with the power to define the general policies and take 
the necessary decisions for implementation by the Executive Committee (Ex-
Co) through the Secretariat.  
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10 REGIONAL 2ND & 3RD 
DIVISION LEAGUES 
AMATEUR 
PREMIER LEAGUE 
(16 CLUBS) 
PROFESSIONAL LEAGUE 
NATIONAL DIVISION ONE 
48 CLUBS IN 6 ZONES SPLIT ON GEOGRAPHICAL 
LINES 
SEMI-PROFESSIONAL 
PREMIER LEAGUE 
BOARD 
DIVISION ONE LEAGUE 
BOARD 
10 REGIONAL FAs 
FA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
(21 MEMBERS)  
 
FA CONGRESS 
(126 MEMBERS) 
FA EMERGENCY COMMITTEE 
(5 MEMBERS)  
 
32 
REPRESENTATIVES 
30 
REPRESENTATIVES 
48 
REPRESENTATIVES 
FIG. 1.2: The Ghana Football 
Association and its Members 
GHALCA: Welfare Body of Clubs in 
Premier, Division 1 & 2 
OTHER GROUPS 
Coaches Association -   2 
Referees Association -   2 
Women FA  -   2 
Juvenile FA -   2 
Players Association   -   2 
Security Services Sports 
Association (SESSA)  -   1 
Schools and Colleges   - 1 
Tertiary Institutions   -      1   
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It is made up of 123 members selected from the various constituent bodies of 
the FA such as the clubs, the regional FAs, Women’s and Juvenile FAs, 
Coaches and Players’ Associations, Referees’ Association, Security Services 
Sports Association, Schools and Colleges Sports, and Tertiary Education 
Sports Associations. The Regional FAs (RFAs) represent the 2nd and 3rd 
division leagues which are organised at the regional level.  
The President of the FA who chairs the Congress, the Executive and 
Emergency Committees of the FA, is elected at the FA’s Congress to serve a 
four-year term, and can be re-elected without limit. The Executive Committee is 
a 22-member Board which is responsible for implementing the decisions of 
Congress. It has six representatives from the Premier Division and four from 
the Division One clubs. Each of the 10 RFAs is represented on the Executive 
Committee by its Chairman.  The FA president and a representative of the 
combined group of other constituent bodies are also members of the Ex-Co.  
The Emergency Committee is a 5-member committee elected by the 
membership of the Executive Committee to run the Association in between the 
meetings of the Executive Committee. The General Secretary of the 
Association heads the Secretariat and runs the day-to-day activities of the FA 
with support from the staff and the 13 Standing Committees of the FA. 
The FA Executive Committee, however, has the power to delegate in totality or 
in part, its responsibilities arising out of its area of authority to third parties 
(GFA, 2010b, Article 32.11, 32.12). The Executive Committee however has no 
power to review the decisions of any of the judicial organs of the FA 
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(Disciplinary and Appeal Committees). This has arisen out of the history of the 
organisation in which management members of the FA affiliated to clubs 
occasionally required a review of the decisions of the judicial bodies when 
those decisions were not in the favour of their clubs. This has given the judicial 
bodies of the FA some semblance of independence. 
 
1.1.4  Ghanaian Football’s Achievements 
Ghana is an emerging soccer nation on the world football map. It ranks as the 
24th best men’s soccer nation in the world, and is only second to Cote d’Ivoire 
in Africa, according to the September 2013 edition of the Coca Cola/FIFA 
monthly world rankings. It was the first nation to win the African Cup of Nations 
on four occasions (1963, 1965, 1978 and 1982) and was the highest ranked 
African team at the last two FIFA World Cup tournaments in Germany (2006) 
and South Africa (2010), reaching the quarter-finals on both occasions. It was 
one penalty kick away from becoming the first African team to play in the semi-
finals of the World Cup. The country has also qualified to participate in its third 
consecutive World Cup tournament in Brazil in 2014.  
Ghana was the first African country to win a medal at the Olympic Games 
soccer tournament (Barcelona, 1992), the only African country to win the FIFA 
Youth Tournament for U-20 players (Egypt, 2009), and has also won the World 
U-17 soccer title on two occasions (1991 and 1995). The country recently won 
the bronze medal at the FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup (New Zealand, 2012).  
These achievements at the national team level mask difficulties at club level. 
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Since Asante Kotoko’s triumphs in 1971 and 1983 in the CAF Cup of Champion 
Clubs, and the successes of Hearts of Oak in 2001 (Champions League) and 
2005 (Confederation’s Cup), Ghana’s participation in CAF organised 
competitions have been marked either by failure on the pitch or by prior 
withdrawals of clubs on financial grounds (GHALCA, 2010). One difference 
between national team football and club football in Ghana is its funding – while 
the national team benefits from public funding from the State, club football is 
financed primarily from the limited resources of private entrepreneurs.   
 
1.1.5  Ghanaian Football’s Business Environment 
Ghanaian football clubs, just like their counterparts in several other countries 
around the world, are faced with an imbalance between revenue and 
expenditure, leading inevitably to the accumulation of debt. In Europe, the 
cause of this imbalance may be traced to increases in revenue being matched 
by significant increases in player costs as clubs attempt to outdo each other to 
qualify for lucrative domestic leagues, as well as for UEFA club competitions 
(Balduck and Lucidarme, 2011; Baroncelli and Caruso, 2011; Morrow, 2011; 
Senaux, 2011; Wilkesmann, Blutner and Muller, 2011). In contrast, although 
Ghanaian clubs have not seen significant increases in revenue, nevertheless 
costs continue to increase as a result of increased wage demands, inflation and 
increasing cost of credit in the country. 
There are considerable challenges to revenue generation. One relates to on-
field quality. Ghana ranked 1st in Africa and 13th in the world in terms of the 
number of nationals involved in international transfers in 2012 (FIFA, 2013). 
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The exodus of the best playing talents to other countries in search of better 
playing conditions and financial rewards, which begun in earnest in the early 
1980s, might have made the league less attractive to fans, resulting in lower  
attendance at matches and lower revenues (Darby, 2012).  
The fall in attendance might have also discouraged the clubs from increasing 
the minimum prices of tickets. In May 2009 the average price was GHC2.00 
equivalent to £1(see figure 1.4),. By May 2013 the average price was still GHC 
2.00, equivalent to only £0.65 (BOG, 2013). Thus real incomes from league 
games have fallen along with nominal income. Figure 1.3 also shows that 
inflation in the country has also averaged over 10% between 2007 and 2012, 
further eroding the real value of the incomes of clubs. 
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Even with the low ticket prices, attendance at matches might have also fallen 
as a result of competition arising from the broadcast of arguably better quality 
English and Spanish football matches, something which has been found to 
affect attendance of matches even in other European countries and in the USA 
(Bainbridge et al, 1996; Bourke, 2011; Cowie and Williams, 1997; Morrow, 
1999; Zhang et al, 1998). Also, watching well-produced broadcasts on giant 
screens for GHC0.50 per match makes economic sense for a lot of fans 
compared to paying GHC2.00 or more plus travel cost to watch a relatively low-
quality domestic league game. 
 
The relatively poor quality of the league also means that the FA encounters 
significant challenges in marketing it to the corporate world.  The sponsorship 
agreement with telecommunications company, Globacom (Gh.), expired at the 
end of the 2012/13 league season and has not been renewed as the sponsor 
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has not paid the amount due to the FA and the clubs for the 2012/13 season. 
According to www.footy-ghana.com, the 2013/14 league season also started in 
September 2013 without a headline sponsor. Thus not only did clubs have to 
borrow money in anticipation of being paid by the sponsors for the previous 
season, but they are also not expecting any new inflow of funds from sponsors 
in the short-term to pay up their debts, generating additional cash-flow 
challenges for the clubs.  
The consequences of this are exacerbated by the high cost of credit in the 
country relative to other countries. As shown in Fig 1.3, the representative 91-
day treasury-bill rate was almost 23% at the end of December, 2012, after 
reaching a high of 27.8% in March 2009, compared to an average of 5% in the 
UK over the same period (World Bank, 2013). This implies that turning to the 
financial institutions to borrow funds to meet both the short and long-term 
challenges to their cash-flow problems is unlikely to be a viable alternative.  
The media rights to the league for the next three years beginning 2013/14 have 
been bought by the South African company, Supersports, which is paying 
US$700,000 per annum. This does not compare favourably to the US$40 
million and the US$8.5 million per annum it pays for media rights to South 
Africa’s PSL and the Nigeria PSL respectively. Ostensibly, the size of media 
rights paid for the Ghanaian league is likely to be a function of the perceived 
attraction of the league, the size of the Ghanaian market for the television 
company, and the marketing ability of the Ghana FA.  
Merchandising activities of the clubs have also been limited by: the size of the 
Ghanaian market; the internal marketing capacity of clubs; the lack of attraction 
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of the league; the unbalanced nature of the fan base which is skewed towards 
the two big clubs which are supported by about 90% of the country’s football 
fans (Bediako, 2012). The clubs evidently have struggled to package 
themselves to attract private sponsorship with Kotoko the only club with more 
than one sponsor at the beginning of the 2012/13 and 2013/14 league seasons.   
A combination of taxes, stadium rental costs, deductions for the provision of 
security, medical and safety services by state organisations all ensure that the 
average club takes home approximately only 51% of the gate proceeds from a 
match (GHALCA, 2010). 
The migration of Ghana’s best talents abroad not only affects the revenue 
generation ability of the clubs, but also the cost of player purchases and player 
wages. The clubs compete not only with domestic rivals for the talents 
available, but also with clubs from Europe, and more recently from South Africa 
which has become a destination for Ghanaian football talent (Darby and 
Solberg, 2010). The cost of the remaining talents is higher as players demand 
more to stay instead of leaving, whilst his former club also demands more in 
transfer fees as they have alternative buyers to the domestic Ghanaian clubs. 
The increased international nature of player transfers has also meant that the 
players and their clubs sometimes negotiate in foreign currency. Thus with a 
falling value of the local currency, the real cost of player recruitment increases. 
Whilst the monthly player wages might be considered low in Ghana 
(Panneborg, 2010b; Darby, 2010), writers have consistently failed to include the 
sign-on fees charged by the players and their agents, which can be argued to 
be part of the earnings of the players over the duration of their contracts. They 
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might also be ignoring the fact that clubs in Ghana are usually responsible for 
the accommodation, medical, insurance and utility bills of players. These costs 
contribute to increased wage expenditure by Ghanaian clubs.  
As expenditure levels remain consistently high or in some cases might be 
rising, Ghanaian clubs are faced with major revenue generation challenges. 
This apparent imbalance between revenue and expenditure has the potential to 
threaten the financial stability of most individual clubs and is also a risk to the 
sporting integrity of the league as a whole. According to data from Bediako 
(2012), only four out of the 14 clubs that started the 1992 league season were 
still playing Premier League football after 20 years in 2012. No fewer than six 
clubs have ceased to exist, while the remaining four clubs have failed to return 
to the elite division since relegation. A further  three clubs which took part in the 
2002 league have gone into liquidation due to financial difficulties after only ten 
years in existence. 
This brief overview demonstrates that the Ghanaian football business 
environment provides a very compelling context within which to discuss the 
finances and the financial regulation of professional football clubs. Financial 
regulation of the clubs would let them appreciate the challenges of the business 
environment within which they operate, allowing them to incorporate that in 
their decision-making. An appropriate incentive-based financial regulatory 
framework can also help in limiting the challenges posed to the financial 
management of clubs by the business environment.   
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1.2  THE RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
In recognition of the challenges to the financial stability of European football 
clubs arising out of accumulating debts, in 2010 UEFA introduced the UEFA 
Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (UEFA CL & FFPR). 
Countries like France, Germany and those in Scandinavia have a long history 
of financial licensing, and these countries’ systems have served as a template 
for UEFA’s regulatory system (Gammelsaeter and Senaux, 2011).  Financial 
licensing is a key component of the financial regulatory framework utilised by 
UEFA. In its attempt to improve the professionalism in club football world-wide 
and to ensure the long-term viability of national leagues, world governing body, 
FIFA has also developed guidelines for the implementation of mandatory club 
licensing legislation at the level of each national association (FIFA, 2010). 
These are targeted primarily at clubs featuring in the various top leagues within 
FIFA’s member associations.  
The current financial regulatory framework in Ghanaian football is defined by a 
few Articles in the GFA Rules and Regulations, and in its Statutes that attempt 
to address, directly or indirectly, the financial management of football clubs. 
Article 8(1)(a) legislates for the incorporation of all Premier League clubs, whilst 
Article 8(2) deals with the responsibilities of an incorporated club (GFA, 2010, 
Article 8.1, 8.2). The rationale for the introduction of the incorporation rule, 
according to the FA (GFA, 1994), was that incorporation would automatically 
challenge clubs to increase the responsibility of directors. With respect to other 
countries, it is also argued that incorporation would also transform clubs’ 
financial management process to ensure their financial stability and the integrity 
of the league (Mutter and Huber, 2011).   
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However, as Morrow (2003) argues there is no ‘best model’ for a football club in 
terms of ownership and governance and the superiority of a legal form over 
others may be context specific. Morrow (2011) points out that incorporation can 
sometimes generate adverse consequences due to a conflict, perceived or 
otherwise, between sporting and financial objectives, where the need for 
managers to achieve sporting success conflicts with the prioritization of 
financial returns for owners. Thus in the absence of regulatory structures to 
ensure convergence of sporting and financial objectives, the mere incorporation 
of a club and the required submissions of financial statements annually do not 
in themselves guarantee improved financial management of a football club. 
Article 40 (1) gives the FA the right to investigate cases of financial 
mismanagement of clubs and to restore order in a club if it deems it necessary 
to protect the image of the league. Related to this, Article 8 (1b) also enjoins 
clubs not to register more than 50 players in any one league season to ensure 
that clubs do not overburden themselves with a large pool of players that would 
lead to excessive player cost. 
However, given the financial management challenges facing Ghanaian clubs, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the current financial regulatory framework 
in operation in Ghana is effective. The financial regulatory framework in 
operation in any football environment has the potential to influence the quality 
of financial reporting carried out by the clubs, their investment choices, and 
ultimately their financial performance. The requirement by FIFA for Ghana to 
implement a club licensing system therefore provides an opportunity for Ghana 
to develop a more comprehensive financial regulatory framework, one which 
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takes into account the social, political, economic and financial environment 
within which Ghanaian clubs operate.  
However, while considerable lessons can be learnt from the operation of 
financial licensing frameworks in other jurisdictions, the national associations, 
and by extension, league clubs are not a homogenous group around the world 
(Walters, 2007). Thus it can be argued that models used for developed market 
economies, for instance, may not necessarily be appropriate for developing 
economies (Luiz and Fadal, 2010). The regulatory institutions that are relevant 
for a country are also not independent of the country’s history (Rodrik, 2000). 
As such it is important to conduct research to help determine the most 
appropriate financial regulatory framework for each of the national associations. 
An attempt to develop a context-specific financial regulatory framework for 
Ghanaian football requires an appreciation of the institutional and industry 
conditions specific to Ghana football, which in turn shape the regulatory 
objectives, and the scope and form of the regulatory process (Sappington, 
1994). However, beyond the anecdotal evidence suggesting weaknesses in the 
existing financial regulatory framework for Ghanaian football, there is no known 
attempt to document the exact industry conditions to include consideration of 
matters such as: pricing and attendance; revenue generation and expenditure 
patterns of clubs; financial performance and position of clubs; the adequacy or 
otherwise of existing legislation; and the quality of financial reporting done by 
clubs.  
There is also no documented evidence on the financial management practices 
of clubs to influence policy-making both at the level of the FA and Government. 
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The suggestion by GHALCA (2010) that the CAF inter-club competitions are 
not an attraction to Ghanaian clubs, and rather are the source of the 
accumulated debt of some of its members is not backed by any documented 
financial evidence.  The suggestion by some clubs that their financial 
management are a function of the lack of capacity within the FA to implement 
the appropriate financial regulatory systems in Ghana also needs to be verified. 
The lessons that can also be learnt from the experiences of other leagues and 
national associations should also be evaluated and incorporated into the policy 
design process.  
The fundamental aim of the study is to critically review the framework for the 
financial regulation of professional football in Ghana and propose an 
appropriate framework specific to the context of Ghana.  
The following objectives have been identified as a road map to achieve this 
aim:  
1. To critically appraise and evaluate existing frameworks of financial  
regulation in football and assess their applicability in the Ghanaian 
context;  
2. To evaluate the current financial disclosure practices of Ghanaian  
professional football clubs;  
3. To evaluate the financial position and performance of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs and assess whether they are financially 
sustainable entities;  
4. To evaluate the existing framework for regulating the finances of  
Ghanaian clubs; and  
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5. To develop an incentive-based financial regulatory framework applicable 
to the Ghanaian context 
 
1.3  IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
Most academic work done on African football concentrates on the external 
migration of football talents from African leagues (Darby, 2009; Darby, Akindes 
and Kirwin, 2007; Darby and Solberg, 2010; Poli, 2006, 2010); the place of 
Africa in the power relations of global football (Desai and Vahed, 2010; 
Ngonyama, 2010); the impact of hosting major global events (Ndlovu, 2010; 
Steinbrink et al, 2011); and feminism in African football (Saavedra, 2003). The 
study on superstition in football by Ofori (2013) and the politicisation of football 
in Ghana by Fridy and Brobbey (2009) remain the only other known academic 
works specific to Ghana football. This study is therefore important from several 
standpoints. 
The study is the first of its kind in Ghana on football finance, football financial 
reporting and financial regulation in football. It is the first study to publish 
financial figures on Ghanaian football clubs which hitherto have been 
unavailable out with the clubs and governing bodies. While the sports finance 
and sport management literature is replete with papers analysing financial 
aspects of primarily European and American football leagues, no known 
academic studies have focused on data from African market economies.  
This study is the first of its kind to provide a discussion on the financial position 
and performance of clubs in Ghana and to assess whether these organisations 
are financially viable. This work thus makes an important contribution in, for the 
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first time, providing stakeholders of Ghana football with the necessary 
information for policy formulation around the key areas of financial 
management and financial regulation. While the thesis is focused on a 
particular area of economic activity, more generally, the thesis also contributes 
to the growing literature on financial management and financial performance 
within developing economies. This allows for the comparison of financial 
performance of football clubs in different jurisdictions to be made. 
The review and analysis of existing financial regulation frameworks in football 
worldwide provides regulators with the basis upon which to make informed 
assessments as to whether world-wide general regulations such as the FIFA 
Club Licensing regulations are effective at meeting the specific needs of 
different countries. Specifically, the study greatly enhances academic and 
independent discussions of the FIFA licensing regulations; to date, the great 
majority of literature in sports finance and sport management has focused on 
the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations.  
Building on this, the study is the first known attempt to develop an original 
context-specific financial regulatory framework for any of FIFA’s member 
associations. The study thoroughly details out the exact procedures adopted in 
the formulation of a financial regulatory framework which is applicable in a 
particular context, in this case, Ghana. This, it can be argued, allows for other 
researchers and policy makers to replicate this study, utilising the processes 
adopted by this study and the specific institutional factors pertaining in those 
countries. Therefore the process of the development of the framework can also 
be adopted by FIFA for application in other member countries. 
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1.4  ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organised in nine chapters. Chapter 1 provides the general 
context for the study by identifying and discussing issues relating to the 
Ghanaian football environment in particular: its governance structure; existing 
financial regulations; and the financial environment facing its clubs. Building on 
this the research aim and objectives of the study are then specified. The 
chapter continues by setting out the importance of the study.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the conceptual framework adopted for the study and the 
points of convergence and divergence between Sappington’s framework and 
the other theories of regulation and regulatory design. The weaknesses in 
Sappington’s model and how these can be resolved within the framework 
proposed by this study are identified.  
In Chapter 3 the methodological approach to the study is introduced and a 
justification provided for the adoption of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in this study.  
Building on Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 adopts Sappington’s framework as the 
basis for reviewing existing regulatory frameworks such as the UEFA Club 
Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations and the Scottish Club Licensing 
Regulations. The aim is to acquire a detailed understanding of these 
frameworks to assist in the development of a conceptual framework for financial 
regulation of professional football in Ghana.  
In Chapter 5 the focus returns explicitly to Ghana, with focus on the quality of 
financial disclosure in professional football in Ghana, the financial position and 
performance of Ghanaian clubs, and consideration of broader financial issues 
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which impact upon clubs’ financial management such as access to funding from 
financial institutions.  
In Chapter 6 an initial conceptual framework for the financial regulation of 
football in Ghana is proposed, building on the previous chapters. The 
framework developed is a context-specific incentive-based Football Financial 
Clearinghouse applicable to Ghana.  
Chapter 7 discusses the result of the interrogation process for the framework 
developed. Evidence is provided on the perspectives of Ghanaian football’s 
stakeholders on: the rationale for financial regulation; financial disclosure in 
Ghanaian professional football; access to both private and public funding; 
financial capacity building and policy advocacy; their general impressions about 
the FFC framework; and the expected implementation challenges.    
Building on the evidence and analysis of stakeholder interviews in the previous 
chapter, chapter 8 sets out the primary outcome of the study, the modified 
version of the FFC framework.  
The contributions, conclusions and the implications of the study for 
researchers, stakeholders and for policy are then reported in Chapter 9.  
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CHAPTER II 
PRINCIPLES OF REGULATORY POLICY DESIGN: 
THE SAPPINGTON MODEL 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The chapter aims at reviewing theories of regulation and how they feed into 
regulatory design models. As would become evident at the end of the review, 
Sappington’s (1994) principles of regulatory design provides a more 
comprehensive and compelling framework for the design of regulation in any 
context, compared to the others reviewed.  Sappington’s model is thus adopted 
as the conceptual framework for this study. The discussions that follow, 
therefore, concentrate on providing a detailed discussion of the Sappington 
framework, and its relevance for the current study. The review also draws out 
the point(s) of convergence or divergence between Sappington’s model and the 
other existing frameworks, whilst also pointing out limitations of the Sappington 
model, and how that can be addressed by the financial regulatory framework to 
be developed by this study. 
Section 2.1 defines regulation, discusses the focus of research on regulation 
and provides a general overview of Sappington’s framework which has been 
chosen as the conceptual framework for this thesis. Section 2.2 discusses the 
objectives and function of regulation in the literature, whilst section 2.3 focuses 
on how the resources of the regulator affect its independence and ability to 
resist regulatory capture. Section 2.4 then discusses the effect of the 
institutional environment on the regulatory design process, whilst section 2.5 
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deals with the importance of industry conditions on the form that regulation 
takes. Section 2.6 analyses the form and scope of regulation, whilst section 2.7 
concludes the chapter with the summary of the discussions, and a further 
rationalisation of the choice of the Sappington framework as the conceptual 
framework of the study.  
 
2.1.1  Focus of Research on Regulation 
Table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 provide a summary of the relevant literature on the 
theories of regulation and regulatory design, showing their main focus and 
discussing their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the financial regulation 
of football and thus, their relevance for this study. It also traces the history of 
the discussions on regulation and provides a basis for a review of Sappington’s 
(1994) regulatory framework.  
 
Baldwin et al. (2010) also provide an account of the shifting focus of research 
on regulation over time away from the command and control structure of the 
1960s and 1970s. They trace the movement away from the traditional interest-
group driven approaches to the less restrictive and incentive-based controls of 
the 1980s (Breyer, 1982). These early approaches were followed by models 
whose primary focus were limited to regulatory enforcement such as 
responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002); smart 
regulation (Gunningham, 1999; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999); and 
regulatory craft (Sparrow, 2000). 
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Table 2.1: Focus of Literature on Regulation – 1960-1990 
Author (s) Orientation Implications for the financial regulation of football 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Tullock (1967) economic rationale for regulation interest groups within football can engage in 
rent-seeking activities. 2. Importance of 
institutional factors 
limited to only economic rationale for regulation 
Stigler (1971) demand for regulation 1. discusses who receives the benefits and 
costs of regulation  
2. importance of industry conditions in 
regulatory design 
limited treatment of supply of regulation i.e. why 
regulation is imposed 
Posner (1971) regulation of utilities provides a critique of Stigler’s theory focuses only on public regulation 
Ehrlich and Posner (1974) cost associated with regulation importance of financial resources in regulatory 
design in resource constrained environment 
limited focus on cost of regulation 
Oliver (1980) positive versus negative incentives provides a basis for choosing either positive 
or negative incentives in football regulation 
limited to compliance response of regulatee to 
different types of incentives 
Breyer (1982) incentive-based controls suggests a role for incentives in regulation focuses more on coercion rather than deterrence 
Diver (1983) regulatory standards discusses the features of good regulatory 
standards (relates to form of regulation) 
deals with only a limited aspect of regulation 
Becker (1983) regulatory capture 1. importance of ensuring the independence 
of the regulator  
2. importance of institutional factors 
fails to discuss the objectives of regulation and 
importance of resources to regulatory design 
Kagan and Scholz (1984) motivation of corporate leaders justifies the need for regulation in the face of 
corporate leaders with ‘amoral characters’ 
focuses only on the use of deterrence approach 
Selznick (1985) definition of regulation defines regulation limited application of definition 
Gunningham (1987) negative effects of deterrence 
approach  
discusses why deterrence approach can lead 
to unintended consequences.  
limited to compliance response of regulatee 
Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) response to regulation by regulatee discusses the possible response of regulatee 
to the imposition of regulation. 
focuses only on compliance response of regulatee 
Peltzman (1989) demand for regulation Shows each industry has stakeholders 
beyond the firms themselves.  
limited to only the demand side of regulation. 
Craig (1990) public choice theory public interest role in the regulation of social 
activities such as football 
discussion limited to market failure rationale for 
regulation 
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Table 2.2: Focus of Literature on Regulation – 1991-2000 
Author (s) Orientation Implications for the financial regulation of football 
Strengths Weaknesses 
McBarnet and Whelan 
(1991) 
principles versus rule based 
standards 
choosing between principles and rules in 
standard setting 
choice between types of standards not sacrosanct.  
Ayres & Braithwaite (1992) 
 
responsive regulation developed the regulatory enforcement 
pyramid 
1. only sees the government as the regulator.  
2. discounts self- and meta-regulation 
Laffont and Tirole (1991, 
1993) 
regulatory capture (principal agent 
model) 
points out the incentive problems faced by 
auditors and managers in information 
disclosure 
deals with limited aspect of regulation  
Hutter (1993) compliance strategies offers incentive-based regulation as an option focuses on compliance response  (i.e. the form of 
regulation) and not regulatory design  
Ogus (1994) community value importance of objectives beyond the 
economic for social institutions like football 
what counts for community value indeterminate 
Levy and Spiller (1994) transaction cost approach 1. importance of industry conditions for 
regulatory design  
2. defines the beneficiaries of regulation.  
focuses on cost of regulation and not regulatory 
design 
Haines (1997) enforcement pyramid shows how punishment can be combined to 
achieve regulatory compliance 
concentrates on compliance response of regulatee 
Gunningham and Grabosky 
(1999) 
smart regulation utilizes enforcement pyramid but recognizes 
meta-regulation 
movement up and down an enforcement pyramid 
may be inefficient 
Llewellyn (1999) regulation of financial markets 1. provides a rationale for the regulation of 
financial industry.  
2. points out the importance of industry 
conditions in regulatory design  
3. important role of monitoring 
does not discuss the importance of resources of 
regulator to regulatory design 
Sparrow (2000) regulatory craft 1. utilizes a problem solving approach.  
2. regulation should seek to resolve key 
issues.  
3.recognizes the importance of context. 
concentration on big problems may miss several 
small problems.  
Perrow (2000) conventional versus meta-regulation provides a distinction between the tools of 
conventional and meta-regulation 
concentrates on compliance response and ignores 
objectives of regulation 
Rodrik, 2000 industrial regulation importance of institutional factors in regulatory 
design 
concentration on industrial policy 
 
 
47 
 
Table 2.3: Focus of Literature on Regulation – 2001-2010 
Author (s) Orientation Implications for the financial regulation of football 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Hood et al (2001) regulatory standards discusses the key characteristics of quality 
regulatory standards  
focuses only on the form of regulation 
Simpson (2002) deterrence and compliance 
strategies 
detailed discussion of choice between 
deterrence and compliance 
focuses on compliance response 
Baldwin and Anderson 
(2002) 
specific versus general deterrence determinants of choice between specific and 
general deterrence 
limited to discussion of form of regulation 
Coglianese and Lazear 
(2002) 
self  and meta-regulation 1. regulatory discretion pyramid.  
2. football’s regulatory structures combine 
both self- and meta-regulation 
possibility of abuse of discretion by the self-regulated 
firm 
Hood et al (2004) public interest regulation rationalizes the public role in regulation limited focus on objectives of regulation 
Scott (2004) critique of enforcement pyramid provides critique of pyramidal response focuses on compliance response 
Black (2005) risk-based regulation argues for the regulation of bodies and 
organizations posing the most risk 
may ignore many small risks 
Sama and Shoaf (2005) standard setting identifies basis of recent accounting scandals limited focus on regulatory form 
Hampton (2005) risk-based regulation regulation of large risks may ignore many small risks 
Hutter (2006) meta-regulation identifies importance of several layers of 
regulatory authority as in football 
 
Baldwin and Black 
(2008) 
really-responsive-regulation 1. importance of institutional environment  
2. motivational posture of regulatee  
3. compliance response  
4. attitudinal setting of regulatee  
5. resources of regulator  
6. effect of changes in regulator’s 
circumstances 
regulatory capture not considered  
Brunnermeier et al (2009) regulation of financial markets similarities between financial and football 
industry suggests similar regulations (e.g. use 
of clearinghouse) 
focuses only on rationale for regulation and not the 
regulatory design process 
Veljanovski (2010) strategic use of regulation 1. role of institutional and industry conditions 
on regulatory design. 
 2. possibility of regulatory capture  
3. importance of independence of regulator 
concentrate only on the form of regulation 
Scott (2010) principles versus rule based 
standards 
importance of combination of both types of 
standards 
concentrates on the form of regulation and not its 
determinants 
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The weaknesses identified in these early approaches, which are discussed in 
detail later in this section, led to the development of regulatory approaches that 
emphasise institutional structures that determine a firm’s response to 
regulation. These include risk-based (Black, 2005) and ‘really responsive 
regulation’ (Baldwin and Black, 2008).  Sunstein and Thaler (2008) focus more 
on the motivations and behaviours of the regulation community whilst ‘better 
regulation’ or ‘high quality regulation’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 2009) focuses on a 
reduction in the cost and burden of regulation on business units and individuals. 
These models in general, it can be argued, deal with specific aspects of 
regulation and do not pass as comprehensive models of regulatory design. 
 
2.1.2  What is Regulation? 
One of the early attempts to provide a definition of regulation was made by 
Selznick who suggested that it was:  
“The sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
authority over activities valued by the community”     
       (1985, pp. 363) 
The target of regulation can be a firm or organisation or individual which 
provides activities deemed valuable to a community. It is to that firm, 
organisation or individual that regulation is applied and which bears the 
consequences of non-compliance (Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010). 
According to this definition, the regulator is the public authority, either within or 
outside the community that creates and enforces the rule, whilst a command is 
what the regulator requires the target to do or refrain from doing. This definition, 
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thus, feeds into the debate on private versus public regulation, and the 
advantages of each. 
 
Black (2001), however, argues that defining a community, what constitutes its 
values, and how control is exercised in a community is in itself subject to 
debate. Thus it can be argued that the usefulness of Selznick’s definition is 
limited by an apparent lack of clarity. Black (2001, pp. 104) offers an alternative 
definition of regulation as: 
“…Intentional use of authority to affect behaviours of a 
different party according to set standards, involving 
instruments of information gathering and behaviour 
modification---“  
This is considered by the likes of Baldwin et al. (2012) as being superior to 
Selznick’s definition as it provides a clear line of authority and also involves 
information gathering in an attempt to modify behaviour. Whilst Black’s (2001) 
definition does not suggest that the regulator has to be a public authority, a key 
challenge to the definition comes from proponents of self-regulation (Brint, 
1994; Freidson, 2001; Larson, 1977), as it seems to make little room for an 
organization regulating itself, a feature of several contemporary forms of 
regulation. This definition also seems to discount the possibility that the creator 
of the regulation might delegate enforcement to another entity, which has 
become a feature of self-regulatory and meta-regulatory frameworks.  
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2.1.3  Sappington’s Principles of Regulatory Design: An Overview 
In his seminal paper on ‘Principles of Regulatory Design’ which served as a 
background paper for the World Bank’s World Development Report, 1994, 
Sappington (1994) provided a framework for the development of regulation in 
any sector of society. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of Sappington’s 
framework in which it is argued that the form, function and scope of any 
regulatory framework depends crucially on: the objectives of the regulator; the 
resources available to the regulator; the industry to be regulated; and the 
institutional structure of the jurisdiction within which the regulator operates.  
 
This implies that even where the objectives of regulators in a particular industry 
within two different jurisdictions are identical, differences in institutional 
environment would necessarily mean that the form that regulation takes would 
differ accordingly. It also means that the scope and function of regulation would 
be different. Where resources available to different regulators also vary, the 
form, the function and the scope of regulation would also be affected. 
 
Sappington’s argument finds support from Rodrik (2000) who posits that the 
institutions that are necessary for the growth and development of a country, a 
community or an industry are not independent of its history, and that these 
institutions evolve over time even within the same jurisdiction. Thus institutions 
that are relevant for the development of one country would not necessarily be 
relevant in other countries due to context-specific differences.  
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2.2.  THE OBJECTIVES AND FUNCTION OF REGULATION 
Similar to Sappington’s formulation, the importance of regulatory objectives in 
defining the form and scope of regulation is something that is recognised by 
Baldwin and Black (2008) in their discussion of ‘really responsive regulation’, 
where they argue that a regulator has to be responsive to changes in the 
objectives, priorities and circumstances of the regulator. A really responsive 
regulator must also be responsive to the institutional environment within which 
both the regulator and the regulatee operate. The institutional environment, for 
example, would include the distribution of resources within an industry. 
However, Baldwin and Black (2008), like many other earlier writers (Becker, 
1983; Breyer, 1979, 1982; Laffont and Tirole, 1991, 1993; Posner, 1971, 1974; 
Stigler, 1971; Tullock, 1967) failed to go beyond recognition of the importance 
of regulatory objectives, into providing details of what these objectives could be. 
Sappington (1994) on the other hand provides a very comprehensive 
discussion of the possible goals of regulation, without suggesting that this is an 
exhaustive list.  
 
Figure 2.2 provides examples of objectives of the regulator in Sappington’s 
framework. For example, the regulator can mandate the adoption of particular 
operating equipment or technique to promote its use, in a command-and-
control design. It can also promise incentives for new investment in industry 
performance improvement, in an attempt to foster development in the industry.  
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The regulator can also dictate and enforce operational and performance 
standards (see Brunnermeier et al., 2009 in respect of financial markets), set 
targets and define rewards system in an attempt to ensure that safe and quality 
service are provided. Other objectives of regulation, according to Sappington 
(1994), could include promoting least-cost production, achieving desired levels 
of consumption, promoting more equitable outcomes, and limiting the earning 
potentials of producers. In the context of this study, these objectives could 
include: providing for subsidies to clubs; league regulating entry to optimize 
joint league incomes; and ensuring that smaller clubs are not exploited by 
larger clubs in respect of player purchases. 
Various aspects of these objectives have found support in the literature as well. 
Public choice theory has the underlying assumption that both the market place 
and the political arena are inhabited by individuals who attempt to maximise 
their welfare (Craig, 1990). As such regulation would only be demanded where 
evidence of market failure exists and needs correction. Markets may fail either 
due to the existence of market power, externalities, public goods or asymmetric 
information (Stieglitz, 1989). Proponents of normative theories of economic 
regulation, for instance, argue that in the absence of government intervention, 
the distribution of resources would not be efficient. It must be noted, however, 
that others have offered rationales for regulation that are quite different from 
those suggested by Sappington. For instance Stigler (1971) argues that 
politicians supply regulation to maximise the likelihood of staying in office, 
suggesting the possibility of regulatory capture. 
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According to Sappington (1994), the function of a regulation could either be 
informing or enforcing regulation (Fig. 2.1). Thus it could be providing 
information for consumers to make an informed choice, or making the choices 
on behalf of the consumer. The difference is the extent to which regulation 
serves to inform the consumers about the regulated firm’s activities or dictate 
which activities are allowed. This is a position shared, for example, by 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) who argue that issues such as: asymmetric 
information; agency costs; conflicts of interest on the part of the service 
provider; the need to ensure consumer confidence, which has positive 
externalities; and the economies of scale that exist in the monitoring of financial 
firms all provide rationales for the regulation of financial markets.  
 
Some regulations ensure some minimum level of information disclosure (for 
example, a requirement for companies to submit annual financial statements to 
the Registrar of Companies). Financial disclosure regulations are meant to 
serve a stewardship role between firm managers and the other stakeholders 
(Gary et al., 1995; Sarpong and Gray, 1989); to encourage managers to 
disclose adequate levels of financial information (Barrow, 2011; Gasking, 1999; 
Narayanaswamy, 1996, Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995), so that accountants do not 
utilise their superior accounting knowledge to give misleading information 
(Morrow, 2006).  Others are designed primarily to: protect consumers from 
unsafe products; ensure that all customers are treated in similar fashion; limit 
the producer profits of the monopolist; or to control various aspects of the 
interactions among producers within an industry. 
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These goals of regulation can be argued to be mainly economic in nature. 
However Feintuck (2010) proposed that regulation in certain fields such as 
healthcare and education should incorporate and give emphasis to values 
beyond those of the market because economics sometimes fails to account for 
community and political values such as social justice. Others have argued that 
the goals of ‘community value’ cannot be achieved in an unregulated market 
(Ogus, 1994). In the context of this study, sport has social goals that go beyond 
business, and as such there is a public interest rational for the regulation of 
football to achieve these social goals or the ‘community value’ in sports. This is 
used to justify government support for football activities even though Noll and 
Zimbalist (1997) suggest that it is difficult to do so.  Coggburn and Schneider 
(2003) thus suggest that even where justified, any public financial support for 
any industry or firm must be linked to the achievement of set performance 
targets. 
 
Whilst multiple objectives of regulatory design exist, the achievement of all of 
the goals of a regulator is limited by the potential for conflict to exist between 
goals (Sappington, 1994). For example, the goal of fostering development in 
the industry might not necessarily be compatible with an attempt to limit 
producer profits or ensuring equitable outcomes. Alternatively, cost 
minimisation and quality enhancement may be in conflict under certain 
circumstances. Whilst cost minimisation is recognised by Sappington’s as a 
possible objective of regulation, he fails to provide a detailed discussion of the 
possible costs associated with the regulatory design process, which can affect 
its implementation success. As Coase (1960) pointed out, however, regulation 
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generates its own costs and inefficiencies and these require to be factored into 
any regulatory design process.  
This is a challenge that was taken on by Ehrlich and Posner (1974) who posit 
that the objective of regulatory design is to minimize cost associated with the 
process. These costs come in the form of the costs of making the rules 
(Rulemaking Costs); the cost to the regulator of enforcing the regulations 
(Enforcement Costs); the cost to the regulatee of complying with the regulations 
(Compliance Costs); the costs imposed by regulatory offences (Harm Costs); 
and the costs of getting regulation wrong (Error Costs). An efficient regulatory 
system, according to Ehrlich and Posner (1974), minimises the sum total of 
these costs by selecting the appropriate rule, level and type of enforcement. 
This approach however, can be said to have a very limited focus and cannot be 
considered as an adequate conceptual framework for this thesis. Whilst it is 
important that designers of regulation take into consideration the importance of 
the regulatory cost, especially in resource-constrained environment, the 
regulatory design process goes beyond just the cost of regulation as shown by 
Sappington’s framework.  
The regulator can also have multiple objectives including regulation, 
supervision and monitoring (Llewellyn; 1999). According to Sappington (1994), 
whilst conflicts among multiple goals might be resolved by making 
compromises between the goals, the compromise made would depend on the 
relative importance of the conflicting goals. The relative importance of the goals 
is in itself a function of the expected consequences of failing to meet each of 
the conflicting goals. Sappington argues further that if failure to meet a 
particular goal would have a substantial, obvious, immediate, and adverse 
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impact, the regulator would likely give that goal a high priority. Multiple goals 
may be achieved by sequencing, without a need to attempt to achieve the goals 
simultaneously, especially where progress in achievement of goal 1 improves 
the chances of achieving goal 2. The simultaneous attainment of sporting and 
commercial objectives, it can be argued, is a challenge football clubs in 
particular continue to contend with around the world. 
 
It can be argued that Sappington’s discussions of the goals of regulation are 
limited by a lack of appreciation of the possibility that the goals of regulation in 
itself are determined by the industry conditions and the institutional 
environment of the regulator and the regulatee. His formulation gives the 
impression that the objectives, resources, industry conditions, and the 
institutional environment, whilst together determining the scope, the form and 
function of regulation, are independent of each other.  
 
2.3  THE RESOURCES, INDEPENDENCE OF REGULATOR AND  
REGULATORY   CAPTURE 
 
Figure 2.3 provides an overview of the resources required by a regulator in 
Sappington’s framework. According to Sappington (1994), the quality and 
quantity of resources available to the regulator would determine the level of 
information used in the design, implementation and evaluation of the regulatory 
process within the regulated industry. The resources include the size, 
educational training, and experience of regulatory staff.  
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Sappington further argues that the extent of information available to the 
regulator determines the choice between command-and-control regulation and 
incentive-based delegated regulation in terms of relative effectiveness. He 
argues that in the absence of extensive information about the industry, 
regulatory policy is better served when decision-making is delegated to the 
(better-informed) regulated firm.  
 
For example, allowing the price-setting function of regulation in the 
telecommunication industry to be made by the party with superior information 
potentially allows the regulator to effectively achieve its goals. In such a 
situation, the prices are set by the regulated firm within boundaries agreed with 
the regulator. On the other hand where the regulator has a high level of 
information about the regulated industry, it gives it more flexibility in deciding 
between the use of command-and-control and delegated forms of regulation. It 
can also decide to employ a combination of both. 
 
Sappington argues that the higher the resources of the regulator, the higher the 
regulator’s ability to develop and implement a comprehensive set of regulations 
to cover a greater percentage of the regulated industry’s activities. Thus a 
regulator with limited resources is more likely to engage in partial regulation in 
an attempt to economise on resources. It would limit itself to regulating only a 
specified aspect of the industry’s activities, e.g. the financial administration of 
the firms in the industry, instead of all of the administrative, technical and 
operational activities of the firms. 
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He argues moreover that, the quality and quantity of human resources available 
to the regulator relative to that of the regulatee, together with the institutional 
environment, is a factor in determining the commitment ability of the regulator. 
This is the ability to promise financial reward for desired performance to the 
regulatee or threaten sanctions for undesired behaviour. This in turn affects the 
independence of the regulator and the perceived credibility of the regulatory 
process.  
 
This argument is supported by Levy and Spiller (1994) who also argue that the 
institutional endowments of a regulator affect the credibility and effectiveness of 
the regulatory framework. This also affects the motivational posture of the 
regulatee i.e. how the regulatee responds to the imposition of regulation. In the 
view of Baldwin and Black (2008), the firm has a choice between being content 
with regulation, and as such accommodating/capitulating, and resisting, game 
playing, litigating or disengaging from regulation where appropriate (Baldwin, 
1985; Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988; Veljanovski, 2010). In effect, the quality of 
resources of the regulator would affect the regulatee’s perceptions about the 
independence of the regulator. 
 
Assuring the independence of the regulator is the first step to shielding it from 
potential regulatory capture (Boehm, 2007). Becker (1983) argues that interest 
groups invest in influencing the political process and the outcomes depend on 
the relative pressures exerted. He argues further that the structure of taxes, 
subsidies and political favours are all a function of the concessions made to 
different interest groups competing for political favour which inevitably 
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influences the regulatory design process and the relationship between the 
regulator and the regulatee.  
 
For instance, a firm could invest in an attempt to gain regulation that favours it 
or minimise the impact of unfavourable regulatory outcome (Stigler, 1971). 
Veljanovski (2010) follows the line of argument of Sappington (1994) by 
suggesting that the ability of the firm to gain from strategic behaviour is a 
function of the form, function and scope of regulation. These in turn are 
influenced by: the structure of the industry; the level of technological 
development in the industry; and the existing regulatory framework, including 
the complementary control instruments. Crucially, Veljanovski (2010) argues 
that the quality of human resources available to industry relative to that of the 
regulator would determine the extent to which firms can manipulate the 
regulator. It can be argued, therefore, that one response to reducing the 
possibility of firms deceiving the regulator is for regulatory bodies to hire 
experts and industry specialists, to improve the quality of human resources. 
 
According to Tullock (1967, 1980) the unproductive utilisation of the political 
process to achieve economic rent in the form of ‘rent-seeking’ by special 
interest groups (Tollison, 1998) generate inefficient outcomes.  Laffont and 
Tirole (1991, 1993) also utilises a Principal-Agent model to explain why in the 
presence of information asymmetry, regulatory capture could occur. The 
regulator, they argue, could collude with the firm and obtain rent by hiding 
information about the true nature of the firm from the state (the principal) if the 
firm stands to benefit from the retention of information.  
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Laffont and Tirole’s (1993) arguments can be utilised to shed light on the 
relationship between firm managers, auditors of firms, and the other 
stakeholders of the firm in terms of information management. In the context of 
this study, the existence of these incentives might suggest that without proper 
monitoring, club auditors might compromise the integrity of the financial 
statements issued by clubs by colluding with club managers.  
Whilst capture theory might not be considered a good general view of 
regulation today (Veljanovski, 2010), it can be argued that regulatory capture 
may still be relevant in certain industries, including football. Since the 
association is a membership body, and the clubs are the association, the 
association and the clubs are closely inter-related.  Thus the potential for 
regulatory capture to exist is high.  By not explicitly discussing the causes of 
regulatory capture Sappington’s (1994) framework could be considered limited 
to some extent. However, he suggests that where the regulated firms can easily 
influence the tenure of office of the regulator, it undermines the commitment 
ability of the regulator, and as such the independence of the regulator. In such 
a scenario it could be argued that the environment for the existence of active or 
passive regulatory capture might be created.  Likewise, Baldwin and Black 
(2008) also only implicitly assume the existence of regulatory capture. 
 
Sappington’s framework is also limited by the implicit assumption that financial 
and physical resources are less important, compared with human resources, in 
determining the form and function of regulation. It could be argued that in a 
resource constrained environment, the availability of financial resources for 
regulatory design and implementation cannot be taken for granted. In a 
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resource-constrained environment such as the one faced by professional clubs 
in Ghana, it becomes very important, to monitor and control the costs 
associated with regulatory design, and also maximise the use of financial 
resources. 
 
2.4  THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN REGULATORY 
DESIGN 
There is convergence in the literature on the importance of the institutional 
environment on the regulatory design process. Figure 2.4 provides an overview 
of the institutional structure, which Sappington (1994) argues, is critical in 
determining the form and scope a regulatory framework takes. According to him 
the form of a regulatory framework is dependent on the political and legal 
infrastructure in the jurisdiction of the regulator and the stability of tenure of 
both the regulator and the government. Together with the quality of 
complementary control institutions, these factors represents the institutional 
environment in which the regulator operates; a key consideration in regulatory 
design. 
 
These institutional factors determine the regulator’s commitment ability which is 
the power to promise financial rewards for desired behaviour/performance, or 
threaten sanctions for undesired behaviour/performance. The regulator’s 
commitment ability depends on the political pressures it confronts.  
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According to Sappington (1994), it is also influenced by the extent of consumer 
power in determining the regulator’s tenure in the short run, the strength and 
independence of the judicial branch of government, and the stability of 
government over time. Where the regulator has limited commitment ability, it 
loses its power to influence firm behaviour, undermining the success of 
regulatory policy by severely limiting the scope of regulation. In extreme cases 
limited commitment ability on the part of the regulator makes regulatory design 
baseless. 
 
Sappington (1994) argues that a country’s legal system, private-rule making 
bodies and other governmental rule-making bodies, all serve as complementary 
control instruments that affect the design of regulatory policy. These include the 
country’s judicial service, tax authorities, social insurance authorities, registrar 
of companies, the sector ministry responsible for the industry in question, and 
self-regulating professional bodies such as the Medical Association, Bar 
Association and the Chartered Institute of Accountants. The existence and 
effective functioning of these other bodies, which also control and regulate 
certain aspects of the firms’ operations, are a necessary condition for the 
proper pursuit of more targeted, partial and non-comprehensive forms of 
regulation by the primary regulator.  
 
It can be argued that in the context of this study, if the tax and social insurance 
authorities, for instance, are effective in ensuring that football clubs comply with 
tax and social security laws within a country, the financial regulator of that 
industry would not have to concern itself about firms having overdue tax and 
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social security payments. Similarly, an effective audit culture would ensure that 
football’s financial regulators had confidence that the audited financial 
statements of firms conform to the true state of affairs of firms within that 
industry, and that it effectively plays its stewardship role (Sarpong and Gary, 
1988), rather than having concerns over attempts by firms to engage in creative 
accounting, to ‘game’ the regulator (Veljanovski, 2010). 
 
The importance of institutional factors in regulatory design has been well 
discussed in the literature. For instance, the early writers on the positive 
theories of regulation all incorporate politics into the regulatory design process, 
and argue that resource and institutional constraints are found in any political 
marketplace (Peltzman, 1975, 1989; Posner, 1971; Stigler, 1971). The creation 
and outcome of the regulatory process are the result of political and legal 
process and that its implementation invariably generates winners and losers 
depending on the extent of strategic ‘gaming’ at play. The general implication of 
these theories is that the beneficiaries of the imposition of regulation are not 
always those who are meant to be protected under the public interest 
arguments for regulation. They are thus sometimes referred to as the ‘interest-
group’ theories of regulation (Boehm, 2007). 
More recently, Baldwin and Black (2008) have discussed the importance of the 
institutional environment of both the regulatee and the regulator for the form 
that regulation takes. They argue that the institutional environment of the 
regulatee, which determines its motivational posture is itself influenced by 
issues such as the relationship between the individual firm’s internal goals and 
the demands of regulation. Other determinants include the means of imposition 
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of regulatory norms and the perceived fairness of the regulatory regime. On the 
other hand, the institutional environment of the regulator is influenced by the 
existing political and legal infrastructure, the resource distribution amongst 
various stakeholders, and the norms regulating conduct.  
 
2.5  INDUSTRY CONDITIONS AND REGULATION 
Sappington (1994) provides a very comprehensive discussion of the 
importance of industry conditions on the regulatory design process. Sappington 
(1994) argues that the conditions within an industry (which determine the 
production techniques adopted, the nature of the products of the industry, the 
consumer demand and the structure of information) would determine the form 
and scope of regulation therein (see Figure 2.5). Thus, even where the 
objectives, resources and institutional environment are the same within two 
different jurisdictions, differences in ‘circumstances’ in the industries concerned 
can shape the form of the regulation imposed (Baldwin and Black, 2008).  
According to Sappington, the production technology adopted would be 
determined by the existence or otherwise of economies of scale in production. 
This would determine whether the entire industry output can be efficiently 
supplied by one producer (a monopolist); a few working together in a 
coordinated cartel group (oligopolists); or a large number of suppliers. This 
might explain, for instance, the different number of clubs observed in different 
leagues around the world. 
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This would effectively determine the role of competition rules in that particular 
industry. For instance, in an industry where there is joint-production of the 
product by a group of actors, such as in the football industry (Hamil and 
Chadwick, 2010), cartel-like behaviour is inevitable and there may be little 
room for anti-competition regulations. Thus the entry into and exit from an 
industry can be regulated depending on the production technology resulting 
from the existence of economies of scale.  
Where production externalities exist in an industry, the social cost of 
production might exceed the private cost of production (negative externalities) 
or the social benefits of production might exceed the private benefits of 
production (positive externalities). In a situation whereby external costs are 
generated through production, a more than socially efficient level of the 
product is supplied, with the reverse holding true for external benefits 
(Budzinski, 2012). In such a situation there is a role for a regulator to attempt 
to internalise the external benefits/costs, either by compensating the generator 
of the positive externalities, or by sanctioning the agent generating the 
negative externalities.  
This is to allow for the socially efficient levels of the product to be produced. 
Thus government regulation that encourages subsidies to football, for 
instance, can be justified on the basis of the output of the industry generating 
external benefits to society.  
The nature of the product or service supplied by the particular industry would 
also determine the scope, form and function of regulation in the industry, i.e. it 
would determine whether the function of the regulation is to inform consumers 
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about the product or to ensure that input, process or output standards are 
achieved (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Llewellyn, 1999; Sappington, 1994). This 
would also depend on the characteristics of the product. Llewellyn (1999) 
argued that the difference between financial products, and other goods in 
general, and the different incentive structures faced by financial services firms, 
requires the industry to have regulation markedly different from that in the 
general goods market.  
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) also suggested that banks trade amongst 
themselves more than firms in other industries, resulting in higher inter-
connectivity. This in turn increases the risk of loss in assets of other banks 
who have lent money to the failing bank, creating a panic that can cause 
depositors of other banks to withdraw deposits (Baltensperger and Dermine, 
1987; Bhattacharya and Jacklin, 1988; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). These 
negative externalities suffered by banks might result from informational 
contagion effects, since as one bank fails it cast doubts on the abilities of 
banks of similar size and characteristics to meet service requirements.   
According to Sappington (1994), demographic and economic characteristics of 
the consumers also affect the form of regulation that is necessary to ensure 
that the objectives of the regulator are achieved. For example, the 
consumption of products like medicine, alcohol and tobacco by children and 
pregnant women is generally regulated differently from that of the wider 
population. Consumption of products like vaccines generates external 
benefits/costs and there is the need for regulation to ensure that these 
consumption social benefits/costs are internalised.  
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Where economies of scale in information collection and dissemination also 
exist in an industry there is the potential for regulation to limit the cost of 
information acquisition. A central authority that performs the role of information 
provider is allowed in these circumstances to collect the information that would 
have been costly for individuals in the society to obtain. Where industry 
specific information is possessed by many different agents within an industry, 
the regulatory process would have to be more participatory than in a situation 
where the regulator possesses most of that information. The rule-making 
process would be better served, and the objectives of regulation more likely to 
be achieved, if an open regulatory process is adopted where the regulator 
does not possess the majority of the information in the industry (Sappington, 
1994).   
The importance of industry conditions in regulatory design is a feature of 
Sappington’s formulation which is noticeably absent from many of the other 
frameworks and theories reviewed (e.g. Baldwin and Black, 2008; Becker, 
1983; Ehrlich and Posner, 1974; Levy and Spiller; 1994; Stigler, 1971). In the 
context of this study, Sappington alerts us to the important role that football 
industry-specific conditions and the institutional environment will play in 
determining the form and scope of the Ghanaian football financial regulation 
that this study is concerned with, making his framework a more relevant 
conceptual framework for the study.  
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2.6  THE SCOPE AND FORM OF REGULATION 
According to Sappington (1994) the varied extent of regulatory oversight and 
control implies that regulation can be partial, merely suggesting guidelines for 
a small subset of activities of firms in the industry (see Fig. 2.1). Examples of 
these are sometimes found in the pharmaceuticals industry where the 
regulator concentrates on defining the drug content or quality whilst allowing 
the firms to determine the production process and pricing policy. It can also be 
comprehensive in scope, imposing strict rules on all relevant activities of the 
firms being regulated.  
 
The form of regulation refers to the regulatory design and enforcement 
procedures, the locus of decision-making in the regulatory arena, the nature of 
regulatory rules (Sappington, 1994), and the regulatory governance structure 
(Levy and Spiller; 1994). Regulatory design could be centralized in a 
command-and-control fashion, where the detailed actions to be taken by the 
regulatee are dictated by the regulator (see Fig. 2.1). Alternatively, it could be 
incentive-based where the realized performance of the regulatee is compared 
with established targets and goals, and the firm is rewarded accordingly in a 
delegated decision-making fashion. Whilst Baldwin and Black (2008) argue 
that the choice between primary and delegated legislation is a function of the 
type of governance structure in a given country, Scott (2010) suggest that it is 
determined by the distribution of resources, amongst state and non-state 
actors in the regulatory space (Walters and Hamil, 2013).  These arguments, 
put together are not significantly different from Sappington’s views on the 
matter.  
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Sappington argues that the resources available to the regulator influence the 
level of information available to the regulator, and in effect the locus of 
information within the regulatory process. Where the regulator has limited 
information relative to the regulatee, delegated decision-making would be 
superior to command-and-control forms, which in these circumstances are 
ineffective. It is not only the decision-making that could be delegated, 
according to Sappington.  The primary regulator in a country, usually 
Government, could also delegate the rule-making authority to a third party or 
substitute regulator, adopting a meta-regulatory approach (Coglianese and 
Mendelson, 2010). The third form of design is referred to as potential 
regulation in which no restrictions are imposed on the regulatee until the firm’s 
performance is adjudged, ordinarily by consumers, to be unsatisfactory 
according to some pre-specified criterion. 
 
Several other writers have discussed the choice between primary regulation 
and other forms of regulation. Figure 2.6 is the Regulatory Discretion Pyramid 
(RDP) of Coglianese and Mendelson (2010) which provides a categorization 
of the level of discretion afforded the regulatee in determining the shape and 
content of its internal control systems. This categorization differentiates 
between unconstrained freedom, self-regulation, meta-regulation and 
conventional command-and-control regulation. 
75 
 
 
      
          
.                 
 
Conventional Regulation
Meta-Regulation
Self-Regulation
Unconstrained Freedom
Most Discretion 
Least Discretion 
Fig. 2.6 Regulatory Discretion Pyramid  
 
Essentially the movement down the RDP involves the primary regulator giving 
more discretion to the target of regulation. Thus, the bottom of the pyramid is a 
situation of unconstrained freedom where the target of regulation has the most 
discretion and may choose not to regulate itself or conform to regulation. Self-
regulation refers to an approach in which the regulatory target imposes 
command and consequences on itself resulting from the target and the 
regulator being the same entity (Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010). An 
example would be the regulation imposed by say, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) on its membership who are expected to 
conform in exchange for specified benefits. Non-conforming members are 
sanctioned where appropriate.  
76 
 
 
Hutter (2006, pp. 215) refers to meta-regulation as “the state’s oversight of 
self-regulatory arrangements”. Where an outside regulator intentionally 
induces self-regulation from targets it is referred to as meta-regulation. Others 
have referred to this process variously as enforced self-regulation 
(Braithwaite, 1982), mandated self-regulation (Bardach and Kagan, 1982), or 
regulating the regulators (Parker, 2002). Meta-regulation provides rewards 
and recognition for those who opt for self-control (Nash, 2002), and/or it 
explicitly threatens to sanction firms or entities that do not conform. Meta-
regulation allows for critical self-evaluation and greater reflexivity by the 
regulated firm (Parker, 2002) and therefore places the responsibility for 
regulation on the firms themselves, subject to external scrutiny. At the top of 
the pyramid is conventional regulation which attempts to define in detail what 
the regulatee could or could not do, leaving it with little or no discretion.  
 
Perrow (2000) agrees with Sappington that where firms have more information 
about the problems of the industry than any regulator could foreseeably obtain 
self-regulation and meta-regulation, which incorporates forms of delegated 
decision-making, may be superior to conventional regulation. In the same vein 
self-regulation and meta-regulation may be a better choice in situations where 
the industry is heterogeneous, like the football industry (Walters, 2007), or 
when the problem or potential problem is also not well understood.  
 
Even proponents of self-regulation and meta-regulation (Coglianese and 
Lazear, 2002; Coglianese and Mendelson, 2010) admit that the challenge with 
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both forms of regulation is that target organisations need to appreciate the 
importance of self-regulation and also have the skill and personnel, to not only 
develop an effective internal regulatory system, but also to implement and 
monitor its success, as there is a risk that members may abuse the self-
discretion offered them. Also, even though private standard setting facilitates 
the deployment of industry expertise, it could lead to businesses shaping the 
standards to suit their interest (Mattli and Buthe, 2005).  
 
In the context of this study, discussions on meta- versus self-regulation places 
into context the relationship between the supra-national regulatory frameworks 
of organisations like FIFA, UEFA and CAF, vis-à-vis the attempts by national 
associations like Ghana to develop self-regulatory models for the financial 
management of their member clubs.  
 
2.6.1  Principles versus Rules-Based Standards 
The form of regulation also includes the standards or rules around which a 
regulatory regime is organised and these are central to all regulatory regimes 
(Hood et al., 2001; Scott, 2010). Every efficient regulatory regime should be 
able to identify, detect deviation from, and provide a mechanism for correcting 
deviation from standards. According to Diver (1983), a standard should be 
transparent to the extent that it is easily comprehensible to its audience and 
easily applied to its intended circumstances. In developing regulatory 
standards therefore, a choice needs to be made between principles-based 
and rules-based standards (Scott, 2010).  
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Each type of standard setting has its advantages and disadvantages, as 
evidenced by recent accounting scandals (Sama and Shoaf, 2005).  For 
example, while the 2008 bank failures have been blamed by some on the use 
of broad principles or standards instead of detailed rules as the basis of the 
regulatory regimes (Scott, 2010), rules-based standards were seen by others 
as contributing to the collapse of corporate giants like Enron (Ball, 2009).  It is 
argued that very detailed standards give little room for creativity and might 
lead to a ‘ticking of the boxes’ mentality (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991). They 
have argued quite validly that detailed standards might be followed to the 
letter but at the same time ‘evade the spirit and undermine the objectives’ of 
the standards. 
 
These challenges with focusing on one type of standards have encouraged 
regulators to adopt a combination of both rules and principles-based standard 
in a single regulatory framework, depending on the objectives of the 
regulation. For instance, the UEFA CL and FFP regulation combines both 
rules and principles-based standards to achieve regulatory objectives.   
 
2.6.2  Enforcement of Regulation 
Without detailing out what specific regulatory enforcement models are 
necessary to achieve compliance, Sappington (1994) admits that the 
regulatory design process also includes the enforcement mechanisms 
adopted by the regulator. Effective enforcement is vital to the successful 
implementation of legislation as unenforced regulation rarely fulfils its 
objectives (Gunningham, 2010).  
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According to Simpson (2002) deterrence emphasises a confrontational style 
based on the argument that given the right level of severity of punishment, the 
firm and other potential violators would be deterred from future violation. In 
such an instance one needs to be able to detect, establish and personalise 
wrongdoing for this strategy to be effective.  
 
The deterrence strategy is built on the premise that business corporations are 
‘amoral calculators’ (Kagan and Scholz, 1984); who would not conform unless 
they are required to do so by law or unless non-compliance would be detected 
and punished. General deterrence is based on the premise that firms would 
learn from the punishment suffered by others and desist from similar conduct. 
Specific deterrence, however, assumes that a company when punished would 
attempt to avoid similar punishment in future (Baldwin and Anderson, 2002; 
Simpson, 2002).  
 
On the other hand, a compliance strategy emphasises the dichotomy between 
cooperation and confrontation or between conciliation and coercion (Hutter, 
1993; Shapiro and Rabinowitz, 1997). Threat of enforcement remains so far 
as possible, in the background; to be used only if attempts to encourage 
compliance fail (Hawkins, 1984). Both deterrence and compliance strategies 
have their weaknesses and strengths. Gunningham (2010) cautions that 
where deterrence is over-used it could create a culture of ‘regulatory 
resistance’ and could lead to some off-setting responses by the regulatee 
(Levy and Spiller, 1994), depending on the motivation of a firm’s leaders.  
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However, a strategy of advice and persuasion could also degenerate into 
‘intolerable laxity’ and fail to deter those who have no intention of complying 
which could lead to ‘negotiated non-compliance’ (Gunningham, 1987, 2010). 
He argues that where firms in an industry benefit from generally good 
corporate leaders, a compliance strategy, which is more incentive-based and 
involves delegated decision-making, would be more effective than an 
adversarial approach built on a regulatory logic of deterrence (see, for 
example, Fehr and Falk, 2002)  
 
2.6.3  Regulatory Enforcement Models 
The obvious limitations of compliance and deterrence strategies as stand-
alone strategies have led to the development of responsive regulation (Ayres 
and Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002); smart regulation (Gunningham, 
1999 and 2010; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1999); risk-based regulation 
(Black, 2005); regulatory craft (Sparrow, 2000) and really responsive 
regulation (Baldwin and Black, 2008). 
 
Unlike a pure deterrence or compliance approach, responsive regulation 
assumes virtue on the part of the regulatee and assumes further that the 
regulator also responds in a cooperative manner. It is modelled on the 
“enforcement pyramid” (see Figure 2.7) developed by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992). At the bottom of the pyramid, firms are advised and persuaded to 
conform and an escalation up the pyramid towards a deterrence-oriented 
strategy only occurs if there is non-compliance. The regulator only responds 
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with punitive/coercive strategies when the expectations are not met by the 
regulated (Gunningham, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
Incapacitation
Fines & other 
punitive action 
(Higher Court)
Fines & other punitive 
action (Lower Court)
Enforceable undertakings and 
restorative justice strategies
Prohibition Notice
Improvement Notice
Penalty Notice
Warnings, Directions, and negotiated outcomes
Warning
Figure 2.7: Enforcement Pyramid 
Proponents of responsive regulation see the judicious use of a mix of 
compliance and deterrence as the likely optimal strategy. It also rewards those 
who go beyond mere compliance. According to Scott (2004), the strength of 
the enforcement pyramid is the ease with which one could connect its 
theoretical construct to concrete and practical experience. 
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One key problem with responsive regulation, however, is that the model is 
weak in dealing with complex and networked regulatory frameworks, as the 
step-by-step escalation up and down the regulatory pyramid might be 
inappropriate in such cases, and might sometimes result in unintended 
consequences (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Haines, 1997). Pyramidal response 
also depends on the level of genuine dialogue between regulators and the 
regulated (Gullingham, 2010; Parker, 1999; Scott, 2004). As such, in an 
industry where it is impractical to achieve sufficient levels of repeat interaction 
between the regulators and the regulatee the applicability of the enforcement 
pyramid would be limited.  
 
According to Gunningham (2010), the difference between responsive and 
smart regulation, is that the smart regulation pyramid conceives of the 
possibility of regulation using a number of different instruments and 
implemented by a number of parties. The preferred role of government under 
smart regulation is to create the necessary pre-conditions for other parties to 
assume a greater share of the regulatory burden rather than engaging in direct 
intervention. This would produce better regulation (see Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge, 2010; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998).  
 
In risk-based models the targeting of regulation is based upon an assessment 
of the degree of risk associated with an entity (Black, 2005; Hampton, 2005). 
The level and intensity of regulation is increased depending on the level of risk 
generated by the entity. Critics of risk-based models, including Gunningham 
(2010), point to the likelihood that risk-based models may end up 
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concentrating on a few large risks rather than many lower level risks. 
Moreover its effectiveness also depends on the level of sophistication of the 
risk analysis done. 
 
The concept of regulatory craft requires regulatory enforcers to identify and 
remedy important problems (Sparrow, 2000). In effect, regulatory craft is 
similar to risk-based models as both attempts to reduce risks and eliminate 
hazards. This would seem to suggest that regulators should be able to 
determine what instruments of regulation are best able to achieve compliance, 
know when to use them and develop a system for recognizing when tools are 
inadequate in order that replacements could be brought forward (Sparrow, 
2000).  
The focus of regulatory craft on determining important regulatory problems and 
fixing them to the exclusion of ‘unimportant’ problems assumes that regulation 
could always be parcelled into problems and projects. Baldwin and Black 
(2008) argue further that responsive regulation, smart regulation, risk-based 
regulation and regulatory craft only concentrate on dealing with the compliance 
response of a regulatee, failing to take into consideration the attitudinal 
settings of the regulatee and the institutional environment within which the 
regulator operates. Hence they argue that changes in the priorities, 
circumstances and objectives of the regulator are all crucial to achieving 
regulatory goals. It is precisely these issues that their model of a ‘really 
responsive regulation’ seeks to be responsive to. Appendix 1 provides a 
general critique of the various regulatory enforcement models provided by 
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Baldwin and Black (2008) as a prelude to their discussion of ‘really responsive 
regulation’ 
 
2.6.4  The Role of Incentives in Regulatory Compliance  
Oliver (1980) draws attention to the distinction between negative and positive 
incentives. Whilst rewards are considered as positive incentive, penalties and 
sanctions are negative incentives, provided to induce behavioural change. 
Hilbe and Sigmund (2010) on the other hand point out differences in effect of 
negative and positive incentives in achieving cooperation in a population. They 
argue that the best policy to turn a population of non-cooperators into a 
population of cooperators is to provide rewards for those who choose to 
cooperate and once the majority become cooperators, the few who defect 
could then be punished, in a responsive manner (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992). 
 
According to Levy and Spiller (1994), regulatory incentives include the rules 
governing pricing, cross or direct subsidies, entry, access and 
interconnections within the regulated industry or organisation. Similarly, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) suggest that the range of instruments available to 
the regulator to ensure regulatory compliance includes rules, authorisation, 
establishing principles and guidance, monitoring, intervention, sanctions, 
compensation and mandatory disclosure requirements. For instance, financial 
incentives are known to motivate firms to comply, with tax regulations (Feld 
and Frey, 2007), even though Fehr and Falk (2002) suggest that monetary 
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incentives might be counter-productive and reduce the performance of agents 
or their compliance with rules. 
 
Levey and Spiller (1994) points out the negative effects of prescriptive 
regulations, penal sanctions, and administrative enforcement on productivity, 
as well as on the responses of the regulated. They also draw attention to the 
importance of regulatory incentives on firm behaviour. These issues are 
critical in developing an incentive-based financial regulatory framework for 
Ghanaian football.  
An incentive-based regulatory framework such as this study proposes would 
have to deal with the theoretical challenges identified by the regulatory 
enforcement models discussed in section 2.6.3, in terms of the effect of 
different types of incentives on motivation. For instance, an incentive-based 
model might have to assume that leaders in Ghanaian football are good 
corporate leaders whose current financial management choices might have 
been influenced by difficult economic conditions. 
 
2.6.5  Strategic Use of Regulation 
Informational asymmetry generates both market and regulatory failure as the 
regulator could sometimes be threatened by a regulated monopolist, 
especially where its commitment ability is weakened by political pressures or 
by the lack of job security (Sappington, 1994). On the other hand Veljanovski 
(2010) argues that in a competitive environment the regulator sometimes has 
more information than individual members of industry, thus limiting the ability 
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of individual firms to manipulate information and avoid compliance with 
regulation.  
 
Sometimes even the best intentioned regulators cannot be relied on to always 
act properly. According to Veljanovski (2010) threat of delay in approval is 
sometimes used by regulators to get concessions from a regulatee, especially 
in merger situation where there may be particular time limits. Publicity and 
public opinion which could have adverse reputational effects on a shamed 
company could also be used to obtain compliance from firms. The existence of 
strategic behaviour by regulators suggests that, within any regulatory 
framework, parties affected by regulation should have the right of review due 
to concern over the abuse of regulators’ unfettered discretion.  Concerns may, 
however, arise over the possible use of the review process by firms to unduly 
frustrate the regulator, thus weakening the effectiveness of regulation.  
 
This study attempts, in part, to develop a model of financial regulation which is 
specific to a particular group of clubs in the football industry, in order to modify 
their financial management practices. In the context of this study, the 
discussions on the use of strategic behaviour by the regulator and the 
regulatee is quite relevant in that the ability of Ghanaian football’s financial 
regulator to achieve regulatory compliance would be dependent on its ability to 
deal with the use of strategic behaviour by clubs. On the other hand, there 
should also be in-built mechanisms within the regulatory framework to deal 
with potential abuses of the process by individuals working for the regulator. 
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This study aims, in part, to develop a financial regulatory framework to deal 
with the specific institutional challenges within a particular industry in Ghana. 
The regulatory framework to be developed is thus specific to Ghana, and 
moreover applicable only within the institutional context within which Ghanaian 
professional football clubs operate. Thus the concept of context specificity in 
regulation that revolves around peculiar industry conditions, institutional 
structure, and the availability of human, financial and physical resources is 
critical to the development of the framework. 
 
In the context of the study, Sappington’s framework provides a powerful 
framework for the analysis of how financial regulation serves to control 
aspects of the financial interaction amongst clubs e.g. in terms of player 
transfer and its payments; revenue distribution from the joint-production of a 
football game; and joint-sale of league rights revenue. The framework could 
also be utilised to rationalise a football financial regulator’s attempt to 
encourage investment in youth and infrastructure development. This according 
to Sappington would be considered as an attempt to provide incentives for 
new investment in industry performance and development. As an objective, 
Sappington’s analysis also suggests that Ghanaian football’s financial 
regulator could aim at regulating the pricing decisions of clubs to protect 
consumers and ensure the long term interest of fans as consumers. As 
discussed earlier, the other theories are limited in their discussions of the 
objectives of a regulator.  
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Sappington’s framework, crucially, recognises the possible conflicts that might 
exist between various regulatory goals, which in the context of football, 
revolves around the conflict between achieving sporting and financial goals. 
The framework provides a powerful analytical tool for determining the 
sequencing of the achievement of both financial and sporting objectives, which 
need not necessarily be achieved simultaneously.  Importantly, Sappington’s 
framework also recognises the limitations placed by the resources available to 
the regulator on the ability of the regulator to achieve its regulatory objectives. 
In the context of the study, the financial environment is characterised by 
limited resources for both the regulator and the regulatee, possibly limiting the 
ability of the financial regulator for Ghanaian football to adopt a 
comprehensive regulatory framework. Sappington’s framework also alerts us 
to the crucial importance of the phasing of the implementation of football’s 
financial regulatory framework.  
 
Sappington’s work could also be considered to be superior to the other 
theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter in the sense that it provides a 
more detailed framework for assessing the form, the scope and the function of 
any regulatory framework. Importantly, the framework differentiates between 
command-and-control and incentive-based delegated regulatory systems. It 
combines aspects of traditional regulatory theories that focused on using 
deterrence and compliance to enforce regulation; the use of both positive and 
negative incentives to affect the motivational posture of the regulatee; and the 
importance of institutional and industry conditions for regulatory design.  
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Whilst Baldwin and Black’s (2008) ‘really responsive regulation’ achieves a lot 
of convergence with Sappington’s formulation, their lack of emphasis on the 
objectives of regulation and the importance of industry conditions makes it 
inferior as a comprehensive framework for regulatory policy design. 
 
Despite its limited recognition of the critical role of: the cost of regulation in the 
regulatory design; the existence of regulatory capture which might affect the 
independence of the regulator; and the importance of financial and physical 
resources in the regulatory process, Sappington’s framework is adopted as 
the theoretical basis of this study. The focus of Sappington’s framework on the 
importance of the institutional structure, the industry conditions, the resources 
available to the regulator, and the objectives of the regulator as being the key 
ingredients in the design of a regulatory framework strikes consonance with 
the focus of the study on developing an incentive-based, context-specific 
regulatory framework for Ghanaian football.  The model of financial regulation 
to be developed by this study would also deal with the limitations of the 
Sappington model identified. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This section discusses the philosophical foundations of research which explain 
the ontological and epistemological stance underpinning this study. It 
discusses the adoption of a mixed-method design and the specific qualitative 
and quantitative methods utilised in this study.  It draws out the limitations of 
the research methods adopted and how these challenges were resolved.  
 
3.2  ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
3.2.1  Positivism versus Interpretivism 
Table 3.1 provides an overview of alternative philosophical stances adopted 
by social science researchers and their implications for the choice of study 
methods. 
The research question formulated by every researcher is a function of one’s 
view about what constitutes reality (ontological position), what possible ways 
exist for knowledge about this reality to be gained (epistemological position), 
and how one could go about acquiring such knowledge (methodological 
position). This then invariably determines the plan (Design) and the 
procedures (Method) that could be used to collect that knowledge (Smith, 
2010; Willig, 2008). 
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Table 3.1: Ontological and Epistemological Considerations for Social Research 
 I II Approach Adopted by this 
Study 
Ontological Position: 
View of Social Reality 
Objectivism: view 
social reality as 
something objective 
and measurable 
Constructivism: Social 
reality as something 
constructed by people 
Pragmatism: existence of 
both the natural or 
physical world and the 
social and psychological 
world 
Epistemological 
Position: Theory of 
Knowledge 
Positivism: follows a 
natural science model 
Interpretivism: 
interpretive 
Critical Realism: views 
current truth, meaning and 
knowledge as tentative 
and as changing over time 
Role of Theory Deductive Approach, 
testing of theory 
Inductive Approach, 
generation of theory 
Mixture of Inductive and 
Deductive 
Methodological 
Approach 
Quantitative Qualitative Mixed-Methods 
Source: Adapted from Spratt, Walker and Robinson (2004); Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
 
 The epistemological position taken by a researcher is generally influenced by 
their ontological orientation: those with a Constructivist view generally take an 
Interpretivist position; those with an Objectivist view commonly align 
themselves to the Positivist position (Bryman, 2012; Grix, 2002). Positivists 
argue that there is an objective reality; singular and external to the research 
question under study; ultimately knowable and measurable (Atkinson, 2012). 
Thus the investigative approach of the Positivist research is characterised by 
control, replication and hypothesis testing (Gratton and Jones, 2012).  
In contrast, the Interpretivist approach to research is a quest for subjective 
knowledge derived from Constructivist assumptions that ‘reality is a 
complicated and messy matter’ which cannot be studied without the 
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researcher immersing himself into the society in which the study is being 
conducted (Atkinson, 2012). For instance, trying to understand the perception 
of football business managers about the adequacy of regulation cannot be 
achieved without the researcher engaging the stakeholders in a discussion of 
their individual subjective lived realities.  
 
3.2.2 A Pragmatic Approach to Research 
Purists from the two traditions argue in favour of an ‘Incompatibility Theses’ 
(Howe, 1988); arguing against the mixture of epistemological and ontological 
positions in any one research project. For the critical realist, however, 
pragmatism rejects the incompatibility thesis and offers methodological mixes 
that are able to help researchers provide answers to the numerous research 
questions that they are confronted with on a daily basis (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
For instance, in an attempt to develop an appropriate form of regulation for a 
particular group of people or entities, Sappington (1994) suggested that the 
context and the objectives of the regulator are critical. One would need to 
determine the extent of regulation existing in an industry and how the new 
regulation would affect, for instance the financial position of clubs.  Whilst it 
might be difficult to objectively measure the extent of existing regulation, the 
effect of regulation on the financial position of clubs is, to a large extent, 
measurable. Adopting a purely positivist or Interpretivist approach would 
therefore be inadequate to answer the research questions.  
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The research objectives of the current study are varied, with some concepts 
measurable and others being defined in such a way as not allowing them to be 
reduced to quantities. Consequently this study adopts a pragmatic approach 
to the selection of methods, allowing it to combine particular qualitative and 
quantitative methods that are considered appropriate, at each stage of the 
study, to achieve the stated objective. This approach is based on a critical 
realist philosophical standpoint which views current truth, meaning and 
knowledge as being tentative and changing over time (Ackroyd and 
Fleetwood, 2004; Easton, 2010; Fleetwood, 2005; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 
2004).  
Critical realism is based on the assumption that social phenomena such as 
actions, texts, institutions have to be interpreted by starting from the 
researcher’s own frame of meaning (Sayer, 2000). However, the world exists 
independently of our knowledge of it and as such social phenomena exists 
regardless of the way a researcher interpretes it (Easton, 2010; Fleetwood, 
2005).  
The general implications of these assumptions are that the methods of social 
science and natural science may have similarities and differences (Easton, 
2010). Thus depending on what knowledge we seek to acquire, we can 
employ either the methods of social science, natural science or both. Sayer 
(1992) also argues that in order to be able to explain social phenomena, as 
this study seeks to do, we have to evaluate them critically, employing both 
positivist and Interpretivist approaches, which can be combined with little 
problem (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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3.3  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THIS STUDY 
This section provides a contrast between the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to research methodology and provides a rationale for the choice 
of a mixed-method approach to this study. 
3.3.1  Quantitative versus Qualitative Approach to Social Research 
The two traditional methodological approaches to research are the quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. These differ in terms of: their general orientation 
to social research; their epistemological foundations and their ontological 
basis. Thus they differ in their analytical objectives; the types of questions they 
pose; the types of data collection instruments they use; the forms of data they 
produce; and the degree of flexibility built into study design (Mack et al, 2005) 
 
Quantitative analysis deals with directly measurable ‘quantities’ which can be 
converted into numerical values and statistically analysed to either confirm or 
refute a theory or hypothesis (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Atkinson, 2012; 
Smith, 2010; Gratton & Jones, 2012). In the context of the current study, 
quantitative methods could be applied to the analysis of the financial 
performance and position of football clubs to provide evidence of clubs’ 
financial viability. 
 
Smith and Manning (1982) suggest that qualitative research, on the other 
hand, is better suited for initial exploratory research into unknown or unfamiliar 
phenomena. It is useful for describing complex phenomena especially when 
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studying a limited number of cases in depth as is with the case in this study, 
with its focus on the rationale for regulation of football and football clubs in 
Ghana. It enables the researcher to develop concepts, conjectures, and 
interpretations empirically grounded in the investigated systems. It could be 
argued that qualitative approaches are more responsive to local situations, 
conditions, and stakeholders’ needs than could be obtained through 
quantitative analysis. 
 
It could also be argued that data collection and research questions are 
adjusted according to what is learned, as participant responses affect how and 
which questions researchers ask next. These are key features of pre-
dominantly semi-structured methods such as in-depth interviews, focus groups 
and participant observations. For instance this study utilises critical review and 
semi-structured interviews to achieve one of the study’s key objectives, i.e. the 
development of a context-specific model of financial regulation.  
 
3.3.2  The Choice of a Mixed-Method Approach to the Study 
The advent of mixed-method research strategies has shown that it is possible 
to combine what historically were seen as incompatible research methods in 
one research project, if it is the best way to answer the research questions 
posed. Proponents of mixed-method research believe that the choice between 
quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches is not an either/or 
issue, because both quantitative and qualitative research are important and 
that qualitative researchers should feel free to use quantitative methods and 
vice versa (see Johnson and Christensen, 2004; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
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1998, 2008). They argue that differences in epistemological beliefs of a 
qualitative ‘inquirer’ and a quantitative ‘investigator’ should not inhibit each 
from adopting methods traditionally associated with the other’s work.  
 
Thus not only is it possible to mix quantitative and qualitative methods to 
answer the questions posed by the chosen research objectives, but it is also 
possible to mix philosophical views about knowledge. The epistemological 
position of the researcher therefore does not dictate what speciﬁc data 
collection and data analytical methods researchers must use (Johnson et al., 
2004).  
 
Table 3.2, adapted from Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), shows the 
contribution of selected writers whose contributions are considered very 
important to the development of Mixed-Methods Research. 
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Table 3.2: Contribution of writers to the development of Mixed-Methods Research 
Stage of Development Authors (Years) Contribution to Mixed Methods Research 
Formative Period Campbell and Fiske (1959) Introduced the use of multiple quantitative methods 
Sieber (1973) Combined surveys and Interviews 
Jick (1979) Discussed triangulating qualitative and quantitative 
data 
Cook and Reichardt (1979) Presented 10 ways to combine quantitative and 
qualitative data 
Paradigm Debate 
 Period 
Rossman and Wilson (1985) Discussed stances toward combining methods – 
purists, situationalists, and pragmatists 
Bryman (1988) Reviewed the debate and established connections 
within the two traditions 
Reichardt and Rallis (1994) Discussed the paradigm debate and reconciled two 
traditions 
Greene and Caracelli (1997) Suggested that we move past the paradigm debate 
Procedural  
Development Period 
Greene, Caracelli and 
Graham (1989) 
Identified a classification system of types of mixed 
methods designs 
Brewer and Hunter (1989) Focused on the multi-method approach as used in the 
process of research 
Morse (1991) Developed a notation system 
Creswell (1994) Identified three types of mixed method designs 
Morgan (1998) Developed a typology for determining design to use 
Newman and Benz (1998) Provided an overview of procedures 
Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998) 
Presented topical overview of mixed methods research 
Bamberger (2000) Provided an international policy focus to mixed 
methods research 
Advocacy as  
Separate Design 
 period 
Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998) 
Provided a comprehensive treatment of many aspects 
of mixed methods research 
Creswell (2003) Compared quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods 
approaches in the process of research 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
(2004) 
Positioned mixed methods research as a natural 
complement to traditional qualitative and quantitative 
research  
Source: Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), 
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 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) also develop a typology of mixed-method 
designs based on the two dimensions of sequencing and prioritization of 
qualitative or quantitative methods in the mixed-method design. The nine 
different designs which they obtained are summarised by Rudd and Johnson 
(2010) as in the second column of Table 3.2., which also includes the 
typologies developed by Terrell (2011). 
 
Table 3.3: Classification of mixed-method approaches 
Dimension Morse (1991); Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 
(2004); Rudd & Johnson (2010) Classification 
Terrell (2011) Classification 
Equal-status  
concurrent designs 
QUAL + QUAN 
QUAN + QUAL 
Concurrent Triangulation  
Concurrent Transformative  
Equal-status  
sequential designs 
QUAL   →  QUAN 
QUAL   →  QUAN 
QUAN  →  QUAL 
QUAN  →  QUAL 
Sequential Exploratory Strategy 
Sequential Transformative 
Sequential Explanatory Strategy 
Sequential Transformative 
Dominant-status  
concurrent designs 
QUAL + quan 
QUAL + quan 
QUAN + qual 
QUAN + qual 
Concurrent Nested Strategy 
Concurrent Triangulation  
Concurrent Nested Strategy 
Concurrent Triangulation  
Dominant-status  
sequential designs: 
 
QUAL  →    quan 
qual    →     QUAN 
QUAN  →    qual 
quan   →      QUAL 
Sequential Exploratory Strategy 
Sequential Exploratory Strategy 
Sequential Explanatory Strategy 
Sequential Explanatory Strategy 
Source: Morse (1991); Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004); Rudd & Johnson (2010); Terrell (2011) 
 
The claim that better understanding would be obtained because mixed 
methods offers strengths that ‘offset the weaknesses of separately applied 
quantitative and qualitative methods’ (Creswell, 2006; p18) have been 
challenged by critics such as Bazely (2004) and Terrell (2011) who suggest 
that ensuring validity in a mixed method design is no less a challenge as 
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controlling validity in a standard quantitative or qualitative research. For 
instance triangulation, as a technique of using quantitative and qualitative data 
to validate each other has been misused, according to Bazely (2004) and in 
any case does not assist validation as each data source must be understood 
on its own terms (Fielding & Fielding, 1986; Flick, 1992). There is also the 
potential for the inappropriate application of the sampling rules of one method 
to create distortions of the assumptions of the other method and invalidate 
these assumptions, for example, as a result of an attempt to meet 
expectations for generalisation of results from a predominantly qualitative 
approach.  
 
Even in terms of analysis Bazely (2004) warns that attempting to ‘quantitize’ a 
qualitative theme in an attempt to integrate the data in a mixed-research 
strategy could create problems. Without discounting the relevance of the 
mixed-method strategy as a valid method for social science research he 
advocates that researchers need to take into account the assumptions 
underlying the methods of analysis being used to draw and present 
conclusions.  
 
3.3.3  Mixed-Method Type Adopted For the Study 
These cautions in the use of the mixed-method strategy have all been taken 
into consideration in determining the methodological approach adopted by this 
study as summarised in Figure 3.1.  
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Modified Football Financial 
Clearinghouse Framework 
Development of 
the Draft Version 
of Football 
Financial Clearing-
house (FFC) 
Framework 
Critical Review of 
Existing Regulatory 
Frameworks in Football 
+ Financial Reporting in 
Ghanaian Football 
Review of 
Ghanaian 
Football Finance 
Results in 
Data is integrated at the 
Analysis Stage 
Validation of Draft FFC Framework 
- Semi-Structured Interviews 
- Focus Group 
a. Existing Regulatory Framework 
b. Financial Management  
c. Model 
-  Content Analysis 
 
 
Questionnaire used 
in the validation of 
transcripts and data  
 
Followed By 
 
QUALITATIVE 
Qualitative + 
quantitative QUALITATIVE 
                       QUALITATIVE Quantitative 
QUALITATIVE 
STAGE 3: CONCURRENT NESTED STRATEGY STAGE 2: QUALITATIVE STAGE 1: CONCURRENT TRANSFORMATIVE  
FIG 3.1: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
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The study utilises some quantitative data analysis embedded in a 
predominantly qualitative design in an attempt to find answers to the research 
questions identified. In an attempt to find the mix of methods that best answers 
the question at hand the study adopts a pragmatic approach to method 
selection, influenced primarily by the critical realist epistemological position 
adopted. The predominantly qualitative approach to answering the research 
questions implied that the study did not need to statistically test pre-determined 
hypothesis.  
 
The attempt to develop a context-specific incentive based framework for the 
financial regulation of professional football clubs meant that the researcher 
needed to allow the information obtained from the critical review of existing 
framework and the review of Ghanaian football finance to inform the process of 
developing a framework. Such a process which seeks to develop a framework 
for a defined constituent (Ghanaian professional football clubs) needed to be 
informed by all the information which could conceivably be obtained. This 
includes information on the financial reporting and performance of the clubs, 
information that could only be adequately and appropriately obtained through 
the quantitative analysis of the financial statements of the clubs over a given 
time period. Hence, this resulted in the inclusion of quantitative analysis within 
a predominantly qualitative study. 
 
The study has proceeded in three distinct stages each with a different 
methodological approach. Stage 1 (see Fig. 3.1) utilises a Concurrent 
Transformative Strategy (Terrell, 2011) involving a predominantly qualitative 
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process of critically reviewing existing regulatory frameworks in football, done 
concurrently with a qualitative review of the existing financial reporting 
framework and a quantitative analysis of the financial performance of 
professional football clubs in Ghana.  This strategy is informed by the choice of 
critical realism as the epistemological basis for the study which allows the 
researcher to choose the best methods that would help to answer the research 
question and objectives.   
  
Stage 2 involves a purely qualitative process of utilising the results and analysis 
in Stage 1 to develop a draft version of the Football Financial Clearinghouse 
Model (FFCM1) which would subsequently be validated in Stage 3. The 
interrogation of the FFC framework adopts a Concurrent Nested Strategy which 
involves the application of some quantitative data collection and analysis 
process embedded in a pre-dominantly qualitative data collection and analysis 
process. The qualitative process involved the use of semi-structured interviews 
and focus group sessions to collect data on the existing financial regulatory 
framework; the financial management of professional clubs in Ghana and the 
clubs’ perception of the FFC Framework.   
 
The quantitative process involved the use of a Likert-Scale type questionnaire 
with closed questions for the purpose of validating the interview data 
transcription process and also to confirm some of the information obtain from 
the interviews. The end product of the three stages is the development of a 
modified version of the Football Financial Clearinghouse Model (FFCM2).  
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3.4  APPLICATION OF QUALITATIVE METHODS 
This section discusses the use of critical review, semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups as the main tools for qualitative data gathering. It also discusses 
the selection of research subjects, instrumentation and the procedures used in 
gathering the qualitative data for analysis. It discusses the ethical issues 
considered in qualitative data collection and how they were resolved. It 
discusses the processes of recording, transcription, coding and analysis of the 
interview data in this study.  
The section concludes with a discussion of how the issues of researcher 
reflexivity and subjectivity, as well as validity and reliability which could 
potentially limit the generalizability of qualitative research findings were dealt 
with in this study. 
 
3.4.1  Selection of Specific Data Gathering Methods 
Critical Review 
In order to facilitate the critical review of existing frameworks for financial 
regulation of football around the world, the following documents were obtained: 
- FIFA Club Licensing Regulations (FIFA, 2010) obtained from the www.fifa.org; 
- UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (UEFA, 2012a, 
2012b) obtained from www.uefa.com; 
- CAF Statutes (CAF, 2013) obtained from www.cafonline.com; 
- Scottish FA’s Club Licensing Manual (SFA, 2013) obtained from 
www.scottishfa.co.uk  
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The FIFA Club Licensing Regulations (FIFA CLR) provides the framework for 
confederations and national associations to self-regulate, and provides an 
example of regulations emanating from a world governing body (WGB). The 
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (UEFA CL & FFPR) 
provides a framework for the financial regulation of clubs governed within a 
national governing body (NGB) framework. It has been selected for review 
because it provides the most comprehensive set of financial regulatory tools 
designed by any Confederation Governing Body (CGB) under FIFA (Flanagan, 
2013). The Scottish FA Club Licensing Regulations (SFA CLR) was selected 
for review based on convenient access and availability. Moreover, the well-
publicized financial difficulties encountered by Rangers, one of Europe’s 
leading clubs, have resulted in considerable emphasis being placed on the 
SFA’s approach to financial regulation (Morrow, 2013 forthcoming). 
Microsoft Word versions of the following documents were also obtained from 
the Ghana Football Association’ General Secretary: 
o Ghana Football Associations Statutes (GFA, 2010); 
o Ghana Football Association’s Rules and Regulations as amended in 
September, 2012. 
The review involved a utilization of key aspects of Sappington’s framework to 
analyse the FIFA CLR (FIFA, 2010), the UEFA CL & FPR (UEFA, 2012a, 
2012b), and the SFA (2013) frameworks and to assess the applicability of 
various issues to a Ghanaian context (see Chapter 4). A review of the Ghana 
Football Association’s Statutes and its Rules and Regulations was also 
undertaken to assess its existing approach to  the financial regulation of 
professional clubs.  
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An assessment of the quality of financial disclosure by Ghanaian Premier 
Division clubs is also done based on a critical review of financial statements 
submitted by the clubs to the FA. The review entails consideration of the 
submission and storage of accounts, the credibility, content and consistency of 
accounting in the financial statements of the clubs. An assessment of the 
comparability of the financial statements is also undertaken on the basis of the 
existence of comparable figures from prior years, treatment of recruitment costs 
and asset depreciation 
The result from the critical review of existing frameworks and the review of 
Ghanaian football finance, disclosure and accounting policy adoption are then 
combined to serve as the contextual basis for the formulation of the draft 
version of the financial regulatory framework for Ghanaian football. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Group 
Opdenakker (2006) provides a comprehensive discussion on the advantages 
and disadvantages of four different interview techniques for the collection of 
qualitative data and argues that the difference lies in whether a particular 
interview type involves synchronous or asynchronous communication in time 
and/or place. Table 3.4 shows the classification of each interview type based 
on the above categorization.  
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Table 3.4: Classification of interview types by Time and Place 
 Time Place 
Synchronous 
Communication 
Face-to-Face (FTF) 
MSN Messenger 
Telephone 
Face-to-Face 
(FTF) 
 
Asynchronous 
Communication 
E-mail E-Mail 
MSN 
Messenger 
Telephone 
Source: Opdenakker (2006) 
 
According to Opdenakker (2006) where the attitude of the respondent towards 
the framework and their understanding of the model itself is important to the 
research outcome, an interview technique which is synchronous in place allows 
for the collection of social cues such as intonation, voice and body language. 
The use of the face-to-face interview technique had the added advantage over 
the other techniques of allowing for the non-delayed collection of spontaneous 
data, even if the cost involved was substantial compared to the other 
techniques.  
 
However, the reduction in cost through the use of telephone and other forms of 
interviews in place of face-to-face interviews is most often than not achieved at 
the expense of quality in result (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004); and the effect of 
the trade-off becomes more pronounced in qualitative research that involves a 
small purposively selected sample. Thus, the choice of the face-to-face 
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interview technique for the current study is justified by the need to present the 
model to the respondents before questions could be asked of them, and to also 
pick up the social cues emanating from the respondents during the course of 
the interview session, this allowing the researcher to provide enhanced 
interpretation of the findings. 
 
Research Subjects 
The study involved stakeholders of professional football in Ghana. These 
included: the professional football clubs in Ghana (16 Premier League); the 
Ghana Football Association; the Premier League Board; and the Ghana 
League Clubs Association (GHALCA).  
The study involved the Chief Executive Officer or his/her representative in each 
of the professional football clubs. The representative in question had to be a 
Manager or somebody within the club with the capacity to take financial 
decisions on behalf of that club. This ensured that the researcher was able to 
collect credible information and opinions which represented the view of the 
clubs. Each of the clubs has a representative in the capital (normally referred to 
as the Accra Rep of the club) who liaises with the FA on issues involving the 
clubs. Whilst it would have been easier for the researcher to interview these 
representatives (since they are all based in Accra) they do not always have the 
capacity to take decisions on behalf of the clubs and their opinions do not 
always reflect the position of the Management of the clubs. Thus it was 
important for the credibility of the study, and the reliability of its outcome to 
involve only top management level personnel in the interview process. 
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Out of the 16 club officials that were interviewed, six officially carried the title of 
Chief Executive Officer; five of them were either members of the club’s Board of 
Directors or carried the title Vice-President; three were either a General 
Manager, Finance Manager or Administrative Manager; and two of them were 
either Chairman of the Board or President of the club providing the study with 
respondents who had varied managerial competencies.  
The respondents were knowledgeable about regulation and governance of 
football in the country as they represented, to a large extent, both the regulators 
and the regulated as far as professional football in Ghana is concerned. Apart 
from the President of the FA and the Chairman of the League Board who were 
all interviewed as key informants, ten of the 16 club officials are current or 
former members of the Executive Committee of the Ghana Football Association 
(GFA) or members of other sub-committees of the FA. Two of the respondents 
are members of the Premier League Board whilst another two are Executive 
members of the welfare body of the clubs, the Ghana League Clubs 
Association (GHALCA). Thus the opinions of the respondents represent not 
only that of professional football clubs in Ghana but also a high percentage of 
officials of the regulator (Ghana Football Association).  
In terms of the professional background of the respondents, six out of 16 have 
a professional background in banking, finance or law, making them 
knowledgeable in issues relating to financial regulation. The President of the FA 
is not only a lawyer by profession, but also works with a bank as legal advisor. 
The Chairman of the League is also a former Managing Director of a bank with 
many years of lending history to football clubs. These, together with the officials 
of the GHALCA provide key-informant perspectives for the study, something 
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which is considered to generally enrich the study and improve its reliability 
(Gratton & Jones, 2010) 
The Ghana Football Association, the body responsible for the organization, 
regulation, development and promotion of football in Ghana, was represented 
in this study by the President of the Association who is also the official 
spokesperson of the Association. He is also the Chairman of both the 
Emergency and Executive Committees of the FA.  
The Executives of the Ghana League Clubs Association (GHALCA), the welfare 
body of football clubs in Ghana, were involved as key stakeholders 
representing all clubs in Premier, Division 1, Division 2 and Division 3 clubs in 
the country. It was considered that they provided a general perspective on the 
thinking of the clubs in Ghana. Two of their members took part in a focus group 
discussion that followed the same approach as that adopted with the clubs.  
Instrumentation 
The semi-structured interview guide used to obtain data for the interrogation of 
the FFC conceptual framework (attached as Appendix 2) was developed based 
on a general review of literature, the comparative review of existing regulation, 
the review of Ghanaian football finance, and the preliminary FFC Framework 
itself.  
In choosing the type of interview format to use the researcher was guided by 
the fact that the study was adopting a mixed-method design in which while the 
topics for discussion were pre-specified, the order and wording of the questions 
would vary depending on the participant and the progress of the interview 
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(Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). The interview guide described the general 
guidelines as to how an average interview session was to be conducted. The 
interview guide was validated during a mock interview/model presentation 
session with the supervisors of the thesis. It indicated that the interview session 
was to start with the interviewer providing the rationale for the overall study and 
the description of the functional objectives of the draft Football Financial 
Clearinghouse Model. It also requested respondents to provide their overall 
evaluation of the FFC Framework. 
Procedures 
The FFC Framework diagrams, together with a Participants’ Information Sheet 
(PIS, attached as Appendix 3), were sent by email to each of the clubs, the FA 
President, the League Board Chairman and the GHALCA Executives 14 days 
before the interview session was due, to allow them sufficient preparation time. 
The FFC Framework Diagrams included Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. The PIS, 
which sought to recruit the respondents for the study, provided information 
including:  the rationale for the study; why the respondent was important to the 
attainment of the study’s objectives; and the right of the respondent to withdraw 
from the study at any stage of the study. This ensured that ‘informed consent’ 
(Gratton and Jones, 2010) or more appropriately ‘valid consent’ (Berg and 
Latin, 2008) of the participants in the study was obtained. 
All clubs were telephoned one week prior to the suggested interview date to 
confirm both receipt of the FFC documents and to finalize interview 
arrangements. Whilst the great majority of clubs indicated that they received 
the emails, 80% of 17 clubs indicated that they had not looked at the contents 
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of the mail at this follow up stage. Calls were also made a day to each interview 
to confirm arrangements. The interview guide was piloted a week before the 
actual interview sessions. This was to check for clarity and logical sequencing 
of the questions, as well as offering some insight into likely interview duration. 
One of the three CEOs of the clubs that were relegated from the Premier 
League in the previous year was selected for the pilot. His background in sports 
marketing and finance ensured that he had relevant knowledge on the issues 
under discussion.  
The presentation of the framework diagrams during the pilot stage was 
protracted; the desire on the interviewer’s part to provide sufficient detail to 
inform the interviews leading to a time over-run. As a result of the pilot, the 
researcher elected to emphasize the key components of the framework during 
the actual interview sessions; while offering the respondent the opportunity to 
ask for explanations where they thought it was necessary.   
Interview sessions took place between the 7th of September and 23rd of 
October, 2012. Where possible the interviews took place at the office or home 
of the CEO or General Manager of the clubs, so as to conduct the interview in a 
convenient environment in which the interviewee was comfortable answering 
questions. However, for practical reasons this was not always possible. The 
following is the breakdown of the venues for the nineteen (19) interviews that 
were conducted: 
 Office of Respondent:   8 
 Office of the Football Association  4 
112 
 
 Office (not that of Respondent)  4 
 Residence of Respondent   1 
 Car Park (in parked car)   2 
The interviews that were conducted in office environments had the advantage 
of providing an opportunity to reduce background noise when recording the 
interviews. The four interviews that took place at the Boardroom of the FA were 
with members of the Executive Committee and took place between other FA 
commitments. As a result, these sessions were sometimes interrupted by 
people looking to have separate chats with the respondent.  
 
3.4.2  Ethical Considerations for Primary Data Collection 
Once the framework diagrams and the interview guide had been developed and 
approved by the PhD Supervisors, they were submitted for approval by the 
School of Sports Research Ethics Committee. This serves as part of the 
process of ensuring that the procedures employed and the outcome of the 
research project is not only ethical but also valid. In due course the Committee 
gave its approval for the fieldwork to begin (Ethics Approval Certificate attached 
as Appendix 4). The key issues identified in respect of the project ethics  
revolved around how the anonymity of the subjects were to be ensured by the 
researcher, how the research subjects were to be recruited and the need for 
written consent or otherwise.  
The confidentiality of the subjects was ensured by referring to individuals only 
by an appropriate code (e.g. HOO1). Both the recorded audio and transcript 
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data are only available to the researcher and his thesis supervisors to ensure 
that the information is kept strictly confidential. There are no known risks to the 
participants in the study. 
 
3.4.3 Dealing with Interview Data 
Recording and Transcription of Interview Data 
With the permission of the respondents each interview was recorded using 
Sony audio recording equipment, which facilitated transferring the data to a 
laptop. An Apple IPhone 4s’ Voice Memo application was also used as audio 
recording backup during each interview.  
The simultaneous use of two different recording devices reduced considerably 
the probability of equipment failure and obviated the need to take down 
extensive field notes whilst interviewing. This allowed more rapport to develop 
between the interviewer and the respondent and encouraged more information 
to be divulged by the respondent (Gratton and Jones, 2010). More extensive 
field notes were written up in the evening after each interview as the use of field 
notes have been found to be superior to an emphasis on audio recording and 
transcribing verbatim (Fasick, 2001; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Wengraf, 
2001). 
Only two out of the 19 interview sessions were not interrupted at some point. 
Interruptions included: 
  1. Calls to the respondent’s phone; 
  2. People entering the office to have short discussions  
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      with the respondent; 
3. Respondent breaking to conduct a scheduled telephone interview     
    with a radio station; and 
  4. Voices of people from adjoining rooms spilling over  
                          to interview room.  
Thus the duration of the interview sessions was affected by the interruptions 
that occurred. Whilst the minimum duration of the interview sessions was 26.50 
minutes, the maximum was 73.19 minutes for a focus group meeting. One 
General Manager of a club insisted that he wanted his Finance Manager to be 
present for the interview session. This also lengthened the duration of this 
interview session as two individuals responded to the same issues, sometimes 
with differing opinions and emphasis. The average interview session lasted for 
43.11 minutes. However, the average for the five top clubs was 48.08 minutes, 
perhaps reflecting their greater experience of financial regulation. Similarly, the 
key informants had a lot more to say than the clubs themselves with average 
interview duration of 58.71 minutes. 
Each interview session started with an introduction and the rationale for the 
study. This was then followed by a description of the Football Financial 
Clearinghouse Model and what it seeks to achieve, facilitated by the 
PowerPoint presentation of the FFC Framework Diagrams. The respondent 
was then asked questions based on the presentation of the framework and on 
its relevance within the Ghanaian context (see Appendix 2). Thereafter the 
researcher sought to provide clarifications on any issue that was not clear 
throughout the interview session. Finally, the transcript validation process was 
then explained to the respondent. 
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The recorded audio sessions were all transferred into a folder in the NVIVO 10 
software which was to be used for the data analysis. Each audio file was given 
a unique code in an attempt to ensure anonymity of the respondent. This code 
is only available to the researcher and his PhD supervisors to ensure 
confidentiality. The researcher listened to each tape twice to ensure that no part 
of the tapes was missing before the transcription begun. A template was also 
developed for the transcript which showed the: 
1. Project title 
2. Interviewer 
3. Interviewee Code 
4. Date of interview;  
5. Venue of interview 
6. Transcript of Conversation 
Transcription refers to “the process of reproducing spoken words, such as 
those from an audiotaped interview, into written text” (Halcomb & Davidson, 
2006; p38). The transcription was done entirely by the researcher given the 
firsthand knowledge he had in the interview process; the expertise he had in 
the subject of interview and the advantage of having engaged in verbal and 
non-verbal exchanges with the participants (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).  
 
To the extent that the researcher was not engaged in a purely qualitative 
research (Halcomb & Andrew, 2005; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006) but rather in 
a mixed-method research design which sought to identify common ideas from 
the data, verbatim transcription was not considered necessary in terms of the 
validity or reliability of the conclusions from the study (Seale & Silverman, 1997; 
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Silverman, 1993; van Teijlingen & Ireland, 2003). Thus the transcripts do not 
include the verbal and non-verbal cues as well as the presentation of the FFC 
framework; or nodding and short comments of approval and understanding 
offered by the respondents as the presentation proceeded. The 20 transcripts 
(including the pilot interview) were done in Microsoft Word 2010 and transferred 
to NVIVO for analysis.  
  
Coding the Interview Data 
The coding process facilitated thematic analysis by searching for “sequences of 
text within and across cases and the links amongst the various themes” 
(Bryman, 2012; p 13). Each transcript was read twice before coding started and 
each sentence was coded into one of the sub-themes. Where a sentence 
contains more than one theme, it was coded under the various different themes 
and this was later used to identify the link between the various themes. Thus 
the coding process allowed the researcher to reduce the large volume of 
transcript data into more manageable themes. An attempt was made to reduce 
intra-coder variability through the constant review by the PhD supervisors of the 
coding and analysis process adopted. The issue of inter-coder variability did not 
arise since the study is an independent study by the researcher and as such 
there is no possibility of somebody else coding the data which could then be 
compared. 
The coding for the content analysis was done using the NVivo 10 software and 
this was done in four stages. The first stage produced eight main themes, 33 
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sub-themes; and a further 40 lower level themes. The transcripts were coded 
under these various themes. The main themes were: 
a) regulated access to credit; 
b) financial licensing 
c) provision of advisory services 
d) monitoring 
e) composition of FFC board 
f) existing regulation 
g) financial constraints facing clubs 
h) rationale for financial regulation 
The first four themes were derived from the FFC Board Function Framework as 
respondents were asked questions on how the FFC would assists in each of 
the four functions; whilst the fifth was a process theme.  The remaining themes 
related to existing regulations and financial conditions of the clubs, and to the 
rationale for the regulation from the clubs’ own perspectives.  
The second phase of the coding process involved a revision of the coding 
themes based on discussions with peer reviewers and the thesis supervisors 
which generated a new set of themes: 
a) rationale for regulation 
b) quality of Existing Regulation 
c) financial licensing 
d) access to private funding 
e) access to public funding 
f) financial capacity building 
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g) financial monitoring 
Each of these themes had an average of four sub-themes. These served as the 
basis of the analysis section in chapter 6. In respect of the interrogation of the 
FFC framework which is analyzed in chapter 7, the emergent themes and the 
sub-themes obtained from the interview transcripts included:  
a) Functional Objectives of the FFC Framework 
1. general impressions of the FFC framework 
2. FFC and financial management within clubs 
3. FFC and financial governance from football association 
4. incentives for compliance 
b) Form of the FFC Framework 
1. composition and independence of regulator 
2. role of government 
c) Implementation Challenges 
1. extensive education requirement 
2. resource requirements 
3. phasing of implementation 
4. quality of complementary control institutions 
 
Analysing interview Data 
In analysing the interview data an attempt was made to include direct quotes 
from the interview transcripts, where appropriate. The researcher has made an 
attempt to ensure that direct quotes are only used to show instances that are 
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unusual, data that is unexpected or when they describe the phenomenon 
particularly well. This is to ensure that the use of direct quotes is not abused 
(Gratton and Jones, 2010). Where quotes have been utilised their importance 
to the overall analysis is made explicit. Due to the familiarity with the interview 
transcripts, the process of analysis combined both the computer software and 
manual tagging to allow the researcher’s insight to inform the analysis. 
 
3.4.4 Limitations of Qualitative Methods 
Researcher Reflexivity and Subjectivity 
One key challenge of conducting qualitative research is taking into account the 
effect of the characteristics of the researcher on the research subjects and the 
entire research process (Denzin, 2001; Gratton and Jones, 2010). As an official 
of the biggest football club in Ghana since August 2006, and having served on 
several Committees of the Ghana Football association (GFA), the most recent 
positions being a member of the FA Cup Committee and the Reserve League 
Development Committee, there was the potential for the researcher’s 
background to affect the data collection process generally, and the answers 
given by the respondents in particular.  
As someone who could be viewed as a possible ‘rival’ in the league, the 
interviewees could view the information to be given as ‘industry secret’ and as 
such give deceptive ‘answers’ or be ‘economical’ with the information which 
might have invalidated the data. This potential threat to data validity was dealt 
with by giving the interviewees assurances that the data collected would be 
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treated in the strictest of confidence and would be well-stored. This encouraged 
the interviewees to provide as much information as possible even with little 
prodding from the researcher.  
It could also be argued that the researcher’s background rather provided the 
researcher greater access to the interviewees that could not have been 
achieved by an ‘outsider’. The researcher’s ability to arrange interviews with 
officials of all 16 Premier league clubs, together with officials of the FA was of 
great benefit to the study and to the validity of the findings. Interviewees were 
perhaps more willing to discuss their opinions freely with the researcher 
because they believed that, as ‘one of them’, the researcher would not 
misapply the information. As a result existing documents were readily provided, 
including financial statements of clubs deposited with the FA. This level of 
provision, coupled with the readiness with which interviewees agreed to be 
interviewed, strengthens the belief that the researcher’s background rather 
actually served as an advantage to the study.  
It remains the case that some interviewees could have attempted to provide 
‘convenient’ or ‘correct’ answers to the questions (Gratton and Jones, 2010), in 
an attempt to ‘help’ their friend obtain the results ‘he was looking for’, especially 
in the validation of the FFC framework (subject bias). This potential threat was 
limited by the researcher encouraging the interviewees to be as forthright as 
possible, since negative comments were as helpful as positive ones in the 
development of a framework consistent with the Ghanaian context. This 
encouraged the interviewees to raise various points of disagreements with the 
original version of the model which helped to improve the final version of the 
model.  
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Care was also taken during the interview session to ensure that the 
researcher’s dressing, personality, verbal or non-verbal cues (including facial 
expression and nodding) did not in any way ‘direct’ the respondents or 
encouraged them to provide answers or argue in a particular way.  
It must be noted that the issue of subjectivity cannot be totally eliminated in a 
qualitative research which is fundamentally value-laden as even the choice of 
the subject to study by the researcher is subjective (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). However, whenever possible attempts were made in this 
study to ensure that the research design, choice of methods of data collection, 
process of interviewing and the data analysis process was devoid of the 
personal subjective thoughts of the researcher. The entire process was 
moderated at each stage by the two thesis supervisors who served as expert 
reviewers. This ensured that the results were not influenced by the researcher’s 
personal bias and idiosyncrasies (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Ensuring Reliability and Truthfulness  
There is a growing consensus that the twin concepts of reliability and validity 
used to assess the quality of qualitative research are inappropriate (Gratton 
and Jones, 2010; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Even when used in qualitative 
research reliability refers to the consistency of the methods applied in data 
collection. Thus to ensure that the outcome of this study is dependable and 
reliable there is an extensive discussion of all the steps undertaken to arrive at 
the results, so as to allow for future replication where relevant. 
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To ensure that data collected was valid and represented the experiences of the 
participants, the interview transcripts were returned to the respondents who 
were given a week to review the transcripts. They were then asked to respond 
to a one-page transcript validation questionnaire which gathered biographical 
information on the respondents, as well as asking them to indicate whether the 
transcript corresponded to what had transpired between them and the 
researcher (see Appendix 5).  
 
Three questions relating to their opinion on the FFC were also included. This 
was to help ascertain whether the respondents were being consistent with their 
responses and that the answers given during the interview sessions had not 
been influenced by immediate circumstances including their surroundings and 
current experiences (Gratton and Jones, 2010). 
It could be argued that the presentation of the FFC Model during the data 
collection stage to the participants had the potential to ensure that the study 
achieved ontological, educative, catalytic and tactical authenticity (Holloway 
and Wheeler, 2009). The respondents were educated to develop a greater 
understanding of others within their world; enhance their decision making and 
also empower them to improve the financial management of their clubs. 
Generalization of Research Findings 
An important feature of any research is the possibility of the research findings 
being generalized beyond just the few people included in the research study. 
Even though generalizability of research results may not be necessary 
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requirement from a qualitative design, the results from this study may be 
expected to have resonance beyond the professional football clubs in Ghana. 
 An empirical generalization is made where the researcher argues that the 
study population is statistically representative of the wider population allowing 
him to infer that what is true for the sample would be true for the general 
population (Mason, 2002). In this study, however, the entire population of fully-
professional football clubs was used to interrogate the draft framework for the 
financial regulation of professional football clubs. This thus suggests that there 
is no challenge to the generalizability of the study to professional clubs in 
Ghana. Moreover, it is believed that the study’s results could be important to 
amateur football clubs which may attempt to join the Premier League, as a 
result of the process of merit-based relegation and promotion.  
More generally, there is no reason to believe that Ghanaian professional 
football clubs operate in an environmental which is completely different from 
that of clubs in neighbouring West and Central African countries, both in 
cultural and economic terms. Broere and van der Drift (1997) provide an 
interesting account of the huge similarities in football cultures in Africa, south of 
the Sahara. Beyond the language dichotomy of English and French, similarities 
exist in the economic conditions facing clubs in all these countries including: 
high cost of borrowing; inadequate access to alternative sources of funding due 
to under-developed money and capital markets; and high and rising levels of 
inflation.  Specific to the footballing environment are problems of poor revenue 
from match tickets and mass exodus of players to leagues in Europe and Asia 
(Darby, 2010), and the politicisation of football (Fridy and Brobbey, 2009). This 
might have resulted from clubs’ inability to compete in terms of remuneration of 
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players; inadequate and inefficient governance systems; and inadequate 
regulation. As such the findings of this study are expected to be of use to clubs 
in the other countries that share similarities with their Ghanaian counterparts.   
 
3.5  APPLICATION OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS  
3.5.1  Financial Performance and Position of Clubs 
Data Challenges, Types and Form  
The study made use of both primary and secondary data. The secondary data 
was mainly quantitative data obtained through the review of financial 
statements of clubs that have played in the Premier League from 2006 to 2011. 
Premier League clubs are required to submit audited accounts annually to the 
FA in fulfillment of the requirements of Article 8(1).  
Officials of the FA could not readily locate the submitted financial statements of 
the clubs, suggesting a problem with record keeping at the FA. The FA also 
exempted three newly promoted clubs from submitting financial statements on 
account of the late determination of which team had qualified to play in the 
Premier League. The Division One season overshot its original duration 
ensuring that the teams that were promoted to the Premier League for the 
2012/13 season were only known one month before the commencement of the 
season. This reduced the number of financial statements that could have been 
used in the study. The initial request by the researcher to the FA for copies of 
previously submitted audited accounts yielded 23 out of a possible 96 sets of 
audited accounts covering the period 2006-2011. A follow up request produced 
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another 22 financial statements. The information in these financial statements 
is used for the analysis in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
The other set of secondary data was obtained from ‘function statements’ which 
provides the distribution of revenue from league matches. Clubs are obliged to 
submit copies of the Function Statement to the Ghana Football Association 
after each game. However, not all clubs have a good history of ensuring that 
the Function Statement gets to the FA. The clubs using venues operated by the 
National Sports Authority (NSA) are more likely to submit function statements, 
and also present verified revenue figures, compared to those playing in 
privately-owned grounds, as the Authority also has a stake in the total revenue 
accrued.   
During the field work in September 2012, the researcher obtained copies of 
function statements covering the period from the 2005/06 season to the first 
round of the 2011/12 soccer season. These were obtained from the FA 
Accountant on the instructions of the FA President. A further request covering 
the second round of the 2011/12 season was made to the FA. This data is the 
basis of the analysis of match attendance in section 5.5.5 of this study. The FA 
also provided data on the indebtedness of Kotoko to other clubs, and 
information on efforts made by the club to settle its indebtedness. This data is 
analyzed in section 5.5.2. 
The limited nature of the data did not allow for the utilisation of more efficient 
analytical tools such as the ones employed by Cordery et al. (2013) to assess 
the financial vulnerability of sports clubs in New Zealand. However, to the 
extent that this study serves as a baseline study of football finance in Ghana, its 
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results remain useful as a reference point for more sophisticated analysis in the 
future.  
Analysis of Quantitative Data 
In assessing the financial position of clubs, simple ratios and percentage 
changes have been employed in section 5.3 of the study. Trend analysis in 
respect of revenue, expenditure and net profit are also done. Changes in asset, 
liability and equity positions are also assessed using trend and ratio analysis. 
Cash management ratios such as gearing ratios are also employed to assess 
the financial performance of Ghanaian professional clubs.  
 
3.5.2  Transcript Validation Questionnaire 
This section discusses the implementation of the transcript validation 
questionnaire and the analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaire. 
Data Types and Form  
Approximately two months after the interviews were concluded and after the 
transcription had been done, a transcript validation session was undertaken 
where each of the completed transcripts were returned to the respective 
respondents as part of a second round of fieldwork (see section 3.4.4). A one 
page questionnaire was developed to obtain the respondents views on the 
quality of the transcription done by the researcher (Appendix 5). This was to 
allow for the triangulation of the data from the first round of interviews to ensure 
that respondents were consistent on some of the key issues raised in the 
validation of the model.  The questionnaires were readily filled and returned by 
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all the respondents since the researcher sent them to the respondents by hand. 
It took each respondent less than ten (10) minutes to fill them in the presence 
of the researcher since they had already reviewed their transcripts.  
Analysis of Quantitative Data 
Simple proportions and ratio analysis was done with the data collected from the 
questionnaire to support the interrogation of the FFC framework discussed in 
Chapter 7. All the respondents indicated that, to a very large extent, the 
transcripts corresponded to the interview done earlier and that little or no 
changes had to be made in the transcripts for them to be valid.  
 
3.6  SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
issues relevant to this study. On the basis that answering the various research 
questions posed in the study require different methodological approaches, the 
study opted for a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods to both data 
collection and analysis.   
In respect of the qualitative approach, the method of critical review was 
adopted in respect of the existing football financial regulatory frameworks. 
Qualitative content analysis, undertaken using NVIVO software, was utilised to 
analyse the data obtained from the semi-structured face-to-face interviews of 
stakeholders of professional football in Ghana. This was in part to obtain their 
views on the financial regulation and management in Ghanaian football, and 
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also to interrogate the conceptual model of financial regulation that was 
developed in the study.  
A purely qualitative process of utilising Sappington’s framework and the 
conclusions drawn from the review of existing frameworks, and the review of 
Ghanaian football finance was also undertaken. The limitations of utilising 
qualitative methods in research and how they were dealt with was also 
discussed in this chapter. The chapter also discussed the utilisation of 
quantitative methods such as financial ratios to assess the financial 
performance of Ghanaian football clubs as the basis for developing the context-
specific FFC Model. The validation of the interview transcripts with a 
questionnaire was discussed. 
In effect this study also outlines, in detail, the systematic steps undertaken to 
arrive at the FFC framework, which is the final outcome of the study. The study 
utilises the review of the theoretical literature to justify the selection of the 
Sappington Model as the conceptual framework for the review of the existing 
frameworks for the financial regulation of football (done in the next chapter). It 
also serves as the framework for the development of the FFC Model at the 
conceptual level. The review of the existing frameworks of financial regulation is 
then combined with the review of Ghanaian football finance to provide the 
justification for, the industry conditions and the institutional environment within 
which the FFC framework is developed. This famework is then interrogated with 
the help  of stakeholders of Ghanaian professional football and the results are 
used to modify the framework into one that is applicable in the specific context 
of Ghana. This very academic process of model development allows for 
replication of the conclusions of the study in other jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER IV  
EXISTING FRAMEWORKS OF FOOTBALL REGULATION  
– A CRITICAL REVIEW 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a critical review of existing regulatory frameworks in 
football utilizing the main aspects of Sappington’s framework. The aim of this 
review is to provide useful lessons for the development of the context-specific 
regulatory framework for professional football; a key objective of this study.  
4.1.1  Regulations Reviewed 
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the relationship between the various 
regulations reviewed in this chapter. These include the FIFA Licensing 
Regulations (FIFA, 2010), the UEFA CL & FFPR (UEFA, 2012a), the SFA CLR 
(SFA, 2013), and the GFA Rules and Regulations (GFA, 2010). The FIFA CLR 
could be considered as a meta-regulatory framework that allows member 
confederations and the national associations to self-regulate (Coglianese and 
Mendelson, 2010), and provides an example of regulations emanating from a 
world governing body (WGB). The UEFA CL & FFPR, on the other hand, is an 
example of a regulation emanating from a confederation governing body 
(CGB), which provides a framework for the financial regulation of the clubs 
within member national governing bodies (NGBs).  
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It has been selected for review because it provides the most comprehensive set 
of financial regulatory tools designed by any CGB under FIFA (Flanagan, 
2013). It was developed by UEFA through the adoption of a ‘holistic and 
systemic approach’ (Bell, 2011), in a very pro-active attempt to deal with the 
risks of financial management in European football (Flanagan, 2013).  
These risks have arisen as, despite remarkable increases in revenue, it has 
failed to keep pace with significant increases in player costs, as elite level clubs 
attempt to gain promotion, avoid relegation or to outdo each other to qualify for 
the lucrative UEFA club competitions (Balduck and Lucidarme, 2011; Beech, 
2010; Dietl and Franck, 2007; Gouget and Primault, 2006; Hamil & Chadwick, 
2010; Lago et al., 2006; Morrow, 2011; Senaux, 2011) 
The SFA CLR represents an example of an NGB’s attempt to regulate the 
financial management of its clubs based on guidelines from FIFA and its CGB. 
It was selected for review based on convenient access and availability. 
Moreover, the well-publicized financial difficulties encountered by Rangers, one 
of Europe’s leading clubs, have resulted in considerable emphasis being placed 
on the SFA’s approach to financial regulation (Morrow, 2013).  The GFA’s 
Rules and Regulations (GFA R&R), which at the commencement of this study 
was the only document in Ghana that attempted to provide some form of 
financial regulation of professional football clubs in the country, is also 
reviewed. Examples, where necessary, are also taken from the German and 
the French club licensing systems; considered as the forbearers of the UEFA 
CL & FFPR (Dietl and Franck, 2007; Gammelsaeter and Senaux, 2011). 
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The review concentrates on the financial components of these over-arching 
regulations, their apparent strengths and weaknesses and relevance in respect 
of a developing economy context, and the lessons that could be drawn from 
them in the formulation of an incentive-based financial regulatory framework for 
Ghana.  
 
4.1.2  Sappington’s Framework as the Basis of the Review 
Figure 4.2 provides an overview of Sappington’s framework, the main aspects 
of which are used to shape the analysis of the existing framework in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. Sappington argued that the objectives and 
resources available to a regulator, together with the industry conditions and 
institutional environment within which the regulator operates influence the form, 
scope and function of regulation (section 2.1.2). The main functions of a 
regulation would be either to inform consumers or to enforce standards that the 
regulation requires the regulatee to conform to.  
 
The choice between developing a comprehensive set of regulations to regulate 
every aspect of the regulated firm’s activities, and concentrating on a partial 
scope for the regulation depends on the level of information available to the 
regulator. This is in turn dependent on the quality and quantity of human 
resources available to the regulator, relative to the regulated firms (see section 
2.3).  
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Sappington argues further that the three forms that regulation could take would 
be a traditional centralized command-and-control, delegated incentive-based, 
and potential regulation (see section 2.6). The incentive based regulation could 
either be a proactive or reactive. Also, the decision-making or the rule-making, 
or both, could be delegated to the regulated entity. 
 
4.2  OBJECTIVES OF REGULATOR 
Figure 4.3 provides an overview of the financial objectives of clubs as specified 
in the various frameworks under review and how they are related to the 
objectives of regulators in general, as specified in Sappington’s framework.  
 
The introduction of football club licensing around the world (see FIFA, 2010; 
UEFA, 2010) is a systematic attempt to encourage good governance, financial 
stability and transparency in football club management. The financial objectives 
of these regulations are to be achieved through the safeguarding of the 
credibility and integrity of club competitions by improving the level of 
professionalism and the degree of financial transparency within the relevant 
clubs (Bell, 2011; Flanagan, 2013; Lindholm, 2011). These authors suggest, for 
instance, that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules seek, essentially, to achieve 
long-term financial soundness, thereby ensuring the long-term viability of 
European football. These objectives could be said to be consistent with the 
rationale for financial regulation of any sector of the economy including banking 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009), and utilities (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004).  
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They are also consistent with Sappington’s objectives of fostering industry 
development and investment; ensuring safe and quality product; promoting 
equitable outcomes; achieving desired levels of consumption; limiting earnings 
of producers and promoting least cost production.  
 
4.2.1  Industry Development and Investment 
In order to foster industry development and investment (Sappington, 1994), the 
club licensing frameworks under review encourage clubs to invest in youth and 
infrastructural development as a means to ensure that the future resources of 
the club are developed in a sustainable way (FIFA, 2010, Article 6.2; UEFA, 
2012, Article 17, 18, 58). UEFA, however, goes a step further in giving meaning 
to this objective by exempting expenditure on youth and infrastructure 
development from the calculation of relevant income and expenditure used to 
determine its break-even determination (UEFA, 2012, Article 60). It is argued 
that developing their own youth teams should ensure that clubs are in a better 
position to avoid the need to acquire expensive players in the future, while also 
providing an opportunity to earn income from the sale of players they develop. 
This has the potential to ensure the long term financial stability of the clubs.  
In an attempt to safeguard the credibility, continuity and integrity of club 
competitions these regulations aim at improving the economic and financial 
capabilities of the clubs, making strides towards ensuring clubs’ financial 
stability  and the smooth running of leagues (Bell, 2011; Flanagan, 2013; 
Preuss et al., 2012). There are externalities associated with the financial 
stability or otherwise of clubs within the league as it affects the credibility of the 
league (Budzinski, 2010).  A credible league has the potential to attract the right 
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level of investment from sponsors for the league and clubs in general. The 
credibility of the league thus could be considered as a public good with benefits 
accruing to even clubs whose investment decisions may not ensure financial 
stability.   It thus seems reasonable to argue that in the absence of regulations 
club officials may not supply efficient levels of financial stability and integrity in 
a football competition.  
Improving the level of professionalism within football clubs is another objective 
which relates indirectly to the financial activities of clubs (Flanagan, 2013). The 
quality of financial information generated by a club would determine the quality 
of financial management decisions taken by that club (Sappington, 1994), and 
would be a function of the quality of personnel employed by the club to manage 
its finances. For example, personnel in the finance department of a Ghanaian 
club should be conversant with the appropriate accounting, auditing and 
reporting standards required by the Companies Act, 1963 (Act179), IFRS and 
the club licensing regulations. It could therefore be argued that the Personnel 
and Administrative criteria inherent in all of the licensing frameworks under 
review expect clubs to employ the appropriate calibre of personnel to ensure 
professionalism in their activities (FIFA, 2010, Article 8.2, P.03; UEFA, 2012, 
Article 29) 
 
4.2.2  Safe and Quality Service 
FIFA (2010, Art 1.1), UEFA (2012, Article 2) and SFA (2013, Article 2.1) all 
seek to promote transparency in the finances of clubs. There is information 
contagion effects associated with the financial outcome of clubs and an 
improvement in the financial fortunes of clubs would improve confidence in the 
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footballing industry and hence encourage commercial partners to associate 
with the industry. Accounting, auditing and reporting requirements aim to 
ensure the financial stability of clubs, by requiring them to conform to stated 
acceptable standards, at the same time safeguarding the credibility and 
integrity of the club competitions. In so doing it also ensures that stakeholders 
obtain the information necessary to make assessments as to whether clubs are 
being run efficiently or not. 
 
4.2.3  Equitable Outcomes 
In conformity with FIFA Club Licensing Regulations (FIFA CLR) another 
objective general to all the other licensing regimes is the need to protect 
creditors of clubs such as players, social/tax authorities and other clubs (Article 
65 and 66 of UEFA CL & FFPR). In all cases clubs are required to ensure that 
their liabilities to these categories of creditors are settled promptly when due 
(Bell, 2011; Preuss et al, 2012).  When clubs buy players from other clubs, 
inevitably they deny the selling club the chance of utilising the services of the 
player. Should they then refuse or be unable to settle the debt obligation in 
respect of this transaction, however, they also deny the selling club the 
opportunity to replace that player, thus further weakening its ability to compete 
equally.  This is akin to double jeopardy – punishing an individual twice for the 
same offence. For the buying club, it could be said to be engaging in ‘financial- 
doping’, (Hamil and Walters, 2010) which according to the Collins English 
Dictionary is  
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“---The situation in which a sports franchise borrows heavily in 
order to contract and pay high-performing players, jeopardizing 
their long-term financial future---“  
Football clubs often portray themselves as social institutions (Morrow, 2003); 
for which they sometimes receive benefits including financial ones (Barros, 
2006; Dejonghe and Vanderweghe, 2006; Senaux, 2011). Payment of taxes is 
a social obligation and as such every club is reasonably expected to fulfil their 
social obligations. In Ghana, this would include: income tax deductions from 
staff salaries; social security contributions on behalf of workers; Value Added 
Tax and National Health Insurance Levy from gate proceeds (GRA, 2012). In 
this regard, when one club settles its debts to tax and social authorities in a 
timely fashion whilst others do not, the outcome cannot be considered to be 
equitable as the conforming club is disadvantaged in cash flow terms relative to 
other clubs. Secondly, a football club is expected to provide performance over a 
short-term, rarely extending beyond a season. The benefits from debt payment 
avoidance may be huge if as a consequence a club avoids relegation or gets 
promoted; another feature of financial doping. This objective therefore could be 
interpreted as an attempt to promote more equitable outcomes as envisaged by 
Sappington (1994).  
 
The UEFA CL & FFPR defines a comprehensive monitoring system to ensure 
clubs do not have overdue debts (UEFA, 2012, Part III, pp.32-41). The GFA 
Statutes (GFA, 2012b, Article 17.1.1) in contrast do not make any attempt to 
enforce the settlement of debts between clubs within the association beyond 
suggesting the setting up of an arbitration panel whenever there is a dispute 
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between two clubs over transfer issues. The introduction of a body to 
coordinate the implementation of a player transfer payment system; oversee 
player contracts with clubs; and also review the financial statements of clubs 
within a financial regulatory framework in Ghana football would act to ensure 
that clubs pay their creditors on time, with the resultant benefits alluded to in 
the discussion of other frameworks. While it could be argued that promoting 
more equitable outcomes in sports could be an improvement in revenue 
distribution (Kesenne, 2005) achieving greater competitive balance is not an 
explicit aim of the Financial Fair Play rules (Lindholm, 2011), or for that matter 
any of the other licensing frameworks under review 
 
4.2.4  Limiting the Earnings of Producers 
The interdependence between financial and sporting success is well 
documented (Franck, 2010; Frick, 2004; Preuss et al, 2012; Szymanski 2003; 
Vöpel, 2011). As financial rewards from sporting contests increase, club 
‘owners’ and directors increasingly overstretch resources in a ‘rat race’ hunt for 
talent; seeking to maximise sporting success and in turn financial rewards 
(Akerloff, 1970). It could be argued that UEFA’s attempt to moderate the flow of 
income to clubs from ‘sugar-daddy’ investors may not only be an attempt to 
reduce the financial risks associated with investment in risky assets (Lindholm, 
2011; Preuss et al, 2012), but may turn out to place a limit on the potential 
earnings of these investors (Sappington, 1994).   
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4.2.5  Promote Least Cost Production 
It has been suggested that the main aim of FFP is to limit the sums of money 
that clubs may spend on wages (Lindholm, 2011), thus promoting least cost 
production (see Fig. 4.2). He argues that, the break-even rules may function 
like price fixing agreements among competing buyers, akin to salary caps in 
other leagues, the rules preventing clubs from spending more than they earn 
through their football activities (Dietl et al., 2011). The argument here is that 
huge investments by ‘so-called benefactor owners’ leave the clubs with huge 
debts whenever the owners decide, sometimes at short notice, to quit the clubs. 
Most commonly the losers when owners behave in this way are clubs’ other 
stakeholders including supporters and other trading partners. Secondly, it could 
be argued that the competitive nature of football means that there is a risk that 
the spending behaviour of benefactor investors encourages similar behaviour 
among competitor clubs which may not have the resources to do so, thus over-
exposing their clubs to risks. 
A counter argument is that FFP rules may in fact restrict the opportunity for 
investment into football clubs. Geey (2011) argues that aspects of the break-
even regulations actually discourage industry development and investment by 
limiting possible investment into and by smaller clubs; effectively acting as a 
barrier to such clubs entering into ‘league of big clubs’. Allowing them to spend 
beyond their means in the short run may allow them to buy the best players, 
obtain more sporting success and more income, which would help them to 
grow.  
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The UEFA CL & FFPR unlike the other licensing frameworks goes beyond just 
being a tool aimed at establishing good corporate governance, financial 
transparency and stability in football as suggested by Bell (2011). Whilst the 
club licensing components of UEFA (2012) shares the tenets of the other 
licensing frameworks in this review, the FFP component represents a “modest, 
robust and graduated” attempt toward ﬁnancial rationality (Flanagan, 2013). It 
requires clubs to balance their books and not spend more than they earn 
(Geey, 2011). According to Preuss et al. (2012; p. 4) UEFA’s FFPR is an 
ambitious but positive attempt to introduce more discipline and rationality in 
club football finances; achieved by hardening what Storm and Nielson 
describes as “soft-budget constraints” facing clubs (2011, p. 4). Soft-budget 
constraints exist where clubs believe that they could overspend on player 
investment to achieve sporting success, and that their growth does not depend 
on current or future financial performances, or the ability of the clubs to avoid 
losses. 
 
4.2.6  Achieve Desired Levels of Consumption 
In the production of football, the fans are both producers and consumers at the 
same time. To ensure certain levels of consumption of the products of the 
football industry by fans, clubs would have to make efforts to reach out to the 
fans as major stakeholders (Senaux, 2008; Walters, 2007). This would depend 
on the ability of the clubs to improve their marketing and commercial activities 
which could be achieved through improved human resource capacity, an 
objective of both the UEFA (2012, Article 27-29) and the SFA regulations. 
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4.3 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
This section discusses the relevance of the institutional environment to the form 
and scope of the regulations reviewed. Figure 4.4 provides an overview of the 
issues that are relevant to the institutional environment of FIFA, UEFA and the 
Scottish FA which affects the form and the scope the licensing regulations take. 
 
4.3.1  Delegation of Responsibility 
FIFA (2010, Article 3.2) defines the national member association as the licensor 
with ultimate responsibility for the licensing system resting with the national 
association. UEFA (2012, Article 5.1) and SFA (2013; Art. 1.3a) thus recognise 
the NGB as the licensor, in respect of licensing. The NGBs award licenses on 
behalf of UEFA, for their clubs to compete at international level, and/or on their 
own behalf in respect of domestic competitions. The FFPR component of UEFA 
(2012) however is not delegated to the NGB.  
 
The NGBs could, however, delegate the implementation of the licensing to an 
affiliated league or set up an independent body. As a minimum requirement 
there has to be two decision making bodies referred to in FIFA (2010; Art. 
3.2.2.2) as the first instance body (FIB) and the Appeals body (AB). This is in 
pursuit of FIFA’s desire to ensure that the principles of fair treatment, the right 
to a hearing, and the right to an appeal, which are integral to its principle of 
fairness, are respected. Thus, consistent with Sappington’s framework (1994) 
there is a large degree of delegation of responsibility in respect of decision-
making between FIFA, the Confederations, the NGBs and the Licensing bodies. 
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Institutional Structure 
Commitment Ability 
of Regulator 
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Control 
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regulators 
2. Independence of financial 
regulator 
Independence of Judicial 
Branch of Government:  
1. Independence of judicial 
bodies of football association 
from executive 
2. Guarantee that decisions 
of financial regulator can be 
enforced 
Ease of change of tenure of Regulator: 
1. appointment or election of Board of 
financial regulator 
2. Stability of term of office of financial 
regulatory Board and staff 
Stability of Government: 
1. Stability of UEFA, FA governance systems 
providing continuity in support of financial 
regulations 
2. Broad-based regulatory process reducing the 
chances that change in leadership automatically 
changes regulatory priorities and focus 
Ability to Promise 
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for Desired    
Behaviour 
Performance  
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Sanctions for 
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Performance 
Determines whether 
Regulation should be 
Partial or 
Comprehensive 
FIG. 4.4: INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN  
FOOTBALL 
DETERMINED BY DETERMINES 
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4.3.2  Decision-Making Bodies for Club Licensing 
UEFA has been responsible since 2004 for the licensing of clubs that take part 
in its club competitions through their respective national associations (UEFA, 
2004). Since the introduction of the FFPRs, however, the Club Financial 
Control Body (CFCB), composed of qualified experts in the financial and legal 
fields (Preuss et al, 2012) has been set up at the confederation level. It works 
through its two chambers: the investigatory and adjudicatory chambers (see 
Appendix 6). This is an independent body charged with the responsibility of 
governing the monitoring process of the financial component of the club 
licensing process (UEFA, 2012a; Art. 53). They are responsible for the 
compliance audits in which they ensure that both the licensor (FA) and the 
applicants/licensees comply with the minimum requirements for the award of 
the licence.  
 
At the National Association level the Scottish FA set up a Licensing Committee 
(the FIB) whose meetings are regulated by the Scottish FA’s Board Protocol 
which determines whether a club’s licence could be issued or not and at what 
level the license is to be issued (SAF, 2013; Art 2.2). The Scottish FA’s 
Licensing Committee has the power to award three different levels of license. It 
awards domestic licenses to all members playing in the various levels of the 
league. Additionally Scottish Premier League (SPL) clubs apply for UEFA 
licences through the Licensing Committee, whilst clubs that qualify to play in 
UEFA competitions on sporting merit and also meet the additional UEFA FFP 
rules are also licensed separately by UEFA.  
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This three tier system ensures that every member of the national association 
undergoes a certain minimum form of licensing. Whilst this provides potential 
benefits in the form of harmonising the operations of clubs at all levels, the 
resource cost of such a venture in a developing economy may be prohibitive.  
 
The Confederation of African Football places less emphasis on the financial 
regulation of clubs compared to its UEFA counterpart. Beyond its club licensing 
regulations it has not gone to the extent of introducing specific regulation aimed 
at improving the financial management of clubs in its member associations. 
Neither does it have a body akin to the CFCB found in the UEFA system. 
Instead, the Organising Committee for the Management of the Club Licensing 
ensures that the process of issuance of licences by affiliated national 
associations to take part in the CAF Inter Club competitions conform to CAF 
licensing regulations (CAF, 2013).  
 
4.3.3  Commitment Ability of Regulator 
In relation to Sappington’s arguments the commitment ability of the licensor is 
dependent on the political pressures that may be brought to bear on it by clubs, 
the association of clubs, player associations and federations themselves. UEFA 
has had to make concessions to the clubs in the formulation of its FFP 
Regulations to avoid threats of break away from UEFA by top clubs (Geey, 
2011). More specifically, Geey (2011) also claims that this process of 
consultation resulted in a number of concessions being made including the 
provisions set out in Annex XI (mitigating factors which could be considered by 
UEFA in respect of the FFP monitoring requirements), and the removal of all 
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infrastructure and youth development costs from the break-even calculation. 
The possibility of a transfer embargo as a punishment for not meeting FFP 
regulations was dropped by UEFA due to possible threat of restriction-on-trade 
suits by players according to football advisory firm Grant Thornton (2012).  
UEFA is expected to begin the analysis of the finances of clubs qualified for its 
competition for the purposes of FFP in May 2014.  In June 2013, The Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) affirmed an UEFA ban on Spanish club, Malaga for 
having overdue debts to other clubs and Spanish tax authorities, under the 
FFPRs (Rogers, 2013). This meant that Malaga could not compete in the 
2013/14 Europa League for which it had qualified on sporting grounds. It could 
be argued that UEFA has thus shown a willingness to stick to its rules.  
The sanctions that may be imposed by the adjudicatory body of the CFCB 
include, but are not limited to, deduction of points, withholding of revenues from 
a UEFA competition, prohibition on registering new players in UEFA 
competitions, and restriction on the number of players that a club may register 
for participation in UEFA competitions (UEFA, 2012b, Article 21). Others 
include disqualification from competitions in progress and/or exclusion from 
future competitions, and withdrawal of a title or award. Thus UEFA could be 
considered to be adopting a deterrence approach to regulatory compliance, 
rather than explicitly utilizing an incentive based approach (Simpson, 2002; 
Gunningham, 2010) 
However, doubts still exist whether UEFA is able and willing to sanction any of 
the big clubs in the six major footballing nations of Europe, if they fall foul of the 
FFP regulations (Geey, 2011). In Ghana, clubs which have fallen foul of the 
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forfeiture clauses in the FA regulations (GFA, 2010, Article 34) have been dealt 
with accordingly, irrespective of the size of the club. This may be a sign that the 
FA has adequate commitment ability to withstand pressures in the 
implementation of regulations.  
The FIFA Club Licensing framework, which serves as a meta-regulatory 
framework that governs the form that the licensing frameworks of the national 
association takes, gives the right to determine the tenure of the licensing bodies 
to the federations.  A pre-defined tenure of the financial regulatory body which 
could be renewed without limit might provide the necessary confidence and 
independence of the regulator to allow it resist regulatory capture (Morrow, 
1999). This, according to Sappington (1994) would improve the commitment 
ability of the regulator. 
UEFA makes an attempt to ensure the stability of the term of office of the 
CFCB. For example Article 5 of the CFCB Procedural Rules specifies a term of 
four years, with opportunity for re-election. The Scottish FA specifies the term 
of office of a member of the Licensing Committee as being two years and the 
individual could be re-appointed without limit. However, a longer tenure, 
overlapping the terms of the Executive Committee of the Ghana FA, would be 
more effective as it would ensure that any incoming Executives would not be 
tempted to immediately appoint a new set of people to the Licensing Committee 
to serve its wishes.  
This is crucially important in the Ghanaian context where members of the 
Executive Committee which also own clubs would at the same time be seeking 
licenses for the new season. The potential for conflict of interest of this nature, 
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and regulatory capture to exist increases with the value of the expected benefit, 
and as the decision-making process becomes less transparent (Barnes and 
Florencio, 2002; Becker, 1983). For instance, there is every cause to be believe 
that a vote to re-admit Rangers into the Scottish Premier league (SPL) would 
involve conflict of interest as the club also has a right to vote (Morrow, 2013).    
The quality of the complementary control institutions such as the judicial bodies 
of the national federation would determine the extent to which the objectives of 
financial regulation are achieved. A weak judiciary process would limit the 
ability of the financial regulator to enforce its decisions against clubs. The 
motivational posture of clubs would be determined by the perceived fairness of 
the regulatory regime (Baldwin and Black, 2008). The ability of the league 
management to effectively regulate all other aspects of the clubs’ management 
would allow the financial regulator to limit itself to the financial management of 
the clubs.   
 
4.4 RESOURCES AND INDEPENDENCE OF REGULATOR 
This section discusses the importance of the resources of the regulator to the 
form, function and scope of regulation in respect of the regulations reviewed.  
 
4.4.1  Quality of Human Resources 
The quality of the regulator’s resource is an important determinant of the level 
and quality of information used in decision-making (Sappington, 1994). It also 
affects its ability to ward off regulatory capture, as it improves the 
independence of the regulator and its ability to deal with political pressures 
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emanating from the executive arm of any football association. Really 
responsive regulation would be responsive to the distribution of resources 
within the environment in which the regulator operates (Baldwin and Black, 
2008), and the institutional environment in which it operates. Thus in 
developing a financial regulatory framework for football the regulations have to 
address the issue of the quality of personnel necessary for the achievement of 
the goals of the regulation.  
 
Andreff (2011) developed this argument further by suggesting that as much as 
possible the membership of financial decision-making bodies for sporting 
organisations should no longer be nominated by federations, leagues, clubs, 
trainers or players’ unions. He argued that as a matter of constitutional 
requirement, their membership should be made up of chartered accountants, 
financial experts, lawyers, economists, as is usual in other industries, in order 
to assure independence. However, this cannot be done to the exclusion of 
people with knowledge about the workings of the sporting organizations 
themselves i.e. industry experts.  
 
FIFA, apart from insisting that the independence of the decision making bodies 
should be guaranteed in the Club Licensing Regulations, does not make explicit 
requirements as to the qualification of the membership of the boards. UEFA 
(2012a) is, however, very clear on the minimum requirements as far as 
composition is concerned, suggesting that decision making bodies should 
include individuals who meet the requirements of independence as defined in 
Article 7.7 of UEFA (2012a), and with backgrounds at the highest professional 
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levels, including at least a qualified lawyer and an auditor holding a recognised 
qualification. In practice, both the Investigative and Adjudicatory arms of the 
CFCB are comprised of membership from a varied professional background as 
possible, and people of high educational background and experience, from 
outside the immediate UEFA membership as evidenced in Appendix 6.  
 
4.4.2  License Administration  
The composition of the administrative arm of the licensing body is as crucial as 
that of the decision making arm. Each of the licensing systems discussed has a 
Licensing Administration which provides administrative support and also 
conducts the monitoring of the license implementation. It writes reports which 
form the basis of the decision by the FIB and the AB. Whilst the FIFA CLR 
recommends that the licensor would be responsible for setting up the license 
administration and appointing ‘qualified staff members’ it does not indicate the 
kind of qualification that a staff member should hold (FIFA, 2010; Art. 3.2.2). 
The UEFA CLR & FFPR on the other hand recognises both qualification and 
competence.   
     
The SFA CLR (SFA, 2013, Article 2.5) is more precise about the background of 
the staff of the Licensing administration as it specifies that an expert each for 
Infrastructure, Legal, Financial and Coaching issues should be staff of the 
Licensing Administration. The requirement for the personnel of the licensing 
administration to be of a high order may be based on the premise that the 
quality of the human resource available to the regulator reduces the chance of 
a licence holder/applicant undertaking strategic behaviour in an attempt to 
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‘game’ the regulator, or ‘capture’ the regulator (Sappington, 1994; Veljanovski, 
2010). 
 
The governance role played by the Licensing Committee might suggest that it 
could be institutionally based, without the need for people with specific 
professional background, in contrast to the technical role played by the License 
administration. The regulation, however, suggest that the committee be made 
up of people appointed from within the list of Scottish FA Council members and 
a maximum of two co-opted members (possibly non-Executive Board 
members).  This in no way guarantees the independence of the Licensing 
Committee from the Executive, even if an attempt is made to ensure that 
conflict of interest involving members of the Committee are dealt with on ethical 
grounds (SFA, 2013, Art. 2.4). 
 
4.4.3  Mode of Membership Formation 
FIFA gives the power to determine the members of the decision making bodies 
of the various Club Licensing Regulations to the respective national 
associations, whether through election or appointment. Appointment of the 
membership of the decision making bodies would seem more appropriate to 
ensure independence since election would perhaps create the unwanted 
situation of the membership trying to please its electoral base to ensure being 
retained on the body at the next election. For instance, Hansen (1999) 
suggests that appointed judges are more independent than elected judges. 
UEFA, the SFA and the Ghana FA all utilise an appointment process, although 
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there is a risk that the person(s) wielding the power to appoint might abuse their 
powers of appointment, something which is not alien to Ghanaian football 
management and governance (Bediako, 2012).  
 
4.5 INDUSTRY CONDITIONS 
Figure 4.5 provides an overview of the industry conditions within the European 
football that affects the form of the regulations designed. The conditions in the 
industry within which the regulator operates - defined by the prevailing 
production technique, the nature of the product, the nature of consumer 
demand and the information structure - determine the scope, the form and 
function of regulation (Sappington, 1994). The production technology within the 
football industry is characterised by the joint-production of a game by clubs and 
the fans that generate the atmosphere (Hamil and Chadwick, 2010; Morrow, 
1999). Economies of scale in production also exist resulting in differences in the 
number of teams that optimize the objective of the regulator in each league in 
the different countries. The feature of open-leagues that result in promotion and 
relegation in soccer in most parts of the world increases the incentive for clubs 
to gamble for success, thereby generating externalities for other clubs and the 
league (Storm, 2012). 
 
Production externalities arising from fan behaviour create issues such as 
hooliganism and increased cost of provision of safety and security for society. 
For instance, regulation in football in the UK was initially framed around issues 
of public order (Greenfield and Osborne, 2010). 
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INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
NATURE OF PRODUCT & 
CONSUMER DEMAND 
PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY 
Economies of Scale: 
Number of teams that will optimize the 
objective of the regulator differs from 
country to country 
Number of Suppliers: 
Open League resulting in promotion and 
relegation 
Production Externalities: 
1. Benefits to society (e.g. youth 
development justifies Government 
support 
2. Cost to society of Fan behaviour: 
3. Cost of providing safety and security 
4. Effect on local economy 
Consumption Externalities: 
1. Fans are producers and consumers at 
the same time 
2. Consumption activities affect other 
producers (e.g. media) 
Consumer Characteristics: 
1. Fan loyalty leading to limited brand-
switching 
2. Relatively higher incomes than other 
footballing regions 
Nature of Products: 
1. Socially embedded 
2. Clubs have limited control over product 
Locus of Information: 
1. The licensor has the potential to 
centralise information 
2. Allows for quick decision making and 
regulatory review 
Cost of Information Organisation: 
Resource cost of information 
gathering would suggest one agency 
collecting information 
Economies of Scale in Information 
Collection: 
Licensor has access to all financial 
information of clubs 
FIG. 4.5: INDUSTRY 
CONDITIONS IN EUROPEAN 
FOOTBALL 
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American football is believed to also boost the local economy of the host cities and 
towns generating incomes for other business as well as taxes for the local and 
state government (Coates and Humphrey; 2003; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; 
Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). The promotion of Swansea FC to the English 
Premier League is estimated to worth £58 million and 400 jobs to the City of 
Cardiff in Wales, according to Prof. Calvin Jones of the Cardiff Business School 
(CBS, 2013)  
 
Football, like most sports also provides opportunities for the youth away from the 
street and crime (Sandford et al, 2008). The positive effect of sport on responsible 
leadership amongst the youth, personal development, and life skills development 
(Theokas et al, 2008), and its ability to alleviate a variety of social problems 
(Coalter, 2007), all provide examples of the external benefit from the youth 
development activities of sports clubs. This would justify government subsidies to 
football as an attempt to internalise the positive externalities generated by football 
clubs through youth development (Bourke, 2011; Relvas, 2011; Senaux, 2011). 
 
There are consumption externalities, as the consumption activities of football fans 
affect the production activities of the media. The media has an active role in 
creating the football product whilst the media also thrives on football. Most football 
organisations are product-led to such an extent that their success is judged by 
what happens on the field (Hamil and Chadwick, 2010). This feature of the football 
product and consumer demand, coupled with the realities of relegation and 
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promotion resulting from the open-league systems practiced in most European 
football federations means that clubs try to outspend each other in a ‘rat-race’ 
fashion.  
 
The European football scene continues to be characterised by financial difficulties 
for several clubs despite the influx of capital (see, for example, Dietl et al, 2007; 
Gammelsaeter and Senaux, 2011; Hamil and Chadwick, 2010; Lago et al, 2007; 
Morrow, 1999); commercialism and professional marketing practices (Hamil and 
Chadwick, 2010); and increased foreign ownership of clubs. The unhealthy debt 
situation of some of the clubs have resulted from the increased competition to buy 
‘prized assets’ in the form of highly priced players and the increased wage 
demands of players and their agents (Geey, 2011).  
 
These defining features of the football industry in Europe have shaped the form of 
the UEFA CL & FFPRs which are an attempt by UEFA to deal with these specific 
features of the industry. The break-even conditions could be seen as an attempt to 
deal with player cost inflation and the funding of clubs by ‘so-called benefactor 
owners’ (Franck & Lang, 2013). Similarly, the financial regulation of football clubs 
in Ghana has to be determined by the peculiar industry conditions facing 
stakeholders. 
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4.6 SCOPE, FUNCTION AND FORM OF REGULATION  
This section deals with the scope, the function and the form of the licensing 
regulations reviewed.  
 
4.6.1  The Scope of Regulation 
The scope of a regulatory framework relates to the extent to which it attempts to 
regulate a specific aspect of an industry’s activities (partial regulation) or every 
aspect of firms in the industry’s activities (comprehensive regulation). It also refers 
to whether all firms within the industry are covered, or only a defined group are 
regulated (Sappington, 1994). The UEFA CL & FFPR aims to improve the 
standards of all aspects of ‘football in Europe’ and to give continued priority to the 
training and care of young players in ‘every club’ (UEFA, 2012a, Art. 2.1a). 
However, only clubs which qualified to participate and seek to take part in UEFA 
Club competitions are required to undergo licensing. Also only clubs with ‘relevant 
incomes’ in excess of five million Euros are subject to the FFPRs.  
It might be the ambition of many clubs to play in the competition due to its financial 
attraction, influencing them to change their business model to conform to FFPRs in 
anticipation of qualification. However, due to the balance of power amongst clubs 
in most European leagues only a few clubs in each country are able to qualify for 
the UEFA Champions League annually. For example, only six clubs finished in the 
top ten in the English Premier League over a ten-year period from 2001/02 to the 
2010/11 season (Deloitte, 2011). Hence, only a small number of clubs would thus 
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ever require going through the regulatory process of the FFP. Thus limiting the 
licensing process only to clubs taking part in UEFA competitions might not 
‘improve standards in every European club’ as anticipated by UEFA, and may 
suffer from under-inclusiveness, by not being able to include all entities it proposes 
to deal with (Diver, 1983).  
This issue could be argued to be less of a challenge in Europe than, say, in Ghana 
where a number of clubs do not find the CAF Champions League as financially 
attractive as European clubs find the UEFA Champions League (GHALCA, 2010). 
The CAF Licensing framework (CAF, 2013, Art. 60) similarly deals only with clubs 
participating in CAF Inter-Club competitions, which may not serve as sufficient 
motivation for all Ghanaian clubs to conform to licensing rules.  The Scottish FA 
however has a more comprehensive licensing system that affects every level of 
professional football. Scottish Premier League Clubs undergo both the National 
and UEFA Club Licensing, whilst Scottish Football League Clubs and the Scottish 
Highland Football League Clubs only undergoing the National Club Licensing 
(SFA, 2013, 1.2).  
Setting financial thresholds in any system of regulation also runs the risk of 
arbitrariness (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). The choice of the EUR 5 
million thresholds by UEFA, which admittedly might be a low figure in European 
football terms, is not necessarily based on any objective criteria. Inevitably, clubs 
just over the threshold are treated differently from other clubs just below the 
threshold. At the margins, there is a risk that this may provide the motivation for 
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some clubs to engage in creative accounting to ensure that they do not qualify for 
monitoring. 
 
4.6.2  The Function of the Regulation 
This section discusses the stated function of the reviewed regulations. Financial 
disclosure and financial management regulations within the reviewed frameworks 
are discussed. 
Financial Disclosure 
According to Sappington (1994), the function of regulation is either to inform 
consumers about the product, or to enforce input, process and output standards to 
protect consumers. Whilst Sappington (1994) did not explicitly argue that it is 
possible for a regulatory framework to do both, it could be argued that club 
licensing regulations do attempt to satisfy both objectives (FIFA, 2010; SFA, 2013; 
UEFA, 2012a). In order to ensure financial transparency and provide information to 
stakeholders of football clubs, the club licensing regulations require clubs to 
furnish the licensor with a minimum amount of information as contained in its 
audited financial statements as required by national legislation.  
FIFA recognises that there are differences in the financial reporting requirements 
in different countries; reflecting differences in the context in which clubs operate. 
Moreover, the corporate governance structures in different countries may be 
different resulting in specific reporting requirements expected by different national 
legislation. As far as possible, FIFA requires the licensor to take into consideration 
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the national regulations on financial reporting i.e. in the case of Ghana the 
Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179). However, even when the existing national law 
falls short of the minimum requirement, the licensor is expected to ensure that the 
minimum requirements from FIFA are met. 
FIFA (2010, Article F.01), UEFA (2012a, Article 47 & 48) and SFA (2013, Article 
47 & 48) all define the minimum financial information (and relevant period) that 
should be submitted to the licensor by a club. It is the responsibility of the licence 
applicant to provide all information requested by the licensing authority. Significant 
changes that occur after an application has been made, or after a licence has 
been approved, should be communicated to the licensor. However, the inclusion of 
confidentiality clauses in the regulations relating to documents submitted for the 
purposes of licensing (UEFA, 2012a, Article 11; pp.11), suggest that the licensing 
process in itself may not generate adequate information on the financial state of 
the clubs for the public, unless these documents are also made available to the 
respective  Registrar of Companies.  
     
The level of financial disclosure across Europe differs greatly from one country to 
another. This obviously has implications for a pan-European system of regulation 
such as UEFA (2010a), which is meant to affect financial disclosure attitudes in the 
different countries. For example, in countries like England (and Scotland) a lot of 
financial information about clubs is conveniently available, both through reports 
like Deloitte’s Annual Review of Club Finance (Deloitte, 2011) and directly from 
clubs or through Companies House. The Scottish FA even proposes to go further 
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in terms of transparency, planning to publish all the financial information it holds on 
its clubs, other than their debt position, on its website; a proposal which has been 
accepted by its member clubs (SFA, 2013). This is the closest any national 
association has come to full and transparent disclosure of financial information.  
Morrow (1999, 2005) suggests that the improvement in the level of information 
disclosure in UK football might be as result of both the recognition of stakeholders 
beyond shareholders by clubs and the greater involvement of professionals in 
advising football clubs. Increased financial awareness among the football public as 
well as increased media interest in financial affairs of clubs,  and the limited liability 
structure of majority of UK clubs have also contributed  to enhanced disclosure 
(Morrow, 2005; 2013). This has led to an improvement in the ease of access to 
financial information on UK clubs, as discussed above. 
The same cannot be said of every other European country though. According to 
Wilkesmann et al. (2011) German clubs are not required to publish their accounts 
based on their legal form.  The licensing procedure is also controlled by the DFL, 
which is owned by the clubs themselves without any external control. The DFL is 
also not allowed to interpret the quality of the data provided by the clubs (Dietl and 
Franck, 2007). These issues limit the flow of financial information to the public, in 
turn undermining financial transparency. Andreff (2007) suggested that French 
clubs do not want their accounts to be disclosed except to the decision making 
body. Clubs are prepared to pay a fine for limited disclosure rather than make a full 
disclosure to the public. This is because according to Andreff, French football is 
characterised by financial wrongdoing such as:  
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“…false invoicing, hidden honoraria, fake club accounting 
and book cooking (despite DNCG audits), embezzlements, 
rigged matches and referee bribing, the use of ‘‘black bags’’ 
when transferring overseas players, fictitious player transfers 
hiding undisclosed money transfers, and abuse of social 
benefits…” 
      (2007, pp. 656) 
In such a situation Andreff (2007) propose relegation for clubs who resist 
disclosure. He argues that proper financial disclosure would potentially limit the 
occurrence of some of the financial wrong-doing mentioned above. Despite the 
cost associated with financial disclosure, which may include the direct cost of 
producing the information and the potential loss of competitive advantage to rival 
firms, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) suggest further that, in general, disclosure 
leads to efficient markets. It reduces the cost of capital, especially in financial 
securities.  
To encourage firms to achieve socially optimal output levels Coggburn and 
Schneider (2003) propose a rational policy linking subsidies and other economic 
support from governments to firms to their performance. For football clubs this 
could include financial performance and financial disclosure. This suggestion 
should be very useful for the development of a financial regulatory framework that 
seeks to improve the financial environment within which clubs in Ghana operate. 
Government and FA financial support for clubs which show evidence of improved 
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financial management and transparency may be provided as incentive to 
encourage further effort in the same direction.  
The financial licensing components of the licensing regulations under review also 
seek to stipulate standards in terms of the content of financial statements as well 
as the quality of auditing. In recognition of differences in accounting standards 
across Europe and to ensure inter-country comparability the UEFA CL & FFPR 
CLR stipulate that financial statements are to be audited based on the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as provided by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  
 
There remains an on-going debate as to whether football club financial statements 
(as required under these regulations) really speak to the needs of the various 
stakeholders of football clubs (Morrow, 2013). The financial statements required by 
the standard accounting codes more often than not, assume that the company is a 
profit maximizer (Sarpong and Gray, 1989). Football clubs may have several 
organisational objectives, and they may also have social roles that are subject to 
externalities. To that extent, the standard ways of determining their financial 
performance might be resulting in the underestimation of their performance 
(Morrow, 1999). Also, Morrow (2013) questions whether beyond submitting 
audited accounts for purposes of licensing by FAs, football clubs have accounts 
users similar to that of any other company. Even though they go through the same 
costly motions of preparing the accounts, Morrow (2013) suggests they may be 
engaging effectively in a ‘dialogue of the deaf’.  These seem to suggest that the 
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accounts of football clubs may have to be significantly different from that of the 
standard firm. 
 
Financial Management  
The FFPRs also set financial management standards in terms of requiring clubs to 
live within their means and to not regularly spend more than their revenues (Bell, 
2011; Flanagan, 2013; Geey, 2011; Lindholm, 2011). Article 58, Annex X (UEFA, 
2012) states that ‘‘the break-even result for a reporting period is calculated as 
relevant income less relevant expenses’’. Table 5.1 provides the composition of 
both relevant income and expenses.  
Table 4.1: The Concept of Relevant Income and Expenses in the UEFA CL & FFPRs 
RELEVANT INCOME RELEVANT EXPENSES 
a) Revenue – Gate receipts 
b) Revenue – Sponsorship and advertising 
c) Revenue – Broadcasting rights 
d) Revenue – Commercial activities 
e) Revenue – Other operating income 
f) Profit on disposal of player registrations (or income 
from disposal of player 
registrations) 
g) Excess proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed 
assets 
h) Finance income 
 
Relevant income is decreased if the elements a) to h) 
in paragraph 2 include any 
items below : 
i) Non-monetary credits 
j) Income transaction(s) with related party(ies) above 
fair value 
k) Income from non-football operations not related to 
the club 
a) Expenses – Cost of sales/materials 
b) Expenses – Employee benefits expenses 
c) Expenses – Other operating expenses 
d) Amortisation/impairment of player registrations and 
loss on disposal of player 
registrations (or costs of acquiring player registrations) 
e) Finance costs and dividends 
 
Relevant expenses are increased if the elements a) to 
e) in paragraph 3 include the item below  
f) Expense transaction(s) with related party(ies) below 
fair value. 
 
Relevant expenses are decreased if the elements a) to 
e) in paragraph 3 include any items below : 
 
g) Expenditure on youth development activities 
h) Expenditure on community development activities 
i) Non-monetary debits/charges 
j) Finance costs directly attributable to the construction 
of tangible fixed assets 
k) Expenses of non-football operations not related to 
the club 
 
Source: UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, 2012 
 
 
The break-even requirements are considered a tailored approach based on the 
level of risk faced by the club (Bell, 2011), and ensure that it is no longer possible 
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for rich owners to cover the losses of clubs perpetually (Flanagan, 2013). It is 
reasonable to argue then that the exemption of infrastructure cost, youth and 
community development costs from the calculation of relevant expenses (see 
Table 4.1) is an attempt to re-direct club spending from risky assets such as player 
purchases to less risky and longer term assets (Franck and Lang, 2013). The 
UEFA FFPRs thus adopt a risk-based approach to regulatory design, similar to the 
form suggested by Black (2005).  However, it could be argued that the exemption 
may also lead to club managers opting to undertake over-ambitious stadia 
development projects which may only add up to the long-term debts of the club. 
The FFPRs may thus reallocate expenditure away from player spending to other 
expenditures without necessarily improving current on-field performance, which 
might be crucial for the club’s long-term financial success.  
 
The break-even requirements have also been likened to a relative or implicit salary 
cap where each club has a different level of expenditure they cannot exceed 
(Lidnholm, 2011; Morrow, 2013). This is different from the more common “absolute 
salary cap” under which all clubs are subject to the same capped amount.  Geey 
(2011) suggest that regulations may limit expenditures on players in any given 
year. 
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4.6.3  The Form of the Regulation 
Sappington (1994) refers to the form of a regulation as encompassing: regulatory 
design; enforcement procedures; the locus of decision making in the regulatory 
arena; and the nature of the regulatory rules. The regulatory design could be either 
command and control, delegated decision making or potential regulation (see 
section 4.1.2). A regulatory framework could combine aspects of command and 
control and delegated decision making depending on the function of the regulation. 
The UEFA CL & FFP regulations and the Scottish FA regulations all combine 
aspects of the two types of regulatory design.  
Appendix 7 and 8 provide an overview of the regulatory design and the locus of 
decision making within the regulatory arena for both UEFA and the Scottish FA. 
The monitoring is undertaken by the CFCB which has the power to refer any club 
for disciplinary measures to be taken against them in conformity with UEFA’s 
disciplinary procedures (UEFA, 2012a, Article 72). Clubs sanctioned by the CFCB, 
however have a right of appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS).   
The UEFA framework achieves regulatory compliance through the requirement for 
clubs and national associations to subject themselves to spot checks by UEFA 
through the compliance audits conducted by either UEFA or an appointed body of 
UEFA (Article 71). The effective use of third-party compliance audits could serve 
as a credible threat to associations intending to ensure that their member clubs 
participate in UEFA organised club competitions even where they do not meet 
specified criteria. A similar structure at the national association level would also 
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serve as a credible threat against club officials colluding with auditors to 
misrepresent financial figures. 
Whilst equal treatment of clubs might be guaranteed within countries, it cannot be 
guaranteed across different UEFA member countries as national associations are 
given the power to determine the sanctions applicable to clubs that do not comply 
with the club licensing requirements. The range of sanctions that UEFA proposes 
vary from an attempt at coercion in the form of requiring further information, and 
deterrence in the form of fines and bans (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). This 
confirms the suggestions by Bell (2011) that the UEFA CL & FFP regulations 
adopt a risk-based approach to regulatory design (Black, 2005) in which the 
sanctions imposed are relative to the level of risk generated by the license 
applicant in terms of the size of relevant income and expense. 
The Scottish FA has three different levels of licensing (section 4.6.1). The licensing 
administration undertakes all the auditing of documents and the compliance audit 
of the licence applicants (the clubs) on behalf of the Licence Committee, an 
independent body set up by the Executive Committee of the Scottish FA. The 
decision making bodies are the Licence Committee and the Appellate Tribunal 
(Judicial Panel) which makes decisions on the award of licence and appeals 
against the decision of the Licence Committee respectively.  
The Judicial Panel has the power to fine, suspend or terminate the membership of 
a club from the SPL, SFL or any other recognised bodies (SFA, 2013, Article 35). 
The regulations define the range and scale of fines that could be imposed, with 
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clubs in higher levels of the league paying higher amounts for the same offence 
committed (SFA, 2013, Article 3.7). Thus, there is presumed to be equal treatment 
within leagues, but unequal treatment across league; similar to the fine structures 
in Ghana football (GFA, 2010a). Again this could be viewed as an attempt to adopt 
the risk-based approach of Black (2005); financial failure of clubs in higher leagues 
potentially pose greater problems for the stability and integrity of the leagues 
compared to those in the lower leagues.  
The Scottish regulations incorporate a process of regulatory review and 
modification as indicated by the presence of a group of experts who continually 
review the reports of the licencing administration and the decision-making bodies. 
This would imply that the regulations could be considered as ‘really-responsive’ 
regulation (Baldwin and Black, 2008), as they allow the regulator to respond to 
changes in the circumstances, objectives and priorities of the regulator on an on-
going and continuous basis.  This process, though not explicitly contained in the 
UEFA CL & FFP regulations, could be undertaken by the CFCB whose 
investigative activities would result in a review of industry conditions, the 
institutional environment and the resources available to the regulator to inform 
future regulatory reform (Sappington, 1994). Setting up a different body from the 
financial regulator to undertake this review in a resource-constrained environment 
like Ghana, would, however, be an inefficient use of resources. 
The nature of the regulatory rules is contained in the procedural rules defined in 
both the UEFA CL & FFP regulations and the SFA CL regulations. The procedural 
rules incorporate the deadlines; the application of the principle of equal treatment; 
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right of representation, appeal, and to be heard; and the type of evidence to be 
requested, as determined by the decision making bodies. Other issues relating to 
the procedural rules in the regulations under review include the burden of proof; 
the grounds of complaint by appellant; the form of the deliberations and hearings; 
as well as the cost of the processes of the decision making bodies.  
Within the UEFA CL & FFPRs extensive rules are also made describing each of 
the regulatory deadlines in both the licensing (Articles 7, 8 and 9) and the 
monitoring process (Articles 43, 47, 54, 55, 62 and 64). The Scottish regulations 
also provide extensive information on procedural deadlines consistent with UEFA 
guidelines, ensuring definiteness of the process, including of an appeal.  
Both the UEFA and Scottish licensing and monitoring frameworks attempt to 
safeguard the principle of equal treatment by requiring the decision making bodies 
- that is the first instance and appellate tribunals [UEFA, 2012a, Article 5(4) f, 7(10) 
b and 11(1)] and the CFCB [Articles 53(2) and 55(2)] - at each stage to treat all 
applicants equally and fairly. However, that the requirement for clubs playing in 
Europe to have to go through a more rigorous set of monitoring requirements from 
that of their domestic rivals might be considered to reduce their financial and 
business autonomy, which in turn may distort competition within a domestic 
league. This would then defeat the principle of fairness, which is at the core of the 
FFPR, within domestic leagues. Meanwhile the perception of fairness of the 
application of the regulations would determine the motivational posture of the firms 
in response to regulation (Baldwin and Black, 2008). 
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Secondly, widely differing tax rates and social security costs across Europe would 
also mean that financial performance based on break-even conditions means 
different things across Europe. For example the tax on sports income is 50% in 
England and 23% in Spain. An extreme example is clubs based in the tax haven of 
Monaco.  Here there is zero income taxation for its resident players (Genta, 2010), 
which means that clubs could attract marque players without having to spend as 
much as their counterparts in other parts of Europe. Thus whilst they could 
achieve on-field success in the UEFA competitions, their rivals from other 
countries might not be able to get the same quality without breaching FFPR rules.  
The right of appeal against the decisions of any UEFA organ or licensor during the 
licensing and monitoring process is enshrined in the UEFA regulations. Article 7 
provides information on who could file an appeal, when an appeal could be filed, 
conditions under which an appeal could be filed and the process of filing the 
appeal and its effect. Annex 1 (C8) and Annex IV (7) provide for an applicant 
taking part in the monitoring process to appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sports 
(CAS) in respect of a decision by the CFCP. This right was duly taken up in the 
case of Malaga, albeit, unsuccessfully (see section 5.3.3). In respect of the 
licensing process UEFA provides the licensor (National Association or League) the 
power to determine whether an appeal would have a delaying effect or not.  
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4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This section provides a summary of the discussions and the conclusions drawn for 
the development of a financial regulatory framework for professional football in 
Ghana.  
 
4.7.1  Summary 
The main aspects of Sappington’s framework were used to shape the analysis of 
the existing framework in this chapter. The main frameworks reviewed include 
FIFA (2010), SFA (2013) and UEFA (2012a). Lessons were also drawn from the 
German and French experience in club licensing.  
 
UEFA’s Financial Fair Play rules seek to achieve long-term financial soundness, 
thereby ensuring the long-term viability of European football. These are consistent 
with Sappington’s listed regulatory objectives (see section 4.2). In order to foster 
industry development and investment, the club licensing frameworks encourage 
clubs to invest in youth and infrastructural development. They also aim at 
safeguarding the credibility, continuity and integrity of club competitions. The 
frameworks also encourage clubs to employ the right calibre of personnel to 
ensure improvements in professionalism. In order to provide safe and quality 
services to stakeholders, the regulations all seek to promote transparency in the 
finances of the club, allowing stakeholders to obtain the information necessary to 
make assessments as to whether clubs are being run efficiently. All the licensing 
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regimes aim at ensuring equitable outcomes by protecting creditors of clubs, be 
they players, other clubs or social/tax authorities.   
 
UEFA’s attempt to moderate the flow of income to clubs from ‘sugar-daddy’ 
investors may be an attempt to reduce the financial risks associated with 
investment in risky assets. The FFP regulations also aim at promoting least cost 
production by indirectly limiting the sums of money that clubs may spend on 
wages. The counter argument however, is that the FFP rules may in fact restrict 
the opportunity for investment into football clubs, especially the smaller ones.  
The review has highlighted the importance of the independence of the decision-
making bodies in respect of licensing and monitoring. A pre-defined tenure of the 
financial regulatory body which could be renewed without limit provides the 
necessary confidence and independence of the regulator to allow it resist 
regulatory capture. There is evidence of a high degree of delegation of 
responsibility in respect of decision-making between FIFA, the Confederations, the 
NGBs and the Licensing bodies.  
The importance of the quality of the human resources available to the regulators in 
the frameworks that have been reviewed was evident. Qualified personnel from 
the relevant financial fields are as important as industry experts to the success of 
the regulatory framework. Appointing only industry experts from within increases 
the chances for the existence of conflict of interest. The quality of the 
complementary control institutions such as the judicial bodies of the national 
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federation would also determine the extent to which the objectives of financial 
regulatory framework are achieved. 
The football industry is characterized by economies of scale in production, as well 
production and consumption externalities. These would provide a rationale for 
external intervention, for example, to deal with the provision of safety and security. 
UEFA’s regulations are an attempt to deal with the specific features of the 
European football industry. For instance the break-even conditions could be seen 
as an attempt to deal with player cost inflation and the trend towards funding of 
clubs by ‘sugar-daddy’ owners.  
 
Most regulatory frameworks combine aspects of command and control, and 
delegated decision-making depending on the function of the regulation. The UEFA 
CL & FFP regulations and the Scottish FA regulations all combine aspects of the 
two types of regulatory design. 
 
4.7.2  Conclusions  
The objective of the review done in this chapter provides valuable lessons for the 
development of a context-specific financial regulatory framework for professional 
football in Ghana. Firstly, it is essential that the objectives of the regulatory 
framework are clearly defined as this would shape the form and the function of the 
regulation. Secondly, the regulatory design process must take into consideration 
the resources – human, financial, and physical – of the regulator, in order to 
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determine how comprehensive the scope of regulation should be. The resources 
would also determine the most effective regulatory enforcement instrument to be 
utilized as it would affect the commitment ability of the regulator. 
  
Thirdly, it is essential that the independence of the regulatory body be guaranteed. 
This would be achieved through the quality of personnel appointed to serve on the 
board of the regulator (Esteve et al., 2011; Ferkins and Shilbury, 2012), the mode 
of selection of the membership and the security of tenure of the membership of the 
regulatory board. Fourthly, the quality of the complementary control institutions is 
crucial to the success of the financial regulator. For instance the ability of the 
league management to effectively regulate all other aspects of the clubs’ 
operations, would allow the financial regulator to limit itself to the financial 
management of the clubs. 
 
Finally, the regulatory framework could combine aspects of both command-and-
control and an incentive-based delegated decision-making approaches to 
regulatory design. It is therefore reasonable to argue for the introduction of a 
regulatory body that ensures that financial licensing and monitoring are 
complemented by incentives such as access to credit and the provision of support 
services to clubs. 
The lessons from this review would be combined with the conclusions that would 
be drawn from the review of Ghanaian football finance in the next chapter to 
develop a draft financial regulatory framework for professional football in Ghana.   
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CHAPTER V 
REVIEW OF GHANAIAN FOOTBALL FINANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the financial disclosure practices of 
Ghanaian professional clubs. It is also to evaluate the financial position and 
performance of the clubs to assess whether they are financially viable entities. The 
focus of this chapter is on the published financial statements of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs. The results from this chapter are then utilized as part of 
the industry conditions and institutional environment for developing the FFC 
framework at the conceptutal level.There are two main components of the chapter. 
The first part of the chapter concentrates on the quality of financial reporting and 
disclosure, assessing the credibility, consistency and comparability of the reports 
submitted to the FA. It measures the performance of the clubs using the Ghana 
National Accounting Standards (GNAS) as the benchmark.  
Notwithstanding the limitations set out in the first part of the chapter, in the second 
part the first detailed review and analysis of the financial position and performance 
of Ghanaian football clubs is provided. The chapter also summarizes the evidence 
on other issues affecting the financial management of clubs in Ghana. These 
include the low utilization of formal sector credit; unpaid player transfer debts; low 
levels of sponsorship activities; and the effect of participation in CAF organized 
inter-club competitions on the financial position of clubs.  
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5.2 QUALITY OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY GHANAIAN  
PROFESSIONAL CLUBS  
This section discusses the information disclosure practices of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs, focusing primarily on the submission of audited 
financial statements to the FA. It reviews the credibility of the submitted financial 
statements by analyzing the contents of a sample of these financial statements. 
This section also provides an analysis of the accounting treatment adopted by 
clubs in two specific areas which affects the comparability of the financial 
statements of different clubs and the reported financial performance: namely, of 
the amortization of player recruitment cost and depreciation of fixed assets. 
 
5.2.1 Submission and Storage of Accounts  
The Ghana Football Association (GFA) requires all premier league clubs to submit 
their audited financial statements to it prior to the commencement of the new 
season (GFA, 2012, Article 8.2). Ostensibly this allows the FA insight into the 
financial management of clubs in furtherance of the financial control powers it 
exercises over the clubs provided for under Article 40 of the GFA R & R (GFA 
2012, Article 40).  
One major challenge in the submission process in Ghana is ambiguity over which  
version of a club’s financial statements should be submitted to the FA. According 
to the Article 8.2 (GFA, 2012) the audited financial statements to be submitted at 
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the start of a particular football season are those for the year preceding the 
recently completed league season. Thus, prior to the commencement of the 
2012/13 league season, clubs were obliged to submit audited accounts for the 
year ending within 2010/11. With different clubs having different financial years, 
the regulation seems ambiguous as to the exact version of a club’s account to be 
submitted. This sits in contrast to the clarity offered by UEFA’s regulation (UEFA, 
2012a), which provides as an example, the monitoring period assessed in the 
licence season 2015/16 covers the reporting periods ending in 2015 (reporting 
period T), 2014 (reporting period T-1) and 2013 (reporting period T-2). Thus the 
financial statements required are those for the period T-1 and T-2. 
In 2011, some clubs in Ghana had their financial years ending in June, August, 
October or December. Hence, for each of these clubs licensing would be based on 
accounts from different years. For example, the lack of clarity ensured that for the 
2012/13 season, whilst some clubs submitted accounts for the year ending June 
30th, 2011, others submitted accounts for the year ending December 31st, 2010 or 
June 30th, 2012. Thus by the time they are submitted to the FA, most financial 
statements of clubs are most certainly not  timely and not necessarily  relevant, 
despite these being basic requirements for accounts to be useful (Morrow, 2013, 
Siciliano, 2003).  From a practical point of view, this makes the compilation and 
analysis of financial performance for Ghanaian professional football clubs difficult. 
The GFA utilize a deterrence approach (section 2.7.1) to achieve regulatory 
compliance; imposing quite severe punishments for non-submission of the audited 
accounts within the timeframe provided for by the Association (GFA, 2012; Article 
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8.2). A club that fails to submit its audited financial statements is punished with the 
forfeiture of its match (GFA, 2012, Article 34.1j). The club would be considered to 
have lost its first match of the season and its opponents credited with 3 points and 
3 goals. The forfeiture clauses in the regulations have been invoked several times 
in the recent times, especially for the non-payment of fines and the fielding of 
unqualified players. During the 2012/13 season RTU lost accumulated points for 
fielding unqualified players. Berekum Arsenals also lost points for non-payment of 
fines within stipulated period. This has ensured that there is haste by clubs to 
submit audited financial statements before the commencement of the season.  
For the purposes of this research, a formal request was made for the audited 
financial statements submitted by clubs for the period 2005/06 to 2011/12 league 
seasons; a request was approved by FA Emergency Committee in March 2012.  
By March 2013, only 45 reports from 19 different clubs had been retrieved as 
against the 112 financial statements which should have been submitted during that 
period. Making a concession for three newly promoted clubs which cannot supply 
previously audited accounts each season because their legal form in Division One 
does not require them to prepare accounts,  91 sets of audited accounts should 
have been submitted by 13 clubs during the stated period).  
The GFA official responsible for the storage of the submitted financial statements 
(a Deputy General Secretary of the Football Association) told the researcher that 
he was unable to locate several of the submitted financial statements because the 
storage facility was relocated to another room within the same building. However, 
he indicated that no club had ever been penalized for non-submission during the 
179 
 
period under consideration, assuring the researcher that all clubs who are 
supposed to deposit financial statements had complied annually.   
 
5.2.2 Credibility of Accounts 
Out of the 45 sets of audited financial statements obtained from the FA for the 
purposes of this study, six of the reports, belonging to 4 different clubs were 
rejected and not utilized in the study due to various anomalies detected. One club 
submitted an identical report to the GFA for each of the years 2006, 2007 and 
2008, merely changing the year on the cover sheet. All the information contained 
in the document was identical to the information in the club’s audited financial 
statement for the year ending 31st December 2006. The headline dates indicated 
2005 and 2006, leading to the conclusion that those documents were not credible 
enough to be included in the analysis. 
Analysis of financial statements for the year 2010 revealed that two clubs had 
identical figures for every line item, even though the clubs are of markedly different 
size, indicating the possible submission of fraudulent documentation by one of 
them. Further checks in the document revealed that names of players attached to 
the notes to club A’s financial statements as the list of players purchased for that 
season, were actually players purchased by club B. One interpretation is that club 
A had copied the financial statements of club B, changed the cover and submitted 
it as its own, in order to beat the reporting deadline in order to achieve legitimacy 
by being seen as conforming to laid down regulations (Morrow, 2006). The act of 
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misrepresenting the financial statements of the club may also have been done in 
anticipation that the content of the statements might not be subject to review. Club 
B’s financial statements were utilized in the analysis, whilst that of club A was 
rejected on the grounds of likely fraudulent submission. Two other sets of accounts 
were also rejected as they were neither signed by the auditors nor the directors of 
the club, even though they had been duly accepted by the FA upon submission. 
The remaining 38 accounts were deemed to be credible and these reports formed 
the basis of the subsequent review of financial statements whose outcome is 
discussed in the sections that follows.  
 
5.2.3 Content of Accounts 
Incorporated Ghanaian clubs are bound by the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179: 
Article 123-136) which requires directors of companies to keep books of accounts 
and circulate balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and other reports to all 
members within a specified time period. The details of the required content of 
these documents are specified in the 4th Schedule to the Act. The Ghana National 
Accounting Standards (GNAS) issued by the institute of Chartered Accountants 
Ghana (ICAG), to which most of the auditors of the reports reviewed for this study 
refer, mirrors the standards in the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). It requires that a set of financial statements should include a Directors’ 
Report; Auditor’s Report to the members of the company; Profit and Loss account; 
Balance Sheet; Cash Flow Statement and Notes to the Financial Statements.  
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The GNAS thus provides a framework for assessing whether a club is meeting 
information disclosure requirements. The  financial statements of the clubs (n = 
38) were reviewed to  determine the extent to which the financial reporting and 
auditing which was disclosed had been done in accordance with Act 179, and the 
GNAS framework. Table 5.1 below provides an overview of the quality of the 
content of the various sections of the financial statements reviewed. 
Table 5.1: Quality of information in Financial Statements 
Quality 
of 
Content 
Balance Sheet Income & 
Expenditure 
Account 
Cash Flow 
Statement 
Notes to 
Financial 
Statement 
Directors’ 
Report 
Auditor’s 
Report 
No. percent No. percent No. percent No.  percent No.  percent No. percent 
None 
Limited 
Detailed 
- 
19 
19 
- 
50 
50 
- 
19 
19 
- 
50 
50 
22 
2 
14 
58 
5 
37 
- 
9 
29 
- 
23 
77 
7 
21 
10 
19 
55 
26 
- 
22 
16 
- 
58 
42 
Total 38 100 38 100 38 100 38 100 38 100 38 100 
Source: Financial Statements of various clubs between 2006 and 2012 
 
Directors’ Report 
The GASB standards and Article 132 of the Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) 
provide guidelines on the contents of the Directors’ Report for companies in Ghana 
and this is adopted by this study for the purposes of this review.  A  Directors’ 
report in an audited set of financial statements is considered detailed if it provides 
information on the nature of the company’s business, and whether this has 
changed during the year under consideration or not. It also has to include a 
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summary of the state of the company’s affairs, including results of operations, and 
whether the directors recommend the distribution of part or all of dividends for the 
year. A detailed directors’ report would also indicate the acknowledgement of the 
responsibilities of the directors to ensure that the accounts represent a true and 
fair view of the state of the company, as well as providing comments on the 
appointment of auditors. On the other hand where most of this information is 
absent or has little relevance for the company’s activities for the year under 
consideration the report is considered to be ‘limited’.  
Figures from table 5.1 shows that out of the 38 financial statements reviewed 7 of 
them (19% of the sample) had no Directors’ report attached. Whilst 21 clubs (55%) 
had limited information, only 10 clubs (26%) disclosed information considered 
detailed enough to be useful for outsiders seeking information on the financial 
situation of the clubs. Thus majority of the clubs paid little attention to the content 
of the Directors’ report, and for some of them the same information continues to be 
repeated annually. 
Auditor’s Report 
The review in this section is based on the requirements of both the GASB 
framework and Article 133 of Act 179. Clause 1-5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Act 
also provides the mandatory requirements for an auditor’s report. The mandatory 
requirements are that the auditor’s report should include a statement indicating 
whether or not: the auditors have obtained information and explanations necessary 
for the audit to be conducted; proper books of accounts have been kept by the 
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company; the balance sheet is in agreement with the book of accounts; and 
accounts give a true and fair view of the state of the company’s affair and profit 
and loss position of the company. 
An auditor’s report is considered ‘detailed’ if it meets all the mandatory 
requirements of the Act, and if it contains information on the responsibilities of 
directors and auditors in the audit process, as well as the basis for the opinion of 
the auditor expressed in the report – both of which are required by the GASB 
framework. The report should also mention the auditing standard or framework 
(example the GASB or IFRS) on which the audit is based. In this respect, only 16 
(42%) of the 38 reports reviewed could be considered as detailed. 22 of the 
financial statements have auditors reports that do not make any statements that 
could be considered specific to the firm or accounting period under consideration. 
These reports are thus classified as ‘limited’ as they could have been carried over 
from another company’s report or repeated from a previous year.  
Profit and Loss Account Disclosure  
Different firms around the world have different ways of referring to the Income 
Statement (Siciliano, 2003) and this may also be a reflection of their organizational 
structure. So while a company in the UK is obliged to produce a Profit and Loss 
account a non-profit organization may produce what is called an Income and 
Expenditure Account. Similarly a Ghanaian club which is incorporated as a 
company limited by guarantee is considered by the Companies Act, 1963 as a 
non-profit organization and as such is required to produce only an Income and 
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Expenditure account. On the other hand, clubs whose liabilities are limited by 
shares are obliged by Clauses 1-12 of the 4th Schedule to Act 179 to draw up 
Profit and Loss Accounts annually, along with detailed mandatory information.  
Whilst some clubs correctly referred to the Income and Expenditure Account 
(Lions) or the Profit and Loss Account (Liberty) depending on their organizational 
structure, Hearts of Oak, which is limited by shares submitted a Statement of 
Comprehensive Income instead of a Profit and Loss Statement. The apparent 
confusion might be an indication of lack of adequate appreciation of financial 
disclosure principles within Ghanaian football. Kotoko which is limited by 
guarantee and as such a non-profit company also produced a statement of 
Comprehensive Income instead of an Income and Expenditure Account. Others 
simply referred to them as income statement (Tema Youth and Aduana).  
The information in the Profit and Loss account is considered ‘detailed’ if it 
organizes the sources of income into key components such as gate receipts; 
sponsorship and advertising; broadcasting rights; commercial; and other operating 
income as in Annex VI of UEFA (2012). It should also state the key components of 
expenses, and other items such as profit/loss on disposal of assets; profit/loss on 
disposal of intangible assets – players, finance costs and tax expense. Whilst 50% 
of the accounts had profit and loss accounts that could be considered as detailed, 
the other 50% had only limited information with majority of them referring a reader 
to the notes attached to the financial statements. Thus information that could 
easily have been presented in the main document is seemingly obscured by its 
placement in the Notes to the Financial Statement, contrary to the specification of 
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Clause 1-12 of the 4th Schedule to Act 179 which specifies what items are to be 
discussed in the main Profit and Loss Accounts. This might be an indication of an 
attempt by club managers to bias the opinion of accounts users.   
Balance Sheet Disclosure 
Siciliano (2003) defines the balance sheet as an itemized statement that 
summarizes a firm’s assets and liabilities at the end of a year. Clause 14 of the 4th 
Schedule to Act 179 provides a list of the mandatory requirements which, where 
applicable to a company must be distinguished. These include, among others, 
interests in land, goodwill, patents, trade-marks, development expenditure, and 
other intangible assets. Others are trade investments; loans and advances; trading 
stocks, trade debtors; bills of exchange and promissory notes; payments-in-
advance; marketable securities; and cash in hand and in the bank. 
Whilst some of the above items may not be relevant for a football club’s Balance 
Sheet, a ‘detailed’ balance sheet should provide information on the various 
categories of current and non-current assets of a firm, as well as the liabilities as at 
the date the balance sheet is drawn up. Information on the financing of the net 
assets of the firm should also be provided in the balance sheet. Without these the 
balance sheet cannot be considered as complete. Exactly 50 % of the accounts 
reviewed could be considered as detailed with the remaining statements providing 
only limited information on the various components of the assets and liabilities 
(Table 5.1).  
Cash-Flow Statement 
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The Companies Act, 1963 (Act 179) makes no explicit reference to the submission 
of a Cash Flow Statement as part of the financial statements of a company 
registered under the act. Most clubs therefore do not include a statement of cash 
flows, even though this is in violation of the GNAS, which forms the basis for the 
accounting disclosures made. The GNAS requires companies, irrespective of size 
to submit a Cash Flow Statement that provides details on cash flows from 
operating, investing and financing activities, as well as information on the flow of 
cash and cash equivalences.  
About 58% of the statements reviewed do not include any Cash Flow Statement 
making the cash flow statement arguably the most ignored part of the financial 
statements of football clubs in Ghana (see Table 5.1). Whilst 5% of the statements 
provide only limited information on the cash flows of the clubs, only 37% of the 
reviewed documents have detailed cash flow statements that outline the clubs’ 
cash flow from operating, investing and financing activities, as well as information 
on cash and cash equivalences.  
Notes to the Financial Statements 
 The notes to a set of financial statements are considered as an integral part of the 
statements. For example, Annex VI UEFA (2012a) provides a detailed guideline to 
how the notes to the financial statement of a football club should be treated. 
Detailed notes would, at a minimum provide information on the accounting policies 
utilized in the preparation of the notes; how tangible and intangible fixed assets 
(such as goodwill and amortization of player values) are treated in the accounts. 
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Other key issues that should be reported on in ‘detailed’ Notes to the Financial 
Statement would include related party transactions, controlling party, and 
contingent liabilities as defined by Clause 3 of the 4th Schedule to Act 179.   
The majority of the financial statements reviewed for this study provide most of the 
breakdown of income and expenditure in the notes, in contravention of the 
requirements of Clause 1 of the 4th Schedule of Act 179, which defines which 
income and expenditure items should appear in the Profit and Loss Accounts. 
Thus even though the information might still be contained in the financial 
statements, it could be considered to have been wrongly placed. 
Summary  
The discussions in this section show that majority of the clubs pay little attention to 
the content of the Directors’ report, and for some the same information continues 
to be repeated annually. It seems a common practice that majority of the 
information meant expected to be included in the main income statement is to 
some extent at least, obscured by its placement in the Notes to the Financial 
Statement.  
The cash flow statement arguably is the most ignored part of the financial 
statements, consistent with existing research which shows that historically the 
cash-flow statement is given little emphasis in the financial statements and annual 
accounts of companies worldwide.  
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5.2.4 Consistency in Accounting  
A review of the 38 accounts show that four out of the 19 clubs have changed their 
financial year, in each case, as the clubs indicate in the financial statements, to 
align it with the changes in the FA’s football season which runs from July – May of 
the following season, beginning in 2007. Five out of the 19 clubs also changed 
auditors over two audit periods, without any note being made in the accounts as to 
whether this was done in conformity with Clause 135 (1-6) and Clause 136 (6) of 
Act 179. In most cases they also ended up with a new format of accounting, and 
invariably only one year’s accounts with no comparative figures from prior year, in 
contravention of GNAS.    
Changes in a club’s financial year or in its auditors within a short period may 
sometimes be a sign of an attempt by a club to engage in manipulation of figures 
or to hide the true financial condition of the firm (Gasking, 1999). Creative 
accounting is an attempt by accountants to manipulate financial figures to give a 
misleading or illusory impression of the company’s position of performance, 
utilizing their knowledge of accounting rules (Morrow, 2006).  
Four sets of accounts also showed figures for 2010 in the accounts for the year 
ending December 31st, 2011 being different from the figures for 2010 in the 
accounts for the year ending December, 31st, 2010, without any comment on 
adjustments for prior year. Whilst these numbers might not be large, the evidence 
draws attention to the existence of such practices which goes against the doctrine 
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of materiality that underpins financial management and reporting around the world 
(Stewart, 2007).  
 
5.2.5 Comparability 
This sub-section discusses the existence or otherwise of comparable figures from 
prior years in the financial statements assessed. It also discusses how the cost of 
recruiting players and the depreciation of fixed assets are treated within the 
various clubs’ financial statements.  
Existence of Comparable Figures from Prior Year 
A key feature of a good financial statement is that it provides financial information 
from prior years to allow for horizontal financial analysis to be made. Providing 
comparable figures for the previous year allows a reviewer to make comments as 
to whether there has been an improvement or deterioration in the position and 
performance of the club. Out of the 38 financial statements reviewed, ten sets had 
no comparable figures included therein. In each of these reports a claim is made 
that the said financial statements were the first for the club, and as such no 
comparable figures exists. However, 3 of the clubs making these claims had 
submitted financial statements to the FA in the previous year, claiming on that 
occasion that it was also the first set of financial statements of the club. In each of 
these instances, the clubs had changed auditors from the prior year. The lack of 
comparable data might also signal an attempt by some clubs, albeit a few, to 
conceal financial information from relevant stakeholders. 
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Treatment of Player Recruitment Cost 
Similar to the treatment of depreciation of fixed assets by the clubs, the varied 
treatment of player recruitment costs in the financial statements makes 
comparability of accounts difficult. Player recruitment costs in the Ghanaian 
context include the transfer fee and the sign-on fee. The transfer fee is paid to the 
player’s previous club as compensation for early termination of contract, and for 
training and development in accordance with the relevant FIFA statutes. The sign-
on fee which is sometimes referred to as the ‘enticement fee’, on the other hand, is 
part of the emoluments that a player is expected to earn over the lifetime of his 
contract with the club and is paid in advance to the player.  Thus, apart from the 
wages and salaries negotiated between the club and the player, the club also 
agrees a signing on fee with the player.  
According to the report of the Player Status Committee of the FA, which was 
contained in the General Secretary’s report to Congress (GFA, 2010) at the end of 
the 2009/10 soccer season, the majority of the cases involved unpaid signing-on 
fees for players whose contracts had been unilaterally terminated at the end of a 
season by the clubs. The signing on fee was meant to be paid to the player at the 
beginning of the contract, implying that even when the player’s contract is 
terminated before its maturity, the player would have earned monies for which no 
services would subsequently be rendered. Recently however, clubs like Kotoko 
agree to pay the signing-on fee on a pro-rata basis, in equal installments over the 
duration of the player’s contract such that the un-served part of a player’s contract 
is not rewarded on the termination of the contract.  
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The distinction between the transfer fee and the signing-on fee as components of 
the player recruitment cost, is crucial in determining whether all recruitment cost 
could be capitalized in the balance sheet as an intangible asset. The signing-on 
fee, as part of the emoluments of the players, cannot be capitalized as assets and 
have to be expensed immediately through the profit and loss accounts. The 
proportion of the signing-on fee expensed through the profit and loss account 
would depend on whether the sign-on fee is paid pro-rata or all paid up front. The 
transfer fee on the other hand represents the investment made by the club in the 
player’s future services and is commonly capitalized as an intangible fixed asset 
(Morrow, 1999, 2006). UEFA’s Club Licensing regulations gives clubs the choice 
to either capitalize the cost of player acquisition or expense it through the profit 
and loss account (Morrow, 2006).  
The review of the financial statements shows that there are five different ways in 
which Ghanaian clubs treat player recruitment costs. Type I is employed by 
Ashgold which is a subsidiary of the gold mining giant, AngloGold Ashanti and is 
audited by the reputable international audit firm, Ernst &Young, and which hence 
might be expected to be more likely to adopt international auditing standards. The 
total recruitment cost, including the transfer fee is capitalized as an intangible fixed 
asset and amortized on a straight line basis over the period of the player’s 
contract. The value of the player is also assessed annually for impairment to 
obtain the net book value. This treatment conforms to the requirements of the UK 
accounting standard FRS 10 as discussed by Morrow (2010).  
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Type II is similar to Type I in all respects except that the amortization is not done 
over the contract of the player but is done on a straight line basis at a fixed rate, an 
example being the 20% utilized by Aduana.  This treatment seems to suggest that 
the player would still be of value as an asset to the club over a five year period, 
even though the club indicates that the average contract duration of its players is 
three years. Thus the club may be carrying on its books, the value of an asset 
which no longer belongs to it after three years. Type III, which is utilized by Kotoko, 
suffers the same weakness as Type II as it only capitalizes the value of both the 
transfer fee and the sign-fee as non-tangible fixed assets without any attempt to 
amortize or re-value for impairment. Thus the club’s assets might be over-valued 
and, like type two, include values of players that are no longer with the club or 
whose contracts have expired.  
The difference between Type III and Type IV is that the latter amortizes the entire 
recruitment cost over the period of the players’ contract without any attempt to re-
value the assets for impairment which occurs on an annual basis as the player 
ages. This is the amortization method utilized by clubs such as Medeama and Wa 
All Stars. The Type V method, which is the most popular amongst the rest of the 
clubs, is to expense the entire recruitment cost through the profit and loss 
accounts creating a profit position which, arguably, is grossly understated. This 
treatment resonates with the amortization procedure existing in the English 
Football prior to the Bosman ruling, as discussed in Morrow (1999) and which is 
still considered as an appropriate accounting treatment in some countries in 
Europe.   
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Depreciation of Assets 
This section discusses the treatment of fixed assets in the financial statements of 
different clubs. Table 5.2 shows the rate of depreciation for land/building, motor 
vehicles, sportswear/equipment and office furniture and equipment used by 
different clubs in their financial statements as at the end of December 2011.  
 
Table 5.2: Rate of depreciation of fixed assets by Ghanaian clubs – December, 2011 
 CLUBS 
Item ADUANA ALL 
STARS 
ARSENAL CHELSEA EDU HEARTS KOTOKO LIBERTY LIONS 
Land/Building n/a n/a n/a 10 5 3 n/a 10 n/a 
Motor Vehicle - 20 15 25 20 20 20  25 
Sportswear/equipment 50 20 - 25 20 10 - 20 - 
furniture/office equip. 20/(15) n/a 10 25 15 20 7.5/(10) 20 10 
Source: Financial Statements of Clubs for year ending December, 2011 
 Depreciation rates for land/building range between a low of 3% by Hearts and a 
high of 10% by Chelsea. Motor vehicle depreciation also ranges between 15-25%, 
whilst the rate on sportswear and equipment ranges from a low of 10% utilized by 
Hearts and 50% of Aduana. Kotoko’s 7.5% depreciation of furniture and office 
equipment is the league low whilst the 25% utilized by Chelsea is on the other 
extreme.  
Only Aduana and Kotoko differentiate between computers (and accessories) and 
other furniture and office equipment in respect of depreciation rates. Meanwhile, 
whilst Kotoko utilizes a higher rate for computers (and accessories) relative to 
194 
 
other office furniture/equipment, Aduana does the opposite. Whilst these practices 
may be acceptable, it makes comparison of the assets base of the different clubs 
difficult. 
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5.3 FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POSITION OF GHANAIAN 
PROFESSIONAL CLUBS 
The objective of this section is to discuss the financial position of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs in respect of the revenue and expenditure.  It also 
provides a discussion of the financial position of the clubs based on the most 
recent financial data available. The section also discusses the debt profile of clubs 
in relation to the assets of the club. It thus provides an overview of the financial 
difficulties faced by the clubs; something which may be similar to the problems of 
European football but with a few contextual peculiarities. 
 
5.3.1 Revenue 
The study estimates that total league revenues reduced by about 5% from 
GHC10.3 million in 2010 to GHC9.8 million in 2011 (Table 5.3). The drop in total 
revenue was on account of an almost 20% drop in gate revenues from GHC 1.672 
million in 2010 to GHC1.338 million in 2011. Sponsorship revenues are, however, 
estimated to have increased by 23% from GHC3.795 million to GHC4.68 million 
between 2010 and 2011, offsetting to some extent, the decline in gate revenue.  
About 40% of the premier league clubs experienced a decline in total revenue 
between 2010 and 2011 even though increasing sponsorship revenue was 
anticipated to lead to increase in total revenue for clubs.  
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Sources of Revenue  
The falling attendances for the clubs implies that gate revenue continues to be a 
declining share of total revenues, falling from 17.7% in 2010 to 15.6 % in 2011. 
Table 5.5 provides estimates for average attendance, average gross revenue and 
the share of revenue going to the home clubs. Average attendance for majority of 
the clubs is below 1000 per match, especially when they are not playing Kotoko. It 
ranges from 389 for Wa All Stars to 35,282 when Kotoko plays Hearts of Oak in 
Kumasi. Most clubs rely on their game against Kotoko to raise the highest amount 
of match revenue, making Kotoko the attraction for the league. All the clubs more 
than double their gross revenue and their share of the gate proceeds when they 
play Kotoko. 
The average spectator spends the most amount of money (GHC 6.06 which is the 
equivalent of £2.00) to watch a Kotoko-Hearts game in Kumasi, and the least 
(GHC2.01, the equivalent of £0.65) to watch Liberty Professionals play at home in 
a match that does not involve Kotoko (see Table 5.5). Due to the level of VAT 
charged, the cost of hiring the stadium, the operational expenses incurred in 
organizing a match, and the shares of revenue paid to the FA and allied bodies 
(PLB & GHALCA), the average club obtains less than 50% of the gross revenue 
made at the match. Whilst Edubiase could earn as much as 56% of the gross 
revenue from their home matches, Liberty Professionals take home only 24% of 
the total proceeds from their games.  
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Player transfer revenue as a percentage of total revenue on average fell from 
29.3% in 2010 to 22.4% in 2011, with about 30% of the clubs receiving nothing 
from player transfer revenue. The fluctuations in income from player transfer make 
it an unreliable source of revenue for the clubs. For example, revenue from player 
transfer in 2010 for Hearts represented over 50% of all revenues for the club. 
However, in 2010 the club did not receive any money from player transfers. 
 Sponsorship revenue which, in the accounts of Ghanaian clubs, include 
commercial and advertising income, league sponsorship and media rights 
revenue, has become an increasingly bigger proportion of total revenues for all 
clubs in Ghana. Sponsorship revenue increased its share of total revenue for the 
clubs from an average of 41.7% in 2010 to 53.4% in 2011 (Fig. 5.1). This was on 
account of the increasing share of sponsorship for the top clubs.  
 
Effect of Kotoko and Hearts on League Revenues 
The drop in total league revenue could be attributed to the significant reduction in 
revenue levels for the two big clubs, Hearts and Kotoko, which between them 
accounted for about 35% of the league revenues in 2010 (Fig. 5.2). Whilst Hearts 
experienced a 26% drop in revenues from GHC1.793 million, Kotoko saw total 
revenues drop from GHC1.785 million in 2010 to GHC1.502 million in 2011, a fall 
of almost 16% (Table 5.3). The revenue performance of Hearts of Oak was on 
account of a 10% fall in sponsorship revenue, and an 18% fall in match revenue in 
the same period. The relatively poor on field performance of the club which had 
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seen the club fail to win the league title for four years seem to have contributed to 
the poor off-field revenue performance of the club.  
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The drop in revenue for Kotoko which was on account of a reduction in revenue 
from player transfer (see Fig. 5.1) and other income sources was cushioned by the 
marginal increase in match revenue. This was supported by a significant increase 
in sponsorship revenue from GHC 0.485 million in 2010 to GHC 0.798 million in 
2011, a rise of 64.7%.  The ability of the club’s management to commercialize the 
high brand value that the club commands ensured that Kotoko became the first 
club in Ghanaian history to attract more than two companies as sponsors. The 
shift of the club from TIGO to their telecommunications industry rivals MTN as title 
sponsors also ensured that the club benefited from an increased sponsorship 
package (Kotoko, 2013). 
The drop in revenue was however a general phenomenon amongst clubs as only a 
few of the clubs experienced significant increase in total revenue during the period 
under review (see Table 5.3). The 2009 league champions Aduana and the 2010 
Champions, Berekum Chelsea both posted increases in not only total revenue, but 
match and sponsorship revenues as well (Table 5.4). Aduana’s performances of 
2009, which made them the first club to win the premiership title as debutants, 
ensured that they gradually built a fan base, which was quickly converted into 
increased match day and sponsorship revenues. 
  
  
200 
 
 
Table 5.3: Revenue and Expenditure for Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010-2011 
 TOTAL REVENUE  TOTAL EXPENDITURE TOTAL PROFIT/LOSS 
CLUB 2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
172,720.00  
 244,429.00  
 540,444.00  
 765,800.00  
 101,192.00  
 1,793,233.00  
 1,785,654.94  
 285,028.00  
 740,582.00  
 22,222.00 
301,250.00  
 356,411.00  
 261,500.00  
 1,300,490.00  
 130,000.00  
 1,326,538.70  
 1,502,030.00  
 427,227.00  
 506,504.00  
 23,481.00 
0.744 
0.458 
(0.516) 
0.698 
0.285 
(0.260) 
(0.159) 
0.499 
(0.316) 
0.057 
277,939.00  
 265,066.00  
 1,063,841.00  
 658,031.00  
 110,887.00  
 1,781,879.26  
 1,301,921.18  
 539,820.00  
 668,816.00  
 24,417.00 
304,276.00  
 730,313.00  
 854,061.00  
 1,101,298.00  
 166,366.00  
 2,302,282.77  
 1,480,773.00  
 650,886.00  
 631,106.00  
 23,440.00  
0.095 
1.755 
(0.197) 
0.674 
0.500 
0.292 
0.137 
0.206 
(0.056) 
(0.040) 
(105,219.00) 
(20,637.00) 
(523,397.00) 
107,768.00 
(11,366.00) 
11,354.37 
63,498.76 
(254,792.00) 
71,766.00 
(2,195.00) 
(3,026.00) 
 (373,902.00) 
 (592,561.00) 
 199,192.00  
 (36,366.00) 
 (975,744.00) 
 21,257.00  
 (223,659.00) 
 (34,602.00) 
      41.00    
(0.971) 
17.118 
0.132 
0.848 
2.200 
(86.936) 
(0.665) 
(0.122) 
(1.482) 
(1.019) 
AVERAGE 645,130.49 613,543.17  669,261.74 824,480.18  (66,321.89) (201,937.00)  
ESTIMATED  
LEAGUE 
TOTAL 10,322,087.9 9,816,690.72 
(0.049) 
10,708,187.9 13,191,682.83 
0.2319 
(1,061,150.19) (3,230,992) 
(2.045) 
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Table 5.4: Components of Revenue and Expenditure for Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010-2011 
 GATE REVENUE SPONSORSHIP REVENUE EXPENDITURE ON PLAYER 
CLUB 2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
25,720.00  
 11,506.00  
 140,444.00  
 6,300.00  
 9,542.00  
 217,785.97  
 415,235.50  
 28,804.00  
 177,659.00  
 12,024.00 
34,850.00  
 2,811.00  
 30,000.00  
 7,990.00  
 10,250.00  
 178,388.00  
 418,907.00  
 36,869.00  
 104,178.00  
 12,435.00  
0.355 
(0.756) 
(0.786) 
0.268 
0.074 
(0.181) 
0.009 
0.280 
(0.414) 
0.034 
78,000.00  
 183,000.00  
 210,000.00  
 196,500.00  
 90,000.00  
 857,751.34  
 484,875.37  
 28,804.00  
 233,250.00  
 9,835.00 
176,400.00  
 168,600.00  
 206,500.00  
 210,000.00  
 90,000.00  
 771,661.77  
 798,704.00  
 244,809.00  
 248,082.00  
 10,833.00  
1.262 
(0.079) 
(0.017) 
0.069 
- 
(0.100) 
0.647 
7.499 
0.064 
0.101 
180,090.00  
 140,896.00  
 796,035.00  
 397,293.00  
 56,640.00  
 1,044,103.27  
 
 190,854.00  
 159,851.00  
 11,819.00 
191,600.00  
 219,900.00  
 634,640.00  
 765,620.00  
 70,650.00  
 1,378,801.69  
 
 232,842.00  
 156,938.00  
 11,877.00  
0.064  
 0.561  
-0.203  
 0.927  
 0.247  
 0.321  
 
 0.220  
-0.018  
 0.005 
AVERAGE 104,502.05 83,667.80  237,201.57 292,558.98  330,842.36 406,985.41  
ESTIMATED  
LEAGUE 
TOTAL 1,672,032.752 1,338,684.8 
(0.1994) 
3,795,225.13 4,680,943.63 
0.2333 
5,293,477.813 6,511,766.56 
0.2301 
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This ensured that they continually increased match attendance and match 
revenue, and achieved a more than 35% increase in match revenue between 2010 
and 2011. There was also a more than 120% increase in sponsorship money for 
Aduana from GHC78, 000 in 2010 to GHC176, 400 in 2011. This was on account 
of moving from Division One to the Premier league. Chelsea also increased total 
revenue by 69.8 % on account of a 27% increase in gate revenues, a 7% increase 
in sponsorship revenue. They also capitalized on the exposure obtained by their 
players from participating in the CAF Champions league to increase revenue from 
player sales from GHC0.567 million in 2010 to GHC1.079 million in 2011, an 
increase of 47.5 %.  
Attendance and Match Day Revenue 
Table 5.5 provides a breakdown of average match attendance and match revenue 
figures for clubs in the Ghana Premier League for the period 2006 – 2012, 
showing the significant effect of Kotoko on match attendance and match revenue 
for all clubs. The effect of playing against Kotoko is a more than 300 % increase in 
attendance and match revenue for almost all clubs. Attendance for King Faisal for 
instance improves from an average of 471 to 18,295 when playing against all the 
other 14 clubs and playing against Kotoko respectively. Since it shares the same 
venue with Kotoko, a home match for King Faisal against Kotoko is effectively 
another home match for Kotoko as majority of Kotoko’s large following would be 
able to watch Faisal games.   
.  
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Table 5.5: Average Attendance and Revenue Figures for Ghanaian Clubs: 2006-2012 
CLUB WITH OR WITHOUT AVERAGE 
ATTENDANCE 
AVERAGE  GROSS 
REVENUE 
HOME CLUB 
REVENUE 
SPEND PER ATTENDEE 
GHC) 
HOME CLUB SHARE 
OF  REVENUE 
KOTOKO WITHOUT HEARTS 9,519 35,289.05 17,099.63 3.60 0.47 
AGAINST HEARTS 35,282 214,192.66 100,690.00 6.06 0.46 
HEARTS WITHOUT KOTOKO 5,388 14157.61 6,727.78 2.77 0.47 
AGAINST KOTOKO 27,319 139,092.20 75,702.70 5.16 0.54 
ASHGOLD WITHOUT KOTOKO 1,215 2,934.63 1,147.26 2.47 0.36 
AGAINST KOTOKO 4,166 18,780.00 9,597.15 4.64 0.51 
CHELSEA WITHOUT KOTOKO 1,095 3,639.50 1,554.96 3.30 0.39 
AGAINST KOTOKO n/a 6,588.00 3,239.00 n/a 0.49 
MEDEAMA WITHOUT KOTOKO 550 1,496.41 566.66 2.64 0.38 
AGAINST KOTOKO 3,851 19,255.00 9,411.00 5.00 0.48 
ALL STARS WITHOUT KOTOKO 389       814.13       270.77  2.13 0.31 
AGAINST KOTOKO 996    2,149.00       710.00  2.16 0.33 
LIBERTY WITHOUT KOTOKO 967 2,533.43 1,021.15 2.01 0.24 
AGAINST KOTOKO 5,265 15,720.20 7,580.87 3.21 0.48 
FAISAL WITHOUT KOTOKO 471 1,106.54 330.64 2.63 0.28 
AGAINST KOTOKO 18,295 68,978.00 29,699.50 3.78 0.32 
OLYMPICS WITHOUT KOTOKO 1,080 2,387.08 1,158.85 2.65 0.48 
AGAINST KOTOKO 4,735 15,697.00 7,090.95 2.99 0.45 
DWARFS WITHOUT KOTOKO 2,416 8,467.42 2,846.46 3.41 0.34 
AGAINST KOTOKO 6,315 27,826.00 11,639.00 4.40 0.42 
HASAACAS WITHOUT KOTOKO 1,217 2,702.13 1,294.53 2.05 0.42 
AGAINST KOTOKO 2,104 4,443.00 1,968.76 2.19 0.45 
KESSBEN WITHOUT KOTOKO 836 2,746.12 1,199.50 2.70 0.28 
AGAINST KOTOKO 3,810 20,606.67 9,893.66 5.41 0.45 
ADUANA WITHOUT KOTOKO 653 1,960.00 856.14 2.99 0.42 
AGAINST KOTOKO 1,600 8,000.00 4,060.00 5.00 0.51 
EDUBIASE WITHOUT KOTOKO 817 1,716.61 561.56 2.23 0.31 
AGAINST KOTOKO 1,941 4,342.00 2,431.92 2.23 0.56 
YOUTH WITHOUT KOTOKO 588 1,564.76 660.01 2.51 0.38 
AGAINST KOTOKO 4,008 15,579.00 7,649.18 4.51 0.49 
LIONS WITHOUT KOTOKO 476 1,086.02 468.77 2.29 0.41 
AGAINST KOTOKO 1,822 3,686.50 1,933.15 2.04 0.52 
LEAGUE WITHOUT KOTOKO 1,210 3,272 1,193.19 2.58 0.36 
AGAINST KOTOKO 6,159 24,716 11,534.13 3.79 0.46 
Source: Calculated from function statements of the clubs 
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 Average home attendance ranges from a low of 389 when Wa All Stars plays 
against the other 14 clubs minus Kotoko to a high of 35, 282 when Kotoko hosts 
Hearts of Oak in the main fixture of the Ghanaian league calendar.  
Wide disparities in revenue from matches exists as gross revenue from matches 
ranges between a low of GHC814 for a Wa All Stars home game and GHC214, 
192.66 for a match between Hearts and Kotoko in Kumasi. Average match 
revenue falls from GHC24, 716 (over GBP 7,700) when they play against Kotoko 
to only GHC 3,272, the equivalent of about a GBP1, 000. 
Due to deductions for taxes, match organizational expenses and distribution to 
stakeholders such as the GFA, PLB and the National Sport Authority, clubs take 
home on the average only 36% and 46% of total gate proceeds when they play 
with the remaining 14 teams and when they play against Kotoko respectively.   
 
5.3.2 Expenditure  
Overall league expenditures increased by over 23% between 2010 and 2011, 
fueled by an equivalent 23% increase in player cost and an increase in total 
expenditure for over 70% of the clubs within the same period (Table 5.3). Total 
expenditure which amounted to GHC10.7 million in 2010 increased to GHC13.2 
million in 2011, as expenditure on players by all clubs is estimated as having 
increased by 23% from GHC5.293 million in 2010 to GHC6.512 million in 2011 
Table 5.4).  
205 
 
 Figure 5.3 shows the changes in total expenditure by clubs in 2010 and 2011. 
 
Total expenditure increased for over 70% of the clubs with champions Berekum 
Chelsea setting the pace, matching their increase in revenue (69.8%) with a 67.4% 
increase in expenditures from GHC0.658 million in 2010 to GHC1.1 million in 
2011(Fig. 5.3). This was fuelled by a 92.7% increase in expenditures on players in 
an attempt to win the league. Hearts also increased their total expenditure in the 
same period by 29% (3 percentage points above the growth in revenue). 
Significantly, growth in expenditure on players for Hearts grew faster (32%) than 
the growth in both total revenue and expenditure, 
 Kotoko’s total expenditure increased from GHC1.3 million to GHC1.48 million, a 
growth of 13.7% (lower than the growth in revenue).  Only about 20% of the clubs 
experienced reductions in growth in player cost, and these clubs were the ones 
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Fig. 5.3: Total Expenditure by Clubs: 2010-2011 
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struggling to avoid relegation at the end of the season, signaling a correlation 
between expenditure on players and on-field performance. Figure 5.4 below shows 
player expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure. 
 
The share of player cost in total expenditure for the average club was above 50% 
in 2011, and was higher in 2011 than it was in 2010 for majority of the clubs. The 
football consultants Deloitte, as well as UEFA, considers a personnel cost ratio of 
more than 60% as unacceptably high (Deloitte, 2013; UEFA, 2013); making the 
figure for Ghanaian clubs quite manageable. Figure 5.5 also shows the 
expenditure on players as a share of total revenue. 
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Player cost as a percentage of total revenue increased from 64.3% on the average 
in 2010 to over 76% in 2011, on account of both an increase in the quantum of 
player cost for clubs and decreasing revenues. In 2011 almost all clubs saw an 
increase in this ratio with the higher increases being experienced by clubs in the 
top quarter of the league rankings at the end of 2011. Thus clubs are spending an 
increasingly higher portion of any revenue received on player acquisition. This 
would seem to suggest that there is increased competition to sign the best talents 
amongst the teams competing for the title.  
 
5.3.3 Profitability   
Increasing league expenditures and declining revenues led to total league losses 
more than doubling between 2010 and 2011. Total league losses rose from 
GHC1.06 million in 2010 to GHC3.23 million in 2011, a rise of more than 204%. 
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Total league losses as a percentage of total revenue thus increased from 10.3% in 
2010 to 32.9% in 2011 (see Table 5.3). On the average each club lost about 
GHC201, 000 in 2011, up from the 2010 average of GHC66, 000. Discounting for 
the effect of player cost, the average club would have made a profit of about 
GHC264, 000 in 2010 and GHC 205,000 in 2011. It must be stated that only a few 
of the financial statements reviewed provide data that allows for a distinction to be 
made between operating losses and net losses as majority make no distinction 
between operating income and other income.   
There are individual differences in the changes in net loss position. About 70% of 
the clubs experienced overall net loss positions at the end of 2011 with 20% of the 
clubs (including Heart of Oak and Heart of Lions) moving from a position of net 
profit in 2010 to a position of net loss in 2011. Another 30% saw their losses 
worsening (e.g. Edubiase, All Stars, and Arsenal), whilst others reduced their net 
loss position (e.g. Aduana and Tema Youth); or had their profit positions 
worsening (e.g. Kotoko). Only a few clubs like Chelsea saw an improvement in 
their prior year profit position. On the back of increasing revenues from player 
sales as a result of increased exposure of players during the league winning 
campaign, the club saw profits improving by more than 88% from GHC0.107 
million in 2010 to GHC0.199 million in 2011, which was the highest in the league.  
Hearts of Oak’s 29% increase in expenditure, coupled with a 26% fall in revenue 
ensured that it recorded a loss in 2011 which represented over 30% of total league 
losses. The other bad performers in terms of net loss position were Berekum 
Arsenal and Wa All Stars, both with losses of more than 10% of total league 
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losses. Kotoko on the other hand saw the net profits of the previous year declining 
from by over 66% from a 2010 figure of GHC63, 498 to GHC21, 257 in 2011.  
5.3.4 Financial Position  
This section discusses the assets, liabilities and equity position in an attempt to 
determine whether the average Ghanaian club is a going concern or not. The 
discussions on the net equity position are expected to show whether the clubs are 
financially viable entities or are on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Assets 
Figure 5.6 shows the assets of Ghanaian clubs in 2010 and 2011. Total assets of 
clubs in the league experienced a 11.5% decline in value from GHC10.52 million in 
2010 to GHC9.21 million in 2011, mostly on account of the drop in value of assets 
of the two big clubs in the period under review. The joint assets of the two clubs 
accounted for almost 44% and 33% of total league asset value in 2010 and 2011. 
As such any change in their assets has a significant impact on total league assets. 
Kotoko and Hearts both experienced a 21.4% and a 43.5% drop in total asset 
value respectively as a result of a fall in investments. 
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The drop in share of the two major clubs in total league asset value between the 
two periods was also on account of the emergence of Chelsea as a third force in 
Ghanaian football. The assets of the Berekum based club rose from GHC0.96 
million in 2010 to GHC1.2 million in 2011, a 25.9% gain in asset value, and a 13% 
share of total league assets, up from the 2010 share of just over 9% (Table 5.6) 
Liabilities 
The total liabilities of the clubs in the league on the other hand showed a 5% drop 
in the period under review, even though 60% of the clubs saw an increase in their 
liabilities. The change in total league liabilities from GHC10.9 million to GHC10.3 
was on account of the significant 14.4% drop in liabilities of Kotoko, whose total 
liabilities were 28.5% of total league liabilities in 2010. On the average, each club 
has liabilities outstanding at the end of December 2011 of GHC0.645 million.  
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Table 5.6: Assets, Liabilities and Net Assets of Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010-2011 
 TOTAL ASSET TOTAL LIABILITIES NET ASSET = Shareholders’ Equity 
CLUB 2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent 
INCREASE 
(DECREASE) 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
151,476.00  
 309,552.00  
 73,336.00  
 960,297.00  
 91,415.00  
 2,122,687.17  
 2,494,553.24  
 91,175.00  
 273,793.00  
 7,915.00 
144,490.00  
 761,963.00  
 74,847.00  
 1,208,689.00  
 93,270.00  
 1,198,611.14  
 1,961,039.00  
 125,128.00  
 240,725.00  
 8,232.00   
(0.046) 
 1.462  
 0.021  
 0.259  
 0.020  
 (0.435) 
 (0.214) 
 0.372  
 (0.121) 
 0.040 
16,836.00  
 7,760.00  
 1,126.00  
 25,000.00  
 7,428.00  
 3,628,273.47  
 3,114,444.49  
 1,645.00  
 12,258.00  
 8,661.00 
32,571.00  
 5,000.00  
 1,016.00  
 24,200.00  
 8,386.00  
 3,679,941.51  
 2,664,629.00  
 14,806.00  
 13,792.00  
 8,936.00  
0.935  
 (0.356) 
 (0.098) 
 (0.032) 
 0.129  
 0.014  
 (0.144) 
 8.001  
 0.125  
 0.032 
134,640.00  
 301,792.00  
 72,210.00  
 935,297.00  
 83,987.00  
 (1,505,586.30) 
 (619,891.00) 
 89,531.00  
 261,535.00  
 (745.00) 
111,919.00  
 756,963.00  
 73,609.00  
 1,184,489.00  
 84,884.00  
 (2,481,330.37) 
 (703,590.00) 
 110,322.00  
 226,933.00  
 (704.00)  
(0.169) 
 1.508  
 0.019  
 0.266  
 0.011  
 0.648  
 0.135  
 0.232  
 (0.132) 
 (0.055) 
AVERAGE 657,619.94 581,699.41  682,343.20 645,327.75  (24,723.03) (63,650.54)  
ESTIMATED  
LEAGUE 
TOTAL 10,521,919.06 9,307,190.624 
(0.1154) 
10,917,491.14 10,325,244.02 
(0.0542) 
(395,568.48) (1,018,408.592) 
(1.5745) 
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This average, however, hides wide disparities in liabilities of the clubs, with the top 
two clubs accounting for almost 62% of total league liabilities in 2010. Table 5.6 
shows the wide variations in liability values for different clubs at the end of 2010 
and 2011. The accumulated debt levels for Ghanaian clubs are high relative to 
their income levels. In both years under consideration, the total debt of the clubs in 
the league exceeded the revenue made for the year. Total league revenues 
represented only 94.5% of accumulated debts in 2010, and 95% in 2011. This 
implies that even if they wanted to, clubs could not liquidate all their outstanding 
debts using that season’s revenue. 
 
Net Assets 
The fall in liabilities which was lower than the 11.5% drop in assets meant that 
there was a deterioration of the net asset position of the league clubs, moving 
clubs further into negative equity.  Net liabilities rose by 157% from GHC0.395 
million in 2010 to GHC1.018 million in 2011 (Table 5.6). This was on account of a 
64.8% increase in the net liabilities of Hearts and a 13.5% increase in the net 
liabilities of Kotoko, as only 30 % of clubs were in net liability position at the end of 
2011. Even for those with positive net assets positions, about 28% saw their net 
asset position deteriorate.  
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Table 5.7: Capital Employed, Equity and Gearing Ratio for Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010- 2011 
 CAPITAL EMPLOYED DEBT /EQUITY RATIO 
CLUB 2010 (GHC) 2011 (GHC) 2010-2011 
percent change  
2010 2011 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
134,640.00  
 301,792.00  
 72,210.00  
 935,297.00  
 83,987.00  
 697,928.24  
 (619,891.25) 
 89,530.00  
 261,535.00  
 855.00 
111,919.00  
 756,963.00  
 73,831.00  
 1,184,489.00  
 84,884.00  
 (86,217.53) 
 (703,590.00) 
 110,322.00  
 226,933.00  
 296.00  
(0.169) 
 1.508  
 0.022  
 0.266  
 0.011  
 (1.124) 
 0.135  
 0.232  
 (0.132) 
 (0.654) 
0.125044 
0.025713 
0.015593 
0.026729 
0.088442 
-2.40987 
-5.02418 
0.018373 
0.046869 
-11.6255 
 
0.291022972 
0.006605343 
0.01380266 
0.020430751 
0.098793648 
-1.483051815 
-3.787189983 
0.134207139 
0.060775647 
-12.69318182 
 
AVERAGE 195,788.30 175,982.95  -27.5994 
 
-10.13860605 
 
ESTIMATED  
LEAGUE 
TOTAL 3,132,612.784 2,815,727.152 
(0.1011) 
-27.5994 -10.13860655 
 
The overall negative equity position of the clubs, however, is on account of only 
three clubs being technically bankrupt and surviving only on goodwill. However, on 
the account that two of the clubs are the biggest in the country whose liabilities 
may include assets of the other clubs, their financial instability threatens the 
credibility and integrity of the entire league.  The deterioration in their net equity 
position coupled with the rising debt levels of the clubs suggests urgent action 
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needs to be taken by the stakeholders in the industry to avert the possible collapse 
of the league.  
Ownership of Club Debt 
Analysis of the composition of the ownership of the debt shows that majority of the 
debts of the clubs are owed to individuals such as the directors, owners, and 
chairmen of the boards of the clubs. Table 5.8 shows the extent of support given 
by the Directors of clubs relative to the revenue the clubs make in a year.  
Table 5.8: Ratio of Total Revenue to Directors’ Loan for Clubs in 2011 
CLUB Revenue  Debt Owed  
Directors/Trustees 
Revenue as a 
Ratio 
 of Directors’ 
Loan  
Number of  
Directors 
owed 
Edubiase 
B. Arsenals 
Wa All Stars 
Chelsea 
Liberty 
Lions 
Hearts 
Kotoko 
Aduana 
130,000.0 
261,500.0 
356,411.0 
765,800.0 
427,227.0 
506,504.0 
1,326,538.7 
1,502,123.0 
301,250.0 
93,353.0 
1,819,592.0 
1,122,785.0 
935,297.0 
1,536,580.0 
285,348.0 
2,106,215.9 
648,733.0 
210,164.0 
1.39 
0.14 
0.32 
0.82 
0.28 
1.78 
0.63 
2.32 
1.43 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
>2 
>2 
1 
Average 619,706.0 973,118.6 0.64  
Source: Financial Statements of Clubs in 2011  
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All the clubs have line items in the balance sheet classified as directors’ loans, 
directors’ accounts, and advances from trustees, chairman’s account or directors’ 
loan account, representing the sources of finance for the net assets of the club. 
These are considered as long-term loans to the clubs to be paid when the clubs 
make profits; something which invariably does not happen. The director(s) thus 
behave effectively as ‘so-called benefactor owners’, their support to the clubs 
being dependent on financial success from other businesses that they own 
(Franck and Lang, 2013). 
The majority of the clubs made less in revenue in 2011 than the accumulated debt 
to their Directors or Trustees in the same year. The average club’s revenue could 
settle 64% of the debt they owed their directors, showing the extent of 
indebtedness of the clubs to their Directors. Table 5.8 shows that majority of the 
clubs are funded by directors who underwrite the debts of the clubs.  
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Table 5.9: Financial Ratios for Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010-2011 
CLUB PLAYER TRANSFER 
REVENUE/ TOTAL 
REVENUE (percent) 
SPONSORSHIP 
REVENUE/TOTAL 
REVENUE (percent) 
GATE REVENUE/  
TOTAL 
REVENUE(percent) 
 
PROFIT MARGIN 
(percent) 
PLAYER COST/REVENUE 
(percent) 
PLAYER COST/ 
EXPENDITURE 
(percent) 
YEAR 2010  2011 
 
2010  2011 
 
2010  2011 
 
2010  2011 
 
2010 
 
2011 2010 2011 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
08.11  
 17.47  
 22.20  
 73.52  
 24.71  
 50.69  
 15.67  
 79.79  
 26.65  
 00.00    
7.07  
 51.91  
 0.00    
 83.24  
 34.62  
 0.00    
 2.68  
 34.07  
 10.86  
 0.00    
45.16  
 74.87  
 38.86  
 25.66  
 88.94  
 47.83  
 27.15  
 10.11  
 31.50  
 44.26 
58.56  
 47.30  
 78.97  
 16.15  
 69.23  
 58.17  
 53.17  
 57.30  
 48.98  
 46.14 
14.89  
 04.71  
 25.99  
 00.82  
 09.43  
 12.14  
 23.25  
 10.11  
 23.99  
      54.11 
11.57  
 00.79  
 11.47  
 00.61  
 07.88  
 13.45  
 27.89  
 08.63  
 20.57  
 52.96 
-60.91 
-08.44 
-96.84 
14.07 
-11.23 
00.63 
03.55 
-89.39 
09.69 
-09.87 
-1.00 
-104.90 
-226.60 
15.31 
-27.97 
-73.55 
01.41 
-52.35 
-06.83 
00.17 
104.27 
57.64 
147.29 
51.88 
55.97 
58.22 
25.96 
66.96 
21.58 
53.19 
63.60 
61.70 
242.69 
58.87 
54.35 
103.94 
40.90 
54.50 
30.98 
     50.58 
64.79  
 53.16  
 74.83  
 60.38  
 51.08  
 58.60  
 35.60  
 35.36  
 23.90  
 48.40 
62.97  
 30.11  
 74.31  
 69.52  
 42.47  
 59.89  
 41.48  
 35.77  
 24.87  
 50.67 
AVERAGE 29.35 22.44 41.75 53.39 17.66 15.58 -24.87 -47.63 64.30 76.21 50.61 49.21 
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Table 5.10: International Player Transfer Income for Kotoko for Period 2011-2012 
Player Transfer  
Date 
Transfer  
Amount 
Club 1st installment 2nd Installment 3rd Installment Status as at 30/06/13 
    Amount  
Due 
Due Date Amount  
Paid 
Amount  
Due 
Due Date Amount  
Paid 
Amount  
Due 
Due Date Amoun
t  
Paid 
 
Nat Asamoah 
Alex Asamoah 
Jordan Opoku 
Awal Mohammed 
Albert Bruce 
Obeng Reagan 
Harif Mohammed 
Owusu-Ansah  
Ben Acheampong 
Yaw Frimpong 
Daniel Nii Adjei 
29/01/12 
31/08/11 
30/01/11 
28/07/12 
01/01/12 
01/09/11 
01/09/11 
01/09/11 
29/11/12 
17/10/12 
17/10/12 
EUR 200,000 
US$ 80,000 
US$20,000 
US$200,000 
EUR 25,000 
US$ 80,000 
US$ 30,000 
US$ 80,000 
US$150,000 
US$150,000 
US$150,000 
Red Star 
ES Setif 
KS Tirana 
Maritzburg 
Legia W. 
Virtus 
Virtus 
Virtus 
P. Luanda 
TP Mazembe 
TP Mazembe 
100,000 
40,000 
10,000 
100,000 
25,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
150,000 
150,000 
150,000 
16/02/12 
31/08/11 
01/02/11 
01/08/12 
16/01/12 
01/09/11 
01/09/11 
01/09/11 
29/11/12 
01/11/12 
01/11/12 
None 
40,000 
None 
100,000 
25,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
150,000 
150,000 
150,000 
100,000 
40,000 
10,000 
50,000 
n/a 
50,000 
n/a 
50,000 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
16/02/12 
02/11/11 
11/04/11 
30/11/12 
n/a 
01/01/13 
n/a 
01/01/13 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
None 
None 
None 
50,000 
n/a 
25,000 
n/a 
None 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
50,000 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
31/01/13 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
50,000 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
EUR 200,000 not paid 
US$40,000 outstanding 
US$ 20,000 outstanding 
Fully paid 
Fully paid 
US$25,000 outstanding 
n/a 
US$50,000 outstanding 
Fully Paid 
Fully paid 
Fully Paid 
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5.4 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN PROFESSIONAL CLUBS 
This section utilizes some financial performance ratios to provide further 
evidence of financial performance and position of Ghanaian clubs. Whilst the 
current and gearing ratios provide a useful sense of the solvency of the clubs, 
the profit management ratios such as the current-ratio, the gearing-ratio, return-
on-capital-employed, profit margins, and asset-turnover ratio all provide good 
indication of how efficiently the clubs employ their assets to generate profit for 
their shareholders. The choice of these measures was also influenced by 
availability of data. 
 
5.4.1  Cash Management  
To provide evidence of short term solvency problems of the clubs and the 
propensity of the clubs’ directors to utilize debt to fund their net assets, the 
current ratio and the gearing ratio have been calculated.  The interest cover 
ratio, defined as the profit before transfer fees and amortization of costs of 
registration divided by interest payable on bank loans and overdrafts, could not 
be calculated because most clubs do not utilize bank loans and overdrafts nor 
state a figure for interest payable in their accounts. 
Short-Term Solvency 
The current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities and it is a 
measure of the short term solvency of a club. It provides an indication as to 
whether any organization could meet its short term liabilities with its short term 
assets, and a figure of at least one is usually considered desirable in most 
industries (Gasking, 1999). Only 30% of clubs have a current ratio of less than 
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one, indicating that the majority of clubs could meet their short term liabilities 
(debts and payables) with their short term assets (cash and receivables). 
Inventories are not a significant component of the current assets of most 
Ghanaian football clubs, or indeed of most football clubs, as there is little or no 
merchandising done by the clubs. Therefore, the quick ratio is an identical 
figure to that of the current ratio. At the level of the league, the current ratio was 
very comfortable, being in excess of 13:1 for seasons 2011 (see table 6.13). 
Ostensibly this implies that in the short term Ghanaian clubs are highly solvent.  
However, it is interesting to note that three of the top four clubs have current 
ratios which are significantly lower than 1. For instance the current ratio for 
Kotoko deteriorated from 0.10:1 in 2010 to 0.01:1 in 2011 – i.e. the short term 
assets of Kotoko could only take care of only 10% of its short term liabilities in 
2010 and only 1% in 2011. Hearts’ coverage on the other hand reduced from 
32% in 2010 to only 9% in 2011. To the extent that the debts of these big clubs 
are owned by the other smaller clubs, the inability of the clubs to liquidate their 
debts threatens the survival of the other clubs as well.  
Player Transfer Debts 
It is not uncommon for larger clubs to use expected league rights revenue, i.e. 
centrally allocated revenue, to guarantee its player purchases. Table 5.11 
shows detail of this financing approach for Kotoko in respect of the purchase of 
players from 13 clubs for the period 2009-2011. It shows that part of monies 
due to three clubs (Hassacas, Zaytuna, and St. Mirren) at the end of 2009 
remained unpaid at the end of the 2012/13 season. Each of these clubs thus 
had long term debts on their balance sheet despite having been given 
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guarantees by Kotoko that they would be paid at the end of the year with their 
share of the league sponsorship money.  
Of greater concern, and signalling the apparent inability of the FA to effectively 
monitor the payment of player transfer debts, is the fact that despite Kotoko 
having an outstanding balance of GHC186, 500 at the beginning of 2010 due to 
other clubs in respect of overdue transfer payables, the FA still accepted 
guarantee letters from Kotoko given to 3 clubs in 2010 advising the FA to pay 
them from its share of the sponsorship money. The FA knew very well that 
Kotoko’s share of the sponsorship money did not cover its existing 
indebtedness, far less new debt, yet approved the transfers. In 2011 it accepted 
another guarantee letter in favour of Berekum Chelsea for the sum of GHC35, 
000, again in spite of the existing debt of GHC155, 211 owed by the club at the 
beginning of the year. 
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Table 5.11: Payment Schedule of Player Transfer Debt Owed by Kotoko to Other Clubs Using FA Guarantee System in Ghana 
Cedis 
Club Transfer  
Amount  
Due End of 
Amount Owed  
as  at 31/12/2009 
Amount Owed as 
at 31/12/2010 
Amount Owed  
as  at 31/12/2011 
Amount Owed  
as  at 31/12/2012 
Amount Owed  
as  at 30/06/2013 
Gamba 
Faisal 
Hasaacas 
Zaytuna 
St. Mirren 
T. Youth 
RTU 
Ebony 
B. Arsenals 
Dreams 
Bechem 
Lions  
B. Chelsea 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2010 
2010 
2010 
2011 
10,000 
3,500 
21,000 
20,000 
46,000 
10,000 
25,000 
6,000 
45,000 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Fully Paid 
3,500 
21,000 
16,387 
38,334 
10,000 
Fully Paid 
6,000 
37,500 
10,000 
7,500 
5,000 
- 
n/a 
3,500 
5,500 
14,566 
33,913 
Fully Paid 
n/a 
Fully Paid 
28,500 
Fully Paid 
Fully Paid 
5,000 
35,000 
n/a 
Fully Paid 
2,500 
2,566 
8,913 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
10,000 
n/a 
n/a 
Fully Paid 
26,000 
n/a 
n/a 
2,500 
2,566 
8,913 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
10,000 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
26,000 
Total   186,500 155,221 125,979 49,979 49,979 
Source: Ghana Football Association 
 
 
 Table 5.12 also shows the list of clubs from whom Kotoko bought players 
during season 2011/12 without providing the sponsorship monies as 
guarantees and the promised payment schedule. There is no record in the 
clubs accounts of 2011/12 to suggest that the scheduled payments for the year 
were made as planned. Moreover, receivables due from the transfer of its 
players abroad between 2011 and 2012 still had an outstanding balance of 
about GHC846, 300 as at June 2013 (Appendix 9).  
222 
 
Table 5.12:  Player Transfer payment Schedule for Kotoko Outside GFA Guarantee 
System 
Club Contract Sum       2011/12       2012/13      2013/14 
Wa All Stars Asfa 
Yenega  
Yegola F/C  
Bechem United  
Brkm Chelsea  
Red Bull Academy  
Proton F/C  
Kenstep F/C 
B. A. Stars 
 Feyenoord  
Nania F/C  
Windy Prof  
Dreams F/C  
Chance for Children 
 Liberty 
40,000 
23,250 
20,000 
20,000 
30,000 
15,000 
5,000 
15,000 
30,000 
90,000 
5,000 
40,000 
5,000 
15,000 
35,000 
20,000 
15,500 
10,000 
7,000 
10,000 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
10,000 
40,000 
5,000 
14,000 
5,000 
5,000 
20,000 
20,000 
7.750 
10,000 
7,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
5,000 
10,000 
35,000 
0 
14,000 
0 
5,000 
15,000 
0 
0 
0 
6,000 
10,000 
5,000 
0 
5,000 
10,000 
15,000 
0 
12,000 
0 
5,000 
0 
Total 388,250 176,500 143,750 68,000 
Source: Asante Kotoko SC Annual Report for 2011/12 
 
 
Real Tamale United also owed Kotoko the sum of GHC30, 000 from player 
transfers in 2009. After making two instalment payments which brought the 
outstanding balance to GHC18, 000 at the end of 2011, RTU was relegated to 
Division 1, thus losing their share of future league rights monies and resulting in 
the suspension of payments on the debt. Yet, even although RTU returned to 
the league in 2012/13 the balance is still outstanding; similar to several sums 
owed by Kotoko (see Table 5.11). The principal reason for this situation is that 
the league rights money for 2012/13 has still not been paid by the rights holder, 
GLO, to the league, and hence has not been distributed on to the clubs. 
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Medeama also utilised the GFA guarantee system in the purchase of player 
Mohammed Sabato from Kotoko at the beginning of the 2012/13 season. The 
GFA credited Kotoko’s accounts with a balance of GHC9, 000 in March, 2012 
but immediately utilised it to pay-off part of Kotoko’s indebtedness to Berekum 
Chelsea (Table 5.11).   
This evidence might be an indication of the existence of an unorganised debt 
payment system in Ghanaian football. By employing aspects of the operations 
of clearinghouses utilised by the banking sector to improve on the efficiency of 
debt payment, the FA should be able to overcome this challenge. 
Other Football Debts 
Kotoko, like other clubs, also utilizes the league rights money as guarantee for 
loans obtained by the club from football related organizations, as well as to pay 
fines and fees it owes to the FA, FIFA and other footballing organizations and 
individuals. The GFA thus operates in this regard as an informal clearinghouse, 
where debits and credits of the clubs are reconciled. Appendix 9 provides detail 
of deductions made from the club’s share of central rights revenue which were 
paid directly to its creditors by the GFA. Unlike in the UK where the football 
creditors rule determines who the preferred creditors of clubs are in case of 
insolvency (Watson, Farley and Williams, 2012), Ghanaian football does not 
have a creditor ranking system. However, in practice, the FA has considered 
clubs’ debts to the GFA and GHALCA as subsidiary to fines and fees imposed 
on the club by international bodies, and debts to other clubs as the payment 
details below would show.  
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Gearing 
A gearing position of less than one implies that the directors of a firm use more 
of the shareholder’s/owner’s funds than borrowed funds in financing the net 
assets of the company (Gasking, 1999). Only Kotoko, Hearts and Tema Youth 
had negative equity positions in 2010 and in 2011, implying that these clubs are 
essentially undercapitalized by their owners and thus financed their operations 
with borrowed money all other clubs showed a positive equity position. They 
also carried liabilities that were more than twice the equity used in financing the 
net assets of the club. Continuous use of borrowed funds to fund the acquisition 
of risky assets such as player purchases may not be sustainable in the long 
term. The values showed in Table 5.8 indicate that majority of the Ghanaian 
clubs are in serious financial positions or should not be in business in the first 
place.    
 
5.4.2 Profit Management  
Return on Capital Employed 
Table 6.13 provides profit and solvency ratios for selected Ghanaian clubs. The 
clubs demonstrated varying rates of return on capital employed for both years 
under consideration. Apart from Kotoko, all the remaining nine clubs used in the 
analysis had positive figures in respect of capital employed in 2010 (see Table 
6.7). However, the fact that six out of ten clubs made losses in 2010 (see Table 
6.3) resulted in all but three clubs having a negative ROCE (see Table 6.13). 
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Table 5.13: Profit and Solvency Ratios for Selected Ghanaian Football Clubs – 2010-2011 
 CLUB ASSET TURNOVER 
RATIO = 
REVENUE/ASSETS 
REVENUE/ 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
 
CURRENT RATIO =  
CURRENT ASSETS/ 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 
ROCE =  
PROFIT/CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
 2010  2011 
 
2010  2011 
 
2010  2011 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
ADUANA 
ALLSTARS 
ARSENAL 
CHELSEA 
EDUBIASE 
HEARTS 
KOTOKO 
LIBERTY 
LIONS 
YOUTH* 
1.1402 
0.7896 
7.3694 
0.7974 
1.1069 
0.8447 
0.7158 
3.1261 
2.7048 
2.8075 
2.0849 
0.4677 
3.4937 
1.0759 
1.3938 
1.1067 
0.7659 
3.4143 
2.1040 
2.8524 
1.2828 
0.8099 
7.4843 
0.8187 
1.2048 
2.5693 
-2.8805 
3.1836 
2.8316 
25.9906 
2.6916 
0.4708 
3.5418 
1.0979 
1.5315 
-15.3859 
-2.1348 
3.8725 
2.2319 
79.3277 
0.0424 
25.0690 
34.3179 
34.0670 
1.4357 
0.3293 
0.1015 
17.4048 
20.8427 
0.2706 
0.0420 
26.3450 
44.1407 
47.0817 
1.4929 
0.0901 
0.0139 
1.7176 
16.1469 
0.2846 
-0.7814 
-0.0683 
-7.2482 
0.1152 
-0.1353 
0.0162 
-0.1024 
-2.8458 
0.2744 
-2.5672 
-0.0270 
-0.4939 
-8.0259 
0.1681 
-0.4284 
11.3172 
-0.0302 
-2.0273 
-0.1524 
0.1385 
AVERAGE 2.1402 1.8759 4.3295 7.7245 13.3881 13.7355 -1.33431 0.043858 
In 2011, Kotoko and Hearts had negative capital employed (i.e. negative 
equity), with Kotoko making profits whilst Hearts made losses. All the remaining 
clubs had positive capital employed but only Chelsea and Tema Youth made 
profits. Hence, the majority of clubs had negative returns due to their losses. 
Invariably repeated loss-making by the clubs lead to a position of negative 
equity in the long-run.   
 
Profit Margin 
For the 40% of the clubs making profits in 2010, the profit margins were 
relatively small compared to the margins for those making losses. The margins 
were as low as 0.63% and the highest was the 14.7% profit margin on revenue 
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obtained by Chelsea. For those making losses, the margins ranged between 
9.8% for Youth and almost 97% for Arsenal. Thus overall, the average club 
made a loss which was 24.9% of total revenue. Thus for every cedi of revenue 
obtained by the clubs, they made a loss of almost 25 pesewas. For the 30% of 
clubs that made profits in 2011, the margins were still lower than the margins 
for those making losses. The loss as a percentage of revenue ranged between 
on 0.17% (also less than a percent) obtained by Youth and 15.3% by Chelsea. 
Overall, the average club made a negative margin of almost 48% of revenue. 
This implies that the losses of the clubs as a percentage of the revenue 
obtained increased considerably between 2010 and 2011. 
 
Asset Turnover 
The asset-turnover ratio shows how efficiently an organization is utilizing its 
assets to generate revenue. A high assets turnover ratio means that the club is 
doing well; efficiently generating income from its assets. A club with a higher 
asset base, all things being equal should generate more revenue than a club 
with a smaller asset base. The asset-turnover ratio for Ghanaian clubs in both 
2010 and 2011 was impressive but declining (table 5.13). On average each 
GHC1.00 of assets of the clubs produced GHC2.14 in revenues in 2010, but 
only GHC1.87 in 2011. Only 30% of clubs in 2010 and 20% in 2011, had asset 
turnover ratios that were less than 1 and these included the clubs with bigger 
asset base like Hearts, Kotoko and Chelsea. This suggests that they were less 
efficient in generating revenue than the other clubs. With league and broadcast 
right revenues shared equally without recourse to league position or team size, 
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it is to be expected that revenues are more evenly spread. With clubs differing 
substantially in terms of size (based on assets), the asset turnover ratio is 
expected to be more favorable for the smaller clubs. 
 
5.5 OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF 
CLUBS  
This section discusses other key characteristics of the financial environment 
within which Ghanaian clubs operate that may have the potential to generate 
systemic challenges to the financial management practices of the clubs. The 
issues to be discussed include the utilization of formal sector credit, the levels 
of sponsorship activities, merchandising, and the effect of participating in CAF 
Inter-club competitions on a club’s debt profile.   
 
5.5.1  Utilization of Formal Sector Credit 
A review of the financial statements of clubs shows that there is limited-
utilization by Ghanaian pro football clubs of credit from the formal financial 
sector, as compared to other sources of credit such loans from club Directors or 
Trustees. This might be a symptom of either a lack of access to such forms of 
credit, or the high cost of credit which exists in the Ghanaian financial market.  
Table 5.15 below shows the sources of short and long-term loans utilized by 
Ghanaian football clubs over the period 2006-2011.   
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Table 5.14: Sources of Credit for Ghanaian Pro Clubs – 2006-2011 
Source of 
Finance 
Long-Term Loan 
from Directors or 
Trustees 
Short Term Loans 
from Financial 
Institutions 
Bank Overdrafts Loans from 
Parent Company 
No of Clubs 
Utilizing 
17 4 7 2 
Percentage of 
clubs Utilizing 
80.9 19.0 33.3 9.5 
Total No. of 
Clubs 
21 21 21 21 
 
The main source of long-term credit for investment in assets and in player 
acquisition is loans made to clubs by their Directors or Trustees. Over 80% of 
the clubs whose financial statements were reviewed have outstanding loans to 
their directors, although in most cases such loans are interest free. Even where 
there are interest charges, the rates are several percentage points below the 
market rate. An example is a 15% interest approved by the Board of Kotoko to 
be paid as interest on directors’ loans to the club. By way of contrast, the Bank 
of Ghana’s 91-day Treasury bill earns 21% as at 05/08/2013 (BOG, 2013).  
This implies that the clubs are better off obtaining soft loans from Directors 
rather than attempting to obtain hard loans from banks and other financial 
institutions. 
Where the clubs do obtain any form of credit from formal financial institutions, 
the preference has been for bank overdrafts, which have been utilized by 33% 
of the clubs over the period under review. Only 19% of the clubs have obtained 
any form of other short term assistance from banks. The predominance of  
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overdrafts, which are considered by the banks as being less of a risky asset, 
would seem to suggest that the risk associated with dealing with the clubs is 
the key determinant of the apparent low utilization of formal banking sector 
credit by the clubs. From the clubs’ perspective, overdraft finance suits their 
short term financial needs. 
 
5.5.2  Sponsorship and Media Rights  
Table 5.16 below provides figures for recent club sponsorship available to 
various clubs in Ghana’s Premier league.  
Table 5.15:  Value of Recent Club Title Sponsorship in Ghana  
Club Company Brand Year  
Signed 
Duration Value Status as at July 2013 
Kotoko 
 Kotoko 
 Kotoko 
Hearts 
Kotoko 
RTU 
Faisal 
Wise 
Lions 
Mirren 
Kotoko 
Stars 
 
Medeama 
Millicom 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Millicom 
Wienco 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Scancom 
Budget Cash & 
Carry 
Goldfieds Gh 
Starcall 
Spacefon/Areeba 
Areeba/MTN 
Areeba/MTN 
TiGO 
Wienco 
MTN 
MTN 
MTN 
MTN 
MTN 
Blue Jeans 
 
Goldfields Gh 
1999 
2002 
2004 
2008 
2007 
- 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2009 
2010 
2012 
 
2009 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
- 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
 
3 
- 
- 
GHC 900,000 
$4.5 million 
GHc 3,000,000 
- 
$450,000 
$450,000 
$450,000 
$450,000 
GHC 3.6 m 
GHC 270,000 
 
GHC 300,000 
Not Renewed 
Renewed 
Renewed 
Not Renewed 
Terminated 
Terminated 
Terminated 
Terminated 
Not Renewed 
Terminated 
Pending Renewal 
Running 
 
Renewed 
Source: Compiled by author from club sources 
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The levels of the sponsorship are low compared to what pertains in other 
African countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and South Africa (Kotoko, 2013). 
Whilst some clubs like Lions struggle to hold on to the sponsorship when they 
expire others have their contract terminated once they are relegated from the 
Premier League (RTU, Faisal, Wise and Mirren). Kotoko terminated its 2007 
agreement with Tigo in 2009 to move to telecom rivals, MTN for an improved 
offer. Hearts of Oak also turned down an offer of a reduction in sponsorship 
levels when their 2008 deal with MTN came up for re-negotiation, to sign with 
SAS at levels similar to what they were losing from the existing deal. Whilst 
these two clubs could negotiate favorable terms with corporate firms based on 
their size and the mileage they offer advertisers, the smaller clubs are bargain 
takers with little bargaining power. Between 2010 and June 2013, Kotoko 
increased the number of sponsors from 1 to 13 and the details are provided 
Appendix 8. 
The FA sold the media rights to the league in 2008 to Optimum Media Prime 
(OMP), a Ghanaian media company, a subsidiary of Metropolitan Television 
(Metro TV). OMP was to pay GH₵ 300,000 for the second half of the 2008/09 
soccer season and then subsequently pay GH₵600,000 for the second year 
and GH₵ 800,000 for the final year. Whilst this may be insignificant in 
comparison with what pertains in Europe (see Deloitte, 2012), rights revenue 
still remains an important source of revenue, especially the smaller-sized clubs 
in Ghana (see table 6.9). 
At the league level the current sponsorship by Globacom (Gh.) Ltd is worth $3 
million per annum over five years. Each Ghanaian club is expected to receive 
the equivalent of only US$120,000 from the GLO Premier League sponsorship 
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in the 2012/13 season. This is low compared to the sponsorship for the knock-
out competition of South Africa, the NedBank Cup, which has a sponsorship 
package worth over R52 million over five years. By the end of the 2012/13 
season the sponsors of the league had not paid any portion of the sponsorship 
amount due to the clubs. Thus, not only are the sponsorship levels low, the flow 
is unpredictable and unreliable. 
Potential issues of ambush marketing have generated conflict between the 
League and some clubs, these arising in situations where a club’s sponsors are 
a direct rival of the main league sponsor. For example, Kotoko’s headline 
sponsor MTN is a direct rival of the League’s sponsor, GLO in the telecom 
industry. The FA’s contract with GLO makes it illegal for any club to advertise a 
telecom company during league matches, meaning that mileage promised MTN 
per its contract with Kotoko cannot be realized. This leads to economic 
inefficiency or irrationality when considered from the point of view of a club. For 
example MTN pays Kotoko almost eight times the amount the club receives 
from the FA in league rights sales, but the club is unable to fully honor its 
obligations to the sponsor. In contrast, Liverpool advertises Standard Chartered 
at its league games despite the league being sponsored by the sponsor’s rival 
in the banking industry, Barclays. The English FA, however, does not consider 
this as an exercise in ambush marketing. 
Whilst ambush marketing threats are real and could endanger the potential to 
maximize total league earnings from right sales, providing exclusivity to league 
sponsors also has the potential to limit the ability of clubs to obtain individual 
sponsorship deals. It could thus limit the flow of income into the football league 
economy as a whole. It is important, therefore, for the FA to develop clear 
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guidelines on ambush marketing, picking experiences from other developed 
leagues, but at the same time taking the economic circumstances of the 
Ghanaian clubs into consideration. 
 
5.5.3  Merchandising  
Table 5.16 provides information on the kit suppliers and replica jersey sales for 
clubs in the league as at June, 2013.  
Table 5.16: Kit Supply and Replica Sale for Premier League Clubs in Ghana:  June, 2013  
Clubs with Current Kit Sponsors Medeama Errea 
No Official Kit Sponsor All Clubs except Medeama 
Fan Shop Hearts  and Medeama 
Rights to Produce Replica Sold Kotoko and Medeama 
Unofficial merchandise sold on streets Kotoko and Hearts 
Previous Official Kit Sponsorship Kotoko Admiral 
Jako 
Lotto 
+One 
Hearts Mingle 
Kajimolo 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Apart from Medeama SC which currently has a kit sponsorship arrangement 
with Errea, all other clubs, including Kotoko purchase their kits at market price. 
Hearts of Oak are the only club with an official fan shop where replica jerseys 
are sold to the fans. Individual retailers attempt to fill the void created by the 
inability of the two big clubs to market their own produce by selling unofficial 
merchandise on the streets of the major cities.  This leakage of potential 
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income from the game is an inefficiency that needs the collective efforts of the 
FA and its clubs to address. . 
For example Kotoko has sold the rights to the production of merchandise with 
its logo to Champion industries for a two year period ending December 2013. 
However, with the weak copyright enforcement practices in Ghana (an area 
which needs better regulation), and the relatively higher cost of the official 
merchandise, compared to the versions sold on the streets, it is particularly 
difficult for the right holder to benefit from such an arrangement in a poor 
country. Thus clubs are not able to take advantage of the opportunity to raise 
further revenue from merchandise sales.  
 
5.5.4  Financial Effects of Participating in CAF Inter-club Competitions 
Playing in the UEFA Champions League is a huge attraction for many 
European clubs due not only to the profile of the competition, but more 
instrumentally due to the sums of money generated and distributed to 
participant clubs. In 2009/10 a total of €757.4 million was distributed to the 32 
clubs that played in the group stages of the competition with the winner, 
Internazionale of Italy being paid €49.2 million (Deloitte, 2011). To demonstrate 
again the differences between the financial environment in Africa and in 
Europe, it is worth noting that even the club that earned the least amount of 
money from participating in the group stages of the competition, Maccabi Haifa 
FC earned more (€8.7 million) than the total prize money on offer in 2010 for 
both the CAF Champions League and the Confederations Cup combined (see 
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Table 5.14 below). The chance to play in the UEFA competition also serves to 
attract the best players to clubs that qualify for the competition.  
Qualification for the CAF Champions league may serve to attract players to 
Ghanaian clubs as it provides them with the platform to market themselves for 
potential transfers abroad. It may also increase the market value of a Ghanaian 
player on the international market and thus potentially raise money for the club 
in that way. These could be considered as indirect potential benefits of 
participation for the club. The direct financial cost and benefit of participating in 
the competition, however, are crucial in determining the financial viability of 
participation for clubs with limited resources. Any competition that imposes 
financial demands without commensurate guaranteed rewards has the potential 
to seriously undermining their cash flows and generating unsustainable 
liabilities.    
Bediako (2012) argues that in Ghana, Kotoko and Hearts of Oak have been 
victims of their own success due to their rich history of participation in the CAF 
inter-club competitions. He refers to various interviews he has had with 
administrators of the clubs who admit that winning league titles which results in 
participation in the CAF Champions league competition has been a major 
source of the mounting liabilities of the clubs. He does not, however, provide 
evidence of the effect of playing in the CAF inter-club competitions on a club’s 
finances. Revenue and expenditure data from Kotoko’s participation in the 2008 
CAF Champions League competition has been utilized by this study to illustrate 
why the competition could be a financial trap for Ghanaian clubs.  Table 5.19 
provides the prize money awarded for finishing at various positions in the 
competition for the period 2008-2010. 
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Table 5.17: Prize Money awarded for CAF Inter-Club Competitions in 2008-2010 
Ranking Champions League Confederations Cup 
Final Position Money awarded 
to club 
Money awarded 
to national assoc. 
Money awarded 
to club 
Money awarded 
to national assoc. 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
Semi-finalist 
 
3rd in group stage 
 
4th in group stage 
$1.5million 
 
$1.0million 
 
$700,000 
 
$500,000 
 
$400,000 
$50,000 
 
$35,000 
 
$22,500 
 
$13,750 
 
$10,000 
$625,000 
 
$432,000 
 
$239,000 
 
$239,000 
 
$150,000 
$35,000 
 
$30,000 
 
$25,000 
 
$20,000 
 
$15,000 
Source: Confederation of African Football 
 
 
The club played in three qualifying rounds before playing in the group stages of 
the competition. It eventually finished third in its group and thus failed to qualify 
for the semi-finals. At the end of each qualifying round which involved a home 
and an away tie, the club made losses averaging US$63,801.95. Table 5.20 
below shows the revenue and expenditure analysis for the club’s participation 
in the competition based on actual figures. The round cost include: airfares and 
travel allowances for players and staff of the club for the away match; local 
transport, accommodation, and feeding of the visiting team for the home match; 
and the travel, feeding and accommodation of match officials for the home 
match.   
236 
 
 
Table 5.18:  Revenue and Expenditure Analysis for Various Stages of CAF Champions League (US$) 
RANKING ROUND 
COST 
CUM. COST GATES 
REVENUE 
CUMULATIVE 
GATE REVENUE 
CAF PRIZE 
MONEY 
TOTAL 
REVENUE 
PROFIT/ 
LOSS 
1ST ROUND 
 
2ND ROUND 
 
3RD ROUND 
 
4TH IN 
GROUP 
 
3RD IN 
GROUP 
 
SEMIFINAL 
LOSER 
 
RUNNER-UP 
 
WINNER 
127,598.00 
 
127,598.00 
 
127,598.00 
 
382,794.00 
 
 
382,794.00 
 
 
127,598.00 
 
 
127,598.00 
 
127,598.00 
127,598.00 
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1,020,784.00 
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63,793.05 
 
63,793.05 
 
191,379.15 
 
 
191,379.15 
 
 
63,793.05 
 
 
63,793.05 
 
63,793.05 
63,793.05 
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191,379.15 
 
382,758.30 
 
 
382,758.30 
 
 
446,551.35 
 
 
510,344.40 
 
510,344.40 
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63,793.05 
 
127,586.10 
 
191,379.15 
 
782,758.30 
 
 
882,758.30 
 
 
1,146,551.35 
 
 
1,510,344.40 
 
2,010,344.40 
-63,801.95 
 
-127,610.00 
 
-191.414.85 
 
17,170.00 
 
 
117,170.00 
 
 
253,365.30 
 
 
489,560.40 
 
989,560.00 
Source: Author’s own calculations using data from Kotoko’s 2008 participation in CAF Inter-club competitions 
 
The total revenue for the first three rounds was from gate proceeds alone as 
the organizers do not pay any prize money until the group stages. The total 
revenue during the group stages is made up of gate revenue and the CAF prize 
money. By the end of the first three qualifying rounds, Kotoko had accumulated 
losses of US$191,414.85. This implies that had it not qualified for the group 
stages, it would have made a net loss of almost US$0.2 million. Thus for 
finishing 4th in the group, the club earned total revenue of US$782,758.3 
comprising US$400,000 in prize money and US$382,000 from the six home 
matches played in total. This gives a net profit of US$17,170. Winning the 
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competition would have given them a profit of almost US$1 million, assuming 
the gate revenue and expenditure patterns remained similar to that of the early 
round. Figure 5.7 above shows that Kotoko only breaks even by reaching the 
group stages of the CAF Champions League (CL) competition. Similar 
calculations have been made for the CAF Confederations cup and this reveals 
that it would only break even in the Confederations Cup (CC) if it finishes 2nd in 
the competition. 
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Figure 5.7: Profit and Loss for CAF Inter-
Club Competitions 
This implies that for teams with match revenue and expenditure streams similar 
to that of Kotoko, the CAF inter-club competitions are quite dissimilar to the 
UEFA competitions in terms of being financially lucrative competitions for 
Ghanaian clubs.  
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Moreover historically, Kotoko earns over four times the revenue received by the 
average Ghanaian club from match revenue (see Table 5.5). Thus other 
Ghanaian clubs playing in Africa would make considerably less money than 
that specified in the calculations in table 5.18 above. This implies that at every 
stage of the competition, all things being equal, other clubs’ losses would 
exceed those estimated for Kotoko and that any profit made would be 
considerably lower than what estimated for Kotoko. Thus other Ghanaian clubs 
would need to go further in the competition than Kotoko merely to break-even. 
 Table 5.19 shows the effect of simulating the effect of a government grant of 
say, US$210,000 paid to Kotoko in 3 installments, on its profit/loss position. 
This amount is what is required to allow the club just to cover its losses in the 
qualifying rounds. US$70,000 is assumed to be paid during each of the three 
qualifying rounds of the competition, and none during the group stages, when 
CAF begins to pay prize money.   
 
Table 5.19: Profit and Loss Position with and Without Government Grant 
RANKING CL- Without CC -Without CL - With CC - With 
1ST ROUND 
 
2ND ROUND 
 
3RD ROUND 
 
4TH IN GROUP 
 
3RD IN GROUP 
 
SEMIFINAL LOSER 
 
RUNNER-UP 
 
WINNER 
-63,801.95 
 
-127,610.00 
 
-191.414.85 
 
17,170.00 
 
117,170.00 
 
253,365.30 
 
489,560.40 
 
989,560.00 
-63,801.95 
 
-127,610.00 
 
-191.414.85 
 
-232,830.00 
 
-143,830.00 
 
-143,830.00 
 
-14,635.00 
 
178,365.00 
6,206.95 
 
12,390.00 
 
18,620.85 
 
407,170.30 
 
687,170.30 
 
823,365.35 
 
1,059,560.40 
 
1,431,962.40 
6,206.95 
 
12,390.00 
 
18,620.85 
 
-22,829.70 
 
66,170.30 
 
66,170.30 
 
195,365.00 
 
388,365.00 
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The Government grant makes the Champions League a profitable venture at 
every stage of the competition for a club with Kotoko’s characteristics, whilst 
the Confederation’s Cup also becomes a financial viable venture unless one 
finishes bottom of the group stages of the competition. Even then, the loss 
made may be easily covered by the indirect benefits obtained from 
participation.    
 
5.6  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.6.1 Financial Disclosure 
Similar to the position put forward by Stigler (1971) and Becker (1983) the GFA 
adopts the position that clubs would not comply with submission requirements 
for financial statements unless they believed that non-compliance would be 
detected and severely punished. However, the credibility of the submitted 
accounts cannot be guaranteed given the evidence reported in section 5.2.2 
which suggested that some of the figures in the audited financial statements 
might have been manipulated by clubs either to conceal the true financial 
position or as a legitimating activity to ensure the club received its licence 
(Morrow, 2006).   
There are considerable challenges in terms of information disclosure due to a 
lack of consistency in accounting treatment adopted by clubs, resulting in a lack 
of comparable information from the financial statements of different clubs. For 
instance, there is little link between the organizational structure of clubs and the 
type of income statement drawn by the clubs, something which may arise due 
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to a lack of guidance from the GFA. Understandably, the difficulty in estimating 
brand values, rather than an unwillingness to provide information may be the 
main factor in the obvious understatement of the total intangible assets of the 
clubs.  
It seems a common practice that majority of the information meant to be 
included in the balance sheet is recorded as notes to the accounts, with little 
information in the main document itself. Whilst in effect this implies that the 
information has still been made available, obscuring vital information in the 
Notes might be an attempt by club managers to bias the opinion of users of the 
accounts. Also, even where clubs meet mandatory disclosure requirement the 
evidence suggest that they might be unwilling to provide any information 
beyond what the regulation requires them to do. Clubs have changed 
accounting years without providing comparative figures for prior years, which is 
contrary to the fundamental accounting concept of comparability (Barrow, 2011; 
Coyle, 2000; Gasking, 1999). Figures relating to one year that appear 
differently in two sets of accounts but without comments on prior year’s 
adjustments raise questions about the consistency of the accounting carried out 
by the clubs. This coupled with the changing of club auditors without recourse 
to the guidelines set in the Companies Code would seem to suggest an attempt 
to obscure information to suit the purposes of the company and its 
management (Coyle, 2000).  
In general, differences in the ways clubs treat player recruitment costs in their 
accounts makes comparing the financial performance of different clubs in 
Ghana a difficult endeavor. There is also little evidence of attempts by the clubs 
to re-value the players’ for impairment due to loss of form, injury or age 
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(Morrow, 1999), as requested by the UEFA FFPRs. It would be beneficial for 
legislation to standardize the accounting practices of Ghanaian clubs to allow 
for comparison of financial figures within clubs over different years and across 
clubs within a year.  
Secondly the differing treatment of depreciation of fixed assets by the different 
clubs would suggest that comparison of asset changes between clubs should 
be done with extreme caution. Whilst the choice of the rate of depreciation and 
amortization of fixed tangible and intangible assets respectively must reflect the 
peculiar realities within a given company (Siciliano, 2003), it creates 
opportunities for abuses. This creates differences in processes that cannot be 
justified, within the same industry. There is, therefore, a need for 
standardization in terms of how various items are treated within the financial 
statements of clubs to allow for comparability across clubs and over time.  
To the extent that no club has been punished for non-submission of financial 
statements during the period under consideration, the retrieval of only 45 out of 
a possible 91 submitted accounts after a one year search would seem to 
suggest the absence of proper information management within the FA. 
Inappropriate storage systems at the FA hinder any attempt to analyze the 
financial statements and provide feedback to the clubs. The lack of feedback 
from the GFA to the clubs could also generate adverse motivational effects for 
the clubs, e.g. the perception among clubs that the GFA ‘does nothing’ with the 
submitted reports. They might consider the process of submission of the 
audited financial statements as being of little importance. Beyond the need to 
meet information disclosure requirements by stakeholders internal to the club, 
242 
 
and in the absence of other incentives to encourage compliance, there is a 
likelihood that the quality of the information disclosure process would suffer. 
Evidently clubs have made no attempt to go beyond compliance with the 
submission requirements, and instead often submit documents that generally 
lack the quality to usefully serve the purpose for which the GFA introduced the 
legislation in 2003. This provides support for the argument by Gunningham that 
the indiscriminate use of deterrence could have counter-productive 
consequences, as club managers may ‘refuse to do anything more than 
minimally comply with existing regulation’ (2010, p. 124). These findings 
confirm the results of Sarpong (1999) who found evidence of non-compliance 
with the requirements of the Ghana Companies Code and Ghana National 
Accounting Standards by Ghanaian firms in general. 
The section raises concerns about not only the quality and extent of financial 
disclosures made by the clubs, but also the quality of auditing done by the 
clubs’ auditors.  It also raises doubts about the validity of the opinions 
expressed by the various auditors especially where they suggest that their 
auditing has been done based on international auditing standards. Overall 
critical challenges exist in terms of the monitoring and enforcement of financial 
disclosure by the Ghana Football Association in respect of Ghanaian clubs.   
   
5.6.2  Financial Performance 
The low and declining level of revenue obtained by Ghanaian clubs is in 
contrast to the experience in the major European countries where increasing 
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media rights have ensured generally increasing revenue for clubs in England 
(Morrow, 2011; 2006; 1999; Walters &Hamil, 2013); Germany (Dietl &Franck, 
2007; Frick and Prinz, 2006; Lago et al., 2006); Spain (Ascari & Gagnepain, 
2006); and Italy (Baroncelli & Lago, 2006). Revenue is also skewed towards the 
two major clubs, Kotoko and Hearts. However, the share of league revenues 
controlled by the top two clubs in Ghana is significantly lower than the near 
50% share of Ajax and PSV in the Dutch Eredevisie (Pieters and De Schryver, 
2011), and compares favorably with that of the Belgian league (Balduck and 
Lucidarme, 2011).   
Whilst little evidence-based academic work has been carried out to date, it is 
quite possible the high levels of player migration have affected match 
attendances which in turn had a detrimental impact on revenue generated via 
gate receipts  (Bediako, 2012; Darby, 2010). The increased access to foreign 
league games which cost less to watch on television as compared to the travel 
cost involved in watching domestic league games might also account for the 
low attendance figures (see Table 6.5).  
The percentage contribution of match revenue within total revenue is also on 
the decline, similar to recent experience in some European countries. For 
example, gate revenue fell from 80.85% of the budget of the average Belgian 
club in the 1990s, to only 25.8% in 2008/09 (Balduck and Lucidarme, 2011). It 
has also fallen from 80 % in the 1970s in France to around 15% since 2000 
(Senaux, 2011), and in Germany it now accounts for only about 21% of total 
revenue (Wilkesmann et al, 2011).Whilst the decline in share in Europe could 
be interpreted positively in that it is attributable to an increase in media rights 
revenue, the same cannot be said of the situation in Ghana. Rather, the FA has 
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had to re-negotiate downwards the title rights to even the league between 2011 
and 2013.  
The differing ratio of gross match revenue accruing to clubs in Ghana is as a 
result of the minimum expenditure required for the execution of the game at a 
particular league center. Where the difference between gross revenue and 
match expenses is low, i.e. close to zero, the proportion of gross revenue that 
goes to the club will be low. Thus clubs with relatively low gross revenue but 
high operational cost in terms of match expenses would receive a low share of 
gross revenues.  
Revenue from player sales is unpredictable and thus cannot be relied upon as 
a reliable source of revenue. On the average it only accounts for about 17% of 
total revenue for Ghanaian clubs, similar to the range found by Mutter & Huber 
(2011) for Swiss clubs.  
Growth in expenditure occurring across all clubs has been fuelled generally by 
growth in player cost. This, of course, is not peculiar to Ghanaian football as it 
is a key feature of majority of European leagues (see Gammelsaeter & Senaux, 
2011; Hamil and Chadwick, 2010; Lago et al., 2006; Morrow, 2011; Walters and 
Hamil, 2013). It is the source of the financial problems facing clubs in Italy 
where salaries have risen faster (453%) than annual turnover (216%) in the 
decade before 2006 according to Baroncelli and Lago (2006). Spanish clubs 
have seen increased expenditure on players being fuelled by increased 
revenue (Ascari & Gagnepain, 2006), unlike in Ghana where increased player 
expenditure has generally happened at a period where clubs are also 
experiencing falls in revenue.  
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The fall in revenue and the accompanying increase in expenditure have 
resulted in Ghanaian clubs making losses on an annual basis. It must be stated 
however that the existence of operating losses do not necessarily show 
financial crisis (Lago et al., 2006). It is a generally accepted view that most 
football clubs around the world make losses on a consistent basis. According to 
Franck and Lang (2013) out of the 734 European top division clubs whose 
finances were analyzed, about 56% of them reported net losses in the financial 
year 2010. Clubs in England, Germany, Spain, Italy, France and Portugal are 
known to make losses on an annual basis (Dietl & Franck, 2007; Hamil and 
Chadwick, 2010; Morrow, 1999, 2006, 2011; Walters and Hamil, 2013) with 
some English and Scottish clubs going into administration on a regular basis 
(Morrow, 2011; Walters and Hamil, 2013). 
 
The financial position of Ghanaian clubs is not dissimilar to that of their 
counterparts in most European countries. A challenge, however, is that 
accumulating debts if unchecked would become unsustainable in the long run, 
leading to the collapse of the clubs (Lago et al., 2006). For example, more than 
half of the Scottish Premier League clubs were insolvent with liabilities greater 
than assets at their 2003 year ends (Morrow, 2006), even though only a few 
end up folding-up. The majority of Ghanaian clubs are dependent on loans 
given out by Directors who behave effectively as ‘benefactor-owners’ to the 
clubs and bail them out as and when required. Most clubs make less money 
annually than their accumulated debts to their directors. This would seem to 
suggest that if the Directors decide to recall their loans to the clubs these clubs 
would not be able to repay their loans within a reasonable time period.  
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It could be argued that the finances of clubs supported by benefactor owners 
are more volatile, as those clubs’ ability to sustain the debts and remain in 
operation is almost entirely dependent on the fortunes of the personal business 
endeavors of the directors and owners (Franck and Lang, 2013). As has been 
argued in section 3.1.2, UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations attempt to direct 
funding from investors towards longer term and less risky investment such as 
youth development, football infrastructure and community development; 
investment which also has long term implications for the finances of the clubs. 
However, in Ghana, the alternative sources of income such as gate revenue, 
sponsorship and player sales are just as volatile as funding from owners and 
directors, if not more so. Thus the lack of viable alternative sources of revenue 
would seem to suggest that clubs do not have a choice but to rely on the 
magnanimity of rich directors and owners, even with its associated risks.   
Ghanaian clubs like their counterparts elsewhere around the world have 
overdue debts resulting from player transfer activity. They are able to buy 
players on credit as a result of an informal, but inefficient, system of guarantee 
operated by the GFA. Ostensibly this allows clubs to resolve their short-term 
cash-flow problems that would have been compounded by an expectation to 
pay for player purchases instantaneously. The process of crediting clubs with 
their share of league rights revenue and debiting them in respect of payments 
due other clubs in respect of player transfers is similar to the operation of a 
clearing-house. However, weaknesses exist in the operation of the player 
transfer payment system as clubs over-collateralize their share of the league 
rights revenue resulting in debts remaining unpaid well beyond the agreed 
payment period. Any attempt at improving the financial management systems in 
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Ghana football would have to rationalise the operations of this informal debt-
clearing system; building on its operational advantages while remedying its 
inherent weaknesses.     
 
5.6.3  Financial Management of Clubs 
The asset base of the clubs is very low (section 5.3.4). For instance, only two 
clubs own the grounds on which they play their matches and thus they cannot 
use them as collateral for loans. Revenue from player sales is highly volatile 
and unpredictable such that it represented 50 % of total revenue for Hearts of 
Oak in 2010 but zero percent the following year. Clubs cannot therefore count 
player values as assets to be used as collateral.  Match revenue is very low 
(see Table 5.5 and Table 5.9) and is very much dependent on the 
unpredictable performance of the club, as season tickets are not a feature of 
the Ghanaian game.  The high volatility and unpredictability of flow of funds 
from both gate revenue and sponsorship revenue mean that the clubs lack 
adequate collateral to convince financial institutions to provide short term and 
long term funding to the clubs.  
Directors’ guarantee, which Morrow (1999) suggest is used by Scottish and 
English clubs as collateral for bank loans is not a more attractive alternative 
source of collateral for a club which could obtain funding from the Director him 
or herself, usually on an interest free basis. The continual losses incurred by 
clubs (see Table 5.3) shows weak financial performance of clubs in Ghana. The 
net liability position of the clubs in the league taken as a group (see Table 5.7), 
despite individual differences, makes the clubs risky and unattractive clients for 
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the financial industry. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, the cost of credit in 
Ghana is very high compared to that found in the European financial markets. 
Thus the combination of lack of collateral, the high cost of credit, poor financial 
performance of clubs and a weak financial position makes funding from 
financial institutions not a viable option for most Ghanaian league clubs. 
Apart from Kotoko, Hearts and Chelsea, no Ghanaian club has ever played in 
the group stages of any of the two CAF competitions. Hearts won the 
competition in 2000, and the last time Kotoko won the competition in 1983, no 
prize money was on offer. In 2003, Kotoko and Hearts became the first two 
teams to compete for the Confederations Cup trophy, which was won by 
Hearts. Chelsea only finished 3rd in the group stages of the Champions League 
competition. The recent record of Ghanaian clubs in the competition is 
unimpressive. Thus the probability of the clubs progressing beyond the group 
stages and earning profits is quite small.  
In effect, the CAF inter-club competitions in themselves are not very attractive 
to most Ghanaian clubs, explaining why several clubs have refused to 
participate even when they qualify on sporting merit. The 2011 FA Cup winners, 
FC Nania turned down the offer to take part in the 2012 CAF Confederations 
Cup on financial grounds. However, it needs to be argued that whilst the 
competitions might not be economically viable based on private benefits and 
cost considerations, participation may be justified on a broader social cost-
benefit basis. Participation in the competitions provides bigger platforms for 
Ghanaian youth to harness their skills, and to prepare for national team 
assignments; things which could be seen as beneficial to society more 
generally. Thus government support for clubs’ participation in CAF inter-club 
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competitions could be justified on grounds of the positive externalities 
generated by the clubs. 
5.6.4  Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter was to assess the financial disclosure practices of 
Ghanaian clubs. It was also to evaluate the financial performance and position 
of Ghanaian professional clubs. This chapter discussed financial disclosure 
practices, performance and issues affecting the financial management of clubs 
in Ghana’s premier league that generate systemic challenges requiring 
modifications to the existing regulatory framework. The study has found that the 
level of financial disclosure by clubs in the league is very low. More importantly, 
the disclosure that is available indicated that several clubs are in financial 
difficulties. These difficulties have resulted from volatile revenues, expanding 
expenditure levels, accumulating debt and a negative net asset position, 
financed by resources from single owners behaving as ‘sugar-daddies’. 
The level of financial disclosure is considered low as clubs submit audited 
financial statements merely to satisfy submission requirements and hence to 
avoid being punished. Meanwhile the storage and retrieval of submitted 
documents is inefficient bringing into question the internal control mechanisms 
of the FA, and whether the documents are reviewed upon submission. The 
credibility of the submitted financial statements cannot be guaranteed as they 
do not always conform to reporting standards of the Ghana Accounting 
Standards Board. As such the opinion expressed by the auditors cannot always 
be relied on. The differing treatment of asset depreciation and amortization by 
clubs makes comparability difficult. Some accounts do not include prior year 
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figures, which make an assessment of performance difficult, and these, 
ironically, coincide with periods within which clubs change auditors or change 
their accounting years. This leaves room for speculation that these changes 
might be an attempt by the clubs to hide their true financial position.  
The poor quality of financial disclosure in the Ghanaian premier league is a 
symptom of regulatory failure, highlighting clear challenges with the existing 
regulatory framework. The lack of review of submitted financial statements for 
example, would be suggestive of, among other things, a lack of financial 
management capacity within the FA set-up. These challenges make a strong 
argument of the need for a financial regulatory framework that incorporates 
financial licensing as a core feature. This thus would require the setting up of a 
body with the requisite financial capabilities to review the financial documents 
and advise the clubs and the FA on proper financial disclosure standards.  
The financial licensing system which should be built along the guidelines 
provided by the FIFA Club Licensing regulations and the UEFA CL & FFPR 
should ensure that financial disclosure guidelines are provided for clubs in 
Ghana. A standard format for financial reporting that allows for comparison 
between the financial performance of one club and another over time, as well 
as auditing standards incorporated into the financial licensing process is 
required. A system of financial statements review would allow for feedback to 
be given to clubs by the licensing bodies and would resolve the apparent lack 
of motivation on the part of clubs to submit credible documents.   
The pursuit of sporting success has led to the financial instability of majority of 
Ghanaian clubs. This has been as a result of an expanding player cost in the 
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face of volatile match and player transfer revenues, and an unreliable flow of 
sponsorship and media rights revenue. Revenue from matches has fallen as a 
result of depleting player quality and low marketing drives by the FA. The short-
term solvency of the clubs is due more to a generation of sugar-daddy owners, 
who are prepared to underwrite the debt of the clubs in the short run.  The low 
utilization of credit from the financial sector is due to an inability of clubs to 
provide sufficient collateral guarantee resulting from their low assets base, and 
the high cost of credit in the country. The untimely nature of payments of 
sponsorship and media rights revenue forces clubs to resort to borrowing 
sources which generate unexpected debt-overhang. Clubs have accumulated 
debts which in comparison to their assets makes majority of them technically 
bankrupt and unattractive clients to financial institutions.  
This provides further argument of the need for a regulatory framework that 
ensures regulated access to credit for clubs through the establishment of player 
transfer payment system that functions as a clearinghouse. This would ensure 
that payments which are due to other clubs are paid, where necessary from a 
club’s share of rights revenue, whilst at the same time ensuring clubs do not 
unduly take on debt they  cannot service. By coordinating the player transfer 
payment system, this body would ensure the continuous flow of funding within 
the football economy. 
Secondly, the financial regulator for Ghanaian football would also have to 
support the existing loan guarantee system that allows clubs to obtain short 
term debt from the FA, its affiliates like GHALCA and other financial institutions. 
For example, by providing credit guarantees to the clubs, the financial regulator 
would allow clubs to access credit at lower than normal rates from formal 
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financial sector institutions. Their ability to provide such credible guarantees 
would be greatly enhanced by the volume of financial information at their 
disposal as a result of the review of the financial data provided by the clubs. 
Thus the process of ensuring regulated access to funding for clubs would be 
enhanced by the financial licensing and monitoring component of the regulatory 
framework, discussed above.  
Unlike their European counterparts, Ghanaian clubs do not find the CAF inter-
club competitions a lucrative venture whose participation automatically 
generates profits. The pursuit of sporting success at the continental level 
invariably leaves Ghanaian clubs with debts due to their inability to perform to 
the level that would ensure the provision of adequate financial rewards (see 
section 5.5.4). However the external benefits in terms of youth development 
through the participation and exposure the clubs give to the youth provides 
justification for Government support.  Meanwhile Government support has the 
potential of making participation a worthwhile venture. The financial regulator, 
serving as a policy advocate should be in a position to help the clubs access 
funding from sources that have previously been left unexploited such as 
government. With the requisite knowledge and financial information, the 
regulator could lobby government for support for clubs’ participation in such 
competitions as well as for youth and infrastructure development.   
A contextual framework for the financial regulation of football in Ghana is 
developed in the next section. This incentive based context-specific framework 
is proposed to deal with the challenges of ensuring regulated access to credit, 
financial licensing and monitoring of clubs, and providing financial advocacy on 
behalf of the clubs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE FOOTBALL FINANCIAL CLEARINGHOUSE –  
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to critically review the framework for the financial 
regulation of professional football in Ghana and propose an appropriate 
framework specific to the context of Ghana. In order to achieve this aim, a 
critical review of the theoretical literature was done in chapter 2 which resulted 
in Sappington’s framework being adopted as the conceptual framework for the 
development of the context specific framework for Ghana. The critical review of 
existing regulatory frameworks in Ghana done in chapter 4 and the review of 
Ghanaian football finance in chapter 5 provide the institutional framework and 
the industry conditions within which the context-specific framework is to be 
developed. 
This chapter therefore concentrates on the development of an incentive-based 
context-specific financial regulatory framework referred to as the Football 
Financial Clearinghouse (FFC) model. This chapter thus discusses this 
framework at the conceptual level, which is then tested in subsequent chapters 
and the final version of the model is developed, in chapter 8, as the outcome of 
this study.  
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The chapter begins in section 6.2 with a discussion of the concept of 
clearinghouses and how they have been applied in various spheres such as 
finance and economics, medicine, the arts, and in sports. Section 6.3 then 
discusses the determinants of the scope, function and form that the regulatory 
framework takes. This would include the objectives, resources and the industry 
conditions within which the framework is expected to operate. Section 6.4 deals 
with the scope and form of the regulatory framework whilst 6.5 discuss the 
functions of the regulation. This includes: the process of licensing the clubs to 
ensure improved financial management; the incentivising components of the 
framework; and the various deterrence and compliance strategies inherent in 
the framework. 
Even though the study attempts to develop a regulatory framework which is 
football specific, and is meant to be relevant for the Ghanaian context, it does 
not ignore the importance of the many experiences and examples available 
from other countries especially in Europe.  For example the concept of the FFC 
Board, is an adaptation of UEFA’s Football Financial Control Body (FFCB), 
whilst the licensing framework is an incorporation of the FFC Board into the 
German Club Licensing framework.  
6.2  THE CONCEPT OF A CLEARING-HOUSE 
This section discusses the concept of clearing houses and how they are utilised 
in economics and finance, the arts and sciences, and in sports. The key 
features of clearing-houses that are of relevance to this study are also drawn 
out for use in the subsequent sections.  
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6.2.1  Clearing-houses in Economics and Finance 
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics, edited by Black, Hashimzade and Myles 
defines a clearing-house as:  
“---An institution where claims by various banks against 
each other are offset---”. 
         (2012, pp. 62) 
The Routledge Dictionary of Economics on the other hand defines it in terms of 
the institution which deals in the settlement of the mutual indebtedness of 
commercial banks (Rutherford, 2002). In essence, these definitions suggest that 
each financial institution sends its representative to the clearing-house where 
debit items are cleared against credit items. Subsequently, the balance is struck 
and the creditor banks receive payments from the debtor banks (Timberlake, 
1984, p3). This implies that orders for payments are accumulated over time and 
then the clearinghouse helps the market to clear these periodically. They are 
thus considered as one of the most fundamental market mechanisms and are 
essential for trade (Mendelson, 1982) 
 
Timberlake (1984) suggests further that even before the bank panics in the 
United States of America (USA) of 1857, clearinghouses were already in 
existence. By the time of the 1907 bank panic clearinghouse associations had 
gone to the extent of providing what he termed as ‘make-shift currency’; an 
alternative to the existing legal tender in which people had lost confidence 
because of the panic. 
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Goodhart (1988) considers the association of clearinghouses as having played 
a key role in the evolution of central banking, and today central banks still 
perform a role as a clearinghouse for commercial banks. He argues that the 
key feature of a central bank - crucial to the performance of its role as a 
clearinghouse - is its non-competitive nature. Thus the central bank does not 
compete with the members of the clearing-house, i.e.  the banks. 
 In foreign exchange markets, forwards and futures prices are determined 
through a system in which a clearing-house acts as both the seller for every 
buyer and a buyer for every seller (Cornell and Reinganum, 1981). This could 
be argued to be an attempt by the clearing-house to deal with the problems of 
information asymmetry between the buyer and the seller, reduce the cost 
associated with matching a buyer with a seller, and trade risks for market 
participants.  More recently, Acharya et al (2008) have recommended the 
creation of a centralized clearinghouse which would take on the role of 
counterparty and guarantor of all contracts for trade in credit derivatives. This 
system, they suggest, would be superior to a pure over-the-counter (OTC) 
market structure. 
 
6.2.2  Clearing-houses in Arts and Sciences 
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) 
established a clearing-house in 1914 to deal with the cost associated with the 
use of large musical works in performances occurring simultaneously 
throughout the US (Finkelstein, 1966). This allowed producers of arts to trade 
efficiently with users of these works by reducing the cost and time consumed by 
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the user and copyright holder in negotiating for the use of individual pieces of 
work.  
 
Long et al. (1992, 1993) draw attention to the importance of the advisory 
services provided to its stakeholders by the UK Clearing House for Information 
on the Assessment of Health Services Outcomes. This body was established in 
part to facilitate the development and application of measurement of health 
services outcomes through the provision of structured and coordinated 
information and advice (Long et al., 1992). In medicine, Zimmeren et al (2006) 
have entered the debate as to whether the creation of a clearinghouse for 
diagnostic testing is the solution to ensure access to and use of patented 
genetic inventions.  
 
6.2.3  The Player Draft System in US Sports as a Clearing-House 
The player entry draft systems of the North American Sports Leagues (NASLs) 
could be likened to clearing-houses where teams’ player rosters are re-stocked 
annually (Quinn, 2008). They are seen as an alternate to employing free-agents 
or player trades and purchases from other teams. Player drafts begun in the 
National Football League (NFL) in 1936 as an attempt to improve on between-
club competitive balance and to limit the potential for player-cost inflation 
resulting from teams competing against each other to attract the best playing 
talents.   
The use of the reverse-order-of-finish draft as the means to improve 
competitive balance has however been challenged by sports economists on the 
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basis of Rotenberg’s Invariance Principle (see Kesenne, 2007). The argument 
is that if the transaction cost associated with player transfers from one club to 
the other is minimal then the initial allocation of player talent would not affect 
the eventual destination of the player (Berri, Schmidt and Brooks, 2006; Quinn, 
2008). Despite these limitations however, other leagues have adopted the draft 
system, with the National Basketball Association (NBA) being the first to follow 
suit in 1947, and the Major League Baseball, National Hockey League and the 
Major League Soccer (MLS) all subsequently joining.  
The draft system defines an eligibility criterion for players that could be drafted 
and rules that licensed member teams have to follow for the smooth working of 
the ‘clearing-house’. The resource cost of doing business is considerably 
reduced for each member of the league with the provision of some level of 
centralized scouting services for the teams. Thus a lot of information about 
potential draftees is produced within the league for the benefit of members. 
This also reduces the risk associated with individual clubs buying players who 
have low probability of achieving success in a particular league at high costs. 
The drafting ‘clearinghouse’ that allocates players to the various teams also 
places some restrictions on the level of free agency enjoyed by draftees, 
reducing potential player replacement costs for the teams.   
 
6.2.4  The FIFA Transfer Matching System (TMS) 
Beyond the drafting system in the MLS in the USA, the closest thing to a 
clearing-house in football is FIFA’s Transfer Matching System (TMS) which 
became operational in March 2010. The objective of the TMS system is to 
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improve transparency and efficiency in the international transfer of male players 
engaged in the 11-a-side version of football (Celen et al, 2010). Clubs X1 and 
X2 from member associations 1 and 2 respectively, involved in the transfer of 
player Y are obliged to sign a transfer agreement indicating the terms of the 
transfer. The terms would include the effective date of the transfer, details of 
the player involved, the financial details of the transfer and the type of transfer 
i.e. permanent transfer or loan. In the case of a loan the transfer agreement 
would have to indicate the duration of the loan (FIFA, 2012). 
 
The two parties are then required to independently enter the details of the 
transfer agreement into an online system to match the details so that FIFA 
could verify that the two parties are really in agreement. Supporting documents 
such as the transfer agreement, proof of identity of the player, the player’s 
contract with the selling club and his new contract with the buying club are 
required documents before FIFA can issue an International Transfer Certificate 
(ITC) to the association of the buying club.  
 
Crucial to the issue of the ITC is the financial conditions of the agreement 
including: the total compensation due the selling club; the sell-on fee (Gurtler, 
2012); the payment plan; and the commission due to player agents if any were 
involved in the transaction. The banking details of both parties are also entered 
into the online system indicating that all payments and receipts of payments are 
done solely between the clubs and not a third party representing any of the 
clubs. The clubs also give an undertaking that no part of the transfer fee has 
been paid to a third party, beyond the agents and federations involved This is to 
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deal with the potential challenges of money-laundering through player sales. 
FIFA TMS thus serves as a clearinghouse for the international transfer of 
players. 
 
6.2.5  Summary 
The key concepts evident in the examples of clearing houses discussed above 
include licensing members for participation, regulating and monitoring their 
activities, and the provision of incentives and support services to ensure 
regulatory compliance. In performing these functions, clearing houses help 
smoothen the operations of members, reduce the risk of doing business with 
rival firms by building trust amongst member firms through information 
dissemination, and reduce the cost and time involved in trading amongst rivals. 
The incorporation of benefits to members of a clearing house is crucial to its 
operations. 
It is these key features of the concept of clearing houses that are utilised in the 
development of an incentive based financial regulatory framework for Ghana. 
The concept of a clearing-house in respect of this study revolves around the 
two distinct uses of the word ‘clearing’. The process of club financial licensing, 
which is a key component of the FFC framework, involves ‘clearing’ clubs for 
participation in international and domestic competition, in conformity with FIFA’s 
desire to ensure that the credibility and financial stability of leagues around the 
world are not compromised (FIFA, 2010). Secondly, the financial transactions 
of clubs (payments and receipts) with other members of the FFC are also 
‘cleared’  (approved) by the FFC Board to ensure the credibility of the football 
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financial system, and to ensure that the regulatory system as a whole is based 
on credible commitment of members (Veljanovski, 2010). 
 
6.3 DETERMINANTS OF SCOPE, FUNCTION AND FORM OF THE FFC 
             REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The issues that determine the scope, function and form of the Football 
Financial Clearing-house framework (FFC) have developed out of the review of 
regulatory theory (chapters 2), the review of existing financial regulatory 
frameworks (chapter 4), and the review of Ghanaian football finance (chapter 5) 
discussed earlier in this study. Chapter 6 provides an initial assessment of the 
industry conditions within which Ghanaian professional teams operate, and 
which is a relevant consideration in determining the functional objectives of any 
financial regulatory framework for Ghana.  
 
6.3.1  The Objectives of the Regulator 
One key determinant of the form, scope and function of regulation is its 
objectives (Sappington, 1994). The overall objective of the FFC framework is to 
provide for an incentive-based financial regulatory framework for professional 
football in Ghana. In general the framework would regulate, incentivise, provide 
support and monitor the financial activities of professional clubs.  
 
In the context of the FIFA Club Licensing Regulations (FIFA, 2010), every 
financial regulatory framework including the FFC would incorporate a financial 
licensing system. As discussed previously (section 5.2), the quality and level of 
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financial disclosure by Ghanaian clubs is low and as such the FFC framework 
would have to deal with this problem by, for example, instituting a system of 
review of financial statements to provide feedback to clubs to ensure that they 
conform to existing national and international reporting standards. The 
existence of overdue debt arising from player transfers involving Ghanaian 
clubs provides support for FIFA’s requirement that club licensing should ensure 
clubs do not have overdue debts to other clubs and social/tax authorities (FIFA, 
2010, Annex F.02, F.03). The financial licensing framework would also assess 
the financial viability of clubs to provide the basis of the advisory services it 
provides its members, a key feature of clearing-houses. 
 
The second key objective of the financial regulatory framework would be to 
provide incentives for regulatory compliance by clubs, by improving the 
financial environment facing professional football clubs. Financial incentives are 
known to motivate firms to comply, for instance, with tax regulations (Feld and 
Frey, 2007). This could be done, for instance by ensuring regulated access to 
funding for clubs, which is a key constraint for the clubs (section 5.5). The third 
objective is to provide support services to the clubs in terms of financial 
advisory services, training and advocacy.  
 
The learning and performance of individuals and their organisations is improved 
by training (Millar and Stevens, 2012). Overall sport policy changes could also 
be greatly influenced by advocacy (Houlihan, 2005). The provision of the 
support services is in recognition of the lack of financial management capacity 
within the Ghanaian clubs and the GFA (see section 5.6.4). The FFC would 
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also engage itself in the continual monitoring of the financial management of 
the clubs to ensure compliance with regulatory directions. These objectives 
would thus determine the form and functions of the FFC as discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
6.3.2  Resources and Independence of Regulator 
The quantity and quality of resources available to the regulator and its 
distribution amongst the stakeholders may determine the scope and form that 
regulation takes, especially the independence of the regulator (Baldwin and 
Black, 2008; Sappington, 1994). It would be important that the professional 
qualification of the members of a financial regulator for Ghanaian football be 
defined under the regulation.  The committee should be made up of people with 
the requisite skills in legal, administrative, finance, technical, etc. so as to be 
able to effectively discharge the statutory functions. UEFA has set an example 
with the quality of composition of its Club Financial Control Board (Appendix 6). 
The size of the regulating body should also be defined; making sure it is not too 
large to consume financial resources that are scarce within the Ghanaian 
context, and not too little to miss out on the kind of expertise needed to 
effectively carry out its functions.  
The regulation should indicate from which constituency the membership of the 
Committee should be drawn i.e. whether from within ‘the football family’ as 
most other committees of the FA seem to be drawn from, or from people 
‘outside’ the football family. This issue was interrogated as part of the fieldwork. 
It is important that the regulation is clear on the need to ensure that members of 
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the decision-making bodies are not linked to any known constituency within the 
governance structure of the FA. A really responsive regulatory regime should 
be perceived to be adequately dealing with the issue of conflict of interest and 
fairness as emphasised by Baldwin and Black (2008).  
 
6.3.3  Industry Conditions and Institutional Structure 
The adaptation of international best practice guidelines in the formulation of a 
context specific set of regulations for a sector of the economy finds support in 
the development economics literature. Rodrik (2000), in referring to how 
institutions of high quality growth (including regulatory institutions) are acquired 
by developing countries, suggests that both local knowledge (industry 
expertise) and international best practices would be important for the proper 
functioning of the FFC framework (as a regulatory framework).   
The initial evidence from the institutional environment (chapter 1) and the 
industry conditions (chapter 5) within which Ghanaian clubs operate suggests 
that the level of financial disclosure by clubs in the league is very low. 
Moreover, the review of available financial information indicates that several 
clubs are also in financial difficulties. These difficulties have resulted from 
volatile revenues, expanding expenditure levels, accumulating debt and a 
negative net asset position, financed by resources from single owners behaving 
as ‘benefactor-owners’. 
The poor quality of financial disclosure in the Ghanaian premier league is 
arguably a symptom of regulatory failure, indicating weaknesses within the 
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existing regulatory framework. The apparent lack of review of submitted 
financial statements for example, suggests, among other things, a lack of 
financial management capacity within the FA. 
 
6.4  THE FORM AND SCOPE OF THE FFC FRAMEWORK 
This section discusses the proposed structure of the clearinghouse and its 
effect on the independence of the regulator.  
 
6.4.1 Composition of the Clearing-house 
The members of the clearing-house should include the Football Financial 
Clearinghouse (FFC) Board, the decision-making body in respect of the 
financial regulation of professional football clubs. The Board would operate in a 
fashion similar to that of the Club Financial Control (CFC) Board of UEFA 
(UEFA, 2010) and the DCNG in France (Senaux, 2011). It is also responsible 
for implementing the Financial Criteria of the CLRs.    
The FA is both a regulator (to the extent that the club licensing regulations are 
made by the FA) and a regulatee, implying a form of self-regulation (Coglianese 
and Mendelson, 2010). It serves as both an internal creditor and an internal 
debtor of the clubs. The successful implementation of the FFC framework 
would benefit the FA in terms of the improved quality of financial governance of 
its member clubs, ensuring the long term sustainability of the domestic 
competitions. This in turn should act to improve the attractiveness of the 
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domestic competitions for advertisers and sponsors, potentially increasing 
revenue levels of the football federation.  
Other members of the clearinghouse would be the 16 clubs in the Premier 
Division and potentially, the 48 clubs in the Division One League. They owe 
money to both internal (FA and other clubs) and external (financial institutions) 
creditors. Financial institutions represent the external creditors of the 
professional clubs whose credit is guaranteed by the FFC, based on an 
agreement between them and the clubs. The financial institutions could 
conceivably be selected as a pool of firms or as a single financial institution 
recognised by the FA and the FFC as the official financial sponsor of the 
league. Its relationship with the clubs is then detailed out as part of the FFC 
structure. The rate at which they charge interest on credit to clubs could be a 
few percentage points below the market rate to ease the cost of credit to the 
clubs. The financial institution(s) benefit to the extent that they have a pool of 
clients whose business as a collective unit is less risky than dealing with them 
as individual clubs without guarantee (Zeller, 1998). 
 
Other members could include the National Sports Authority (NSA) whose stadia 
are used by clubs; and government who could make resources available to 
clubs through specific annual financial votes for footballing activities. The 
government vote could be money for use in youth and infrastructure 
development, which is known to improve sport participation amongst the 
general populace (Wicker, 2013); participation in CAF Inter-club competitions; 
or for the training of technical staff. Equipment suppliers who provide clubs with 
discounts could obtain ready markets for their products by joining the 
267 
 
clearinghouse, whilst payments due them are guaranteed by the FFC. 
GHALCA, which also lends them money occasionally, could also be considered 
as members.  
 
6.4.2 Independence of the FFC Board 
The FFC Board would be a quasi-judicial body with the power to punish, 
sanction, fine or award costs against any defaulting member of the 
clearinghouse. This is because without requisite commitment ability it no longer 
becomes useful (Sappington, 1994). Secondly, the term of office of the Board 
cannot also be shortened by any other body e.g. the Executive Committee, as 
this would weaken the commitment ability of the Board. However, it should be 
possible to remove members on ethical grounds, as there is the possibility of 
regulators occasionally abusing the discretion given them (Sparrow, 2000). The 
independence of the decision making bodies especially that of the FFC Board, 
ensures that decisions on club licenses and membership of the FFC are based 
on the principle of equality and devoid of conflict of interest (SFA, 2013; UEFA, 
2012b). 
According to Rodrik (2000) the institutions that are needed by a country are not 
independent of that country’s history. In the past, decisions of the judicial 
bodies of the FA could be set aside by the Management Board of the FA when 
it affects a Board Member’s club (Bediako, 2012). Thus to forestall its re-
occurrence, the decisions of the FFC Board should not be subject to review by 
the Executive Committee of the FA to ensure its independence and to avoid 
regulatory capture by the Executive Committee. This, however, is subject to the 
right of the aggrieved party to an appeal to the relevant appellate body set up 
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under the regulations, as even the most well-intentioned regulator might abuse 
its unfettered discretion (Veljanovski, 2010). 
The Board is to be appointed by the Executive Committee on the proposal of 
the FA President. This is to ensure that the Board derives its powers from the 
Statutes of the FA. However, to further ensure the independence of the FFC 
Board and to reduce the possibility of conflict of interest, members of the FFC 
Board cannot be members of the Executive Committee, judicial bodies, 
Standing Committee of the FA, or a staff of the FA, League or clubs.  
The probability of regulatory capture is a function of the quality of the human 
resources available to the regulatory institution. The professional competence 
of the members of the Board should not be in doubt and, as such, a greater 
proportion of the membership should be drawn from expertise in the field of 
banking, finance, law, accountancy, economics and auditing (see section 
4.4.1). The quality of the personnel on the Board would also serve as checks 
on individual members’ private motivations, as some regulators might have an 
interest in creating ‘inefficient regulations’ (‘red-tape’) in an attempt to extort 
rents from private firms (Schleifer and Vishny, 1994; de Soto, 1989;).  
 
The ability of the Board to perform its function of advocacy would also be 
determined by the respect the members command as individuals, and as a 
group, amongst their peers and government functionaries within their area of 
expertise. The need for membership with varied expertise and years of 
experience should be weighed with the cost of remunerating the members of 
the Board. The better the quality of the Board the more expensive it might be to 
get them to provide the needed services. 
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6.5  FUNCTIONS OF THE FFC FRAMEWORK 
Figure 6.1 provides a general overview of the functions of the regulator under 
the FFC framework. It shows that the FFC Board would regulate and monitor 
the activities of clubs whilst providing incentives and support services to 
achieve regulatory compliance. Thus the realised performance of the regulatee 
is compared with established targets and goals and the club is rewarded 
accordingly (Sappington, 1994). Examples of the functions that could be 
performed by the regulator are also given in the diagram. Figure 6.2 on the 
other hand has been adapted from the framework utilised by the German FA in 
the licensing of its clubs, but has been made relevant to the Ghanaian case by 
incorporating the concept of the FFC Board. It shows the licensing framework 
within the FFC. A detail discussion of the contents is provided below. 
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6.5.1 Licensing Clubs for Improved Financial Management 
This study proposes that the FFC Board would serve as the First-Instance-Body (FIB) 
for the Financial Criteria of the Club Licensing Regulations (Figure 6.1) with the FFC 
Manager and the FFC Office being the monitoring arm of the Board. To obtain a 
licence to take part in the professional league, all clubs would have to meet the 
minimum requirements defined under Criteria A and satisfy the conditions under 
Criteria B (see Appendix 11).   
 
Within the proposed FFC framework, the football club submits its application 
(together with the documents listed in Appendix 12) in respect of the Financial 
Criteria to the FFC Board (FFCB) which serves as the FIB in respect of the Financial 
Criteria only (see Figure 6.2). For purposes of licensing, the information in the 
Balance Sheet and the Profit and Loss Account submitted to the FFCB by the club 
shall conform to the line items stipulated in Appendix 13 and 14 respectively. 
Applications in respect of the Sporting, Legal, Infrastructure, Personnel and 
Administration Criteria are all submitted directly to the Licensing Committee, the First 
Instance Body (FIB). 
The Premier League Board currently accepts the financial statements, inspects the 
playing and training infrastructure, as well as office accommodation and equipment of 
clubs to determine their suitability to play in the league. The body, as currently 
constituted with representatives from some clubs, does not meet the eligibility criteria 
for independence as suggested by FIFA to function as the FIB nor serve as the 
FFCB as proposed by this study.  
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The suggestion is for the FFCB to only approve (POSITIVE) if the club satisfies 
all the minimum requirements of the financial criteria, and then the FFCB would 
be deemed to have ‘cleared’ the club in respect of the financial criteria. The 
application is forwarded to the FIB who has no further decision to make on the 
financial criteria. If the club satisfies all other criteria, the FIB issues an approval 
certificate to the club (Licensee) which then signs a License Agreement with the 
Licensor (GFA) promising to abide by the terms of the License. This could 
include allowing the Licensor or its assigns to regularly monitor the activities of 
the Licensee. 
 
If there are any outstanding issues that the club has to satisfy to meet the 
minimum financial criteria, the FFCB would have to reject (NEGATIVE) the 
application. The club could decide not to appeal the rejection of its application, 
in which case the applicant is refused the license for the season. Where an 
application is rejected by the FFCB, the applicant could file an appeal with the 
Appeal Body (AB) which would consider its appeal on its merit. The AB could 
either reject the appeal (NEGATIVE), in which case the license is refused; give 
an unconditional approval (POSITIVE); or a Conditional Approval (CA).   
 
Where an unconditional approval is given, the application is forwarded to the 
Licensor for a License Agreement to be signed with the club. Where a 
conditional approval is awarded by the AB, the License Agreement would 
specify the conditions that the club would have to abide by during the course of 
the license period. This could include payment of a fine or transfer bans as 
happens in UEFA (UEFA, 2012b). Where the AB rejects the application, the 
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club could ask for a review of the decision of the AB, in which case the AB 
would be re-constituted to consider the request. Failure to appeal the decision 
of the AB would result in the club being refused the licence for the said 
competition for that particular year. 
 
To bring it in line with the existing appeals process of the FA, where the Review 
Panel considers the club’s application to be unsatisfactory (NEGATIVE), the 
club should be refused a licence for the licence year, and there is no further 
right of appeal. The Review Panel could, however, set aside the original 
decision of the FFCB, and the Appeals Body if new and relevant information is 
provided by the club during the review process. Where the review by the AB is 
in favor of the applicant a license agreement is then signed by the applicant 
and the FA. 
 
In respect of the Other Criteria, the application is submitted directly to the FIB 
which reviews the documentation together with physical visits to the club’s 
offices, training facilities and stadium to be used for the season. The FIB could 
approve the application (POSITIVE), reject the application (NEGATIVE) or give 
a conditional approval. Where either an approval or conditional approval is the 
outcome of the review a license agreement detailing the terms of the approval 
is signed between the applicant and the Licensor.  
 
6.5.2 Providing Incentives for Compliance  
The FFC framework aims at improving the financial environment within which 
professional clubs operate by coordinating the player transfer payment system, 
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guaranteeing credit from financial institutions and others for the clubs, and 
coordinating funding from the youth and Infrastructure Development Fund 
(Figure 6.1). This process provides the incentive for clubs to improve on the 
financial management of their clubs, and for regulatory compliance (Feld and 
Frey, 2007).  
The proposal is for the FFC to establish a player transfer payment system, to 
replace the existing but ineffective informal debit and credit system of the FA. 
The effectiveness or otherwise of the existing structures is interrogated further 
in the next chapter. All player transfer agreements and payment schedules 
between members of the FFC have to be approved by the FFCB on the basis 
of the buying club showing proof of its ability to pay over the specified payment 
schedule period. This would be assessed by comparing information provided in 
its budget and cash-flow statement for the licence year with the audited 
accounts in the two years preceding the licence year. The comparison is made 
to ensure that the expected cash flows are consistent with the clubs previous 
financial performance. Clubs would be expected to explain any significant 
deviations, from previous years, in expected income. Clubs would not be 
allowed to purchase players within a particular transfer period if they do not 
show the capacity to pay when due, as a form of deterrence (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002). 
 
It is the proposal of this study that the FFC would also seek to coordinate the 
flow of financial resources from financial institutions that agree to be part of the 
clearinghouse: from the Football Association; other affiliates of the FA; and 
equipment suppliers. This is to help reduce the transaction cost involved in 
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dealing with each other, resulting from information asymmetry (Cornell and 
Reinganum, 1981).  
The loan arrangements between clubs and financial institutions, this study 
proposes, would have to be ratified by the FFC Board especially when the club 
seeks to collateralize its share of the rights payments to secure loans. The 
operations of a guarantee system would only be efficient if the FA ensures that 
monies due clubs from sponsorship and right sales are paid on time, as the 
interest repayments would be affected by the timeliness or otherwise of the 
revenue distribution system.   
The FA and its affiliates like GHALCA occasionally extend short-term, interest 
free credit facilities to clubs, especially those participating in CAF Inter-Clubs 
competitions. This is deducted at source from the clubs’ share of rights fees 
(see Appendix 9). The study’s proposal is for equipment suppliers, recognised 
by the FFC as members who provide sporting equipment to clubs on a hire-
purchase agreement, to be considered as creditors of the clubs. Also, loans 
beyond a certain amount of money, taken outside the operations of the FFC 
should be brought to the notice of the FFC. This is because these other loans 
potentially have an ability to limit a club’s capacity to repay its loans contracted 
within the clearinghouse. 
To ensure that Government’s financial resources, that are introduced to support 
club football based on the social importance of football, are utilised efficiently, 
the FFC should coordinate the payment of money from the Youth and 
Infrastructure Development Fund to be set up to provide funding for clubs who 
show a commitment to government’s ideal of youth development. Government 
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support to football clubs for youth and infrastructure development have been 
justified in countries such as France, Switzerland, Ireland and Portugal, on the 
grounds of the external social benefits generated by football clubs (Barros, 
2011; Bourke, 2011;  Mutter and Huber, 2011; Senaux, 2011).  The 
Government would provide an annual vote for youth development at the 
grassroots level through football. Football clubs who are able to show a 
commitment to youth development and provide the youth with employment are 
cleared to access funding from this fund. The Government could also provide 
support for clubs who are committed to providing the infrastructure for the 
training of the youth, be it training pitches or hostel facilities for the players of 
their academy. This would link government support to specified performance 
targets (Coggburn and Schneider; 2003).   
In summary the study considers these incentives as potentially being 
fundamental to the clubs conforming to the licensing regulations, given the 
particular circumstances of Ghanaian football. By coordinating player transfer 
payment system, providing guarantees for short term credit, and coordinating 
access to funding from government, the FFCB would be improving the financial 
environment facing clubs. 
 
6.5.3  Provide Financial Advisory Services to Clubs 
The licensing and monitoring process, which includes a review of the financial 
management systems of clubs, would result in recommendations made by the 
FFC Board in respect of the proper financial planning, control and management 
of clubs. The interactions between the FFC and the clubs would ensure that 
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clubs benefit from the suggestions made by members of the Board in a process 
of learning-by- association, as well as direct training. The repeat interactions 
between members of the Board and the clubs allows for escalation up and 
down the enforcement pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), utilising in this 
case, mostly positive incentives to achieve regulatory compliance. 
Regulation may become irrelevant if the intended targets cannot appreciate 
what the regulation requires them to do and how to do it.  In as much as the 
clubs would strive to appoint suitably qualified people to be responsible for the 
financial management of their clubs, in response to club licensing, it is 
important for the regulatory system to be seen to be improving the quality of the 
personnel responsible for the clubs’ finances. The FFC framework envisages 
training in financial planning, budgeting, financial analysis and issues of 
taxation in a program of continual education for club officials.   
The quality of the Board’s composition means that they are in a position to 
advocate for rule changes within and without the football industry for the benefit 
of the game. The Board could, for instance, suggest changes to the revenue 
distribution formula to ensure improved financial and sporting performance for 
majority of the clubs, and as such the level of competition in the league. The 
proposal is for the Board to also serve as an advocacy group on behalf of the 
clubs to lobby government to, not only to provide tax exemptions to operators in 
the football industry, but to also provide direct financial support for club football. 
The Board is in a position to analyse the effect of various government policies 
on the football industry based on the volume of information they have and the 
quality of their personnel, and make recommendations to government. 
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It could be argued that due to the independence from the Football Association 
and the clubs, Government is more likely to see the Board as being more 
objective in their argument for favourable policy changes, and may take them 
more seriously in their advocacy effort. 
 
6.5.4  Monitoring Financial Activities of Clubs 
Figure 6.3 provides a description of the monitoring framework. This study 
proposes that the FFCB be responsible for the monitoring of the financial 
management systems of the clubs and the implementation of the financial 
license conditions. The FFCB would engage the clubs in a continual process of 
documentation review over an agreed period during the licence year to ensure 
that licence conditions are being respected by clubs. The authenticity of clubs 
audited accounts could also be verified by spot checks done by officers of the 
FFCB. It is the increased interactions between the regulator and the regulatee 
that provides the best conditions for the movement up and down an 
enforcement pyramid using both positive and negative incentives (Ayre and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham, 2010; Oliver, 1980). Clubs are obliged by the 
proposed regulations to open up, on request, to recognised officers of the 
FFCB.  Failure to do so attract sanctions which may be pecuniary, and this 
would also be taken into account when the club applies for a license the 
following year.   
The License Manager (LM) would monitor the implementation of license 
agreement to ensure that licensees comply with the terms throughout the 
license year. The LM would monitor the implementation or compliance with the 
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conditions upon which a conditional license was issued by either the FIB (in 
respect of Other Criteria) or the AB (in respect of both Financial Criteria and 
Other Criteria). Where a licensee is found to be in breach of any of the terms of 
the license agreement a sanction that could include fines or transfer bans for 
the next season, could be imposed on the club effective the current period or 
the next licensing period. Licence withdrawal during the monitoring period 
resulting in clubs being thrown out of a league should not be encouraged as it 
would affect the sporting integrity of a league that has already commenced. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS  
The chapter discussed the FFC framework at the conceptual level by first 
discussing the key concepts of clearing-houses that are relevant to the study. 
These include the reduction in the risk of doing business with rival firms through 
the building of trust amongst member firms. This is achieved through 
information dissemination which helps to also reduce the cost and time involved 
in trading amongst rivals. The chapter also utilises the conclusions drawn from 
the previous chapters to develop the key aspects of the determinants of the 
scope, the function and the form of the proposed FFC framework.   
The key proposals include: providing incentives and support services for clubs 
to ensure compliance with financial licensing and monitoring requirements; 
guaranteeing the independence of the financial regulator through the quality of 
membership; introducing a more efficient player transfer payment system; 
providing advocacy and capacity training services for clubs; and setting up a 
fund to support their youth and infrastructure development activities. 
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The framework which has been developed at the conceptual level is now 
interrogated with the help of semi-structured, face-to-face interview sessions 
conducted with stakeholders of professional football in Ghana. Their responses 
are analysed in chapter 7 and the conclusions drawn are utilised to modify this 
conceptual framework into a fully-fledged model of financial regulatory 
framework for professional football in Ghana which is reported in chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FFC FRAMEWORK AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 
IN GHANA FOOTBALL  
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the existing framework for regulating 
the finances of Ghanaian professional clubs through the perspective of 
Ghanaian football’s key stakeholders. The focus is also to analyse the views of 
the stakeholders of Ghanaian professional football on the four main 
components of the FFC  framework to assess its applicability in Ghanaian 
football. Interviews were held with 16 Premier league officials, the FA 
President, the Chairman of the League Board and executives of GHALCA. The 
first section of the chapter discusses the need for financial regulation of football 
from the perspective of the research participants. The second section deals 
with the role of the FFC in financial disclosure and licensing in Ghanaian 
football, including the quality of the existing regulatory framework.  
The third and fourth sections discuss the stakeholders’ views on the incentives 
built into the FFC framework to ensure compliance with financial licensing 
requirements. The final part deals with stakeholders general impressions about 
the FFC framework’s applicability in Ghanaian professional football, and the 
expected implementation challenges to be dealt with. These discussions further 
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serve to provide an overview of the institutional environment and industry 
conditions within which the modified FFC framework is developed in Chapter 8. 
 
7.2  RATIONALE FOR REGULATION 
The interviewees had no doubts about the need for financial regulation even if 
they offered differing rationales for regulating clubs.  All club officials 
interviewed answered ‘yes’ when asked whether they believed it was necessary 
for professional clubs to be financially regulated, but with differing degrees of 
emphasis. 11 out of 16 club officials believed that the main rationale for the 
financial regulation of professional football clubs was to ensure their financial 
stability in consonance with the position taken by both FIFA and UEFA (Geey, 
2011).  
According to some of the club interviewees, clubs must remain financially 
stable to ensure that the financial interests of players, technical staff and other 
stakeholders are not jeopardised, whether through bankruptcy or an inability to 
meet their financial commitments. Such outcomes might generate negative 
externalities for other clubs, and debtors external to the operations of the clubs: 
‘---Somebody thinks that the money is his so he can do 
anything at all he likes with it. It is not so. You do anything 
at all you wish to do with it at the expense of something 
else and other people and it is not good. In this world we 
are inter-related---‘ 
         [WAS] 
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Some clubs also argued that employee and consumer protection are key 
reasons why the financial stability of a club should be ensured through 
regulation:  
‘---There is also the possibility that there would be inter-club 
or clubs and players kind of relationship. [This] may also 
create debtor-creditor issues which need to be addressed--- 
it may, by implication extend to the way that the finances of 
these clubs are managed--- ‘ 
        [KTK] 
The FA and the League believed that regulation is important for the marketing 
of the league to the general public, and more importantly to “Corporate Ghana”: 
‘---Regulations relating to the financial well-being of clubs 
are very, very necessary… to build public confidence so 
the public can rest assured that they are dealing with 
credible people---‘ 
         [FAP] 
The evidence from this study suggests support amongst stakeholders of 
Ghanaian football for a public interest rationale for regulation (Becker, 1983; 
Breyer, 1982; Feintuck, 2010; Stigler, 1971), especially in situations where 
Government agrees to financially support clubs.  According to some clubs 
proper financial regulation would ensure that the FA and government would 
both be confident enough to provide short term financial support for clubs for 
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youth and infrastructure development, and also for clubs requiring funding for 
participation in CAF Inter-club competitions. One respondent explained that: 
‘---If the FA regulates the financial activities of the clubs 
then they would be able to guarantee that if [it is giving] 
money for you to go to Africa, you are not going to misuse 
the money because at least [the Government] will have 
access in trying to control how the money is used---‘ 
        [AD] 
This seems to suggest that demand for regulation by the clubs is also based on 
their expectation of achieving some benefits from the regulatory process 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). This would then suggest a shift towards positive 
incentives to encourage regulatory compliance (Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010). 
The evidence from the interviews overall suggests that the main rationales for 
financial regulation are: 1) to ensure that clubs are financially stable and could 
operate as going concerns; and 2) to protect the sporting integrity of the league, 
mirroring the conclusions of Lammert et al. (2012), Llewellyn (1999) and 
Brunnermeier, (2009). Lammert et al (2012), for instance, argue that the need 
to protect the sporting integrity of a league contest through financial regulation 
may lie in the public good characteristics associated with the integrity of the 
league. This is because once there is a high level of integrity associated with 
the league no member could be prevented from benefitting from it. Also, all 
clubs in the league risk being tarnished if the behaviour of one club damages 
the integrity of the league. 
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The clubs argued, however, that in the absence of regulation from the FA and 
the PLB, not all clubs would be adequately motivated to invest in ensuring the 
production of this public good, i.e. the integrity of the league. This is because a 
sporting contest characterized by relegation from, and promotion to, a higher 
and more financially-lucrative league, naturally generates a ‘rat race’ (Akerloff, 
1970; Franck, 1995). Clubs attempt to outspend each other to acquire the best 
talents to ensure they win or maintain their league status, thus endangering the 
financial stability of clubs and by extension the integrity of the league as a 
whole (Lammert et al, 2011).  
Secondly, a high level of integrity of a league achieved through regulation 
motivates the Football Association to provide guarantees to clubs in their bid to 
raise private capital from the financial markets. Due to the inability of individual 
clubs to provide acceptable collateral to financial institutions for credit (see 
section 5.5.1), guarantees from the FA allows  clubs to have easier access to 
funding; a  critical ingredient for the financial stability and ultimate survival of 
clubs. The financial institutions also benefit in the sense that it reduces the cost 
of transacting business with the clubs, by reducing the risk of default by the 
borrowing firms (Allen, 1988).   
The evidence presented in this study suggests that the stakeholders of 
Ghanaian football appreciate the need for regulation of the financial activities of 
clubs, and that they would be receptive to the introduction of a financial 
regulatory framework that improves on the efficiency of existing systems.    
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7.3  FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND LICENSING 
This section deals with the quality of the existing financial regulations in 
Ghanaian professional football in terms of adequacy and enforcement, and the 
expected role of the FFC framework in improving its efficiency. 
 
7.3.1  Quality of Existing Regulation 
The quality of the regulation relates to the adequacy of the existing regulations 
in the GFA’s Rules and Regulations (GFA, 2010a) and Statutes (GFA, 2010b), 
discussed in chapter 1. It also relates to the ability of the regulator to enforce 
the relevant legislation within the existing framework. 
Adequacy of Existing Regulation 
Despite the existence of the regulations discussed in Chapter One, 14 out of 
the 16 clubs suggested that there is inadequate financial regulation in Ghana 
football with one club suggesting that:  
“---The current FA regulation is even vague. There is 
nothing like financial regulations---There is nothing like 
that---As compared to the Premier League in UK.  No! I 
don’t even think there is something like that---“ 
         [LIB] 
This is a view shared by both the GHALCA (interview with GHALCA), which 
described the regulations as inadequate, and also by the League: 
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“---What I want to stress … is that the financial regulations 
as far as our football in Ghana is concerned, [are] nothing 
to write home about.”   
        [PLB] 
The interviews suggest that Article 8(2) is the only one that comes readily to 
mind when clubs are asked about their knowledge of the financial regulatory 
laws in Ghana, due to the fact that the stated punishment for failing to submit 
financial statements under this Article is a sufficient deterrent to ensure 
compliance.  
The suggestion that there is inadequate regulation in the face of evidence 
discussed in section 1.2.3 suggests an apparent lack of proper communication 
of the various other pieces of legislation by the FA.  
 
Regulatory Enforcement 
The FA Board, on the other hand believed that there are adequate regulations 
to ensure the proper financial management of the clubs. Asked whether Article 
8 (2) and 40 (1) were adequate to ensure that clubs are financially regulated, 
the President of the FA suggested that: 
“---To be honest with you that alone would have been 
adequate except that the Football Association doesn’t do 
anything with the information the clubs provide---“ 
The FA argued that the Premier League Board, which is responsible for 
organising the professional league in Ghana, is rather ineffective in its 
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implementation of the existing regulation. The issue, according to the FA and 
also to some clubs, is concerned with a lack of implementation rather than the 
quantity of legislation available. This view is also shared by GHALCA: 
“---You can set standards --- [but] you just have to 
implement it. It is the implementation --- there could be 
rules, --- but then people will flout it---“  
        [GHALCA, 2] 
The ultimate responsibility for the implementation of football policy rests with 
the FA Board. The apparent shifting of responsibilities between the FA Board 
and the Premier League Board (PLB) in respect of which body is responsible 
for financial regulation apparently signals the possible presence of conflict in 
the governance structure of Ghanaian football. Whilst a certain level of conflict 
is needed within the organization to ensure that it does not stagnate (Byers et 
al., 2012), too much conflict and disagreement on policy implementation 
approach and effectiveness could prevent the FA’s progression towards 
achieving organizational goals.  Whilst in principle one could argue that the 
existing regulatory system is clearly defined, the apparent conflict between the 
FA and the PLB discussed above gives an indication that it might not 
necessarily be so in practice. 
The FA might also be failing to appreciate the inadequacies inherent in the 
regulations. While the PLB might be responsible for implementing the 
regulations, the structure of the PLB is such that the majority of its members 
come from clubs in the league, and as such, the clubs might seek to unduly 
influence the behaviour of the regulator. Hence, lack of enforcement might be a 
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sign of regulatory capture, in which case the regulator is not motivated to 
implement existing regulations (Becker, 1983; Tullock, 1967)  
Lammert et al. (2011) argues for enhanced regulatory intervention in a sports 
league in situations where there are higher degrees of collective revenues 
resulting from marketing of rights, league sponsorship and ticketing. In the 
Ghanaian Premier League, all media rights and league title sponsorship are 
centrally marketed by the FA on behalf of the clubs (see section 5.5.2). The 
revenue from match tickets is to a very large extent centrally distributed 
(section 5.3.1.3). However, the lack of emphasis from the FA on regulatory 
enforcement to ensure stability of the league suggests there is little evident 
support for the position of Lammert et al. (2011) in terms of Ghanaian football.  
 
7.3.2  Submission of Financial Statements  
The FA’s stated rationale for asking clubs to submit their accounts is to ensure 
that they satisfy the conditions of incorporation, as defined by the Companies 
Code:  
 ‘---The official Liquidations Act for instance--- requires 
companies to be liquid and if you are unable to pay your 
debts you are supposed to wind up. The Companies Code 
also requires you to present accounts every year to the 
Registrar General in order to determine your financial 
viability or sustainability---Those laws in the Companies 
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Code--- they apply automatically to any company 
incorporated under the Companies Code---‘         
        [FAP] 
The request for the clubs to submit accounts could be situated in the 
stewardship role played by accounting information, serving as a link between 
the owners/other stakeholders and the managers of the firm, in terms of its 
financial management (Gray et al, 1995; Sarpong, 1999). Sarpong and Gray 
(1989) argue that accounting information is the basis for the resolution of 
conflicts between a firm and its stakeholders, such as the owners and society in 
general (Freeman, et al., 2010) in respect of the firms’ finances.  However, in 
the absence of regulation to mandate firms to provide financial information, 
evidence suggests that firms are reluctant to disclose information useful to 
users (Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995; Sarpong, 1999). Morrow (2013) provides a 
list of users of club accounts to include: investors; lenders; employees; 
supporters; and Governing bodies, and suggests that each has a different use 
for club accounts.  
 
Some club interviewees believed that it is the FA’s financial support for the 
clubs through league rights revenue that gives the FA the right to request clubs 
to submit audited accounts. This perception might have arisen from the fact that 
the introduction of Article 8(2) into the FA regulations coincided with the start of 
the distribution of league rights revenue to clubs in Ghana: 
 “--- if the clubs had not been given monies by the GFA 
there was no way they could have regulated their 
accounts. But this time the FA has been able to help them 
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with some sort of sponsorship so they want to know at 
least how this sponsorship that is given to them is used---“  
         [ARS] 
Others also believed that the request for the submission of accounts is 
premised on a desire to show the corporate world that clubs are being run well, 
in order to attract further investment to the league, and to the clubs: 
“---since we want to get to professionalism where we 
expect corporate bodies to come and sponsor [us], those 
bodies would want to make sure that when they bring the 
sponsorship you’ll account for them or you would use 
them religiously---“  
        [ADU] 
Some clubs argued that the process of submitting financial statements as part 
of the regulatory requirements also allowed them to review their own financial 
performance and helped them with financial planning.  Some clubs, however, 
thought that too much emphasis has been placed on the submission of the 
audited accounts without sufficient reference to the rationale for the submission 
request:  
“---Honestly speaking--- it is about just submitting and to 
follow the procedure that you are required to go through. 
For all these years that’s what we’ve been doing---“ 
        [EDU] 
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Some clubs believed that the submission of the accounts is primarily cosmetic: 
clubs submit the accounts in order to be seen to be meeting the requirements 
for the award of license to play in the league. Hence, clubs are motivated by the 
desire to achieve legitimacy (Morrow, 2006); rather than meeting the objective 
of financial regulation, an opinion which is confirmed by League officials.  
It must be noted that the requirement to submit audited financial statements is 
reserved only for clubs in the Premier League, and does not extend to clubs in 
the lower divisions. This might be an acknowledgement on the part of the FA of 
the fact that most clubs in the lower divisions are not incorporated firms and 
thus, are not required by law to publish audited accounts. This might also be an 
attempt to engage in risk-based regulation (Black, 2005); as the FA might be 
considering the finance of the lower clubs to pose less risk to the stability of 
league football than their Premier league counterparts. Thus the requirements 
around financial disclosure are new to promoted clubs. Asked whether they 
previously had their accounts audited during their campaign in the Division One 
League one of the newly promoted clubs said: 
“--- No, no, no… we were not [writing up accounts]… we 
are [doing it] now… It was a ‘buga buga’ [unorganized] 
something… this time around the club wants to put 
everything right… maybe somebody would also want to 
invest---“        
        (AP) 
The evidence suggests that too much emphasis has been placed on the 
requirement for clubs to submit audited financial statements without focusing on 
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the effect of improved financial disclosure on the financial performance of clubs. 
In such a situation the financial statements no longer play their stewardship 
roles (Sarpong and Gray, 1988). There may also be a need over time to extend 
financial disclosure requirements to clubs in the lower divisions, albeit at a less 
rigorous level, in preparation for meeting financial licensing requirements in the 
top league. 
Not only are some clubs not submitting the accounts to the FA but they also do 
not submit copies of their audited accounts to the Registrar Generals’ office as 
part of the requirements for incorporated firms as stipulated in the Companies 
Code. A club official, who is also a member of the Executive Committee of the 
FA (interview with ASH), intimated that he was aware that several clubs failed 
to even meet their tax and social security obligations to the Ghana Revenue 
Authority and the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
respectively, with few consequences. This evidence suggests challenges with 
the effectiveness of these complementary control institutions, which limits the 
ability of the financial regulator in football to effectively implement a more 
focused set of regulation, rather than a very comprehensive and resource-
consuming one (Sappington, 1994). 
 
7.3.3  Review of Financial Statements 
The general opinion of the clubs was that beyond submitting the audited 
accounts to the FA through the League, little else happens: the submitted 
financial statements are not reviewed; hence findings are not discussed with 
the clubs; hence there are no recommendations to be implemented by clubs. 
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This is a point recognised by the FA President, who also owns one of the clubs 
in the Premier League:  
“--- (We at) [names club] … we just submitted our 
accounts today and we need to do that before the start of 
the season. But whether the PLB ... analyse the 
information is another thing---“ 
        [FAP] 
According to some interviewees, a review of the audited financial statements of 
the clubs is crucial to the proper functioning of any financial regulatory 
framework as otherwise the regulator would not know whether the club is doing 
the right thing or not:  
 “---We have to check the financials submitted by the 
clubs. Based on the financials, if we see that --- everything 
is perfect with the cash flows but the club is still struggling 
then you know that maybe you are not getting the right 
figures---“ 
       [CHE] 
The clubs’ conclusion that there is no review of the submitted accounts is 
based on the fact that they have either never had any feedback from the FA on 
their submitted accounts, and/or that they have not heard of the FA punishing 
any club for submitting a supposedly falsified account, as suggested in the 
interview with KTK. Ghanaian clubs might thus be behaving as ‘amoral 
characters’, firms who do not conform unless they believe non-compliance 
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would be detected and punished (Kagan and Scholz, 1984). Apparently a 
process that involves clubs having to defend the contents of their audited 
statement may serve as a warning to the clubs, in the form of general 
deterrence (Simpson, 2002), that their financials are being reviewed, and hence 
serve as a motivation for regulatory compliance: 
“---That’s what the law asked them to do [only submit 
audited accounts]. The law did not ask them to come and 
provide further explanations with their auditors---“ 
         [BA] 
The lack of review of the submitted accounts by the League and the FA 
confirms the conclusions of section 6.2, leading to clubs admitting to 
embellishing the financial statements they submit to the FA without expectation 
of their being reviewed (interview with ARS). There is, however, a general 
consensus amongst the clubs that as currently structured the PLB does not 
have the competence to undertake such a review: 
“---the financial statements are always embellished and 
you ask yourself if you even furnish the FA with your 
financial statements---let us all face facts--- do we have 
the requisite personnel to peruse these documents and 
ensure that clubs are adhering to [the disclosure 
requirements]---?“ 
         [TY] 
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According to the clubs there is also a lack of capacity within the FA to: ensure 
the efficient running of a player transfer payment system; ensure that league 
rights monies are paid to clubs on time (interview with ARS); ensure that 
financial regulations are implemented and monitored (interview with RTU); and 
provide capacity building support to clubs (interview with LIB).  
In an attempt to deal with its inability to review the submitted documents the 
PLB effectively sub-contract the financial review to the Auditor General’s 
Department (interview with HOO1). This would suggest an admission on its part 
of a lack of capacity within the organisation to conduct such financial reviews.  
The FA also acknowledged that the resources available to the League - human, 
financial and physical - may not be adequate, and this may explain their 
inability to review the submitted documents: 
“---I think we all took things for granted that maybe the 
PLB was well resourced to do the work [ensure financial 
regulation of clubs] and they would do it but I think they 
need guidance and we also need to resource them---“ 
         [FAP] 
Some of the clubs, however, argued that the lack of capacity of the League 
Board to function effectively is largely a function of the FA’s desire to appoint 
people on the grounds of political patronage, rather than on competence and 
proven efficiency, confirming the assertions of Fridy and Brobbey (2009). The 
issue of political patronage in Ghanaian football is well documented in Bediako 
(2012) and in Broere and Van Der Drift (1997). As one official suggests: 
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“---It all depends on the Executive Committee because 
ultimately they would appoint people--- so you don’t 
appoint your cronies. You select people you know have 
the wherewithal [the knowledge and professional 
competence] ---“ 
         [RTU] 
Other interviewees believed that the situation is a function of the institutional 
environment within which the PLB operates in relation to the FA:  
”--- The PLB must be semi-autonomous, and the PLB 
must be the one to enforce [the regulations] … to review 
such financial reports just like the UEFA are doing--- to 
ensure that everything that people bring [as financial 
statements] are genuine ---“ 
        [FAI] 
Rather than it being a case of not appointing competent people, it was also 
suggested that, the FA finds it difficult to attract the right calibre of personnel 
based on its remuneration structure (interview with KTK). This is consistent with 
the argument put forward by Bayle and Robinson (2007) that an inappropriate 
incentive mechanism could serve as an inhibiting factor in the operational 
performance mix of a national governing body (NGB): 
“---If the FA itself hasn’t got the capacity it has to rely on 
outsiders to do that. And the way I see the FA work--- a lot 
of it being done on voluntary basis --- it is possible that 
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you won’t get professionals who would be willing to 
provide that kind of expertise---“ 
         [KTK] 
The lack of suitably qualified individuals within the FA poses serious challenges 
to the efficient implementation of any financial regulatory framework in Ghana, 
as human capacity and competence are crucial ingredients in the proper 
functioning of any regulatory framework (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Sappington, 
1994).  
It is essential that such a review be undertaken, and by individuals with the right 
expertise and professional competence (see Sections 5.2). This is consistent 
with what is envisaged in other football regulatory systems notably the UEFA 
FFP regulations and the SFA CLRs (see Section 3.4). This explains why 
reviewing the financial statement is a key component of the FFC framework. 
 
7.3.4  Accounting and Auditing Standards 
The auditor’s opinions in the financial statements submitted by the clubs to the 
FA indicate that the accounts of the clubs are audited according to GNAS 
standards (see section 5.2.3). Yet, at the same time, interviewees were of the 
opinion that the veracity of information in the audited financial statements 
submitted by some clubs cannot be guaranteed (see sections 5.2 and 7.3.3).  
For example: 
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“---Even though clubs are enjoined to submit audited 
accounts the question is how true or how correct are 
these accounts presented? ---“ 
         [ADU] 
Ostensibly, the lack of review of financial statements (see section 7.3.3) has led 
to several instances of false accounting, improper auditing and the 
manipulation of financial figures by clubs. Indeed some clubs, behaving as what 
Kagan and Scholz (1984) referred to as ‘amoral characters’, admitted doing so 
because they knew that they would never be found out (interview with EDU)  
“---If I tell you that the financial statements that we furnish 
the FA are decorated, I know what I am talking about. 
Some clubs even submit the same financial statement---
Club A would submit financial statement, Club B would 
submit [and] the figures are the same but yet the clubs are 
different---“ 
         [TY] 
By reviewing the audited financial statements of the clubs for the year ending 
31st December 2010, it was evident that the respondent (TY) was referring to 
his own club and to club BC. It is clear that TY merely picked the soft copy of 
the financial statements of BC, changed the title to the name of TY’s club and 
then even signed on behalf of the auditor.  
There are also clubs which submit identical accounts year after year, simply 
changing the cover, something which was discovered by the FA President 
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when he decided to sample some of the audited accounts and also confirmed 
by another interviewee (interview with FAP): 
“---I know some clubs are doing the right thing… others 
are not doing it… we are in the same business so we 
know of clubs who will only take last year’s accounts, just 
alter the date, alter some few figures and present it---“ 
        [ASH] 
These assertions by the clubs confirm the conclusions made in section 5.2.2, 
that the content of some of the audited financial statements may not be 
credible, giving credence to the assertions by Nicholls and Ahmed (1995) that 
in the absence of adequate regulation and monitoring, firms are reluctant to 
disclose information required by their stakeholders.  
Given the evidence presented here, what is most surprising is that auditors of 
the clubs invariably indicate that the information supplied in the financial 
statements give a true and fair view of the financial position of the clubs. Hence 
the admissions by the clubs bring into question the professional credibility of 
the auditing firms that certify these accounts. As such the interviewees suggest 
that a review of the financial statements by an independent financial regulatory 
body, would determine which auditing firms’ opinion could be trusted. The FFC 
Board would serve as a ‘meta-regulator’ which would ‘audit the auditing 
processes of the clubs’ (Parker, 2002): 
“--- maybe it would get to a point [where] we have to 
recommend some specific firms that we are comfortable 
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with so that figures cannot be cooked --- in terms of the 
auditing--- [we only license auditing] firms we can trust 
that they would not condone any malfeasance [by clubs]---
“       [BC]  
The evidence here suggests the possible existence of collusion between the 
auditor, who in this instance serves as an agent of the club’s stakeholders 
(including the FA as the regulator), and the club’s management (the regulatee). 
They would be considered to be involved in active regulatory capture, i.e. hiding 
relevant information from stakeholders (Tirole, 1991, 1993). Such a situation 
would be solved by the introduction of active monitoring of the process of 
reporting and auditing the club’s audited financial statements which would have 
to conform to some football-specific requirements for the purposes of 
comparability. However, at present the Ghana FA has no specific reporting 
formats for clubs, as noted by one interviewee:  
“---There is one thing asking clubs to submit accounts. 
What kind of accounts? ---I think the first step should be 
developing the real benchmarks for financial reporting. 
Once that is developed, whoever is coming to assess 
whatever is submitted would then have a benchmark 
against which to evaluate whatever has been received---“ 
        [KTK] 
In the absence of financial reporting benchmarks set out as mandatory 
reporting requirements, Brunnermeier et al (2009) argues that clubs would not 
supply the requisite amount of information. In a situation where clubs fail to 
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meet mandatory reporting benchmarks the range of instruments available to 
any regulator would include sanctions (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Oliver, 
1980; Sappington, 1994; Simpson, 2002), amongst a wide range of other 
positive and negative incentives (Oliver, 1980). This is a point that finds support 
amongst the interviewees:  
“---They should be sanctioned… maybe I don’t want to 
talk about point deduction… [but] the sanction should be 
punitive enough to get people to respect it---“ 
[ASH] 
According to several interviewees, a combination of sanctions and continual 
monitoring, would lead to improvements in the credibility of the financial 
disclosure process:       
“---When we do that [review of financial statements] 
continuous for about two, three years --- in fact the system 
would stabilise and you would be sure [to know] that this 
auditor is credible, this one is reliable or [not]---“ 
      [ADU] 
The evidence in this section suggests that the accounts that some clubs submit 
to the FA do not reflect the true financial situation in the clubs, also bringing into 
question the credibility of the auditing firms that certify these accounts (see 
section 5.2). An effective financial regulatory framework would thus have to set 
the right financial disclosure benchmarks and sanction clubs that fail to conform 
to set reporting benchmarks. Auditing firms found to be condoning fraud in 
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financial disclosure could also be reported to the ICAG which retains the power 
to sanction their members.  
 
7.3.5  The FFC Framework and Financial Disclosure 
The FFC framework proposes to introduce a system of financial licensing along 
the lines required by FIFA, and being implemented for instance by UEFA, which 
is considered critical to improving the financial management of clubs. The club 
licensing component of the FFC framework is expected to improve overall 
governance in football according to some clubs. For example:  
“If you have a body which is watching you--- your financial 
operations it would keep you on track. It would keep you 
in check---“ 
[WAA] 
Table 7.1 gives an overview of the responses to six questions provided by the 
club representatives who were initially interviewed during the face-to-face semi-
structured interview process. This was part of the transcript validation process. 
Nine out of the 17 interviewees represented clubs which were more than 10 
years old, with the remaining eight clubs being 10 years old or less. Ten of the 
17 club representatives had a university degree or higher qualification. Of these 
13 had less than ten years as an administrator with a premier division club. 
Only four interviewees had been an administrator of a premier division club for 
more than ten years.  
Asked whether they believed that club licensing would improve financial 
regulation of clubs, only five out of the 17 were neutral, with the remaining 
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twelve agreeing to the proposition. All 17 clubs admitted that there are 
challenges to the financial management practices of their clubs.  
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Table 7.1: Number of Responses of Clubs and Regulators to Validation Questions 
Question Age of Club Level of Education Type of Respondent Experience of  
Respondent 
>10 years ≦10 years Non-
Graduate 
Graduate Club Regulator >10 years ≦10 years 
Existing Regulations Adequate 
     Strongly Disagree 
     Disagree 
     Neutral 
 
6 
2 
1 
 
2 
6 
 
2 
4 
1 
 
6 
4 
 
8 
8 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
2 
 
5 
7 
1 
Clubs Financially Well-Managed 
     Strongly Disagree 
     Disagree 
 
6 
3 
 
4 
4 
 
3 
4 
 
7 
3 
 
10 
7 
 
3 
 
2 
2 
 
8 
5 
Club Licensing will improve Regulation 
     Neutral 
     Agree 
     Strongly Agree 
 
2 
6 
1 
 
3 
3 
2 
 
1 
3 
3 
 
4 
6 
 
 
5 
9 
3 
 
 
1 
2 
 
2 
1 
1 
 
3 
8 
2 
FFC will improve Financial Mgmt. 
     Agree 
     Strongly Agree 
 
2 
7 
 
2 
6 
 
 
7 
 
4 
6 
 
4 
13 
 
 
3 
 
1 
3 
 
3 
10 
FFC will improve Financial Governance 
     Agree 
     Strongly Agree   
 
1 
8 
 
1 
7 
 
1 
6 
 
1 
9 
 
2 
15 
 
1 
2 
 
1 
3 
 
1 
12 
FFC will improve Accountability  
     Agree 
     Strongly Agree 
 
3 
6 
 
3 
5 
 
2 
5 
 
4 
6 
 
6 
11 
 
 
3 
 
2 
2 
 
4 
9 
Total 9 8 7 10 17 3 4 13 
Only a response type that had at least one person providing it as an answer to a question are shown. Full range of options were: a) 
strongly agreed; b) agreed; c) were neutral; d) disagreed; or e) strongly disagreed 
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Thus with 18 out of the 20 respondents suggesting that the existing regulation 
is inadequate to provide proper financial governance to clubs, it is not difficult to 
see why the FFC framework received such high approval rating. All the 
respondents admitted that the introduction of the FFC framework would 
improve accountability within the clubs (see Table 7.1). In addition, the 
respondents representing the three regulators i.e. the FA, the PLB and 
GHALCA all strongly believed that the implementation of the FFC framework 
would bode well for accountability within clubs.  
However, the interviewees in the face-to-face sessions believed that the 
success of the financial licensing body would be dependent on the quality of 
personnel serving on the board, as this would be vital in reducing the probability 
of regulatory capture (Becker, 1983). According to one interviewee who is also 
a member of the Premier League Board, a quite different committee is required 
for the review of the financial statements, one that requires having its positions 
filled with professionals (interview with ADU). 
The evidence here suggests that providing a regulatory framework that 
incorporates a process of financial licensing and implementation monitoring, 
and which places specific requirements on clubs and the regulator in terms of 
financial disclosure, would certainly enhance the quality of financial reporting. 
Such a framework would provide stakeholders with the tools to make informed 
decisions (Barrow, 2011) in their relations with the clubs and the league.   
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7.3.6  Summary 
There is a general acceptance by the clubs, the FA and the League that the 
financial statements submitted by the clubs to the FA in conformity with Article 
8(2) are not subjected to review. This gives the clubs very little motivation to 
ensure that the contents of the submitted documents are credible. According to 
the clubs, this arises due to a lack of capacity within the FA, something which 
would require external expertise if there is to be an improvement.  It is further 
argued that the inability, or apparent unwillingness, of the FA to appoint people 
with the requisite skills and competences to run the League generates 
inefficiencies in policy implementation by the PLB. This in turn creates 
challenges for the FA, which is perceived as being ineffective in achieving its 
organizational goals. 
The discussions also show there is a general appetite amongst the FA and its 
stakeholders for the introduction of financial licensing as part of an FFC 
framework in which the regulator reviews the financial statements of clubs on 
an annual basis. The review is done to ensure that clubs conform to set 
information disclosure standards, and that they do not have any overdue 
payments to other clubs, the FA, tax and social security authorities and 
employees, including players. The review could also lead to an assessment of 
the financial viability of the football clubs in the league, hence allowing the 
regulator to provide the necessary advisory services to the clubs concerned.  
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7.4  REGULATED ACCESS TO FUNDING 
A key objective of the FFC framework is to ensure the easing of financial 
constraints within the environment in which Ghanaian clubs operate. This 
section discusses the views of the clubs on the provision of regulated access to 
credit for clubs, suggested in the FFC framework, as a mechanism to achieve 
compliance with financial licensing requirements.  
 
7.4.1  Funding from Financial Institutions and Government 
This section discusses the challenges faced by Ghanaian clubs in accessing 
credit from financial institutions, and the role envisaged to be played by the 
FFC in easing the financial constraints faced by clubs.   
 
Access to and Cost of Credit 
Ghanaian clubs face key challenges in accessing funding for their activities 
(see section 6.5). According to clubs, the critical period during which clubs are 
actively seeking support from financial institutions is the three-month period 
between the end of one league season (end of June) and the beginning of the 
next season (early September). According to one interviewee: 
“---Before the league starts you are supposed to pay your 
players but they would not be earning any income for you. 
You are supposed to recruit new players and where is the 
money? So if you get a bank that in the lean season 
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would be able to help you at least with soft terms it would 
help---“ 
        [ARS] 
The two main types of financial institutions utilised by clubs as sources of 
funding are banks and discounts houses. The clubs complained about the 
difficulty they face in utilising discount houses such as NDK Financial Services 
as a source of short term finance due to peculiarities of income flow for 
Ghanaian clubs (interviews with HOL and ARS) (see section 5.5). According to 
the clubs, the finance houses would readily provide the credit facility as long as 
the club obtained a guarantee from the FA that the club’s share of the league 
rights income would be used directly to pay off the loan. The FA president 
explained that: 
“---The NDK is a non-bank financial institution set up to 
provide short-term funding to some kinds of business. 
[Ghanaian] football is not the type of business that you 
can use short-term funds to finance [because of 
challenges with flow of income]. So you go there and the 
interest is charged on a monthly basis. Maybe eight 
percent per month times ten months is maybe 80%. By 
the time you get your sponsorship money you are unable 
to pay your debt. The interest is too much---“ 
This is emphasised by another interviewee who explained the choice they have 
to make and the collateral utilised: 
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“---We have seen that most of the clubs have gone to 
NDK and it has not helped them. It has even been a drain-
-- we [my club] borrow at the commercial rate, with the 
banks. We don’t use the finance houses and others 
because it is too expensive --- We have used the banks 
when we do a receivable bank transaction with the bank 
[using the GLO sponsorship income]…then we assign 
those receivables to the banks “ 
        [FAI] 
In such a process, the FA provides the banks with a guarantee that the club’s 
share of league rights income would be paid directly to the bank to defray the 
loan. This is because most clubs lack the assets and a reliable revenue stream 
(see section 5.5) to be utilised as collateral to access commercial credit.  
“---The main sponsor [of the league] is not prompt with the 
payment [of rights fees]. So [a loan from financial 
institutions] is one of the main avenues that we can use to 
mitigate the delays in payment---“ 
        [FAI] 
The clubs insisted that the FA should not withdraw its guarantee for clubs. They 
argued that the financial difficulties they faced were as a result of the FA’s own 
inadequacies. The FA indicated its recognition of the challenges and had 
begun the process of formally convincing a group of financial institutions to 
provide funding to clubs at lower than market interest rates (interview with 
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FAP). The FA would guarantee the payments to the clubs by the banks using 
the expected league rights revenues: 
“---If it materializes the maximum interest [to be charged 
by the bank] is 29% per annum. And it would be a better 
way than going to NDK --- and the other thing is that I 
explained to the bank that they should not expect 
immediate repayment. We receive two tranches --- 
payments are broken into two for a year. ---Sometimes it 
can go beyond that. So they should structure a facility that 
would require payment in one year---“ 
[FAP] 
This would suggest that even the negotiated interest rate was six percentage 
points higher than the 91-day treasury-bill rate as at September, 2012 when the 
interviews were conducted (see Figure 1.2), confirming the high cost of credit in 
Ghana. Most clubs also argued that where clubs are in financial difficulties, 
such that failure to raise short-term finance would lead to their collapse during 
the course of a league season, they should be supported by the FA and 
GHALCA, provided there is a source of repayment (interview with FAI). This, 
they argue would give true meaning to the attempt to ensure the stability and 
integrity of the league (Lammert et al, 2012); the basis of any financial 
regulatory framework for football (FIFA, 2010; UEFA, 2012a; SFA, 2013).  
The clubs also argued that other challenges to the financial health of the clubs 
include: the declining attendances that have resulted from the drop in quality of 
competitions as the best players migrate abroad (Darby, 2010); the lack of 
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proper marketing of the league by the FA and the PLB (interview with FAI, KTK, 
ASH); and the emergence of televised English Premier League and the 
Spanish La Liga games as rivals for the fans’ attention (interview with HOO, 
GHALCA, HOL).    
The FFC and Access to Commercial Credit 
The FFC framework seeks to utilise the removal of some of the barriers to clubs 
accessing credit as one of the incentives for clubs to comply with the financial 
licensing requirements. The provision of incentives is known to encourage 
managers, for instance, to disclose adequate information about their companies 
(Narayanaswamy, 1996; Sarpong, 1999); a key objective of the framework. 
Thus, the clubs argued, the implementation of the FFC Model would foster 
industry development and investment by helping clubs access credit, and would 
be the best thing that has happened to Ghanaian football: 
“---The finances of a club happen to be the heartbeat of 
the club. You have not just introduced monitoring but you 
also want to make sure that [the FFC Board] gives advice 
and makes sure that they even create avenues for people 
[clubs] to get the resources---“ 
[MED] 
“---Yes, somebody is guaranteeing for you to go and take 
money from somewhere and that same person is saying 
that when you take the money I want to make sure that 
315 
 
you use the money for the right thing--- so I think it [ 
financial licensing] is in order---“ 
[ADU] 
“---if they start getting benefits like the [FFC] body helping 
you to source funds; the body trying to tell you that when 
you do things this way these are the benefits that you 
would get, they would try to make sure that they do it 
[conform to licensing] in order to get the money to run 
their clubs ---“ 
        [MED] 
Summary 
There is overwhelming support for the FFC framework’s objective to ensure 
regulated access to credit for clubs. In general, the majority of the clubs do not 
have assets that could be easily utilised as collateral and that explains why 
most of the clubs still utilise the services of the discount houses despite the 
high cost (see Section 5.5.1). It also explains why overdrafts are the preferred 
type of credit from banks (section 5.5.1). The clubs argued strongly that the FA 
should not withdraw the guarantees they offer to clubs who wish to obtain loans 
from financial institutions as the clubs cannot raise collateral on their own. The 
need to obtain the loans, the clubs argued, arises out of the FA’s inability to pay 
league rights fees on time.  
The attempt by the FA to convince a group of financial institutions to provide 
funding to clubs at rates lower than market rates is laudable. Its success, 
however, depends on the FA’s ability to demonstrate to the financial institutions 
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that it regulates its members, and that its clubs have sufficient receivables to 
allow them to pay back their debts. By providing the financial institutions the 
guarantees required on behalf of its clubs, the FA would be encouraging 
regulated access to credit by its clubs.  
 
7.4.2  Access to Government Funding 
The FFC framework includes the creation of a Youth and Infrastructure 
Development Fund, with funding from government sources, from which clubs 
which show practical support for youth development could be provided funding. 
Despite the long-held believe that Ghanaian clubs do not want government to 
interfere in the administration of club football (Bediako, 2012), the clubs believe 
that there is a crucial role for government in the financial regulatory framework, 
especially if it involves providing funding to clubs. One club however, drew 
attention to the difficulties in justifying government support for private sports 
clubs as noted in other countries (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997), suggesting that: 
“--- because the clubs have their own ownership structure 
that is the reason it would be difficult for Mr Government to 
maybe use state funds to support this---[for example] if the 
club is owned by just an individual then Mr Government is 
[seen as] giving money to that individual---“ 
        [CHE] 
However, the majority of clubs argued that football plays a very important social 
role in Ghana (Panneborg, 2010), and this could justify government financial 
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support to clubs. According to club interviewees, such support for private clubs 
is acceptable on the grounds of the external social benefits generated by the 
clubs in terms of youth employment, and a general support for the youth 
development policy of the government: 
“---Government has got a policy for the youth--- to take the 
youth from the streets. The football clubs are private 
sector [organisations] but they have taken most of the 
people off the streets. But for the clubs all these people 
[the players] would be roaming on the streets and they 
would be a nuisance---I mean doing deviant behaviours 
and all these things---“ 
        [ARS] 
Such arguments are the basis of similar support that exists in other countries, 
including France (Senaux, 2011) where the products or activities engaged in by 
football clubs are considered a public good. Elsewhere, for example, 
Portuguese clubs receive subsidies from state and municipal governments 
(Barros, 2006); the Brussels capital government in Belgium subsidises clubs 
with Brussels in its name (Dejonghe and Vanderweghe, 2006); whilst in Ireland 
clubs receive direct financial support from the government in an attempt to 
promote participation in team sports among youngsters for health reasons 
(Bourke, 2011). 
Some club interviewees argued that they also train and provide exposure to the 
players who in due course represent various national teams, whose exploits in 
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turn are a source of image enhancement for the country (interviews with ARS, 
HOO) (Hallmann et al, 2013):  
“---(As for) government funding I am always for it because 
I think that even though individuals are investing from their 
own pockets and other things, the government benefits a 
lot …in terms of exposure---“ 
        [ADU] 
Consequently, they argued for government support for clubs taking part in CAF 
inter-clubs competitions, suggesting that this is the case in other African 
countries. As one club noted, participation in the CAF inter-club competitions is 
not financially attractive based on a private cost-benefit analysis (interview with 
KTK). Another club offered a solution: 
“---So I will suggest that in future the FA should sit down 
maybe in collaboration with the government and maybe 
set up [a fund]---  if government budgets for US$ 1 million 
every year [for clubs] --- it’s not too much. Every club 
takes US$250,000 as seed money to start the African 
campaign---“  
(ADU) 
According to the clubs, the activities of football clubs also help to reduce 
conflict; an essential ingredient for national development and is a commodity 
greatly sought after by policy makers, and one which policy makers need to 
contribute to its attainment: 
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“---it should not be mere rhetoric--- that football is the 
passion of the nation. How much are you contributing to 
that passion of the nation---that exercise that brings the 
country together for at least two, three days--- so that you 
the politician would also have your peace?---“ 
         [ASH] 
Some interviewees suggested that the government support should come in the 
form of a grant instead of a revolving fund, something which was abolished 
years ago when clubs failed to pay back the loans. Expected beneficial effects 
were also identified: 
“---Am sure that it [government support] would motivate 
the clubs to do very well, and if they do very well it would 
also reflect on our national teams because clubs would be 
ready to buy quality and train them. Even if they don’t buy 
they would be ready to invest, put up infrastructure to train 
players---“ 
         [ADU] 
Some interviewees argued that financial support from Government or the FA to 
a club should be contingent on the club satisfying the financial licensing 
regulations within the FFC framework, and having in place an effective financial 
management system to ensure that the resources are put to good use. An 
improved financial regulatory structure, one official argued, would provide the 
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conditions under which good behaviour was rewarded, encouraging more clubs 
to act responsibly (interview with ADU).  
On the other hand, Government support through the operation of the FFC 
framework was also seen as a crucial incentive for clubs to conform to financial 
licensing regulations. As such the clubs argued for a role for Government in the 
operation of the FFC to ensure the transparent use of the resources it provides 
(interview with ADU, ASH and DWA): 
“---And  I think that with the advisory body as you are 
suggesting maybe the government would be well informed 
about how things are being done and about how 
transparent the kind of system that we have in place now 
and from that angle you can also convince them to draw 
them into [funding] it [clubs]---“ 
[HOO] 
“---If it [the FFC Board] is a three member body, [then it 
requires] one person from the government and two from 
the FA ---“ 
[ADU] 
In general, it could be argued that the request by Ghanaian clubs for 
Government support is common in other African countries, and in Europe, even 
when the FA is independent of government. For example, the Swiss FA 
receives both direct and indirect public support annually which allows it to 
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provide funds to clubs which engage in observable youth development (Mutter 
and Huber, 2011).  
 
7.4.3  The Player Transfer Payment System 
This section discusses the interviewees’ opinions about the proposed 
introduction of a player transfer payment system within the FFC framework 
designed to improve the flow of income to and from clubs.  
The Existing Practice in Player Transfer Payment 
As a source of internally generated funds, domestic player sales are a key 
source of private funding for a lot of clubs. It was argued, however, that there is 
no proper way of tracking player transfer payments amongst clubs, leading to 
overdue player transfer debts (interview with TY). These overdue payments 
compel some clubs to look for credit facilities from the financial institutions while 
they wait for their counterparts to pay them. The FA introduced an informal 
player transfer payment system where the credits in favour, and debits against, 
a particular club are settled from that club’s share of league rights revenue.  The 
League officials used examples from two clubs to show how the informal 
system works, but also to highlight the challenges it faces:  
“--- [For example] Kotoko will tell Lions ‘look we don’t have 
the money at the moment so when we get our 
sponsorship purse [money] we will be able to pay’. So 
then they go into an agreement and decide that any time 
the [league] sponsorship money comes through, it - 
322 
 
[Kotoko’s] - share should be used to pay Lions so much. 
They would sign the contract and send it to the FA. As to 
whether the FA accountant has got all the details by just a 
click of a knob on his computer or whatever, to be able to 
ascertain that these are the outstanding [debt owed by 
Kotoko] to Lions and for which reason whenever monies 
comes this should done--- this is another issue---“ 
[PLB] 
The FA admits that challenges do exist with the current system and even 
threatened to suspend the process:  
“---There is no organized system for it and so everyone 
does whatever he likes… They buy 20 players --- let say 
the players may be worth two hundred thousand and your 
GLO money is a hundred thousand. The money comes 
and then the FA is caught in a web. You don’t know who 
to pay first ---“ 
         [FAP] 
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the debt-clearing system has helped many 
clubs purchase players on credit, helping them to better manage their cash 
flow. Thus it is not surprising that the clubs are against the abolition of the 
informal player transfer payment system, citing FIFA’s Transfer Matching 
System (TMS) as an example of a player transfer payment tracking system that 
works efficiently (interview with FAI and LIB). The evidence thus suggests that 
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the current system is inefficient, with clubs buying players even when they 
know they do not have the resources to pay (interview with BC). One club 
argued, however, that the FA is only interested in the documents covering the 
transfer and not in how the payments are settled (interview with TY).  
The volume of cases dealt with annually by the Player Status Committee of the 
FA annually in respect of breach of the financial terms of player contracts is a 
clear manifestation of the problem (GFA, 2011). This could be argued as 
contrary to the principle of fair play: clubs are able to win matches that are 
beyond their true financial capabilities. This could also be likened to ‘financial 
doping’ (Hamil and Walters, 2010). The clubs therefore argued for the 
introduction of a formal internal transfer payment system (see example, 
interview with FAI). 
The FFC Framework and Player Transfer Payment 
The clubs stressed that overdue payments from domestic player transfers were 
a major problem for Ghanaian clubs, especially the smaller ones which are net 
transferors (for example, interview with FAI). They were in favour of the 
implementation of a financial licensing system that incorporated a player 
transfer payment system, such as the one proposed by the FFC framework:  
“---These [transfer payment system] are some of the 
things that I expect the association would have to do. So 
that --- for domestic transfers… people would not even 
accumulate debt. If you know that you have to pay 20,000 
[ Ghana Cedis] within the next thirty days, you will budget 
in such a way that when you are buying players you will 
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look at what you have and what you can pay within a 
certain period before you do the negotiation. “ 
        [ADU] 
It was also argued that the ability to buy players on credit due to the operations 
of the FFC player transfer payment system, on its own is an incentive to comply 
with the financial licensing regulations (interview with HOL). On the other hand, 
the financial licensing system proposed by the FFC framework could also help 
the player transfer payment system:  
“---If your particular account shows deficits [then] it would 
be difficult to contract another player--- How are you going 
to pay? The truth is that once they are reviewing the 
financial statements these things (overdue debt) would not 
even arise---“ 
        [LIB] 
The introduction of the player transfer payment system is a concept that the FA 
is not against (interview with FAP), as the FA appreciates that the accumulation 
of debt from player transfers has the potential to threaten the long-term survival 
of the buying club. It would be an attempt to control an aspect of the 
interactions amongst firms (Sappington, 1994). One club, however, believed 
that whilst the role the FFC Board plays in ensuring that clubs do not have 
overdue debts is a good thing, having debts should not be a major problem so 
long as the two parties involved could renegotiate the debt when due (interview 
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with Kotoko). This arguments mirror the position of UEFA which repeatedly 
argues that the UEFA FFPRs are not anti-debt (Bell, 2011). 
 
7.4.4  Summary  
Ghanaian clubs face major challenges in accessing funding from financial 
institutions. Whilst the main challenge to obtaining credit from the discount 
houses is the cost of credit, raising the collateral guarantee is crucial to 
obtaining credit from the banks. That is the reason why clubs argue that the FA 
should not withdraw the guarantees they offer to clubs which wish to obtain 
loans from financial institutions. The attempt by the FA to convince a group of 
financial institutions to provide funding to clubs at rates lower than market rates 
is also considered laudable and is the type of initiative that falls within the 
general incentives proposed by the FFC framework. 
In general the clubs argued for government support based on the perceived 
benefits enjoyed by society from football’s production process including 
employment creation, reduction in conflict, development of sporting talent for 
national teams, and the enhancement of the national image in international 
sporting circles; essentially a public good argument. The evidence also 
suggests that the existing player transfer payment system is inefficient and that 
Ghanaian football requires a player transfer payment system similar to that 
proposed within the FFC framework. However, the FA would require an 
injection of resources, both financial and human, to be able to efficiently run 
any system of player transfer payment. 
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7.5  FINANCIAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND POLICY ADVOCACY 
This section focuses on the need for capacity-building for clubs and the role of 
the FFC framework in achieving this. 
 
7.5.1  Financial Capacity within Clubs  
Millar and Stevens (2012) have argued that training is necessary for the 
improvement of performance and learning of individuals within an organisation. 
The need for a capacity-building program for clubs is evidenced in clubs’ 
admission that they lacked adequate resources to ensure that their financial 
management systems run efficiently. In the opinion of the clubs there is 
demand for the FA or its agents to build the financial capacity of clubs, as they 
do not even have the capacity to appreciate the import of the financial contracts 
they sign:  
“--- the clubs themselves must have the capacity [but they 
don’t] ---many of them operate from the bedrooms of their 
owners. There are really no proper administrative set up 
[in most clubs] …“ 
        [KTK] 
Despite the obvious lack of adequate capacity within clubs, the FA has no 
existing program to provide financial advisory or training services. This, 
according to some clubs, is because the FA itself does not have the resources, 
financial or human, to provide the necessary advisory service or training 
programs: 
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“---It [capacity-building program] does not exist--- don’t 
waste your time--- it does not exist. You have to be very 
honest. It does not exist. Where? Maybe now we are 
trying something like that but currently it does not exist---“ 
        [LIB] 
Some clubs suggested that a financial licensing system which not only reviews 
financial statements but also incorporates training and advisory services to the 
clubs (interview with ADU and HOO), along the lines suggested by the FFC 
framework is very necessary:  
“--- [training in financial management] is very, very 
important. You don’t presume you know everything and 
we all learn every day. So if there is a program to improve 
our knowledge in everything --- that is something that is 
long overdue. We have to get people to train us on all 
those things---“ 
[ARS] 
This is in tune with the key characteristics of a clearing house that involves 
licensing members for participation, regulating and monitoring their activities, 
and the provision of incentives and support services to ensure regulatory 
compliance (Acharya et al, 2008; Goodhart, 1988; Long et al, 1993; Zimmeren 
et al, 2006).  The FFC framework is considered by the clubs as providing the 
necessary instruments to provide capacity building programs to the clubs which 
are currently lacking and also improve on their level of professionalism. For 
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example, one club discussed the importance of the role expected to be played 
by the FFC Board which oversees the implementation of the proposed FFC 
framework:  
“---You did not just introduce, let’s say, the monitoring but 
you also want to make sure that [the FFC Board] gives 
advice ---and for me it would grow clubs. It would also 
help clubs to really develop in a certain way--- a more 
professional way than just growing because am winning 
leagues---“ 
         [MED] 
According to one club official, the FFC Board could, for instance, provide 
directions as to which financial institutions a club should deal with when they 
require financial assistance (interview with ARS).  
The process of implementing the club licensing system would also require that 
the capacity of the club staff is developed (Millar and Stevens, 2012) by the 
FFCB to allow them to appreciate the requirements of the licensing system:  
“---It’s [provision of financial advisory services] very 
crucial… we need to involve the stakeholders, to 
capacitate them --- that would mean taking them through 
a training and development process that would make 
them capable of implementing whatever the clearing-
house is trying to do---“ 
        [TY] 
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Even where the clubs employ qualified personnel to fill financial management 
positions, the need for a process of continuing in-service training on relevant 
financial issues cannot be over-emphasised; something which is also argued by 
FIFA. 
 
7.5.2  Policy Advocacy within the FFC  
Some interviewees believed that given the lack of capacity within both the FA 
and the clubs, an independent body of experts should relate to policy makers 
as advocates on behalf of the clubs: 
“---If the clubs are confident that the FFC has got the men 
who can negotiate with government --- then there is a 
need for us to leave it [to them] so that they can sit down 
with the government. They have the expertise, they have 
the knowledge, and they have the know-how. They can 
convince the government. I mean the clubs --- we cannot 
do everything--- “ 
         [ARS] 
This independent body of experts working along the lines proposed by the FFC 
framework (see section 6.5.3) would, it is argued, be in a better position than 
the clubs themselves to relate to policy makers on policies that have either 
direct or indirect impact on the financial management of clubs such as stadium 
rental charges, taxation, and duty exemptions on the importation of sports 
goods (see section 4.4). 
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7.5.3  Summary 
The evidence suggests that there is a lack of adequate capacity within the 
clubs and the FA to ensure that clubs integrate efficient financial management 
practices into their operations. The clubs believe that even the process of 
implementing the club licensing system would require that the capacity of the 
club staff is enhanced in terms of financial management, to allow them 
appreciate the requirements and benefits of the licensing system. The human 
resource base of the FA is also limited, and as such the introduction of an 
expert body in the form of the FFC Board into the financial regulatory arena has 
the potential to greatly enhance the capacity of football’s stakeholders in 
Ghana. 
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7.6  INTERROGATION OF FFC FRAMEWORK 
This section focuses on the views of the stakeholders on the overall 
applicability of the FFC framework in Ghanaian football and the implementation 
challenges that need to be dealt with to ensure its success.  
 
7.6.1  General Impressions 
There was overwhelming support from interviewees that the implementation of 
the FFC framework would improve on the existing financial governance 
systems in Ghana football: 
“---The model is super, fantastic---and me as a person am 
looking forward to that---“ 
        [EDU] 
“---if you have a body which is watching you, your 
financial operations it would keep you on track. It would 
keep you in check---“ 
[WAA] 
“---I’m so much in love with the first aspect (access to credit) ---“ 
       [HOL] 
All clubs were in favour of its implementation and complimentary about the 
proposed model, suggesting, for example: that it was long overdue (ASH); 
would solve the concerns of the clubs over financial management (DWA); and 
that it was essential it be given the necessary support to succeed (TY). 
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The general impressions of the interviewees can perhaps best be summed up 
by the comments of one respondent who suggested that: 
“---I believe this is a wonderful idea. I don’t see any 
existing body of the FA that can do what you are talking 
about. This is a whole new thing because there is nothing 
here that already exists. There is nothing here. There is 
nothing like any financial body already in place. This is a 
very wonderful innovation that must be commended and 
must be accepted and approved---“ 
[LIB] 
7.6.2  Form of the FFC Framework 
Some interviewees agreed that the ability of the regulatory body to achieve its 
defined objectives would depend to some extent on the quality of the human 
resources at the disposal of the regulator, which affects its independence 
(Baldwin and Black, 2008; Sappington, 1994). For example: 
“---One thing that I also like is the professional 
background of the members of the committee. It would 
help clubs even to be more innovative since they want to 
make sure that they keep their license---One thing I like 
about it is that they are independent so that they cannot 
be influenced by any club or even the FA itself---“ 
        [MED] 
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The argument here is that with a high quality staffing of the regulator, it would 
not be easy for a club to engage in fraudulent accounting without being found 
out. The interviewees argued that the regulator’s ability to maintain its 
independence from the clubs and the Football Association, and to limit the 
possibilities of regulatory capture (Boehm, 2007), is crucial for winning the 
confidence of the clubs and even government (for example, interview with LIB). 
Government would also be more comfortable providing funding if the regulator’s 
independence could be guaranteed. This resonates with the key conclusions in 
the regulation literature that the form and scope that a regulatory framework 
takes depends on the resources available to the regulator (Baldwin and Black, 
2008; Rodrik, 2000; Sappington’s, 1994). 
The clubs were also in favour of the introduction of experts from outside the 
existing governance structure of the FA, into the regulatory framework as they 
believed it would help improve their financial systems, thus taking a cue from 
the composition of UEFA’s CFCB: 
“---You want experts. You want professionals. So it does 
not matter. If you want experts and you don’t have it within 
and you want to engage outsiders there is nothing wrong 
because you just want the right thing to be done---“ 
         [LIB] 
The quality of personnel of the regulator, according to one interviewee would 
breed confidence within clubs that the regulator is capable of providing policy 
advocacy on behalf of the clubs (interview with ARS).Thus an independent and 
well-resourced regulator is required to engender confidence amongst the 
334 
 
stakeholders of Ghana football to ensure the successful implementation of the 
FFC framework. 
 
7.6.3  Expected Implementation Challenges 
This section analyses the expected implementation challenges raised by the 
interviewees, including the amount of education required for stakeholders, 
resource requirements, phasing of implementation, and the quality of existing 
complementary control institutions. 
Education Requirement 
The key challenge that clubs expect to confront in the implementation of the 
FFC framework is the need to provide education to stakeholders prior to 
implementation. The interviewees were of the opinion that the implementation 
of the FFC framework in Ghanaian football would require that stakeholders 
within the clubs, as well as within the Football Association, are taken through a 
process of education. For example:  
“---I think from the way you’ve taken me through it I think it 
is a good model but the challenges are enormous 
because this is a lengthy model where clubs need a lot of 
education to be able to be abreast with it---“ 
[DWA] 
The FFC framework incorporates a process of training for the staff of clubs and 
as such has inherent tools to deal with the challenge of education prior to 
335 
 
implementation. The evidence in this study suggests that there is a general lack 
of capacity in terms of financial knowledge within the football industry in Ghana. 
There is a tendency for people to oppose changes to regulations especially 
when the new regulations are not fully understood (interview with ARS). Thus 
the clubs believe that the training of stakeholders on the tenets of the FFC 
framework prior to implementation is crucial to its success:  
“---It’s a matter of understanding the concepts ---So it 
involves training--- Maybe we have to involve GHALCA so 
that we get the clubs’ representatives, educate them, let 
them see the importance so that they would all cooperate 
and embrace the change---“ 
[BC] 
The position of the clubs is consistent with that taken by UEFA before the 
implementation of the UEFA CL & FFPR. A series of training seminars had to 
be organized by UEFA before the final position was adopted (Bell, 2011), and 
this has been complemented by ongoing dialogue and workshops involving 
clubs, domestic governing bodies and UEFA. The FFC framework incorporates 
a system of continual training for clubs and FA staff to deal with the education 
requirements even after implementation. 
 
Resource Requirements 
Another key challenge identified in respect of the successful implementation of 
the FFC framework was whether the clubs have the resources to conform to 
the requirements of the licensing framework. In a resource-constrained 
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environment such as that found in Ghana, minimizing the cost of any regulatory 
process is crucial (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974).The constrained resources in 
question here are not only financial resources, but also human and physical 
resources (Sappington, 1994).  
“--- Looking at the financial strength of the clubs ---maybe 
the idea you have brought is very good, but being able to 
comply would be a problem to the clubs ---We are looking 
at a department or a clear-cut department that would take 
care of the finances of the clubs. Maybe some of them are 
not doing it because ---one--- getting the offices in place is 
their problem… [and] two---getting the personnel to fill the 
places is a problem. And for that reason they may prefer 
seeing an auditor put one or two things on paper for them 
and then they pay something which would be far less than 
what they would have incurred on (qualified persons)---“ 
[HOO1] 
The FA’s and the clubs’ ability to ensure the successful implementation of the 
FFC framework may be hindered by their limited resources – human, financial 
and physical. However, at the same time, other interviewees thought that 
compliance should not create too many challenges as the FFC licensing 
framework does not require them to do much more than they already have to 
do under existing regulations (interview with HOO2).  
Whilst this argument by the interviewee might be true in form, in practice 
complying with the FFC regulations would involve higher resource cost (both 
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human and financial) and better quality personnel. It requires them to improve 
on the quality of the financial disclosure by ensuring that the entire financial 
reporting process conforms to laid-down principles and procedures (Said, 
2011). It could be argued; however, that the FFC framework incorporates 
systems that help in improving access to funding for clubs and as such deals 
with the specific challenge of resource constraints.  
 
Phasing of Implementation 
Whilst most clubs call for the implementation of the FFC framework, they also 
appreciate the fact that most clubs, and the FA, may not immediately have the 
financial and human resources to ensure effective implementation (interview 
with WAA, HOO2, DWA), leading to need for phasing of the implementation 
stage: 
“---I think that we need to do it in phases because all the 
clubs might not be able to measure up to certain levels---. 
So if it is implemented in phases and clubs are given time 
to make sure that they put certain things in order [it would 
be appropriate] ---“ 
[MED] 
Some clubs argued that it may take a minimum of three years to ensure that 
every aspect of the FFC framework is operational in Ghanaian football 
(interview with LIB, ADU), including the adoption of the FFC framework into the 
statutes of the FA. Even in Europe where the stakeholders have considerably 
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higher levels of financial capacity than exists in Ghana, UEFA sought to phase 
the implementation of its UEFA FFPR to allow for all concerned to come to 
terms with the tenets of the new regulations (Geey, 2011). Thus, the call by 
Ghanaian clubs for the phasing of any new financial regulatory framework is not 
unusual. The FA would therefore have to determine what the most appropriate 
phasing plan for the implementation of the FFC framework would be to achieve 
maximum effect.  
Quality of Complementary Control Institutions 
According to some of the interviewees, amendments to the FA Statues would 
have to be made to allow the FA’s judicial system, as well as its administrative 
set-up, which would be relied upon by the FFC framework, to function 
effectively.  
“---From what I have seen whether even those regulators 
are honest in dealing with issues of misconduct on the 
part of clubs is another issue. The kind of administrative 
mechanism, judicial mechanism in place, appears to be 
seriously undermined---“ 
[KTK] 
There is also the possibility that conflicts may arise between the FFC Board 
and one or more of the existing regulatory bodies such as the PLB, the 
Executive Committee and the Finance Committee of the FA (interview with FAP 
and KTK). This may be as a result of role conflict (Prouty, 1988); competition 
over the limited resources of the FA (Deacon, 1993), differences in the rewards 
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systems offered by the FA for membership of the various Boards (Cliff, 1987) or 
communication problems (Slack et al., 1994).  In each situation, the FA may 
adopt conflict management solutions such as providing clarity in role definition 
and increasing resources (Kolb and Putnam, 1992). Thus, the effectiveness of 
the FFC framework, it could be argued, would crucially depend on the efficiency 
of existing complementary control institutions in Ghana football. 
 
Summary 
The FFC framework would require a wide range of training programs for the 
clubs and the FA to allow them deal with the extensive educational 
requirements for the implementation of the FFC framework. Pre-implementation 
orientation seminars for the clubs and other stakeholders on the lines adopted 
by UEFA prior to the implementation of the FFPRs (Bell, 2011) would help the 
stakeholders understand and accept the tenets of the FFC framework. 
An improper phasing of the program could result in an inability of the 
stakeholders to adapt to the requirements of the FFC framework. The FA would 
thus have to determine the most appropriate phasing plan for the 
implementation of the FFC framework to achieve maximum effect.  
In a resource-constrained environment such as the one experienced by 
Ghanaian professional football clubs, the cost associated with implementing the 
FFC framework both at the club and the FA level becomes critical to its 
success. It could be argued however that the FFC framework incorporates 
systems that help in improving access to funding for clubs and as such deals 
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with the specific challenge of resource constraints. The conflict management 
strategies adopted by the FA would also determine the success of the FFC 
framework in integrating into the existing structures of the FA.  
 
7.7  CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the evidence collected from this study it is reasonable to 
conclude that the improvement in financial management of the clubs would 
improve the creditworthiness of the clubs and, in effect, the credibility and 
integrity of the financial management practices of the clubs in the league.  It is 
anticipated that this would in turn encourage sponsors and media organisations 
to associate with the clubs, ensuring the long term financial stability of clubs 
and encourage spectators to increase their consumption of the football product 
as a result of the improvement in quality and credibility of the league.  
The implementation of the FFC framework would improve on the existing 
financial governance systems in Ghana football. The clubs argue that as part of 
the financial licensing systems, the FFCB should be given the power to review 
the financial statements of clubs to ensure that they comply with international 
financial disclosure standards. The FFCB, according to the clubs, should also 
define context specific mandatory disclosure requirements for Ghanaian clubs 
to conform to, ensuring comparability of financial statements across clubs. The 
Board should also ensure that clubs do not have overdue payments to 
employees, other clubs resulting from player transfers, and to tax and social 
authorities as required under FIFA CLRs. The FFCB is also expected by the 
stakeholders in Ghana football to engage in the continual review of the financial 
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sustainability of clubs as the basis of the financial advisory services they would 
provide the clubs under the FFC framework. 
 
A key component of the FFC framework is to ensure that clubs have regulated 
access to funding. This funding may come from both private and public 
sources. It is therefore not surprising that the clubs which are resource 
constrained see the FFC framework as a solution to their financial difficulties. 
By helping clubs access funding, the clubs view the regulator as a partner in 
fostering industry development and investment. The key incentives that the club 
consider would be crucial in getting them to conform to licensing requirements 
include the streamlining of the player transfer payment system, the 
guaranteeing of credit from financial institutions, the FA and GHALCA, and 
access to funding from government sources.  
 
Clubs admit to a lack of capacity within their organisations to be effective in 
their financial management. As it incorporates financial training and support 
services, the FFC framework is viewed by the clubs as providing the means by 
which to improve the level of professional approach to financial management 
within their clubs. More generally, this also provides an opportunity to foster 
football industry development in Ghana. The key football stakeholders support 
the inclusion of training in financial planning, budgeting, analysis and taxation 
for club and FA officials as a way of improving capacity within those 
organisations. The FFCB should also provide advisory services in best practice 
in financial management and financial disclosure for key industry stakeholders. 
The stakeholders also believe that the FFC Board would be in a better position 
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than even the FA Board to provide advocacy services on behalf of the clubs in 
respect of government policy towards football in particular, and sport in general. 
 
The above conclusions are crucial ingredients in the modification of the FFC 
framework discussed at the conceptual level in chapter 6 into the modified 
version outlined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE MODIFIED FFC FRAMEWORK  
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to utilise the results and discussions on the role of the 
FFC in the financial regulation of professional football clubs in Ghana, 
undertaken in chapter 7. The original draft FFC framework outlined in chapter 6 
developed out of a comprehensive review of the academic literature on 
regulation which resulted in the adoption of Sappington’s framework as the 
conceptual framework of the thesis (chapter 2), a critical review of existing 
regulatory frameworks using Sappington’s framework as the theoretical basis 
(chapter 4), and a review of Ghanaian football finance (chapter 5).  
These reviews were done to provide the theoretical and empirical lessons for 
the development of the context-specific FFC framework. This framework is then 
developed and modified based on conclusions drawn from the interviews with 
stakeholders in Ghanaian football. It also incorporates the analysis of their 
views on the financial regulation and management in Ghanaian football and the 
interrogation of the FFC framework set out in the previous chapter.  
In arriving at the modified version of the FFC framework, great attention was 
paid to the suggestions made by the clubs in terms of the key challenges that 
are expected to be encountered in the implementation of the FFC framework in 
its conceptual form, as discussed in section 7.6.3.  
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8.2  THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FFC FRAMEWORK 
As discussed in section 6.3.1 the overarching objective of the FFC framework is 
to provide an incentive-based financial regulatory framework for professional 
football in Ghana. It aims at incorporating the concept of financial licensing as 
the basis of the financial advisory services provided to clubs. It also aims at 
improving the likelihood of regulatory compliance by providing regulated access 
to funding for clubs, and by ensuring that the financial activities of the clubs are 
constantly monitored. Figure 8.1 – Objectives of the FFC Regulator - is a 
modification of Figure 2.2, incorporating the views of stakeholders in respect of 
how specific objectives could be achieved. The discussion that follows 
highlights the changes that have arisen as a result of the discussions with 
football’s stakeholders in Ghana. The modifications include the detailing out of 
specific objectives of the FFC regulator obtained as part of the interrogation of 
the draft framework, and these are the highlighted parts of Figure 8.1. 
The proposed FFC regulatory framework also aims to provide incentives for 
new investment in industry development (Sappington, 1994); by encouraging 
investment in youth and infrastructure development via support from the ‘Youth 
and Infrastructure Development Fund’, set up with support from government. A 
strong argument was put forward by the clubs to justify government support 
based on the social benefits arising out of the activities of the clubs. Industry 
development is also achieved through providing financial support services to 
the clubs to improve on the capacity of their staff. Training of staff would also 
improve the level of professionalism with which the clubs manage their financial 
affairs (Millar and Stevens, 2012).  
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By ensuring the credibility and integrity of the league competition, the long-term 
financial stability of the clubs would be improved through improved flow of 
resources to clubs from sponsors, media partners and spectators. The FFC 
also aims at ensuring that clubs are financially sound by providing regulated 
access to credit. The clearinghouse serves as guarantors for credit taken by 
clubs from financial institutions and other members of the clearinghouse. 
 
The revised framework seeks to rationalise the distribution of league and media 
rights revenue to ensure that the distribution is equitable and that clubs are also 
paid on a timely basis, in turn lessening cash-flow management challenges. 
The FFC framework also seeks to encourage clubs to settle debts arising from 
player transfers through the implementation of a player transfer payment 
system, something clubs considered crucial for improved cash-flow 
management.  
 
In order to ensure that the football product is safe and that stakeholders are 
provided with quality services, the framework also aims to improve the financial 
transparency, debt sustainability and credit worthiness of clubs through the 
process of financial licensing. The FFC attempts to encourage not only 
improved control of expenditure by clubs, but also to discourage clubs from 
taking on levels of debt which are not matched with their income generation 
capacity, particularly in respect of player purchases, player contracts, and loans 
from financial institutions (section 7.7).  
 
347 
 
The framework also seeks to encourage clubs to adopt least cost production 
methods especially by encouraging a reduction in wage cost. In contrast to 
UEFA’s FFPR where the regulations place restrictions  on, for example, funding 
injections by majority owners in terms of the determination of the break even 
result, no attempt is made within the FFC framework to discourage external 
investors from providing new finance to clubs, irrespective of how the finance is 
used. This difference in treatment demonstrates again the importance of 
context within financial regulation. As demonstrated in Table 5.15, Ghanaian 
clubs’ sources of revenues are very limited and without benefactors, several 
clubs simply would not be going concerns. 
 
8.3  THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INDUSTRY 
CONDITIONS 
The institutional structure and the nature of the industry to be regulated 
determine the form that financial regulation takes (Sappington, 1994). 
According to environmental determinism theory (Cooke and Wallace, 1990), the 
type of financial disclosure in a country is determined by environmental factors 
such as the stage of economic development, political systems, legal rules, 
accountancy and regulatory systems, education level and the characteristics of 
business organisations in the country. In the view of Baldwin and Black (2008), 
a really responsive regulatory framework has to be mindful of the political and 
legal infrastructure, as well as the norms regulating conduct, which represents 
the institutional environment of the regulator.  
348 
 
The FFC framework recognises these factors as they contribute to the 
commitment ability of the regulator (Sappington, 1994), as well as to the 
motivational posture of the regulatee (Baldwin and Black, 2008). Thus the 
success or otherwise of the FFC Board would be determined by things like the 
political pressures on the regulator, the stability of tenure of the regulator, the 
independence of the judicial arm of the Ghana FA, and the stability in its 
governance systems. The quality of other complementary control institutions, 
within and outside the football environment in Ghana, would also be crucial in 
determining the scope of the regulation.  
 
8.3.1  Institutional Structure 
Figure 8.2 provides an overview of the institutional structure within which the 
FFC framework has been developed. While Ghana has a small number of 
major clubs (3), ostensibly unlike other countries, these clubs are not overly 
powerful within Ghanaian football. Only one out of the three big clubs, for 
instance, has a representative on the FA’s 23 person Executive Committee 
which is dominated by officials of clubs of relatively smaller size in terms of 
supporter base and income. Moreover, various committees of the FA have 
handed severe punishments to big clubs. For instance in 2002/03, Kotoko was 
fined approximately US$100,000 by the FA’s Disciplinary Committee for 
inducing player Charles Taylor to breach his contract (GFA, 2003). Such 
examples, suggest that there is little evidence of pressure from big clubs which 
might affect the commitment ability of the financial regulator.  
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The main challenge to the power of the FFC Board, however, is likely to come 
from the Executive Committee and from the Premier League Board who would, 
by the design of the framework, have to cede part of their regulatory power and 
authority to the FFC. In this context, it is unsurprising therefore that the FA 
President called for a unification of the FFC with the FIB of the Club Licensing 
System, with a view to avoiding possible role conflict (Prouty, 1988). However, 
particular skills have been identified as being required of the membership of the 
FFC Board. Given that the evidence suggests that these would not necessarily 
be available within the (FIB), coupled with the volume of work anticipated in the 
FFC framework it is argued that combining the two bodies is not desirable as it 
may overburden the joint body, leading to a possible loss of efficiency.   
 
There is also the potential for regulatory capture, resulting from some clubs 
having representation on the Executive Committee and the PLB. There is the 
possibility that members of the FFC might want to favour clubs with Executive 
Committee positions in order to retain membership of the FFC. This brings into 
focus the question of the independence of the regulator. Sappington (1994) 
argues that the quality of the human resources available to the regulator is a 
potential defence against regulatory capture. Under the present system, the 
judicial bodies of the FA could be considered to be sufficiently independent 
from the Executive of the FA as decisions of the Disciplinary, Appeals, and 
Player Status committees are not subject to review by the Executive of the FA. 
Thus if the FFC is afforded the same level of autonomy, this would encourage 
confidence in the independence of the FFC and the integrity of its decision-
making.  
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Previously the Executive Committee was greatly influenced by Government due 
to the fact that Government had the right to nominate three people to serve on 
the FA Management Committee, one of whom served as Chairman (see 
Section 1.1.2). This meant that a change in government automatically ended 
the term of office of the government appointees. Inevitably, this led to instability 
in the management of the FA and created the potential to undermine the 
regulation of football, with policy priorities changing with changes in 
government. Subsequently however, stability in the governance of the FA has 
been guaranteed by the current FA Statutes which clearly defines the basis for 
the removal of officers of the FA (GFA, 2010b, Art. 34.2).   
The broad-based regulatory process adopted by the FA statutes also reduces 
the chances that even a change in leadership would lead to a change in 
regulatory priorities. It must be recognised, however, that the inclusion of 
Government in the FFC framework, through the setting up of the Youth and 
Infrastructure Development Fund, creates the potential for political pressure 
and lobbying to be exerted on football authorities. This is a fact appreciated by 
the clubs during the interview sessions (see section 7.4.2.5). 
The quality of complementary control institutions within and outside the football 
industry in Ghana cannot be guaranteed (see Section 7.7). Several clubs either 
refuse or fail to honour tax and social security obligations on behalf of 
employees, with no consequence for the responsible institutions. Clubs fail to 
submit annual audited accounts to the Registrar General’s Department in 
contravention of the rules governing registered companies in Ghana; with 
others failing to honour contracts with creditors without any sanctions. An 
effective financial regulator for football would therefore have to coordinate a 
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comprehensive system to ensure clubs become financially responsible. Thus 
the FFC Board would have to manage a more comprehensive regulatory 
system than would have been necessary if the other complementary control 
institutions were functioning effectively. 
 
8.3.2  Industry Conditions 
Production externalities exist, and may be higher in Ghana than, for example, in 
most European countries where the youth have many more employment 
opportunities beyond football (Darby, 2009).  In a developing economy like 
Ghana, the choices available to the youth are limited and as such the youth 
development efforts of the clubs arguably generate greater societal benefits 
than would be the case in a more developed country. Therefore it could be 
argued that there is greater justification for government support of football 
development in Ghana than would be the case in, for example, an average 
European football nation.  
Figure 8.3 provides an overview of the industry conditions that characterise the 
Ghanaian football, and which potentially determine the form and scope of 
financial regulation in the country. Without providing evidence, Bediako (2012) 
suggests that the economic impact of clubs like Asante Kotoko on their host 
cities is significant and cannot be discounted. He notes, for example, that a 
victory by Kotoko in a league game boosts economic activity in the days 
following the match in Kumasi and its surrounding communities.  
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INDUSTRY CONDITIONS 
INFORMATION 
STRUCTURE 
NATURE OF PRODUCT & 
CONSUMER DEMAND 
PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY 
Economies of Scale: 
Number of teams that will optimize the 
objective of the regulator differs from 
country to country 
Number of Suppliers: 
Open League resulting in promotion and 
relegation 
Production Externalities: 
1. Benefits to society (e.g. youth 
development justifies Government 
support 
2. Cost to society of Fan behaviour: 
3. Cost of providing safety and security 
4. Effect on local economy 
Consumption Externalities: 
1. Fans are producers and consumers at 
the same time 
2. Consumption activities affect other 
producers (e.g. media) 
Consumer Characteristics: 
1. Fan loyalty leading to limited brand-
switching   2. Fans may be relatively lower 
income earners than their European 
counterparts  Season tickets are not a 
feature of the product market 
Nature of Products: 
1. Socially embedded 
2. Clubs have limited control over product 
Locus of Information: 
1. The licensor has the potential to 
centralise information 
2. Allows for quick decision making 
and regulatory review 
Cost of Information Organisation: 
Resource cost of information 
gathering would suggest one 
agency collecting information 
Economies of Scale in Information 
Collection: 
Licensor has access to all financial 
information of clubs 
FIG. 8.3: INDUSTRY 
CONDITIONS FACING FFC 
REGULATOR 
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At the same time, the cost of policing unruly fan behaviour may also be 
significant (Greenfield and Osborne, 2010). This may also be particularly 
significant in a resource-constrained economy if scarce police resources are 
diverted to providing safety and security at football games (NDPC, 2011). 
Income levels for the general Ghanaian population are lower than that of most 
European countries (NDPC, 2011). The Ghanaian football fan may thus have 
incomes that are considerably lower than their European counterparts, resulting 
in financial consequences for the clubs. For example, in terms of funding, 
season ticket schemes are not utilised as a source of pre-finance whilst in 
revenue terms, ticket prices are extremely low compared to European countries 
(see Table 5.5). Match day attendance and match revenue tends to fluctuate, 
as it is very much dependent on current team performance (Masteralexis, Barr 
and Hums, 2009) (section 5.5.5). Televised European matches have become 
the main source of competition, for the league, for fans’ attention. It could be 
argued that if this trend does not change then match day revenue may continue 
to decline along with total revenue.  
The financial crisis in European football is not a crisis of ‘falling’ income but an 
imbalance between income and expenditure, and existence of rising debt 
(Bank, 2002; Lago, et al., 2006). Whilst similar imbalances exist in Ghanaian 
football, the Ghanaian case is exacerbated by falling incomes (section 5.3). 
Cost of credit in the country is high and access is limited by the accumulated 
financial losses of Ghanaian clubs (section 5.5.1), and a lack of collateral. The 
Ghanaian financial regulator may thus have to attempt to help the clubs deal 
with the lack of access to financial resources that plague the league, the 
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paucity in human and physical resources (section 7.5.1), and a culture of non-
service of debts owed to others (section 5.5.2). 
 
8.4  THE RESOURCES, FORM AND SCOPE OF THE FFC FRAMEWORK 
Figure 8.4 provides an overview of the role of the regulator’s resources in 
determining the form and scope of regulation in Sappington’s framework.  
The resources of the regulator that are critical in deciding the form and scope a 
regulation takes are the staff size, the educational training and the experience 
of staff (Sappington, 1994). Arguably, these represent only the human 
resources available to the regulator. Sappington, in contrast to Baldwin and 
Black (2008) lays little or no emphasis on the financial and physical resources 
required for the implementation of the monitoring schemes of the regulator, 
perhaps because he envisages these as being relatively inconsequential within 
the context of middle and high income economies.  
In keeping with this, UEFA and the Scottish FA regulations only mention the 
fact that administrative support for the decision making bodies would be given 
by the relevant confederation or national association, without explicitly 
mentioning the financial and physical resources required. 
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In a resource-constrained economy like Ghana, however, it is important to 
consider the effect of not only the human resources available to the regulator 
but also the financial and physical resources necessary for the attainment of 
the regulator’s objectives, a point acknowledged by the clubs. The 
remuneration of the members of the Board and staff of the regulator, office 
space and equipment and transport facilities simply cannot be taken for granted 
in a developing economy context (see section 8.3.3). 
Thus Sappington’s framework formulation which only included the human 
resource base of the regulator has been extended with the inclusion of financial 
and physical resources to make it relevant for the Ghanaian context (see 
differences between Figs 2.3 & 8.4).   
As has been argued previously, the Ghana Football Association’s operations 
are associated with deficient information systems (section 5.2.1). As such, the 
financial regulator cannot adequately rely on existing structures to provide it 
with the quality of information required to make decisions in respect of the 
financial management of professional clubs. Coupled with the fact that 
complementary control institutions are less effective than in the developed 
world, financial regulation in such an environment would have to be more 
comprehensive in scope than in a European environment. Delegated decision-
making would also seem superior to the command-and-control form of 
regulation in such circumstances (Sappington, 1994). 
As discussed in section 6.4.1 and supported by the clubs during the interview 
sessions, the membership of the clearing-house would include the FFC, the FA, 
the 16 premier division clubs, financial institutions, GHALCA, the National 
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Sports Authority and equipment suppliers. This could be extended over time to 
cover division one clubs (see conclusions in section 7.7). The composition of 
the FFC Board remains as discussed in section 6.4.2 as all the stakeholders 
were comfortable with the attempt to achieve independence for the FFC Board. 
Despite the fact that the Board of the FFC would have to be appointed by the 
Executive Committee (Ex-Co), incorporating a legal requirement for the 
membership to have specific skills and competencies in the Statutes would 
serve to insulate the FFC Board from capture by the Ex-Co as per Sappington’s 
arguments discussed in section 2.3 (see Walters and Hamil, 2013 for a 
discussion of the effect of Board composition on the exercise of power within 
the English FA).   
 
8.5  THE FUNCTION OF THE FFC FRAMEWORK 
Figure 8.5 is a modification of Figure 6.1 in which the functions of the FFC are 
outlined. It has been informed by the theoretical discussions in chapters 2, the 
conclusions from the review of Ghanaian football finance in section 5.6 and the 
conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence obtained through the 
interrogation of the FFC framework in section 7.7. The framework provides for 
the financial regulation and monitoring of clubs, and the provision of incentives 
and support services for regulatory compliance. These functions derive from 
the general attempt by clearing-houses to license, regulate and monitor the 
activities of members (Finkelstein, 1966; Goodhart, 1988).  
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FOOTBALL FINANCIAL           
CLEARING-HOUSE  
IMPROVE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
FACING CLUBS BY ENSURING REGULATED 
ACCESS TO FUNDING 
SERVE AS FIRST INSTANCE BODY FOR 
ASSESSING FINANCIAL CRITERIA OF 
LICENSING REGULATION 
FINANCIAL MONITORING 
OF CLUBS 
PROVIDE FINANCIAL ADVISORY 
SERVICES TO CLUBS 
COORDINATE PLAYER TRANSFER PAYMENT 
SYSTEM: a) By reviewing Transfer Agreements 
between clubs to ensure buying club has ability 
to pay when due; b) Guaranteeing payment of 
selling club from League sponsorship monies; c) 
Review player contracts to ensure that clubs 
can afford terms of contract; d) impose transfer 
bans where necessary 
-  PROVIDE GUARANTEES FOR SHORT TERM 
CREDIT from a) Financial Institutions; b) 
Football Association; c) GHALCA; d) Equipment 
suppliers (hire-purchase) 
SERVE AS POLICY ADVOCACY GROUP: 
on a) Revenue Distribution within 
Football; b) Tax exemption for 
football clubs; c) Government support 
for club football 
ASSESS FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY OF CLUBS: 
a) measure financial performance of clubs; b) 
assess ability to continue as a going concern 
REVIEW FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CLUBS: a) 
Set reporting requirements of clubs to conform 
to minimum standards required by FIFA and 
National Laws; b) Ensure clubs audited accounts 
conform to set standards; c) Set auditing 
standards; d) Ensure club auditors comply with 
set standards 
ENSURE CLLUBS HAVE NO OVERDUE 
PAYMENTS: a) to clubs as a result of player 
purchases; b) to players as part of entitlements 
due from player contracts; c) to other 
employees including technical staff; d) to tax and 
social authorities; e) to FA & GHALCA; f) to 
equipment suppliers 
COORDINATE ACCESS TO FUNDING FROM 
YOUTH/INFRASTRUCTURE DEV’T FUND: To be 
set-up with funding from Government for 
investment in youth and Infrastructure in the 
form of a) annual Football Grant b) Revolving 
Fund from which clubs can borrow   
PROVIDE ADVISORY SERVICES TO 
CLUBS: advise clubs on a) proper 
financial management; b) best 
practices in financial reporting 
ARRANGE TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR 
STAFF OF CLUBS: on a) Financial 
planning; b) Budgeting; c) Financial 
Analysis; d) taxation etc. 
MONITORING TO ENSURE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 
LICENSE CONDITIONS AND 
FFC REGULATIONS  
FIG. 8.5: FFC FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Regulate Incentivise Support Monitor 
360 
 
Other general functions of clearinghouses are to provide support services and 
incentives for members (Long et al, 1993); reduce risks and smoothen the 
operation of members (Acharya et al, 2008); and reduce the cost and time 
involved in dealing with other members of the clearing-house (Cornell and 
Reinganum, 1981; Finkelstein, 1966).     
 
The FFC Board, as the regulator, performs the role of regulating the financial 
management practices of the clubs through licensing.  It also ensures the 
implementation of the licensing conditions by clubs through a process of 
financial monitoring. In order to increase the chances that clubs are motivated 
enough and have the capacity to comply with regulatory and monitoring 
requirements, the FFC framework provides incentives and support services to 
clubs. The content of the boxes in Figure 9.5 have been derived from 
discussions with the clubs and the other stakeholders during the interview and 
focus group sessions 
 
8.5.1  Licensing Clubs for Improved Financial Performance 
A key function of the FFC Board is to serve as the licensing body in respect of 
the financial criteria of the Club Licensing Regulations for professional football 
clubs in the country. The licensing framework has been extensively discussed 
in section 6.5.1. Whilst there were calls for the FFC Board to be merged with 
the FIB they have been retained as separate entities due to the skill 
requirements for the performance of the duties assigned. The functions of the 
FFC are extensive and cannot be combined with the highly technical and non-
financial duties of the FIB in the FIFA Licensing framework. 
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In order to meet the financial criteria for licensing, clubs would have to prove 
that they have the financial resources to be able to meet their financial 
obligations for the licence year, and also have no overdue payments to 
employees, tax and social security authorities, and other clubs at the end of the 
year (FIFA, 2010, Article 10.4, F.02, F.03). This is to ensure that clubs do not 
fold-up during the course of the season, which could jeopardise the integrity of 
the league and also endanger the confidence of the public in the financial 
infrastructure of the clubs.  
Clubs are expected to submit their annual audited financial statements (as 
detailed in Appendices 12-14) for review by the FFC. The FFC Board is 
required to review the financial statements of clubs to ensure that they conform 
to set standards (section 7.7). These standards would include minimum 
reporting standards that conform to those required by FIFA, National Laws and 
professional bodies e.g. Institute of Chartered Accountants. In respect of 
Ghana this would include the requirements within the Companies Code (Act 
179, 1963).   
Appendix 12 shows the documents that are required to be submitted annually 
to the FFC Board for review which would serve as the basis for the award of the 
licence to compete in the league. Modifications to the content of the financial 
statements are expected to make them football specific (see section 7.3.4). 
Comparisons could then be made of financial performance across clubs and 
over time, something which is considered relevant, according to stakeholders of 
clubs. The Cash Flow and the Budget for time T, which are also required to be 
submitted, would help determine whether a club could continue as a going 
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concern, and thus be in a position to meet its financial commitments for the 
forthcoming football season.  
Submission of player transfer agreements between clubs and player contracts 
detailing the financial conditions and the payment schedules allows for the 
detection of overdue debts to other clubs and players, as well as the full extent 
of a club’s financial commitment for the licence year. Examples of this exist 
within the UEFA FFPRs (UEFA, 2010a). Loan agreements with financial 
institutions, the FA and its affiliates would also have to be submitted as and 
when necessary, with the FFC guaranteeing them as required. Clubs would 
also have to submit monthly evidence of timely payment of players and staff. 
 The FFC Board would also have to set the auditing formats and standards that 
club auditors would have to adopt (section 7.4.3 and 7.4.4). This would allow 
for comparability of the results from a club’s financial statements with that of 
other clubs, as well as comparability over time;   one of the key principles upon 
which the quality of financial reporting is judged (Sarpong, 1999; Saudagaran 
and Diga, 1997). They would also ensure that club auditors who do not conform 
to these standards, or are found to have colluded with club officials to submit 
fraudulent documents, are barred from auditing the accounts of football clubs. It 
is also important that only qualified auditors are allowed to audit the books of 
football clubs as this could not be taken for granted.  
 Based on the financial data provided by the clubs to the FFC as part of the 
licensing process, and with the right skill levels, the FFC Board would then be 
in a position to assess both the short-term and the long-term financial 
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sustainability of the clubs by using various financial indicators, and to determine 
whether they could continue as going-concerns.  
 
8.5.2  Incentives for Compliance 
Despite the suggestions by Fehr and Falk (2002) that monetary incentives may 
be counter-productive and reduce the performance of agents or their 
compliance with rules, clubs argued that considering the harsh financial 
environment within which Ghanaian clubs operate (sections 1.1.5 and 5.5), any 
incentive package that improves access to funding would positively affect their 
motivational posture (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Feld and Frey; 2007).  Hence, it 
is important for the FFC Board to be seen to be helping to improve the financial 
environment facing the clubs by ensuring that they have regulated access to 
funding; currently  a major constraint on the financial management of the clubs 
(see section 7.5.2.1). This would engender the necessary trust between the 
regulator and the regulated and increase the likelihood of regulatory 
compliance by the football clubs.  
 
This would not necessarily lead to the regulator substituting the public interest 
objectives (ensuring the integrity and financial stability of the league) for those 
of the industry (clubs) – essentially a risk of regulatory capture (Becker, 1983) - 
as there are other in-built structures to avoid this (see section 6.3.2). In order to 
ease the financial constraints facing the clubs the Board would have to 
coordinate the player transfer payment; provide guarantees for short term credit 
for clubs; and coordinate access to funding from the ‘Youth and Infrastructure 
Development Fund’.  
365 
 
Player Transfer Payment System 
An uncoordinated player transfer payment system encourages clubs to build up 
unsustainable debts as they compete to buy players in a ‘rat-race’ fashion 
without the necessary resources (Akerloff, 1970) (see section 7.5.1). When 
clubs default on the payment of player transfer money, they deprive the selling 
club of both the use of the player in question and any opportunity to replace 
those players, thus weakening the selling club. This limits the competitiveness 
of the league especially if the two clubs are in the same division. Indeed it is 
possible that big clubs may intentionally weaken smaller ones by defaulting on 
payments so as to win titles, akin to financial doping (Hamil and Walters, 2010). 
 
Regulating the player transfer payments system would be done through a 
review of the transfer agreements between the clubs to ensure that the buying 
club has the ability to honour its transfer obligations when due. This would be 
determined by a review of the financial statements, budgets and the cash flow 
statements submitted by the buying club during the license application process. 
Where the buying club seeks to use their share of the League sponsorship and 
Media Rights revenue as a guarantee for the purchase of the player, the FFC 
Board would ensure that such monies are paid directly by the FA to the 
beneficiary club.  
 
Without coordination some clubs over-collateralise their expected share of the 
rights revenue, leading to the inability of the FA to make payments to all clubs 
who are owed monies by such a club (see section 7.4.3.1). The FA cannot 
determine which portions of the debt owed to each club should be paid off since 
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it has no capacity or locus to rank the debts in terms of priority. Coordination by 
the FFC Board, however, would provide a framework to ensure that clubs 
cannot over-collateralise their share, as transfer agreements that require the 
use of rights revenue as guarantee would have to be approved by the FFC 
Board.  
 
The FFC framework is likely to ensure that clubs have the financial resources to 
honour the terms of the contracts that they sign with players at the beginning of 
the season. Clubs in Ghana have a history of signing players on very lucrative 
terms even when they do not possess the financial resources to pay. The FIFA 
CLR guidelines expect that clubs will not have any overdue payments at the 
end of the year, and this would be a responsibility of the FFC Board to regulate.  
Where a club continuously fail to honour its obligations to its playing staff, the 
FFC Board has the power to impose transfer bans over a certain period in 
which the club cannot buy any new players until certain financial guarantees 
are provided. Bans are a part of a wide-range of deterrent strategies that could 
be provided to ensure regulatory compliance (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Baldwin & Anderson, 2002; Braithwaite, 2002; Simpson, 2002). The procedural 
rules for the CFCB of UEFA also suggest other forms of punishment to ensure 
regulatory compliance (UEFA, 2012b, Article 21) that could be adopted by the 
FFC Board. 
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Access to Private Funding 
In order to improve access to credit by clubs, the FFC Board with its ability to 
assess the risk profile of each club, would be in a position to guarantee the 
repayment of short term loans contracted by some clubs from financial 
institutions, the Football Association, GHALCA and the hire-purchase 
agreements with equipment suppliers. The financial data from the clubs that are 
reviewed by the FFC Board during the licensing process would be readily 
available to financial institutions, improving the probability of the financial 
institutions providing credit to clubs to ease their short term cash-flow 
challenges.  
The quality of financial data supplied to the financial institutions during the loan 
application process would have to meet the standards set by the FFC Board for 
purposes of licensing. It is anticipated that creditors would also be more likely to 
do business with clubs due to the improved integrity of the football financial 
system arising out of the financial licensing system and the independence and 
professionalism of the regulators (see section 7.7). This would reduce the 
transaction costs associated with the credit acquisition process as it would 
reduce information asymmetry and has the potential of reducing the risk of 
default, the default premium charged by financial institutions as part of cost of 
credit, and as such reduce the cost of credit. This is a key principle in the 
regulation of financial services outlined by Llewellyn (1999).   
Access to Government Funding 
The role of Government in the development of football in a resource-
constrained economy is critical as it is needed to provide the financial 
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infrastructure in an environment in which clubs are unable to sufficiently provide 
for themselves. Even in Europe where clubs in many countries are very well-
resourced in financial terms, governments continue to support clubs in both 
their youth development and infrastructure development efforts (see section 
7.4.2). For example, the French government considers participation in sports 
and physical education as crucial elements in education, culture, integration 
and social life of the citizenry and hence a right for every citizen, (Senaux, 
2011).  As such, the state and local authorities provide sponsorship to clubs in 
exchange for match tickets which are distributed to youngsters and people from 
the localities who represent 15% of fans at matches. Elsewhere, Swiss clubs 
also enjoy the usage of stadia modernised by the government as part of its 
efforts to win the hosting rights for Euro 2008 (Mutter and Huber, 2011); whilst 
Dutch clubs receive loans, warranties and reductions in stadium rent and 
maintenance costs from state and local authorities (Pieters and De Schryver, 
2011). 
The FFC Board is responsible for coordinating access to funding from the 
‘Youth and Infrastructure Development Fund’, funded by government for 
investment in Youth and Infrastructure development by the clubs (see section 
7.4.2). Government has a responsibility to provide opportunities for youth; 
whilst football clubs provide training and career opportunities for the youth as a 
complement to government efforts. The coordination and monitoring activities 
of the FFC Board would provide Government with the necessary assurance 
that the resources provided would be used for their intended purposes, as 
annual reports on such projects would be made available to government 
through the Board’s reporting framework. The FFC Board would also monitor 
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the repayment of loans made out of the Fund to clubs for youth and 
infrastructure development. This provides an incentive for clubs to undertake 
the improvement of their training and development infrastructure for the youth, 
which is required of them under the FIFA CLRs.    
 
8.5.3  Providing Support Services to Clubs 
The licensing and monitoring process, which includes a review of the financial 
management systems of clubs, would result in recommendations made by the 
FFC Board in respect of the proper financial planning, control and management 
of clubs. This would allow the FFC to provide feedback to the clubs. The 
interactions between the FFC and the clubs would ensure that clubs benefit 
from the suggestions from members of the Board in a process of learning-by-
association (Rusaw, 1995) (also see section 7.7).  
Regulation becomes irrelevant if the intended targets cannot appreciate what 
the regulation requires them to do and how to do it.  In as much as the clubs 
would strive to appoint suitably qualified people to be responsible for the 
financial management of their clubs in order to meet reporting requirements, it 
is important for the regulatory system to be seen to be improving the quality of 
the personnel responsible for the clubs’ finances (see Section 7.5.1). Club 
officials would be offered training in financial planning, budgeting, financial 
analysis and issues of taxation in a program of continual education to improve 
standards.  
The quality of the FFC Board’s composition means that they are in a position to 
advocate rule changes within the football industry, as well as outside the 
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industry, for the benefit of the game. The Board could, for instance, suggest 
changes to the revenue distribution formula to ensure improved financial and 
sporting performance for majority of the clubs, and as such the level of 
competition in the league. They could also serve as an advocacy group on 
behalf of clubs to lobby government to, not only provide tax exemptions to 
operators in the football industry, but to provide direct financial support for club 
football. Due to their independence from the Football Association, Government 
is more likely to take them seriously in their advocacy effort. 
 
8.5.4  Monitoring the Financial Activities of Clubs 
Figure 8.7 is the financial monitoring framework of the FFC. The processes of 
monitoring the financial activities of the clubs have been comprehensively 
discussed in section 6.5.4. 
 
The FFC would be responsible for the monitoring of the financial management 
systems of the clubs and the implementation of the financial license conditions. 
The FFC would engage the clubs in a continual process of documentation 
review over an agreed period during the licence year to ensure that licence 
conditions are being respected by clubs. The authenticity of clubs audited 
accounts could also be verified by spot checks done by officers of the FFC. 
Clubs are obliged by the regulations to open up to recognised officers of the 
FFC whenever they are called to do so. Failure to do so attract sanctions which 
may be pecuniary and this would also be taken into account when the club 
applies for a license the following year.   
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8.6  SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the modified FFC framework as the key result of this 
study. It outlined the key aspects of the FFC framework which has been made 
applicable to the Ghanaian context.  
The main objectives of the framework are to: foster industry development and 
investment; promote more equitable outcomes; ensure safe and quality service; 
achieve desired levels of income; and to promote least cost production within 
the Ghanaian football industry. This is to be achieved by providing for the 
financial licensing and monitoring of clubs, supported by the provision of 
incentives and support services.   
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental aim of the study was to critically review the framework for the 
financial regulation of professional football in Ghana and, if necessary, propose 
an appropriate framework specific to the context of Ghana. 
The following objectives were identified to achieve this aim: 
1. To critically appraise and evaluate existing frameworks of financial 
regulation in football and assess their applicability in the Ghanaian 
context;  
2. To evaluate the current financial disclosure practices of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs;  
3. To evaluate the financial position and performance of Ghanaian 
professional football clubs, and assess whether they are financially 
sustainable entities;  
4. To evaluate the existing framework for regulating the finances of 
Ghanaian clubs; and 
5. To develop an incentive-based financial regulatory framework applicable 
to the Ghanaian context 
The study’s fundamental aim has been achieved, as the FFC framework has 
been developed, reviewed with stakeholders and made applicable to the 
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Ghanaian context through its interrogation by stakeholders in Ghanaian 
football. Section 9.2 sets out the contributions of this study to knowledge. 
Section 9.3 shows how the research objectives were achieved and the 
conclusions drawn. Section 9.4 then draws out the implications of the study for: 
the Ghana Football Association and its member clubs; Government and 
agencies of Government that serve as complementary control institutions; world 
and continental governing bodies such as FIFA and CAF; investors and other 
stakeholders of Ghanaian football; researchers and directions for future 
research. Section 9.5 is a summary of the chapter.  
 
9.2  OVERALL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes four significant contributions to knowledge by showing that: 
Ghanaian football clubs are in a difficult financial situation; there is an appetite 
for change amongst Ghanaian football’s stakeholders for a new financial 
regulatory framework; the existing financial regulatory frameworks, especially in 
Europe, are not applicable in the Ghanaian context, especially as their 
underlying assumptions are based on a different jurisdiction; and that the FFC 
framework would be an appropriate context-specific framework to deal with the 
financial regulation of Ghanaian football clubs.  
Firstly, the study has shown that the finances of Ghanaian football clubs are in 
a mess, and there is therefore an urgent need to do something about them. 
Ignoring these challenges has the potential to threaten the financial stability of 
the clubs, and in the long run, the credibility and survival of Ghanaian league 
football. One of the possible ways to deal with challenges to the financial 
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stability of clubs is the improvement in the financial regulatory environment 
pertaining in the industry.  
The study has also shown that there is recognition by the stakeholders in 
Ghanaian football, including the clubs, that the weaknesses in the existing 
financial regulatory framework threaten the survival of the clubs and the league. 
For example, the stakeholders admit that the financial disclosure practices of 
the clubs need to be improved. There is therefore an apparent appetite for a 
review of the financial regulatory framework.  
Thirdly, the study has shown that existing frameworks developed in other 
jurisdiction, whilst serving as a guide for others; do not necessarily pass as an 
applicable framework to deal with the specific challenges facing Ghanaian 
football clubs. The review of the UEFA CL and FFP regulations, as well as 
FIFA’s own attempt to provide guidelines to national associations have shown 
them to be inadequate for a national association with its own peculiar financial 
challenges, as in Ghana.  
In view of the above, the study’s fourth contribution is a model of financial 
regulation which is applicable in Ghana, and which has the potential to resolve 
the specific financial challenges facing Ghanaian football clubs. The FFC 
framework incorporates into its design, the specific industry and institutional 
factors pertaining in Ghana football. The model has also been interrogated by 
stakeholders in Ghanaian football who overwhelmingly believe it holds the key 
to dealing with the financial challenges in Ghana football.  
The study is the result of an independent and original attempt to analyse 
financial regulation in Ghanaian football. The study is the first of its kind in 
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Ghana on football finance, football financial reporting and financial regulation in 
football. It is the first study to publish financial figures on Ghanaian football 
clubs which hitherto have not been made available by the clubs and governing 
bodies. While the sports finance and sport management literature is replete 
with papers analysing financial aspects of, primarily European and American 
football leagues, no known academic studies have focused on data from 
African market economies. Given the importance of professional football and 
the importance of the emerging Ghanaian football economy, this review 
provides an original and significant contribution to knowledge in the area of 
football finance. 
This work therefore, makes an important contribution in, for the first time, 
providing stakeholders of Ghana football with the necessary information for 
policy formulation around the key areas of financial management and financial 
regulation. While the thesis is focused on a particular area of economic activity, 
more generally, the thesis also contributes to the growing literature on football’s 
financial management and financial performance within developing economies. 
This allows for the comparison of financial performance of football clubs in 
different jurisdictions to be made. 
The review and analysis of existing financial regulatory frameworks in football 
worldwide provides regulators with the basis upon which to make informed 
assessments as to whether world-wide general regulations such as the FIFA 
Club Licensing regulations could be effective in meeting the specific needs of 
different countries. FIFA’s attempt to provide guidelines for all national 
associations fails to appreciate the institutional differences, and even cultural 
differences that inevitably exist in football around the world. Specifically, the 
377 
 
study greatly enhances independent analysis of the FIFA licensing regulations; 
to date, the great majority of literature in sports finance and sport management 
has focused on the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play regulations.  
Another contribution of this study is the detailing out of the systematic steps 
undertaken to arrive at the FFC framework, which is the final outcome of the 
study. The study utilises the review of the theoretical literature to justify the 
selection of the Sappington Model as the conceptual framework for the review 
of the existing frameworks for the financial regulation of football. It also serves 
as the framework for the development of the FFC Model at the conceptual 
level. The review of the existing frameworks of financial regulation is then 
combined with the review of Ghanaian football finance to provide the 
justification for, the industry conditions and the institutional environment within 
which the FFC framework is developed. This framework is then interrogated 
with the help  of stakeholders of Ghanaian professional football and the results 
are used to modify the framework into one that is applicable in the specific 
context of Ghana. This very academic process of model development, to a 
large extent, allows for replication of the conclusions of the study in other 
jurisdictions.  
The study also extends Sappington’s framework by including financial and 
physical resources in the definition of resources. These are critical in the 
development of any regulatory framework especially in resource constrained 
environments. 
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9.3  CONCLUSIONS 
The fundamental aim of the study was to critically review the framework for the 
financial regulation of professional football in Ghana and, if necessary, propose 
an appropriate framework specific to the context of Ghana. 
 
The review of literature, the critical review of the existing football financial 
regulatory models, and the review of Ghanaian football finance served as the 
basis for the development of the Football Financial Clearinghouse model at the 
conceptual level. This first phase was followed by an interrogation process that 
involved presenting the framework during interviews with club CEOs, FA and 
League officials and obtaining their responses.  The third phase utilised the 
results of the consultations with the stakeholders as the basis for modification 
of the framework, in the process achieving objective five of the study. 
 
The FFC framework recognises the fundamental importance of the institutional 
environment within which the regulator and the clubs operate (Sappington, 
1994; Rodrik, 2000; Baldwin and Black, 2008); the effect of the human resource 
limitations on the ability of the regulator to achieve its objectives (Sappington, 
1994); and the effect of inappropriate incentive mechanisms, absence of control 
within the clubs, and deficient information systems on the operational 
performance mix of the clubs and the FA (Bayle and Robinson, 2007). 
The FFC framework received overwhelming support amongst the stakeholders 
in Ghanaian football leading to the conclusion that such a framework may 
provide a solution to some of the regulatory and financial challenges faced by 
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Ghanaian football. The incorporation of incentives and support services into a 
financial licensing and monitoring framework provides ready-made solutions 
that could be implemented relatively easily by the Ghana FA. While context 
remains central to this study and to its proposed framework, similarities 
between Ghana and other African countries mean that a modified version of 
this framework may be of value elsewhere on the continent, with regulators 
able to explore which aspects of the framework best fit their needs (Hausmann 
and Rodrik, 2003).  
Easing the financial constraints that face clubs is therefore expected to be a 
key feature of any financial regulatory framework implemented for Ghanaian 
football. Access to credit from financial institutions is a major challenge for 
Ghanaian clubs due to their inability to provide sufficient collateral guarantee 
resulting from their low asset base, and the high cost of credit in the country. 
The high cost of credit not only makes Government funding an extremely 
attractive alternative, but it also makes schemes such as the provision of 
guarantees by the FA to banks on behalf of the clubs, and the rationalisation of 
the transfer payment system proposed under the FFC framework, very 
important. 
The discussions that follow details out the conclusions of the study on the other 
research objectives, which justified the development of the FFC framework as 
an incentive-based financial regulatory framework for Ghanaian football. 
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9.3.1  Financial Disclosure in Ghanaian Football 
The first research objective was achieved by analysing the contents of audited 
financial statements of clubs in Ghana’s Premier League as at 1st September, 
2012. Various financial statements covering the period 2009-2012 were 
analysed.  The evaluation was based on the credibility of the submitted 
financial statements; the contents of the accounts; the consistency of 
accounting carried out by the clubs; and the comparability of the accounting 
data in respect of the existence of prior year figures, treatment of player 
recruitment cost and asset depreciation practices. Club, FA, PLB and GHALCA 
officials were also interviewed on the quality of financial disclosure in Ghanaian 
football. 
The study concludes that considerable information disclosure challenges exist 
in professional football in Ghana, just as they do in the Ghanaian capital 
markets (Sarpong, 1999). The credibility of audited accounts cannot be 
guaranteed, and there is little feedback on the submitted accounts to the clubs 
from the FA, giving the impression that the financial disclosure process is 
largely a cosmetic exercise.  
There is a lack of comparability of club accounts from one year to another as 
clubs change auditors and auditing formats without providing the basis, in 
contravention of the requirements in the Ghana Companies Code (Act 179, 
1963). There is also a general lack of comparability of accounts across clubs as 
different clubs have different accounting policies and treatments in respect of 
the depreciation, revaluation and impairment of assets, and treatment of player 
recruitment costs. Some of the financial statements (income and expenditure 
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accounts, balance sheets, and cash flow statements) provide very little by way 
of detailed financial disclosure.  
More worryingly, however, the evidence in this study indicates that in the case 
of Ghanaian football, the disclosure challenges are exacerbated due to a lack 
of validity in the opinions expressed by some club auditors. The available 
evidence suggests a degree of capture or proximity between auditor and clubs, 
with several examples of accounts being signed off as meeting the disclosure 
requirements despite patently failing so to do (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Clubs 
admit to submitting incorrect accounts to the FA, even though they have been 
passed by auditors to represent the true and fair state of the finances of the 
clubs. Some clubs submit the same audited accounts to the FA year after year 
by just changing the information on the cover. In most cases, this would be 
interpreted as a sign of an inadequate monitoring and enforcement framework. 
This study also concludes that even where clubs submit validly audited financial 
statements, there is a lack of capacity within the FA and the PLB to review the 
accounts to generate feedback for the clubs, limiting the operational 
performance of the FA (Bayle and Robinson, 2007). In combination with the 
use of a general deterrence approach by the FA to achieve regulatory 
compliance, the lack of feedback has obviously generated a ‘ticking-of-the-
boxes mentality’ amongst the clubs, who therefore submit the accounts in order 
to achieve legitimacy and obtain a license to play in the league (McBarnet and 
Whelan, 1991; Morrow, 2006; Simpson; 2002).   
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9.3.2  Financial Sustainability of Ghanaian Clubs 
The second research objective was achieved by analysing the financial 
performance and position of football clubs in Ghana’s Premier League obtained 
from published financial statements which hitherto had remained inaccessible. 
The review covered the period 2010-2012. 
The low and declining level of revenue obtained by Ghanaian clubs, as 
evidenced in the study, is in contrast to the experience in the major European 
countries like England where increasing media rights have resulted in greatly 
increased revenue for clubs (see, for example, Walters & Hamil, 2013; Morrow, 
2011; 2006). One cause of the low income levels in Ghana might be low 
attendances, caused in part by the migration of playing talent abroad leading to 
an apparent diminution in the quality of competition (Darby, 2010). Other 
contributing factors include a lack of proper marketing of the league by the FA 
and the pervasiveness of televised foreign league games. Weaknesses also 
exist in the operation of the player transfer payment system as clubs over-
collateralize their share of the league rights revenue resulting in debts 
remaining unpaid well beyond the agreed payment period. 
The fall in revenue and the accompanying increase in expenditure have 
resulted in Ghanaian clubs making losses on an annual basis. It is a generally 
accepted view that most football clubs around the world make losses on a 
consistent basis (Franck and Lang, 2013). Moreover, the existence of operating 
losses do not necessarily show financial crisis (Lago, Simmons and Symanski, 
2006). However, the causes of the imbalance between income and expenditure 
in Ghana and Europe are markedly different, and thus require different 
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solutions.  For example, while the percentage contribution of match revenue 
within total revenue is on the decline in Ghana, similar to recent experience in 
some European countries, the decline in this ratio in Europe could be 
interpreted positively as attributable to an increase in media rights revenue, 
something which is patently not the case in Ghana. In Ghana, therefore, the 
challenge is escalating costs in the midst of dwindling/static income. 
The majority of Ghanaian clubs are technically bankrupt and are only sustained 
by benefactor-owners who underwrite the debts of the clubs, just as happens in 
Europe (Lago and Franck, 2013). While in Europe, FFP seeks to limit ex post 
financial contributions from these so-called benefactor owners, in contrast there 
is little evidence to support any call to limit the influence of such investors in 
Ghanaian football since clubs are to a large extent dependent on this source of 
finance. Thus whilst funding from this type of investors in Europe may be a 
major contributory factor to financial instability in European football (Lago and 
Franck, 2013, Lindholm, 2011; Geey, 2011), in stark contrast, it may ultimately 
be the basis of survival for Ghanaian clubs.   
The asset base of the clubs is also very low meaning that the clubs lack 
adequate collateral to convince financial institutions to provide short and long-
term funding to the clubs. Thus the combination of lack of collateral, the high 
cost of credit, poor financial performance of clubs and a weak financial position 
makes funding from financial institutions not a viable option for most Ghanaian 
league clubs. 
The alternative sources of income such as gate revenue, sponsorship and 
player sales are just as volatile as funding from owners and directors, if not 
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more so. Thus the lack of viable alternative sources of revenue would seem to 
suggest that clubs do not have a choice but to rely on the magnanimity of rich 
directors and owners, even with its associated risks.  However, the debt profile 
of Ghanaian clubs is such that if the Directors, who in most cases are the 
owners of such debt, decide to recall their loans to the clubs these clubs would 
not be able to repay their loans within a reasonable time period. 
The financial analysis undertaken also shows that the pursuit of sporting 
success internationally, by Ghanaian clubs challenges their financial stability, 
leading in particular to an of accumulation of debt, similar to the case in some 
European countries (Gammelsaeter and Senaux, 2011; Hamil and Chadwick, 
2010; Lago et al, 2006; Walter and Hamil, 2010; ). While UEFA’s Europe wide 
club competitions are seen as both the pinnacle of football achievement and 
important revenue sources, this study indicates that Ghanaian clubs often do 
not find the CAF inter-club competitions, especially the qualification rounds, as 
financially-viable and hence attractive business opportunities. 
 
9.3.3  Lessons from Existing Regulatory Frameworks 
The third research objective of this study was achieved by employing 
Sappington’s principles of regulatory policy design, which is the conceptual 
framework for this study, as the basis for the evaluation of FIFA’s Club 
Licensing regulations, the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play 
Regulations, and the Scottish Club Licensing regulations. The objective of the 
review was to provide useful lessons for the development of a context-specific 
financial regulatory framework for professional football in Ghana.  
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Key conclusions that are drawn from the review of the existing frameworks are 
that it is essential that: the objectives of the regulatory framework are clearly 
defined; the regulatory design process takes into consideration the resources of 
the regulator; the independence of the regulatory body be guaranteed; and the 
quality of the complementary control institutions are ensured. This is because 
these are important factors that determine the scope and the form that 
regulation takes.  
 
Whilst the resources would determine the most effective regulatory 
enforcement instrument to be utilized, the independence of the regulator is 
achieved through: the quality of personnel appointed to serve on the board of 
the regulator; the mode of selection of the membership; and the security of 
tenure of the membership of the regulatory board. The review also shows that a 
regulatory framework could combine aspects of both command-and-control and 
an incentive-based delegated decision-making approaches to regulatory 
design. This would thus justify the introduction of a regulatory body that 
ensures that financial licensing and monitoring are complemented by incentives 
such as access to credit and the provision of support services to clubs. 
 
The review also provides strong support for the need to recognise the necessity 
of the institutional context within which regulations are developed, as argued for 
by writers such as Rodrik (2000) and Baldwin and Black (2008). The inclusion 
in the UEFA FFPR (UEFA, 2012a) of a rolling break-even measure, definitions 
of relevant income and relevant cost, and limits on contributions by equity 
holders in the clubs is explicit recognition of the financial peculiarities, of 
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European football; that is to say its institutional context (Deloitte, 2011; Geey, 
2011, Flanagan, 2013). For instance, the process of arriving at those 
regulations involved extensive consultations with key stakeholders in European 
football, in order to find a European solution to a European problem. It also 
recognised the possible conflict between the FFPRs and the EU anti-
competitive regulations (Bell, 2011).  
The general conclusion from this review is that the development of the FFC 
framework has to be greatly influenced by the context of Ghanaian football. The 
review of Ghanaian football finance, the review of the governance systems in 
Ghanaian football, and the discussions on the challenges to financial 
management of football clubs are all, thus, necessary steps to understanding 
the context within which to develop a modified FFC framework.    
 
9.3.4  Quality of Existing Financial Regulatory Framework in Ghana 
The fourth research objective of the study was also achieved through interviews 
with stakeholders of professional club football in Ghana. Theses took place with 
CEOs or their representatives of all the 16 Premier league clubs as at 1st 
September, 2012, and the President of the FA, the Chairman of the League, 
and the Executives of the welfare body of the league clubs (GHALCA).  
There is a widespread acceptance amongst the stakeholders of Ghanaian 
football that the quality of financial regulation in professional football in Ghana 
is inadequate. As discussed earlier, the few pieces of legislation on the FA’s 
books are either not enforced or not properly communicated to the clubs. 
Stakeholders also believe that the FA and the PLB do not have the internal 
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capacity to adequately enforce the regulations. The lack of capacity is either as 
a result of the FA leadership failing to appoint the people with the professional 
knowledge and expertise to serve on the Board, or failing to attract the right 
calibre of expertise, based on the remuneration structure which could inhibit the 
operational performance mix of the FA (Bayle and Robinson, 2007)   
The study also finds support for the assertion by Morrow (2011) that 
incorporation of a club does not guarantee improved financial success or 
improvements in its financial management practices. The legislated 
incorporation of Ghanaian clubs in 1993 has done little to improve financial 
disclosure of clubs, the financial management practices of the clubs, or 
financial performance of the clubs (as discussed in sections 10.1.1 and 10.1.2).  
However, there is enthusiasm amongst the stakeholders of Ghanaian football 
for the introduction of a financial licensing scheme along the lines introduced by 
FIFA, and incorporated into the FFC framework. They believe that there are 
rationales for regulating the financial aspects of football, not only in the public 
interest, but also in the interest of the private clubs themselves.  
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9.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The general implication of the conclusions drawn from the study is that the FFC 
framework, which has been developed with the peculiar context of Ghanaian 
professional football in mind, is needed to streamline the financial management 
of clubs in the country. The clubs need to be licensed and their financial 
activities monitored, whilst they are provided with financial incentives and 
support services to encourage compliance with licensing regulations.   
9.4.1 Implications for the Football Association and its Clubs 
Serious financial disclosure challenges exist in Ghanaian football. More 
worryingly, these challenges have persisted, sometimes ostensibly with the 
active involvement of club auditors; individuals who are expected to exhibit the 
highest levels of professionalism and integrity.  This has serious implications for 
football’s regulators, such as the FA, which utilises the audited financial 
statements of clubs as a basis for making decisions on clubs’ financial health 
and viability. However, the implications extend beyond the impact on, and for 
any one club.  
A key role of financial statements is to provide comfort to football governing 
bodies and leagues in terms of the credibility and sustainability of their 
competitions. For example, the use of audited financial statements by football 
governing bodies like UEFA for financial licensing purposes, and as the basis 
for determining a club’s conformity to break-even conditions under the Financial 
Fair Play Regulations (Flanagan, 2013; Bell, 2011; Lindholm, 2011; Geey, 
2011), would be seriously undermined if the opinions expressed by club 
auditors cannot be accepted on face value.  
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The study also concludes that the attempt by the FA to legislate for 
incorporation of the clubs and submission of financial statements, to help 
improve their financial management practices has achieved little success. This 
implies that achieving regulatory compliance is likely to require much more than 
the specification of regulatory benchmarks and the adoption of deterrence 
strategies (Gunningham, 2010). In particular the use of incentives are likely to 
be required (Baldwin and Black, 2008; Feld and Frey, 2007), as well as the 
provision of support services to help develop capacity. The national federations 
and the clubs would also have to invest in human capacity building of their own 
to ensure the easy adoption of good corporate governance and financial 
management practices, and improve on professionalism.  
One of the key conclusions of this study is that regulation cannot be developed 
without taking cognisance of the context within which it is to operate. The 
Ghana FA, thus, needs to appreciate that whilst utilising the FIFA CLR (FIFA, 
2010) as a guideline to develop its own licensing scheme is not inappropriate, 
financial regulatory reform must extend beyond merely adopting a framework 
that has been developed around football in other continents and contexts. It 
must take cognisance of the Ghana-specific challenges facing its clubs in 
developing its framework and incorporate appropriate incentives to achieve 
compliance (Feld and Frey, 2007).   
This is the opportune time for the Ghana FA to engage in a more 
comprehensive review of its financial regulatory framework, rather than a 
dogmatic acceptance and wholesale adoption of the FIFA guidelines into its 
statutes. Given the stakeholder views expressed, it could be argued that the FA 
has an opportunity to engage in ‘really responsive regulation’ (Baldwin and 
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Black, 2008), in which it would be responding to changes in its regulatory 
objectives and priorities in light of FIFA’s orders and its changing 
circumstances, as a result of the peculiar challenges faced by its clubs. This 
then justifies the study’s objective of developing a financial regulatory 
framework which is context-specific and which is applicable in Ghana. 
The review also showed that clearly defined regulatory objectives are critical to 
the successful implementation of a set of regulations. The UEFA CLR & FFFPR 
(UEFA, 2012a) and the SFA’s licensing regulations all have clearly defined 
objectives and an implementation framework. These provide examples for the 
Ghana FA in its attempt to develop a financial regulatory framework for its 
domestic leagues. For instance the Scottish FA has extended licensing to all 
levels of the game, something which could be used as a template by the Ghana 
FA over the medium to long-term.  
In the long-term it is important that financial regulation of clubs by the Ghana 
FA acts to encourage clubs to diversify their sources of income. The FA would 
have to work with government and financial institutions in the country to work 
out feasible funding schemes that allow clubs to execute not only their sporting 
objectives, but also support government in its youth and infrastructure 
development agenda. It in turn is important for the clubs’ own long term 
survival.  
Considering the enthusiasm with which stakeholders in Ghana’s professional 
football embraced the tenets of the FFC framework, it is not surprising that 
there is an obvious pathway to impact. The Ghana Football Association has 
begun the process of developing its own licensing framework which 
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incorporates key elements of the FFC framework. Thus the FFC framework has 
found practical use in Ghanaian football and may well serve as an example for 
other African countries as CAF begins to check the implementation of its 
licensing regulations across the continent. 
 
9.4.2  Implications for FIFA/CAF 
The conclusions drawn from this study demonstrate emphatically that football 
regulators such as CAF and FIFA cannot adopt a one-shoe-fit-all approach that 
ignores the institutional context within which both the regulator and the 
regulated entities operate, without encountering serious implementation 
challenges. While context remains central to this study and to its proposed 
framework, similarities between Ghana and other African countries mean that a 
modified version of this framework may be of value elsewhere on the continent. 
Another implication of the study for the football governing bodies is that whilst 
UEFA could conveniently use participation in the UEFA Champions League as 
incentive to encourage clubs to conform to financial licensing conditions, 
CAF/GFA should look for alternative incentives for Ghanaian clubs to achieve 
regulatory compliance. It is important that CAF conducts an assessment of the 
attractiveness of its competitions to inform change in its performance reward 
system. 
The study also implies that there is a crucial role for capacity building programs, 
not only at the club level, but also at federation level. FIFA’s capacity building 
management and administration programs for professional football have been 
mainly targeted at club officials. However, the study shows that the national 
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federations may be as limited in human resource capacity as the clubs, and as 
such they may also require the training that is occasionally offered the clubs.  
 
9.4.3  Implications for Government and its Agencies 
It has been argued that with help from Government, the CAF inter-club 
competitions could become financially viable pursuits. The study demonstrates 
widespread support among Ghanaian football’s stakeholders for such 
government support, this being based on the notion of football being a public 
good, and on perceived external societal benefits arising out of the production 
processes of professional football clubs. Football could be utilised as a tool for 
helping to achieve Government policy targets on health, as the provision of 
sports infrastructure encourages increased mass participation in sports and 
exercise, which has well-known positive health implications. Support for clubs 
by Government would also be an extension of Governments youth 
development policy to cover a particular section of the youth with an identifiable 
skill.  
There are also implications for government agencies such as the social 
insurance, tax, judiciary and company registration authorities. These 
organisations are key stakeholders which function as complementary control 
institutions (Sappington, 1994), and whose effectiveness in carrying out their 
functions in relation to football clubs affects the ability of football’s regulators to 
effectively regulate the financial activities of clubs.  
The migration of players, which has affected the quality of talents on display in 
the Ghanaian league, may be a function of the weaknesses in the general 
393 
 
Ghanaian economy which ensures that Ghanaian firms cannot compete with 
their rivals from other countries for the best employable talents. Thus any 
solution to the problem of migration from Ghana goes beyond football policy 
and requires a comprehensive national policy to deal with employment and 
wages in Ghana.   
 
9.4.4  Implications for Investors and Other Stakeholders of Clubs 
Just like the FA, investors, creditors, and other stakeholders of clubs utilise 
audited financial statements of clubs as a basis for forming judgements on 
clubs’ financial health and viability. Financial institutions, potential investors and 
shareholders all use the information as the basis for determining the risk 
associated with giving out credit facilities to, or investing in a firm. An 
implication from the findings of this study is that such risk assessment may be 
based, in some instances, on manipulated or unreliable accounting figures, 
potentially jeopardising the investment of this group of stakeholders.   
This highlights one of the challenges in operating meta-regulatory frameworks 
which involve self-regulatory bodies such as professional accountancy 
governing bodies, of which the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ghana 
(ICAG) is a member. Their members are professionals, one definition of which 
is an ability to exercise judgement, with such professions and professionals 
being predicated on principles like integrity and honesty.  
However, where evidence exists that some collude with club management to 
produce manipulated accounting figures, this could be considered as an 
attempt by club auditors to abuse the discretion afforded them. They are 
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exploiting their membership of a self-regulating body, to achieve their private 
individual interests, rather than public regulatory goals. The ICAG would thus 
have to improve on its monitoring of members’ activities to ensure that the 
credibility of its licensing process is not brought into question.   
 
9.4.5  Implications for Researchers and Direction for Future Research 
The modified FFC framework provides researchers with an example of what a 
combination of theoretical reviews and engagement with the stakeholders could 
achieve in terms of a regulatory framework applicable in a specific context. The 
systematic steps utilised by this study to arrive at this model provide the basis 
for replication by other researchers for different contexts. The results of these 
replications may not be the same but would contribute empirically tested 
frameworks that work for a particular football context.  
This study provides a basis for future research into the sustainability of 
Ghanaian professional football clubs utilizing a larger data set. The data on 
financial information on clubs utilized in this study covers a very short period, 
which does not allow for proper trend and regression analysis to be done. 
Future research utilising a set of panel data covering at least five years would 
allow for more vigorous assessment of the factors that affect the sustainability 
of Ghanaian clubs in the Premier division as well as at the lower levels. This 
would allow for cause-and-effect relationship between financial sustainability 
and the factors influencing its achievement to be established. 
The role of televised local games on match attendance and televised foreign 
games on domestic game attendance needs to be critically assessed in the 
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Ghanaian context by the clubs, the FA and policy makers. This is to determine 
what policy, if any, is required to ensure that televised games do not become a 
negative influence on the ability of Ghanaian clubs to improve match 
attendance and ticket revenue.  The FFC, through its policy advocacy role 
could influence policy in this direction. 
The third area of future research would be the effect of quality of financial 
regulation on the investment decisions of club managers. Future research could 
focus on determining how changes in regulatory policy affect the financial 
decisions of clubs, and in effect on their financial performance and position. 
 
9.5  SUMMARY 
This study has shown that Ghanaian professional football clubs face a difficult 
financial environment, and that their messy finances pose a danger to the long-
term stability and integrity of the league. There is recognition amongst 
stakeholders that something has to be done to avert this possibility, with 
improved financial regulation being an option. There is also an appetite 
amongst the stakeholders for improved financial regulation of clubs. 
This study has shown that examples of financial regulation that exist in Europe 
are not applicable in the Ghanaian context, necessitating the development of a 
country-specific financial regulatory framework for professional football in 
Ghana. The incentive-based Football Financial Clearinghouse (FFC) framework 
has been offered by this study as a workable solution to this challenge in 
Ghana. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Critique of Regulatory enforcement Models by Baldwin & Black (2008) 
Critique  Responsive 
Regulation 
Smart 
Regulation 
Risk-based 
Regulation 
Regulatory Craft 
Step-by-step escalation may be 
inappropriate  
√ √ ● ● 
Potential to limit Voluntary 
Compliance  
√ √ ● ● 
Relationship between regulator and 
regulate may be compromised 
√ √ ● ● 
Tit-for-tat strategy across board may 
be wasteful 
√ √ ● ● 
Weak in dealing with complex and 
networked regulatory frameworks 
√ √ ● ● 
Insufficient repeat interactions limit 
pyramidal strategies 
√ √ ● ● 
Regulator may lack judicial, public, 
political or business support for 
escalation of punishment 
√ √ ● ● 
Fairness, proportionality and 
consistency cannot be guaranteed 
√ √ ● ● 
Information management, resource 
and time constraints 
√ √ ● √ 
Coordination problems ● √ ● √ 
Difficulty in prioritising risks ● ● √ ● 
Determining risk tolerance levels ● ● √ ● 
Focus on known and familiar risks ● ● √ ● 
Substitutes widely spread risks for 
lower number of larger risks 
● ● √ ● 
Focus limited to individual firms ● ● √ ● 
Assumes regulation can be parcelled 
into problems and projects 
● ● ● √ 
Source: Baldwin and Black (2008) 
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Appendix 2: CLUB INTERVIEW GUIDE (Part 1) 
1. CLUB: 
2. INTERVIEW DATE: 
3.  INTERVIEWER: 
4. LOCATION: 
5. START TIME: 
6. END TIME: 
Ask for permission to set up audio recording of interview session. 
Note: Start the session by introducing the Interviewer, providing the rationale for the 
overall study and the description of the Football Financial Clearinghouse Model and what 
it seeks to achieve: 
- Improve Financial environment facing clubs by ensuring regulated access to credit 
- Serve as the first Instance Body in the Assessment of the Financial Criteria of the 
Club Licensing Regulations 
- Provide Financial Advisory Services to clubs 
- Provide financial monitoring of clubs 
PART A: INTERVIEW SESSION 1 
Q1: Is there a need for financial regulation of football in Ghana? 
Q2: Does the existing FA regulations serve as an adequate framework for regulating the 
financial management of clubs in Ghana? 
PART B: PRESENTATION 
PowerPoint presentation of Football Financial Clearinghouse Model (30 minutes) 
proceeding as follows: 
- Diagram A: Club Licensing Framework with FFC as First Instance Body for Financial 
Criteria 
- Criteria Grading for Financial Criteria of Club Licensing 
- Diagram B: Club Licensing Monitoring Framework 
- Diagram C: Football Financial Clearinghouse Resource Flow 
- Diagram D: FFC Monitoring of Members 
- Diagram E: FFC Functional Framework 
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Appendix 2: CLUB INTERVIEW GUIDE (Part 2) 
 
PART C: INTERVIEW SESSION 2 
Q1: Based on the presentation above what would be your general impressions about the model? 
Q2: Can Ghanaian clubs meet the criteria grading as explained in the presentation and what modifications, if 
any, would have to be made to the grading system? 
Q3: What should be the implementation plan for the club licensing system? 
Q4: Do you think that all the members as mentioned in the model are required to participate to achieve the 
objectives of the Framework? 
Q5: Do you think that the FFC Board as set out in the Model can effectively 
- coordinate player transfers? 
- provide guarantee for short term credit? 
- Coordinate access to funding from Government? 
Q6: What is your assessment of the FFC Board’s role in the club licensing process? 
- Should it be given the power to review the financial statements of clubs? 
- How do they ensure that clubs have no overdue payments? 
- Can they make recommendations on the financial sustainability of clubs 
- Should clubs failing to meet standards and failing the licensing process be barred from taking part in 
domestic and international club competitions?  
Q7: Would your club require the FFC’s services in the following ways: 
- Provide advisory services in proper financial management and best practices in financial reporting? 
- Arrange training programs for your staff on financial planning; budgeting, financial analysis, taxation 
etc.? 
- Providing policy advocacy on taxation, government support for clubs etc.? 
Q8: What is your overall evaluation of the Football Financial Clearinghouse Model? 
The respondents would then be given the opportunity to ask the researcher any questions that they would like 
to ask for clarification. They would then be thanked for their participation. 
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Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet 
Dear Participant, 
I am a PhD candidate at the School of Sports at the University of Stirling, UK. I am writing a dissertation on the topic “Financial Regulation of Professional Football in 
Ghana”. 
I seek to develop a framework of financial regulation which is incentive-based, football specific and has relevance for the Ghanaian context. The Football Financial 
Clearinghouse (FFC) is a regulatory framework which seeks to improve the financial environment within which Ghanaian football clubs operate by ensuring regulated 
access to credit; license football clubs for participation in both domestic and international inter-club competitions based on financial criteria; provide financial advisory 
services to clubs and monitor the implementation of financial regulations by professional clubs.  
As a key stakeholder in the development of football in Ghana, your input would be greatly appreciated. Your assistance is being sought to provide answers to two sets of 
questions. This would take the form of an interview session or focus group meeting where appropriate, which would not take more than ninety (90) minutes. The first set 
relates to the financial environment within which Ghanaian clubs operate; the degree of transparency and accountability and how this affects their financial performance. 
The second set requires you to review the financial regulatory framework that has been developed and its relevance to the Ghanaian context. The documents you are 
expected to review include diagrams relating to the model and a Definition of Terms to assist you with understanding the model. I would answer all questions that you may 
have in order to fully understand the questions.  
The interview and focus group discussions would be recorded using an audio recording device. You have a choice of determining if you are comfortable with the recording 
of the session. Once recorded however, I would make every effort to ensure that you remain anonymous. You are free to withdraw from the study or any part of the study 
at any time you wish. The findings from this study would be published as part of my PhD thesis. However, the information provided would be kept strictly confidential and 
no names or particulars of individuals or clubs would be used in the final report. Where necessary, only a pseudonym would be used to protect the anonymity of you or 
your organisation. Thank you for taking part in the research. 
ORGANISATION:        DATE: 
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Appendix 4: Ethics Approval 
Certificate 
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Appendix 5: FFC TRANSCRIPT VALIDATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please spend some few minutes answering the questions that follow.  
It is meant for academic research only; and no part of the information  
gathered would be disclosed to third parties without your consent. 
A.  GENERAL 
1. Age      …………………………………………………. 
2. Highest Level of Education   …………………………………………………. 
2. Sex                                                           Male                                 Female  
4. Number of years as administrator at premier league Level           …………………………………………………. 
5. Age of Club     …………………………………………………. 
B. VALIDATION OF TRANSCRIPT 
(Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
Indicate your choice by ticking the appropriate box.) 
[1= Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3= Neutral; 4= Agree; 5= Strongly Agree]      1        2        3        4         5     
1.   Transcript corresponds to what transpired between me and Researcher                                                                                                                                         
2.   There is the need for substantial corrections in transcript                                                                                                                             
3.   Existing Regulations before Club Licensing Regulations were adequate                                                                                                                                             
4.    Club Licensing Regulations will improve financial regulation of clubs                                                                                                                                        
5.    Clubs are in general properly managed financially                                                                                                                                         
6.   FFC Framework will improve financial management of clubs                                                                                                                                 
7.   FFC Framework will improve Financial Governance of Clubs                                                                                                                                         
8.  FFC Framework will improve accountability within clubs                                                                                                                                  
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT! 
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Appendix 6: Composition of UEFA Football Club Control Panel, December, 2012 
Name Chamber Country Position Background 
Jose Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues 
Louis Peila 
Christiaan Timmermans 
Charles Flint 
Adam Giersz 
 
ADJUDICATORY PORTUGAL Chairman of  CFCB Former Judge at the European Court of Justice 
SWITZERLAND Vice-Chairman of CFCB Judge Cantonal, Court of Geneva 
NETHERLANDS Vice-Chairman of CFCB Former Judge at the European Court of Justice 
ENGLAND Member of CFCB Senior Barrister (Financial Regulation and Sports Law 
POLAND Member of CFCB Former Sports Minister of Poland 
 
Jean-Luc Dehaene 
Jacobo Beltran 
Brian Quinn 
Egon Franck 
Umberto Lago 
Petros Mavroidis 
Konstantin Sonin 
Yves Wehrli 
 
INVESTIGATORY BELGIUM Chief Investigator of CFCB Former Prime Minister of Belgium 
SPAIN Investigator Member of Madrid Assembly 
SCOTLAND Investigator Former Executive Director and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
GERMANY Investigator Professor and Chair of Business Management, University of Zurich 
ITALY Investigator Professor of Economics, University of Bologna 
GREECE Investigator Professor of Law at the European University Institute, Florence 
RUSSIA Investigator Professor of Economics & Vice Rector, New Economic School, Moscow 
FRANCE Investigator Lawyer and Managing Partner of Clifford Chance 
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Review Contents and 
Implement License Conditions 
Review Contents 
Prepare and Submit License 
Application Documents 
Review Decision and 
Investigate Licensing Process 
Review Contents 
Provide Club Licensing 
Documents to Clubs 
Review Report and Make 
Decision 
License Committee takes 
Decision to Award License 
Submit Report 
Audit Club 
Provide Report to License 
Committee of Association 
Submit Report to UEFA CFCP 
National Association 
(Licensor) 
Club License 
(Applicant) 
Club Financial Control 
Body (Investigator) 
Club Financial Control 
Body(Adjudicator) Appendix 7:  UEFA 
Licensing & 
Monitoring 
Framework 
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SFA Experts  Licensing Administration   Licence Applicant (LA)  SFA Body/UEFA         Licensing 
Committee 
 
Review Club Licensing 
Documents 
Board Approves Changes 
Review Body Agrees 
changes/make 
recommendations 
Review Contents 
Amend Club Licensing 
Documents 
Provide Revisions to UEFA 
Review Contents 
UEFA confirms complete 
integration of UEFA minimum 
requirements 
Arrange Audit 
Review Contents Provide Club Licensing 
Documents to LA and Others 
LA agrees Audit 
Review Contents 
Consider Content 
Prepare Feedback to Licensing 
Administration 
Review Contents 
Audit from SFA 
Review and Prepare Confirm Date of Audit and 
provide Checklist 
Audit LA 
Prepare Club licensing Report 
for LA 
Review and Prep. Report to    
Experts / LA/LC 
Provide Committee Report to 
Experts/LA/LC 
Review Contents 
Prepare Feedback to Licensing 
Administration 
Consider Contents 
Review and Decision Making 
Appendix 8: Scottish FA Licensing 
Framework 
UEFA Club Financial Control 
Panel Monitoring 
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Appendix 10: Sponsorship Contracts for Asante Kotoko Signed between 2010 - 2013 
Company Contract  
date 
Duration Annual Payments 
(maximum) 
Remarks 
MTN 01/10/2010 2.5 years GHC1,050,000 GHC150,000 paid annual for the construction of Legacy Project 
Interplast 19/10/2010 3 years GHC100,000 GHC 60,000 as bonus for winning League and GHC15,000 for 
winning 
FA Cup 
Latex Foam 14/07/2012 3 years GHC120,000 GHC10,000 in products per annum 
rLG 08/01/2013 3 years GHC 120,000 Plus commission on the sale of Kotoko branded mobile handsets 
IEI 01/01/2011 3 years GHC20,000 GHC 55,000 utilized to purchase insurance premium 
Everpure 01/11/2011 3 years GHC60,000 Half of the amount is in products of the water company 
Fidelity Bank 01/04/2011 3 years GHC72,000 Increases to GHC96,000 in a year in which in the club qualifies to 
play in CAF Interclub competitions Africa 
Smart TV 01/09/2010 3 years GHC67,000  GHC88,000 utilized to buy bus for Youth team in year one 
Blue Jeans 01/08/2012 3 years Y1 = GHC 100,000 
Y2 = GHC 120,000 
Y3 = GHC 130,000 
GHC250,000 for years 2 & 3 to be utilized to construct astro turf 
branded in sponsor’s name 
Kinapharma 01/09/2012 5 years Y1 = GHC 60,000 
Y2 = GHC 72,000 
Y3 = GHC 84,000 
y4 = GHC 96,000 
Y5 = GHC108,000 
Products of company  included  
Africa Origins 01/07/2012 3 years Y1 = 30,000 
Y2 = 40,000 
Y3 = 40,000 
Official Travel and Tours Partner 
Mama Vits 01/10/12 3 years GHC15,000 Official Meal Partner 
UBI Petroleum 01/09/2012 2 years GHC 24,000 In fuel coupons 
Source: Interim Financial Statement of Asante Kotoko SC for the Year ending June, 2013. 
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Appendix 9:  Deductions made from Rights Revenue by GFA to settle Kotoko’s Other Football Indebtedness  
 REFERENCE 
DATE 
IN RESPECT OF ANOUNT REMARKS 
GHANA FA JAN 2009 Loan taken by club to execute CAF 
Champions League campaign 
US$ 20,000 Three payments made between 
2009-2012 leaving balance of 
US$11,058  
GHANA FA AUG 2009 Unpaid player transfer commission in respect 
of transfer of Alex Asamoah to FC 
Gyeongnam of South Korea 
US$ 5,000 Amount paid out of OMP Media 
Right revenue due to club in March 
2010 
HANS DIETER  
SCHIMDT 
MAR 2012 Payment made on behalf of the club as a 
result of the decision of Court of Arbitration 
(CAS) to the club’s former coach  
US$ 22,216 Amount paid out of GLO sponsorship 
revenue due to club in March 2012 
GENCLEBIRLIGI MAR 2012 Payment for Solidarity Mechanism made on 
behalf of the club as a result of decision of 
FIFA Player Status Committee in the transfer 
of Adamu Mohammed 
US$ 6,037 Amount paid out of GLO sponsorship 
revenue due to club in March 2012 
FIFA MAR 2012 Payment of Fines imposed by FIFA Player 
Status Committee in the transfer of Adamu 
Mohammed 
US$ 1,392 Amount paid out of GLO sponsorship 
revenue due to club in March 2012 
GHALCA JAN 2009 Loan taken by club to execute CAF 
Champions League campaign 
US$20,000 Two installments totaling 10,000 
made in 2011 and 2012 leaving a 
balance of US$ 10,000 as at 
30/06/2013 
GHANA FA MAR 2012 Bank Charges US$688 Amount paid out of GLO sponsorship 
revenue due to club in March 2012 
Source: Ghana Football Association 
 
 
 
 
 
 
441 
 
Appendix 11: FFC Financial Licensing Criteria Grading 
Grade Description Content 
A Annual Financial Statements Audited Documents required to be prepared and audited by independent auditors include: 
- Balance Sheet , Profit and Loss account, Notes to Financial Statements 
These documents should be accompanied by Directors’ Report or Financial Review by Management  
Information in Balance Sheet:  Current Assets: Accounts Receivable  -Other expanded to include receivables from FA and Affiliates of the FA 
Non-Current Assets:  No changes made to requirements in the FIFA Regulations 
Current Liabilities: Four other line items included to reflect the fact that the accounts should include ‘purpose-oriented financial info’. Accounts Payable – Other 
disintegrated.  
Non-Current Liabilities: Other Long-Term Liabilities split into that in respect of Player Sign-On and Player Transfer Fees 
Information in profit and Loss Account Revenue: Made more relevant to the Ghanaian situation in terms of the description of the line items. More disaggregated data to be provided which is football 
specific. 
Expenses: Payments to players disaggregated whilst expenditures related to fines/fees/subscriptions are also separated from other operating expenses 
B Evidence of Payment of Employee Salary Club to provide evidence of payment of staff to the FFC on a monthly basis. 
Cash Flow for Licence Year From Operating activities 2. Investing Activities,  3. Financing Activities 4. Others 
Budget for Licence Year  
No Overdue to Clubs From Player Transfers. Evidence to be provided by Club. 
No Overdue to Players From Sign-On/Enticement Fees. Evidence to be provided by Club 
No Overdue to Other Employees Evidence to be provided by Club 
No Overdue to Tax/Social Agencies Tax, Social Security and National Health Insurance payments. Evidence to be provided by club. 
C Loan Agreements with Financial 
Institutions 
It is in the interest of the club to ensure that loans that it contracts are endorsed by the FFC 
Loan agreements with FA Any of the two parties involved would make it available to the FFC 
Loan Agreements with Other FA 
Affiliates 
Any of the two parties involved would make it available to the FFC 
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Appendix 12: Documents to be submitted by Clubs to FFC 
Document Notes Frequency Ghana FFC 
Regulations 
Balance Sheet Required by the Companies Code, 1963 
(Act 179) Part N: Article 123-136. To be 
audited by independent auditor. (Criteria 
A) 
Annually √ 
Profit & Loss Account Required by all (criteria A) Annually √ 
Notes to Financial Statement Required by all (Criteria A) Annually √ 
Cash Flow for the Current Year 
(T) 
Would help to determine whether a club 
would survive as a going concern and 
meet its financial commitments during the 
(Criteria B) 
Annually √ 
Budget for the current Year Would help to determine whether a club 
would survive as a going concern and 
meet its financial commitments during the 
licence year. (Criteria B) 
Annually √ 
Audited Account  (T-1) Required by the Companies Code, 1963 
(Act 179) Part N: Article 123-136. To be 
audited by independent auditor. (Criteria 
A) 
Annually √ 
Audited Account (T-2) Would become automatically available to 
the FFC Board by the second year of its 
operation… except for clubs who are 
undergoing the licensing for the first time 
(Criteria A) 
During the first  
review year only 
× 
Player Transfer Agreements 
between clubs detailing 
payment schedule 
Allows for the detection of overdue 
payments to football clubs resulting from 
player transfers. It is also required as part 
of the player registration process. (Criteria 
B) 
Seven (7) days  
before the  
end of the transfer  
window 
√ 
Player Contracts detailing 
financial conditions of contract 
and payment schedule 
To determine overdue payments to 
players. Also required as part of player the 
player registration system (Criteria A) 
Seven (7) days  
before the end  
of the transfer window 
√ 
Loan Agreements with Financial 
Institutions 
For approval and guaranteeing (if 
required) by FFC (Criteria B) 
14 days before 
 the agreement  
becomes effective 
√ 
Loan Agreements with FA Short term arrangements (Criteria B) 3 days after  
signing of agreement 
√ 
Loan Agreements with Other FA 
affiliates 
short term arrangements (Criteria B)  3 days after  
signing of agreement 
√ 
Function statements from home 
matches 
To be submitted within 7 days of a match. 
Failure to submit within stipulated time 
frame should attract a sanction (Criteria B) 
7 days after a match √ 
Evidence of Payments of Salary 
of Players and Staff 
To be submitted within 14 days of the last 
day of the month 
Monthly √ 
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Appendix 13: Information on Balance Sheet 
Type Item 
Current Assets Cash and Cash Equivalents 
Accounts Receivable from player transfers 
Accounts Receivables from FA  
Accounts Receivables from GHALCA 
Accounts receivables from group entities and related parties 
Accounts Receivables –Other 
Inventories 
Non-Current Assets Tangible Fixed Assets 
Intangible Assets – Players 
Intangible Assets – Other 
Investments 
Current Liabilities Bank Overdrafts and Loans (financial Institutions) 
Accounts Payable Relating to Player Transfers 
Accounts Payable Relating to Player Sign-On 
Accounts Payable to Other Employees 
Accounts Payable to FA 
Accounts Payable to Affiliates of FA 
Accounts Payable – Other 
Tax Liabilities 
SSNIT (Social Security Contributions) 
Non-Current Liabilities Bank and Other Loans 
Other Long Term Liabilities – Player Sign-On 
Other Long Term Liabilities – Player Transfer 
Tax Liabilities 
Long-Term Provisions   
Net Assets/Liabilities Net Assets/Liabilities 
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Appendix 14: Information in Profit/Loss Accounts 
Type Item Comment 
Revenue Gate Receipts 
Player Sales 
Club Sponsorship & Advertising 
League & FA Cup Sponsorship 
Media Right Sales 
Commercial & Merchandising 
Donations 
Other Operating Income 
Represents an almost exhaustive 
list of the sources of revenue for 
Ghanaian clubs. Support from 
government agencies 
Expenses Cost of Sales/Materials 
Employee (Non-Player) Benefit Expense 
Impairment of Fixed Assets 
Amortisation of Player Values 
Player Wages 
Performance Related Payments to Players 
Other Expenditure on Players (e.g. Housing) 
Fines/Costs/Subscriptions 
Other Operating Expenses 
 
Other Profit/Loss on Disposal of Assets – Players 
Profit/Loss on Disposal of Assets – Others 
Finance Cost 
Tax Expense 
Profit or Loss After Taxation 
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 1) 
INTERVIEWER (I):  KWAME BAAH-NUAKOH 
RESPONDENT (R):  ADU  
LOCATION:   CONFERENCE ROOM, GHANA FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, ACCRA 
 
INTRODUCTION OF INTERVIEW SESSION MADE AND RESPONDENT GAVE CONSENT TO BEGIN 
I: Good after… my name is Kwame Baah-Nuakoh and I am doing a PhD thesis on the financial regulation of professional football clubs. I 
would like tom pick your thoughts on the financial regulation of clubs. For instance if you feel there is a need for clubs to be regulated, to 
ensure that they run the financial activities of their clubs properly, whether you think the current FA regulations are adequate to ensure 
that clubs are regulated financially; and then I will show you a model of financial regulation that I have developed and I would pick your 
thoughts on whether you feel it is relevant for the Ghanaian situation. 
So first I want to find out from you what your thoughts are Do you think that clubs should be financially regulated and by whom? 
R: Certainly yes because the clubs form the association and in every association there must be guidelines and especially because the clubs 
manage players and it is an employment situation, there must be a general rule that guides how clubs run their various affairs in terms of 
financial issues. So I think that it’s always necessary and very important that the association becomes the regulator so that once you 
breach it there must be some sanctions because you have to be taking part in the competitions of the association. So if the association 
regulates it---once people always want to be part of the competition they would be compelled to respect the regulation. 
I: Now let me find out from you --- currently what I know is that clubs are asked by the regulations and the statutes to submit their 
accounts annually to take part in the league, the FA is also obliged --- the FA can also investigate the activities of a club---Do you believe 
that these have been working well and are they adequate for the regulation of clubs? 
R: Seriously, I think that at our level now, and looking at our financial circumstances in terms of the national economy I think that for now 
it is okay---but the point is that it is a question of supervision. Even though clubs are enjoined to submit audited accounts the question is 
“how true or how correct are these accounts presented?” So the FA maybe--- that is why I talk about supervision --- so the FA maybe must 
devise a means where these accounts can be verified to know whether people do not just only pick figures to arrive at something. 
I: But the accounts are supposed to be audited by qualified auditors? 
R: Kwame, you are in this country and you know that there are a whole lot of accounting firms, there are a whole lot of auditors who 
would want to work for people. Once they are being paid they can do anything --- because what you bring to the FA is supposed to reflect 
on your accounting or financial situation. You find out that what the clubs bring and during the season what happens and even in terms of 
clubs owing, in purchasing of players, transfer fees and other things. If you compare that with the audited accounts for maybe the 
previous year you would see that it doesn’t tally. So for that reason there must be some mechanism to be able to verify to some extent, 
they are not interfering in their financial business but just to make sure that what they present should be the true reflection of the 
activities of the club. 
I: What is the objective of asking them to present in the first place… to ensure that they have adequate funds all is it because you want to 
make sure that they are doing the right things? 
R: It is because the association would want to make sure that they are doing the right things because you know we have been running 
clubs previously on this ‘one man business’ and --- the man just picks; no receipt; nothing --- gives money to a player or buys something 
without reference to documentation and other things. But since we want to get to professionalism where we expect corporate bodies to 
come and sponsor those bodies would want to make sure that when they bring the sponsorship you’ll account for them or you would use 
them religiously well such that they would know that yes --- they have some returns in terms of respect for the money that they have put 
in.  
It is not just that you come and take the sponsorship money and you think you have to go and use it for your cocoa farm. You must use it 
for the purpose which you applied for. So I think that that is why the association should be more particular in regulating the financial 
activities of the clubs and for that matter putting out a regulation that would compel them to respect certain basic requirements about 
financial activities [of the clubs].  
I: Let me ask you about the transfer--- you raised the issue of clubs owing from purchases… how does it normally go? I mean --- A club 
wants a player from another club, they negotiate, they agree on the terms of payment. Do you have any experience as to how they 
guarantee system for instance comes in? 
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 2) 
R: Yah--- that is where I think these regulations would help because people go into negotiations … because the association hasn’t got any 
mechanism for controlling the transfer arrangement, --- ”eh oh, give me your player… you know registration window is closing. Let me 
register him… eh I will pay you this amount … blah, blah, blah. Even the player “you just sign, I will pay you---” Those are the things that we 
do. But when there is a system such that if you are signing on a player… I know FIFA in their Status and Transfer (the Regulations for the 
Status and Transfer of Players) they have time limits. If you purchase a player in terms of Solidarity and payment of Training Compensation 
, within 30 days you must pay this, that, that, that…  
These are some of the things that I expect the association would have to do. So that --- for domestic transfers… people would not even 
accumulate debt. If you know that you have to pay 200 million (Cedis) within the next thirty days, at the end you will budget yourself to 
the point that when you are buying players you will look at what you have and what you can pay within a certain period before you do the 
negotiation. And that is why it is necessary so that it would even help the clubs to control their debt situation. 
I: Probably not to buy more than they can afford--- 
R: ---more than they can afford--- 
I: Let’s look at the use of the GLO sponsorship money as guarantee--- What are the problems associated with it and what are the 
advantages? Let’s start with the advantages. Who do clubs do that in the first place? 
R: Because clubs had stayed for long without sponsorship so when sponsorship started coming in and especially when the GLO came and 
the first two years they saw that they were regular in paying and because the clubs didn’t have another source of revenue and since other 
bodies that they were dealing with knew very well that at least at the end of this period GLO is going to pay this club this amount. The 
advantage was that you had a guarantee somewhere so if you go in to purchase a player, you tell the man that “oh this GLO money is 
coming so when it is paid I will then come back and pay you.” And that is why I say that it is necessary for the FA to regulate it. So that the 
association knows that you have US$120,000 so if you are doing any purchase within the season, assuming that you are going to use only 
the GLO sponsorship money for your purchases, then it should not go beyond that. Initially that was the advantage because there was 
guarantee so people could rely on.  
I: The clubs would not even have to go to the financial markets to borrow where there would be interest 
R: Where there would be interest and---. The disadvantage is that when the sponsorship delays---you know in Ghana because every day 
you have --- you made use of that your financial term --- the cedi loses value --- the depreciation of ---. The moment you keep on relying on 
the sponsorship and it does not come, the person you owe keeps pressing you, so even if you know the GLO money would come because 
somebody is putting pressure on you you’ll be tempted to go and borrow from the financial institution and come and pay. And now you 
will use the GLO money again as a guarantee. But in the financial institution there are interest accruing and for that reason if the money 
delays---. That is the major disadvantage in terms of using the sponsorship money as a collateral and going in for loans. It is also a 
disadvantage to those who sell the players to you. Because if like the GLO delayed for almost one and a half years, so if you promised 
somebody that within the next thirty or forty days am going to pay you he has to stay for one and a half years. And because there was no 
arrangement to show that if you pay it after this date there must be this interest accruing on it, it is a disadvantage---the seller is losing.  
I: Let me get your thoughts on clubs going to financial institutions for money. What are the main challenges? Has your club ever taken 
advantage of that---gone to financial institutions --- and what are the challenges or what have you heard? 
R: Seriously my club has not done because you know it’s almost like --- it is a traditional team and the paramount chief is the man who is 
doing everything so it’s like the state---local traditional state that is in charge and I am not aware that they have gone to any financial 
institution to--- 
I: And why have they not gone … is it because..? 
R: Because they sell lands and the other royalties that companies pay to them and other things. Then the Omanhene himself uses his own 
personal business monies that he gets---. But you look at other clubs that do not have source of revenue, they are compelled to go to the 
financial institutions and go and borrow. 
I: And what are their stories? 
R: Their stories is very bitter because in the end they find out that whatever comes in in terms of sponsorship is swallowed and sometimes 
they even have to go to beg for the financial institutions to stop the interest for a while so that they would be able to pay. And I think that 
that is the problem --- 
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 3) 
I: So it’s an issue of the cost of credit --- the cost is prohibitive..? 
R: Yes--- Yes, that is the problem --- but I believe that if the sponsorship was coming regularly there wouldn’t have been any problem.  
I: Clubs don’t have to go there or --- is it that if the sponsorship money was coming regularly clubs … 
R: wouldn’t have to go to financial institutions… 
I: ---or they wouldn’t have to pay a lot more interest…? 
R: I think the two --- because the sponsorship takes care of about maybe 20% of your total expenditure. But because sometimes it comes 
in bulk, when it comes you use it to pay something. But whether it comes or not --- but if you know it would come regularly what you do 
sometimes is that you borrow to do the day to day running of the club because maybe you have sold a player somewhere and you think 
that they would pay later so that when that money comes in you use that money to defray. The problem I see is the delay in the 
sponsorship.  
I: Let me pick your thoughts on --- you know clubs --- the FA for instance used to give short term credit to clubs especially those who are 
playing in Africa. What is the history --- what is your understanding of that history? We heard the FA wanted to stop doing that --- Would 
you support that or you think it needs to be refined? 
R: Personally I do not believe that the FA should loan. The FA should support, and for that matter the Government. I have always had that 
view… 
I: support in what way---financially? 
R: Financially---. Give the money to support them and not expecting the money to be paid back--- because whether we like it or not the 
performances of our clubs gives --- the credit sometimes goes to the nation and it raises the image of the association. So if you want to get 
some respect somewhere, due to the performances of your clubs then you must also make some input. And that is why if the FA regulates 
the financial activities of the clubs then they would be able to guarantee that if I am putting money for you to go to Africa, you are not 
going to misuse the money because at least I will have access in trying to control how the money is used.  
So I will suggest that in future the FA should sit down maybe in collaboration with the government and maybe set up --- if in the budget of 
the government --- when we had four clubs in Africa --- if you budget US$ 1 million every year --- it’s not much. Every club takes 
US$250,000 as seeding money to start the African campaign. From then on they themselves would have to fend for themselves. It would 
be okay and am sure that it would motivate the clubs to do very well and if they do very well it would also reflect on our national teams 
because clubs would be ready to buy quality and train them. Even if they don’t buy they would be ready to invest, put up infrastructure to 
train players. 
I: and even maintain them--- 
R: Maintain them so that they would not be flying outside and for that matter the national teams too would also gain. So I will recommend 
that at least one million dollar every year from the government purse because if they go outside they just don’t call the club they talk 
about Ghana. The national anthem that is played is not the club’s anthem (Laughs) 
I: Before I come to the model itself let me pick your thoughts on the club licensing regulations---especially the financial aspects of it. What 
do you understand that--- What are your thoughts? 
R: I think it is the same thing that we are talking about because if the FA is regulating your financial situation --- because it is regulating it, it 
has given some categories of clubs. So depending on your financial might at a particular time you would be classified maybe in a higher 
category. In so doing the clubs would be so committed in trying to do the right thing because they want to remain in the league --- they 
want to be on top there because whether we like it or not sale of players is part of the business of football and every club administrator 
would want to make sure that at least he would be able to sell a player. If this club licensing is put in place it would now be incumbent on 
all the clubs to show financial ability, financial trust --- people must trust that you can do the right thing --- credible, credit worthy and all 
those things and it would show your capability in terms of going to play in Africa or so --- I think that that would give the Association the 
power, authority to regulate and to supervise.  
I: Two quick questions --- why isn’t the FA able to review the financial statements of clubs --- is it an issue of capacity within the FA?  
R: I think it is a practice in this country. Like the companies submit their audited accounts to the Registrar General every year, they don’t --
- you don’t hear anything. Nobody verifies --- nobody does anything  
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 4) 
I: But does the FA have the capacity internally to review? 
R: For now they don’t have but if it has to come on board then they would have to train people for that. 
I: We have raised the issue of some auditors of clubs approve of documents which do not reflect in anyway --- would you suggest that the 
FA say bans an auditing firm because it doesn’t show credibility from auditing any football club? 
R: It would depend on whether they have enough evidence to show that that firm has--- 
I: okay let me give you an example where two clubs being audited by the same firm submits the same figures.  
R: That is enough evidence to show that the auditor did not do any thorough work because in auditing there cannot be two companies 
with the same situation in terms of financial arrangements. That one you would have the basis to recommend that that auditing firm 
should be banned. But I think that if the club licensing and the regulation come into place then the FA would be able to visit the clubs and 
they would demand all these because the club is supposed to hold annual congress to approve of an auditor --- and all these requirements 
must be submitted to the FA. And the FA would go round inspecting. When we do that continuous for about two three years in fact the 
system would stabilise and you would be sure that this auditor is credible, this one is reliable or [not]. 
I: Would you suggest a specific committee of the FA to deal with this particular issue of reviewing the financial capability and issues 
relating to it? 
R: Certainly, it is a professional thing --- like me sitting here as an engineer I cannot go this committee and we need professionals to 
advice. It is not that they are sitting in place just for nothing, they would do the work and make suggestions but once in a while they must 
visit the clubs to provide professional --- give them some professional input, and directions and other things so that we will be able to 
streamline things and --- It is necessary that they put together some professionals, experts … 
THE FFC FUNCTION MODEL WAS THEN PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT.  
The respondent listened attentively as the presentation was done and nodded and provided short comments  frequently to show a 
general understanding and approval of the principles underlying the model. This was sometimes accompanied by laughter. When the 
presentation was done the first comment made by the respondent was “I think it is okay and it sums up to what we have just discussed” 
in reference to the discussions preceding the presentation.  
THE LICENSING DIAGRAM WAS THEN EXPLAINED TO THE RESPONDENT. 
So that they would just vet and make their report to the licensing committee--- 
MONITORING FRAMEWORK IS THEN PRESENTED TO THE RESPONDENT 
On sanctions: You can apply sporting sanctions --- they can lose points --- it would put fear in them to comply--- 
On incentives: That would even secure your existence 
END OF PRESENTATION 
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 5) 
I: What are your general impressions about the model, and whether you think it is applicable to our circumstances? 
R: Luckily we had discussed it separately before even coming to this --- and the inputs that we discussed are captured completely here and 
I think it’s okay. It’s okay.  
I: So in terms of regulating access, you think the player transfer system would work? 
R: Yes--- It would work. Me I have said that it is because there is no system to check those things that is why clubs owe a lot and even 
players are not being paid because it is not in our regulations for the association to interfere in terms of business transactions as regards 
transfer of players. If there is some regulation that would streamline that thing --- I think it is --- so it is ok. 
I: And in terms of providing guarantee for short term credit---  
R: Yeah --- Because you want to have an insight as to what is going on you must also find the means to support the clubs. So if you are 
supporting, then certainly you have the access and the rights and you cannot be thrown out, because you have given that financial support 
and it is incumbent on you to be able to supervise it. And supervising, you want to make sure the right thing is done.  
I: And you think this would provide enough incentives for clubs to do the right thing? 
R: Yes, if somebody is guaranteeing for you to go and take money from somewhere and that same person is saying that when you take the 
money I want to make sure that you use the money for the right thing. It is like you go to the bank and take money for a project. Banks 
have project managers who visit the project sites to make sure that the monies are used for the projects --- so I think it is in order. 
I: And what about the government funding--- in terms of---? 
R: Me for the government funding I am always for it because I think that even though --- individuals are investing from their own pockets 
and other things, the government benefits a lot --- and because in terms of exposure.. if Ghana had not gone to the world cup in 2006 
Ghana was not known even though previously they were talking about it… the World Cup raised the profile of Ghana --- and if the people 
in the tourist industry would be truthful they would see that tourism increased after the World Cup and especially also after the 2010 
World Cup in South Africa when we went to the quarter finals. So it is very beneficial to the government. 
I: You are thinking of an annual football grant --- rather than the revolving fund 
R: Yes --- an annual grant --- the revolving fund sometimes clubs may have difficulties in paying back the money and that is why the first 
one failed because some two clubs refused to pay. So if the government accepts that every year am going to budget two million --- one 
million dollars to the Ghana football association for infrastructural development --- for youth development --- it knows that it is statutory 
and it is always in the budget and no person will go and sit there and say that there is no money because putting up a budget you know 
where you are going to get that money from.  
I: and you believe that these would provide incentives for the clubs to ensure that their accounts are audited properly? 
R: Yes --- because if the government is giving you grant every year you would want to make sure that you do the right thing. So the 
government in collaboration with the FA would set up this body so that the body would always make sure that you do the right thing.  
I: You would suggest that in terms of the composition of the FFC you want to see government/FA collaboration? 
R: Yes --- there must be a government representation because if the government is giving us grant there must be somebody there who 
would protect the interest of the government. So somebody from the government --- If it is a three member body, one person from the 
government and two from the FA that would be okay. 
I: In terms of training programs you think your club for instance would benefit from such a thing? 
R: Yes --- because in Dormaa Ahenkro we have a vast land for future development and we are thinking of putting up an academy and all 
those things. So this training program would be very beneficial and I think it is good. 
I: How frequently would you want the FFC to monitor the clubs?  
R: Depending on the personnel and the availability of time, because they are not going to work there permanently. So maybe twice in a 
year --- maybe at the beginning of the season ---then half way through. So that when we go to congress at the end of the season they can 
make reports to Congress. 
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APPENDIX 15: SAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (Pt. 6) 
I: And probably tell the clubs where we felt short and where we need to improve… 
R: Yes , yes.. and especially if they go round and if they think there must be a follow-up because a club has some short comings 
somewhere, then at their own free time --- but twice in a year would be adequate.  
I: I want to thank you very much --- you benefitted from this discussion…? 
R: I benefitted a lot --- (laughter) 
THE INTERVIEWER THEN EXPLAINED TO THE RESPONDENT THE PROCESS OF TRANSCRIBING AND SENDING IT BACK TO HIM FOR 
VALIDATION  
R: You know we need to develop --- that’s why I say that England --- twenty years ago their league --- nobody was thinking about their 
league --- Maybe they took their time to make sure they do the right thing. But the problem with |Ghana is that we don’t want to take 
things gradually. We want always to compare ourselves and jump. If this thing is put in place it cannot take immediate effect. But 
gradually, gradually, within about five years you see that --- like they say Ghana is ranked third --- our league… this a our regulation we put 
in place when the FIFA thing came ---2006 --- this is 2012  ---six years --- at least it has shown some --- and the level of the competition of 
the game has also gone up. We need to always take our time, have patience and go through it --- 
I: And do things that are applicable to our situation --- 
R: Within our environment --- because you must give a dose that people can swallow --- even though it will be bitter they will swallow it 
gradually. 
I: Thank you very much 
R: Am also pleased! 
 
 
